


MiGRATION

in the SERVICE of AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

Essays in honour of Professor Aderanti Adepaju



Edited by

John O.Oucho

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Migration in the Service of African Development

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Essays in honour of
Professor Aderanti Adepaju

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John O. Oucho

NOMRA



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From an apparently bright future during the era of independence into the early 1970s, through...deteriorating economic and political conditions...to the perception in the 1990s of a dismal future, many Africans now see migration as their last hope for improving their living standards.

– *Aderanti Adepoju 2006*

There are daunting challenges with respect to all forms of migratory flows, but especially regarding irregular migration, human trafficking, and the emigration of skilled professionals. The situation calls for the development of a co-ordinated implementation of policies and programmes and a comprehensive framework to address issues of migration.

– *Aderanti Adepoju 2009*

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALADAA	Asociación Latinoamericana de Estudios de Asia y Africa en Argentina
ASALs	arid and semi-arid lands
AU	African Union
CARIM	(Euro-Mediterranean) Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration
CEAO	Communaute Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (formerly West Africa Economic Community)
CEPGL	Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries – ECGLC)
CERMEDH	Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Migration et les Droits Humains (Study and Research Centre on Migration and Human Rights)
CeSPI	Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (Italy)
CICRED	Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COMAR	Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECA	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States ¹
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	(United Nations) <i>Food and Agriculture Organisation</i>
FRONTEX	‘Frontières Extérieures’ – the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GBV	gender-based violence
GDP	gross domestic product
HDR	Human Development Report
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council (South Africa)
HRDC	Human Resources Development Centre (Nigeria)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IASFM	International Association for the Study of Forced Migration
ICT	information and communication technologies
IDEP	(United Nations) African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
IDP	internally displaced person
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDRC	International Development Research Centre (Canada)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund

1. The ECOWAS countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

INED	L'Institut national d'études démographiques
INM	Instituto Nacional de Migración de México
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITCZ	inter-tropical convergence zone
IUSSP	International Union for the Scientific Study of Population
LDCs	less/least developed countries
LSE	London School of Economics
MOST	(UNESCO) Management of Social Transformations
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NOMRA	Network of Migration Research on Africa
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ²
ORD	Organismes Regionaux de Développement (Burkina Faso)
RHV	la République de Haute Volta
RIPS	Regional Institute of Population Studies
SADC	Southern African Development Community ³
SAP	(IMF) Structural Adjustment Program
SAREC	Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries

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2. The OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
 3. The SADC countries are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

SIAMO	Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l’Acheminement de la Main d’Oeuvre
SID/NL	Society for International Development (Netherlands Chapter)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSA	sub-Saharan Africa
SOPEMI	Système d’Observation Permanente sur les Migrations ⁴
TOM	tertiary outbound mobility measure
UAPS	Union for African Population Studies
UDEAC	Union Douanière et Économique de l’Afrique Centrale ⁵
UK	United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGPID	United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
US/USA	United States of America

4. Continuous Migration Monitoring System.

5. Central African Economic and Customs Union

WAEMU	<i>West African Economic and Monetary Union</i>
WCRWC	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WFP	World Food Programme



Preface

The emergence of a reputable scholar in Africa can be seen as a rather unusual and precarious occurrence. Given the numerous temptations from plausibly success-bound careers, extremely poor remuneration in African institutions, and the habit of experimenting on new ways of survival, few African scholars stay the course and reach the peak of their work and into the sunset years of their lives. Indeed, a typical biography of an African scholar is riddled with all these problems and pitfalls which often make scholarship appear to be a worthless undertaking, and one where few opportunities exist. A scholar who changes vocations from being a university don to being an international diplomat and then to being an adviser of governments may be forgiven for abandoning his primary calling – to be a scholar – in the face of international limelight.

This book is a dedication, by a number of his colleagues, to Professor Aderanti Adepaju who has been in a variety of vocations without abandoning his standing as a notable migration scholar. The idea of producing it evolved from a plea that I made at the inaugural conference of the Network of Migration Research on Africa (NOMRA) in January 2009 for a book to be compiled in honour of Adepaju as a way of immortalising him and encouraging younger scholars to emulate his immense contribution to migration scholarship. The authors come from diverse disciplinary backgrounds – geography, demography, sociology and law – but share one thing in common: migration work; and so, the fourteen chapters of the book cover internal and international migration in Africa from a rich variety of perspectives.

The book will undoubtedly be useful for graduate students, researchers, planners and policymakers working directly on migration or in disciplines closely linked to it. It

will also be useful for general readers who wish to know about migration in general, and Aderanti Adepoju's commendable contribution in the field in particular. All the authors volunteered to work on the topics forming the chapters and all of them are notable for having done that without having to be unduly reminded of their part of the bargain. We appreciate their efforts in making this publication a reality.

For my part, I am particularly grateful to Biddy Greene for her careful and painstaking editing of all the chapters, to Dr Dupe Kuteyi of NOMRA for coordinating the whole process as well as for providing a bridge between the authors and the editor of the book, and, finally to the technical editor who was responsible for the appearance of the final manuscript.

John O. Oucho

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Introduction

John Ouchó

Demography is the science of analysing population in terms of three components of population dynamics, namely fertility, mortality and migration. It is a science because it tests theories or hypotheses using empirical evidence that is subjected to analytical rigour to generate plausible results. Unfortunately, much of scholarship in demography is not intended to contribute directly to development, which implies that there is, at least, partial lacuna between demography and development. Of the three components of population dynamics, the one most closely linked to development is migration.

Yet, migration scholars have been lonely folks in purely demographic work, either dismissed as involved in the 'stepchild of demography' or involved in a phenomenon so complex that it eludes demographic analysis, or both. None of the fathers of modern demography, among them, Ansley Coale, Bill Brass, Etienne van de Walle, Samuel Preston and others, ever drew attention to migration, considering it unimportant and lacking the data necessary for analysing and hence interpreting its occurrence, levels, trends and other perspectives.

Even when some of that first generation of influential demographers had passed on, their descendants perpetuated the trend and consigned migration to obscurity outside the core of demography. When Rupert Vance posed the question of whether demography had theories,⁶ demographers of the

6. See Vance, Rupert B. 1952. Is Theory for Demographers? *Social Forces* XXXI: 9–13.

time realised that the frameworks they had been adopting emanated from other social sciences (such as sociology, economics and geography), biological sciences and the sciences of measurement, namely mathematics and statistics. A person is born, moves from one place to another for particular reasons and eventually dies, which is the reason that population dynamics incorporates fertility, migration and mortality. Despite this, demographers trained in the developed world in the 1960s and 1970s blindly emulated their professors, confining themselves to fertility and mortality: two distinctive occurrences of human life – the beginning of life and the end of it – and both relatively easy to quantify.

About this book

This book is a dedication to Aderanti Adepoju, the African doyen and world-renowned scholar of migration in the context of development. Like him or hate him, Adepoju's name will go down in the annals of history for our descendants to appreciate what it meant to do research, train students and participate in diverse forms of dialogue on migration at a time when it was starved of resources and considered peripheral to demographic work. All the chapters in this book have been authored by Adepoju's long-time colleagues, friends and former students, all with different academic and social backgrounds, and all admirers of his work over the years.

The book can be divided into two broad components. First, it portrays migration as having been relegated to the sidelines of demography, and Adepoju's plunge into its study as a rare feat at a time when only fertility and mortality commanded respect – and funding – among the demographers of the day. Yet Adepoju was steadfast in the study of migration, winning over many enthusiasts and bequeathing to younger generations a field of study that has become the core of development agendas. Second, the book provides insightful

perspectives of both internal and international migration, two subjects on which Adepoju wrote avidly. The chapters on Uganda, Kenya, Botswana, Nigeria and Mali are devoted to aspects of internal migration, while those on African emigration to Mexico and migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire address various aspects of international migration.

Organisation of the book

In fourteen chapters, the book demonstrates what a dedicated scholar can do in sustained scholarship, charting a course for the cooperation of the academic community, planners, policymakers and development partners. If there is any component of population dynamics that blends well with development, it is migration, whose erstwhile marginalisation was perhaps a misreading of the role it plays in societal change.

The **first chapter** is authored by the editor of the book, *John Oucho*. In a moving account of Adepoju's work, the author gives a convincing argument on how Adepoju transformed migration from the periphery to the core of development agenda in Africa. It explains how Adepoju threw himself into migration scholarship in the early 1970s, at a time when migration was considered lowly component of demographic work. His steadfast focus on and commitment to migration work saw his influence shift migration training, research and dialogue from the narrow perspective of population dynamics to its rightful place as the core of development agenda – globally, and particularly in Africa.

Adepoju's work endeared him to colleagues from far and wide, as he traversed different continents, presenting his work, becoming part of networks and inspiring younger generations of Africans and Africanists to work on the many facets of migration. As mentioned in the chapter, this feat was the motivation for the author's strong urging of the participants at

the inaugural NOMRA conference in 2009 to write a book in Adepoju's honour, as a fitting tribute while the man yet lives among his colleagues.

The chapter demonstrates the longstanding marginalisation of migration, not only in university training and research, but also in the public service and the non-public sector. It traces the evolution of the migration-development nexus in which Adepoju undertook research in the 1970s through the 1980s, and his eventual focus on African migration, both within African sub-regions and outside Africa. In addition, the chapter provides milestones of Adepoju's contribution through demographic developmental international discourse, as well as through other lenses which place African countries along paths of origin and transit, and name them, also, as places of destination. It concludes with suggestions of what future generations could embrace to provide continuity with the work that Adepoju and his peers have been able to accomplish.

Chapter 2 describes echoes in the Netherlands of an African migration expert. It is written by *Joris Schapendonk* and *Annelies Zoomers* who have worked with Adepoju in insightful academic initiatives and who see him as the natural link between Africa and the Netherlands. The authors quote the 2009 *Human Development Report* which states that 'migration is not an undesirable phenomenon: what is needed is a concerted effort to channel the energy of migrants into productive activities', and point out that this notion actually originates from an early publication of Adepoju's⁷. This precocious statement reflects the sureness of Adepoju's intuition early on in his scholarship. The authors articulate Adepoju's interrogation of Eurocentric viewpoints on African

7. Page 223 in Adepoju, Aderanti. 1977. Migration and Development in Tropical Africa: some research priorities. *African Affairs* 76: 210-225.

migration over the past decades by publishing his work as journals, articles, book chapters and policy related papers in publications steeped in European agendas. They argue that Adepoju's main point of departure has been that mobility represents a profound and normal element of African social life, and that migration, in general, is not an undesirable phenomenon but an inherent component of development processes. The chapter underlines the friction between pro- and contra-mobility perspectives regarding sub-Saharan African migration, using the 'echoes of Adepoju's academic voice' to reflect on contemporary European (and particularly Dutch) migration-related policy initiatives. The focus in this chapter is on the friction between Adepoju's perspective – generally valuing mobility as an opportunity for households to sustain a certain quality of life – and the determination of most European policymakers to control and restrict incoming mobility from the southern regions of the globe. In this framework, the authors raise some important questions to stimulate the dialogue between the South and the North on migration-development inter-linkages.

Migration between neighbouring African states illustrates the meaninglessness of the (now porous) borders that the former European metropolitan powers imposed on various 'ethnic groups' slotted into arbitrary territorial entities. In **Chapter 3**, *Victor Piché* and three colleagues tackle this subject, using the cases of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. They underline the point that Burkina Faso is the only African country to have carried out two migration surveys (in 1974–1975 and in 2000) which are representative at the national level. These two retrospective and comparable surveys permit an analysis of migration histories as well as a synchronisation of changes in the patterns and characteristics of migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, linking the changes to corresponding migration policies at both national and

regional levels. The chapter distinguishes three major historical periods, each with its migration and policy specificities: the colonial period (1900–1960); a second period covering the years around independence (1960–1975); and a third period covering the last quarter of the twentieth century. It underscores the inter-dependence between these two neighbouring states, a phenomenon which partly explains the current political problems of Côte d’Ivoire.

African emigration to Latin America has been a neglected feature of international migration – the major trans-Atlantic slave traffic of past centuries notwithstanding. In **Chapter 4**, *Maguemati Wabgou* describes the current migration streams to Mexico as important evidence of South-South migration. His work portrays the increasing presence of African immigrants in Latin-American countries as being a result of tighter immigration controls in European countries of destination. He shows that Mexico is becoming a destination of choice for immigrants from African countries in different sub-regions: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and Côte d’Ivoire. The chapter analyses the conditions of new African migrants in Mexico, including their methods of arrival and their establishment, and provides information on the immigrants’ African countries of origin; the means by which they arrive in Mexico; and their economic activities once they settle. Guided by a theoretical framework for analysing African migrations in Mexico, the author provides a comprehensive analysis of actual African migrations in Mexico.

One of the persistent features of African emigration has been student mobility to the Western hemisphere. In **Chapter 5** student mobility by countries of origin and destination is analysed by *Mary Kritz*. She notes that enrolled college students in sub-Saharan Africa are three times more likely than students in other regions to be studying outside their

homelands, and their numbers have risen rapidly in recent years. She also points out that relatively little is known about how African countries differ in their rates of outbound student mobility; or the places to which Africans go for their tertiary studies; or about what the implications of outbound student mobility has for economic and social development in the region. She argues that Africa's demographic growth and its advances in education are now stimulating increased tertiary demand, and will continue to do so for decades to come. She draws attention to the World Bank's observation⁸ that, to compete in the global economy, Africa needs to increase its stock of skilled workers: to achieve the Millennium Development Goals; to increase employment for its growing population; and to increase its competitiveness in the global economy. Kritz also draws attention to faculty deficiencies in Ghana and Nigeria that have been exacerbated by outflows of university professors to other parts of Africa, Europe, North Africa, and the Gulf states, and the failure of PhD-holders trained abroad to return home.

The chapter examines how African countries differ in their numbers and rates of outbound student mobility and considers some of the reasons why those differences might occur; where the students go to; and some initiatives at country and regional levels that could change Africa's rates of international student mobility in the future. The chapter draws attention to Adepoju's 2007 paper⁹ which notes that although specialists in engineering, medicine, healthcare and new technologies are a small proportion of the emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, they cost the region in a variety of ways and

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8. World Bank. 2009a. *Accelerating Catch-up: tertiary education for growth in sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington DC: World Bank.
 9. Adepoju, A. 2007. *Highly Skilled Migration: balancing interests and responsibilities and tackling brain drain*. Brussels: Global Forum on Migration and Development.

far beyond their numbers – not least because of the lost opportunity for the training of replacement cohorts.

In **Chapter 6**, *Eugene Campbell*'s analysis of international and human rights in sub-Saharan Africa addresses a topic which has been little researched in the region. It critically examines the role of human rights violations in motivating the emigration of skilled and unskilled Africans; how 'human rights' pertain to the economic and social benefits that human beings are entitled to – including, education, health, employment, justice and freedom of speech, and so on. Campbell notes that the issue of people's basic rights is central among the factors that influence brain drain, brain circulation, the new diaspora, transnationalism and international remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. Campbell identifies a number of circumstances in which migrants' human rights are violated: internal conflict within migrant groups which occasionally fuels discriminatory attitudes and hostile behaviours of nationals towards immigrants; criminal acts, including human trafficking, violence against immigrants and racial discrimination; and taking unfair economic advantage of irregular migrants. His observation that excessive and persistent acts of discrimination against migrants may have morbid physical and psychological effects on the victims, and may even be deemed to be torture, underlines the cruelty associated with violations of migrants' rights.

The extent to which national legislation could – but currently does not – improve migrant's rights can be explained by inadequacies in the branch of law dealing with this concern. Basing her work on the Moroccan experience, *Khadija Elmadmad* addresses this issue in **Chapter 7**. To this end, she acknowledges Adepoju's contribution to the development of action, training and research in various fields and notably in migration studies, which makes him undisputed as 'Africa's doyen of migration scholarship'. The subject of legal studies

on migration involves two branches of migration law: law regulating population movements, and law protecting migrants. The first branch includes all laws and regulations relating to entry and sojourn in a given country, and to emigration, as well as the sanctioning of any unauthorised immigration, sojourn or emigration. The second branch deals mainly with migrants' rights. These laws are governed by international legal instruments, such as conventions, treaties, declarations and recommendations, which, once agreed upon, are expected to be ratified and subsequently domesticated. Mention is made of institutions in both the developed and the developing world which have introduced legal studies on migration.

Rarely do migration scholars draw particular attention to female migration. In **Chapter 8**, *Mohammed Iliya* and *Augustine Oppon-Kumi* address this subject with respect to Sokoto Metropolis in Nigeria. The chapter analyses a recent intra-regional migratory process involving female migrants that occurred due to the development-induced displacement of females from the Upper Ouémé catchment area in Benin to the Sokoto metropolis in north-western Nigeria. Among the drivers of this migration process was increased poverty among rural women in the place of origin where, as Adepoju once observed¹⁰, the traditionally male-dominated migration pattern has been becoming increasingly feminised. This 'autonomous female migration' involves a case study of Beninose migrants in the Sokoto metropolis. The analysis made indicates that development-induced autonomous female migration from central Benin to the Sokoto metropolis is bound to continue as the price of cotton on the global market continues to fall.

10. Adepoju, A. 2004. *Changing Configurations of Migration in Africa*. Migration Information Source.

The use of census data has provided useful knowledge of lifetime internal migration in African countries, helping to depict migration patterns and processes. Such knowledge informs national policy on migration and especially migration-development interrelations. In **Chapter 9**, *Thando Gwebu* analyses internal migration in Botswana, which formulated population relocation policies for managing and regulating the spatial population distribution. Gwebu uses evidence from the 2001 Population and Housing Census to identify the main causes and spatial patterns of life-time internal migration in Botswana and to assess the extent to which the migration-responsive policies in place have succeeded or not. It should be noted, however, that the causes of the migrations were not available in the census data and were merely ‘presumed’ – and should thus be treated with caution. An important feature of this chapter is the distinction between the terms ‘migration’ and ‘mobility’ which the author defines and interprets in the Botswana context.

The chapter is organised into four main sections: the theoretical and conceptual context; the socio-demographic profile of the migrants; a discussion of the migrants’ areas of origin and destination; and an analysis of internal migration. These are followed by a conclusion and recommendations.

In East Africa, Uganda is a country which has experienced considerable internal migration since the 1950s. In **Chapter 10**, *James Ntozi* and two colleagues trace this phenomenon, noting, among other things, that the main difficulty in measuring migration is that it is a continual, often-repeated process rather than a single event. Despite that shortcoming, the authors acknowledge migration as constituting an important research area which deserves consideration both in its own right and to assert its importance alongside fertility and mortality as a component of population dynamics, especially in Africa. In keeping with the measurement of migration in Uganda, the

authors take the administrative district as the migration-defining area, which permits an analysis of migration streams, patterns and rates. The author's analysis of these issues leads to a consideration of the effects of migration, and, finally, attracts certain policy recommendations.

In another East African study, *Elias Ayiamba*, in **Chapter 11**, examines problems and opportunities for policy action based on lessons learned from Kenya's 2007 post-election violence. His work focuses on refugee camps in Kenya, although these were intended to be strictly for refugees rather than for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) which this violence produced. The chapter examines historical factors of colonial administration which probably rank among the major root causes of ethnic conflicts in Kenya¹¹ and the concomitant consequences of population displacement in the country. In addition, the chapter highlights environmental hazards and poor governance as other causes of forced migration in Kenya. It analyses the livelihoods of encamped displaced persons and their coping strategies (among them family identity, social networks, self-help structures, environmental degradation, prostitution and manipulations through international aid); and, finally, examines post-conflict rehabilitation initiatives by IDPs themselves as well as similarly-intended initiatives by the Government of Kenya and other local and international agencies. The chapter concludes by discussing socio-economic opportunities and challenges of displacement, especially for women.

The contemporary world is, at last, waking up to the realities of climate change, to which migration is closely linked. In **Chapter 12**, *Sally Findley* and *Seydou Doumbia* analyse the cycles of climate vulnerability and migration in the Sahel,

11. Oucho, J.O. 2002. *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya*. Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill.

based on a case study of Niono District in Mali. Arguing that climate variability results in economic vulnerability in the Sahel, the authors place their analysis within Adepoju's early (1977) argument that:

The preoccupation with the question of motivation (why people migrate) tends to obscure the other side of the picture – and indeed a large part – which deals with the question of non-mobility, that is, why most people do *not* migrate from the rural environment.¹²

The authors note that in the studied area non-migrants often predominate numerically over migrants. Those who migrate tend to be young, better educated, and seeking non-agricultural work – which they are less likely to find in the rural environment. There is also a group of 'marginal migrants' who are not fully committed to moving and are less likely to move because they are connected to or based in their home environment. Recently, researchers have begun differentiating between 'stayers', returnees and those circulating between two lives, namely 'away' and 'home'.¹³ The case study is instructive as its methodology is appropriate for interpreting migration-climate vulnerability anywhere in Africa's arid lands.

Theophilus Fadayomi, a long-time associate of Adepoju, underscores in **Chapter 13** the way in which Adepoju has bequeathed migration work to younger generations – indeed there could be no greater legacy than this. In this tribute, Fadayomi traces Adepoju's extensive works – from the 1970s to the present day – on internal and international migration and development in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular. He

12. Page 217 in Adepoju, A. 1977. Migration, economic opportunities and occupational mobility: a case study in Western Nigeria. *Quarterly Journal of Administration* 11: 167–183.

13. Findley, S.E. & S. Sow. 1998. From Season to Season: agriculture, poverty and migration in the Senegal River Valley, Mali. In R. Appleyard (ed.), *Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries: Volume I: Sub-Saharan Africa*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. The chapter gives further references.

analyses the scholar's role in institutional development and capacity-building for the expansion of migration studies and the advancement of migration management in Africa.

The author relates Adepoju's work to various theories and models of internal migration, among them Arthur Lewis's pioneering 1954 theory of migration in a dual economy¹⁴ and the Harris and Todaro 1970 rural-urban migration model¹⁵, formulated in the context of rising urban unemployment and rural stagnation. On international migration, the author reviews Adepoju's works, which came into prominence from the 1980s, and further demonstrates Adepoju's deep concerns about the field of migration studies and its development impact on international relations between Africa and Europe.

The final substantive chapter of this book (**Chapter 14**) is a tribute to Adepoju by two Nigerian authors who fall in the category of the younger generation. In this chapter, *Akanni Akinyemi* and *Modupeola Kuteyi* give account of Adepoju's work as a groundbreaking research on both internal and international migration in Nigeria in the context of changing dynamics and relevance to development. The authors remind readers of one of Adepoju's migration colleagues, Mansell Prothero, as regards the centrality of migration in development. Prothero (1968) described migration as the 'Cinderella' of population studies, which attracted very little interest from stakeholders, with internal migration being the least investigated in demographic enquiries in Nigeria and because migration data were therefore very scanty and its analysis was less complete than for other demographic data. Yet, these shortcomings did not deter Adepoju as he made debut shortly later in migration work. The authors contend that Adepoju's

14. Lewis, W. Arthur. 1954. Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. *Manchester School* 22 (2) 139-191.

15. Harris, John R. & Michael Todaro, 1970. Migration, Unemployment and Development: a two-sector analysis. *American Economic Review* 60.

study of the rural and urban Nigerian milieu not only provided immense insight into the state of migration affairs, but also advocated a way forward, particularly regarding impending migration-related matters that were likely to be of serious concern in the not too distant future. At the debut of his migration work in Nigeria, Adepoju (1974b) noted that despite the government's keenness in the subject, researcher's interests and efforts were not matched by the requisite well-organised action-oriented research. Against the background of Adepoju's achievements, the young authors look forward to more insightful research in the future.

There is one further chapter, **Chapter 15**, which supplies an extensive list of many of Aderanti Adepoju's publications: books and monographs – authored, edited and co-edited – as well as chapters in other books, and journal and conference papers.

The authors' contributions in this book are a testimony to the work that Aderanti Adepoju has accomplished in his nearly four decades of a stellar career in migration scholarship, mentorship and networking with others. By doing this, the authors have laid a strong foundation for immortalising this doyen of African migration studies – a world-renowned scholar with a strong wand of influence in diverse circles. Readers of this book will find it not only a fitting tribute to Adepoju but also a demonstration of how difficult it still is for an African scholar to make it to the top echelons of scholarship.

CHAPTER 1

Transforming Migration from the Stepchild of Demography to the Core of African Development Agenda: The Legacy of Aderanti Adepoju

John O. Oucho

Aderanti Adepoju plunged into migration scholarship in the early 1970s – a time when migration was considered a mere stepchild of demography. His steadfast focus on and commitment to migration work saw his influence shift training, research and dialogue on migration from the narrow perspective of population dynamics to become the core of development agenda – globally, and particularly in Africa. Since 1974, Adepoju and the author of this chapter have traversed different continents, presenting their work, widening their networks and inspiring younger generations of Africans and Africanists to work on the many facets of migration. This was the motivation for the author’s strong urging of the participants at the inaugural NOMRA conference in 2009 to write a book in Adepoju’s honour, as a fitting tribute while the man yet lives among his colleagues.

This chapter attempts to discuss how, why and with that results Aderanti Adepoju has remained a steadfast and committed migration scholar when his peers were veering to fertility and mortality – subjects which demographers preferred, and which at that time attracted stable funding from a variety of sources.

This chapter also aims to demonstrate the previous marginalisation of migration, not only in university training and research, but also in the public service and the non-public sector. It traces the evolution of the migration-development nexus in which Adepoju undertook research in the 1970s through the 1980s, and his eventual focus on African migration, both within African sub-regions and outside Africa.

In addition, the chapter records details of Adepoju's contribution through demographic, developmental concerns, international discourse, as well as through other lenses which place African countries along paths of origin and transit, and name them also as places of destination. It concludes with a brief summary of the work that Adepoju and his peers have been able to accomplish.

Part I Introduction and background

Both seasoned and upcoming demographers have been quick to point out that among the three main components of demographic discourse – fertility, mortality and migration – the last remains the stepchild. Yet in development circles, migration is often depicted as the best companion of development – the one with which it most easily relates. The former stance is taken by demographers who have agonised that their discipline is short in theorising; demographers have been quick to dismiss migration as peripheral in the discipline of demography. Dudley Kirk's review of the demographic perspective of migration in South-east Asia represents this school of thought:

Migration is the stepchild of demography. Fertility and mortality are much more appealing to a generation of scholars enamoured of quantitative models. As far as we are empirically aware, births and deaths are unique events, usually clearly definable and hence superb dependent variables for statistical manipulation. In contrast, migration is much more slippery – it may occur more than once or indeed not at all. (Kirk in Pryor 1979: 212)

Yet earlier in a presidential address to the Population Association of America meeting of 1960, Kirk recognised the effect of migration in the United States even without using the term:

...the depopulation of the countryside is exceeding even the tempo forecast by Spengler. The 1960 census will show that much of the physical area of the United States is losing population, in some cases at truly shocking rates, paralleling and extending the experience in 1940–1950...the decline in the rural farm population of Oklahoma...Over half of this population deserted their farms in the single decade 1940–1950. The next decade may well prove the hypothesis that the American family farmer is a vanishing American, and that the type of rural life he represents, often described as the backbone of Jeffersonian democracy, has become only a matter of history. (Kirk 1960: 307)

This underscores how rural-urban migration depleted rural populations and spurred urbanisation. It reflects the coded expressions of demographers of the day and their pretences that migration did not matter in demographic work. Moreover, in the same address, Kirk foresaw and acknowledged the way in which computer applications would contribute to the demographic analysis of migration,

with its complex variables of origin, destination, distance, and time.

Clearly, qualitative and highly subjective glorification of fertility and mortality data at the expense of migration is inappropriate. That early period saw migration subjected to direct measurement and failed to envisage the possibility of indirect measurement of the phenomenon, let alone multi-regional demography in which the three phenomena were later factored into the work at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Austria. Rogers (1976), adopting the term 'demometrics', contended that demographers had in the past accorded migration a status subservient to fertility and mortality, neglecting the spatial dimension of population growth. Citing pertinent literature references (Greenwood 1975; Price & Sikes 1975; Shaw 1975), he added that scholarly work on migration had only recently begun to flourish. Yet, as Shaw (1975) retorted, sociologists often identify with *who* it is that migrates, geographers with the *direction* of migration streams and where migration originates and terminates, and economists with *determinants and consequences* of migration – and all these do not permit of moulding into the general field and theory of international migration. Unlike demography which lacks convincing theoretical constructs, relying instead on theories from other social sciences, international migration can in fact be explained by theories pertaining to the initiation and perpetuation of migration.¹⁶

In another presidential address at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, a decade and a half after Kirk had made the dramatic exposé of rural depopulation, Goldstein saw no change in the treatment of migration, reasoning that:

16. International theories on the causes of migration distinguish those initiating migration from those perpetuating it. See Massey et al. (1993).

...the improvement in the quantity and quality of our information on population movement has not kept pace with the increasing significance of the movement itself as a component of demographic change...Redistribution has suffered far too long from neglect within the profession...It behoves us to rectify this situation in this last quarter of the twentieth century, when redistribution in all its facets will undoubtedly constitute a major and increasingly important component of demographic change. (Goldstein 1976: 19-21, quoted in Rogers et al., 1982)

This situation still pertains among most demographers, even as migration occupies the centre stage of development dialogue at all levels, from national to global.

On entering the scene of the study of population, Adepaju had to decide whether to join the bandwagon of the dominant school of thought or to chart his preferred course and probably risk isolation. He chose the latter in his migration research, his teaching and his publications, as well as in international civil service and consultations wherever he worked; moreover, he furthered that decision at conferences, in policy dialogue and indeed in all other demographic and non-demographic vocations. As an economist-demographer, he embraced any and every opportunity to relate migration to development at national, regional and global levels.

No longer marginalised in demography – migration comes of age

Morgan and Lynch's 2001 analysis of the success and future of demography acknowledges that 'the history of demography is consistent with the Kuhnian observation that science is not only influenced by intrinsic factors associated with its own developments but it is also buffeted by extrinsic factors – social

context, politics, and research support' (Morgan & Lynch 2001: 36).

For demographers to claim that demography is a science and neglect analysing demographic phenomena in the context of extrinsic factors is a gross shortcoming and a myopic analysis of population issues affecting and being influenced by non-demographic factors. It calls into question the reason why population scientists, broadly defined, limit their work exclusively to fertility and mortality, citing unrealistic and unproven difficulties surrounding any analysis of migration.

Some population scientists have persuaded demographers to embrace 'spatial demography'. One such demographer argues that:

Although place, density, and movement have always had a part in population studies, they have not often held center stage. Demographers' prime coordinates are the two time-like coordinates of time and age. The three space-like coordinates of physical location and the many-dimensional coordinates of social location have tended to play supporting roles. Today, this situation is changing, and a host of scientific questions that intermingle geography with demography and with the whole range of the social sciences are coming to the fore. (Wachter 2005: 15299)

The author continues:

'Migration' is the usual label for the spatial subfield of demography, and movement is its preoccupation. But values of place are often associated not with movement but with roots. (Wachter 2005: 15299)

In a critique of those who held the view of migration as being a stepchild of demography, the geographer Skeldon heads a 2005 article with these words:

Migration may no longer be the stepchild of demography but it remains the most complex and intractable of the population variables from both an analytic and a policy point of view. (Skeldon 2005: 5)

And begins the article itself by saying:

We have come a long way since 1960 when the American sociologist, the late Dudley Kirk, called migration the 'stepchild of demography'. In the intervening 45 years, that stepchild has become richly endowed indeed with, particularly since the late 1980s, a torrential outpouring of articles, books and research on the topic. (Skeldon 2005: 5)

It took the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), the world's premier population association, several years to set up even a semblance of a scientific committee on migration. It was not until 1984 that a working group on the social and economic aspects of migration, rather than merely a committee, was established, and Adepoju was nominated a member of this group of experts. That honour was attributed to the contribution that he had made in migration work for exactly a decade since graduating from university.

Skeldon, like Adepoju, is heavily involved in the analysis of migration in the context of development. The one has produced a wealth of literature on South-east Asia, the other on sub-Saharan Africa.

From the narrow field of demography to triumph in migration work

Some demographers have underlined the impact of rural-urban migration on fertility and birth rates, on the sex- and

age-structure in places of origin and destination, and on fertility indirectly as an indicator of social, economic and associated changes. Migration implies a readiness for change: an attitude that also creates fertility reduction, along with other changes, such as occupational changes that may be associated with fertility decline. It has been acknowledged that migration itself reduces the frequency of sexual intercourse through spousal separation. On the other hand, Bongaarts et al. (1984) argue that rural-urban migration reduces the duration and intensity of breastfeeding, which in turn reduces the length of post-partum amenorrhea, thus enhancing migrants' fertility.

Part II Aderanti Adepoju and his work

Dedicated research, teaching and publication – a doyen of migration studies

Aderanti Adepoju is a Nigerian national whose profile consists of a litany of successes in migration research, teaching and publication. His thirty-eight years of professional experience – thirty-one years as professor and researcher, and more than twenty years of professional experience as an international expert in migration issues – speak volumes for his career as a migration expert of no equal.

A summary of Adepoju's training and career as economist-demographer describes it all. He obtained a BSc degree in Economics at the then University of Ife, Nigeria in 1969, followed by MSc in 1970 and PhD in Demography in 1973 at the esteemed London School of Economics (LSE) in the United Kingdom. As a university don, he had a fast track career, becoming Professor and Head of the Department of Demography and Social Statistics at the University of Ife in 1980, a Research Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at the University of Lagos (appointed in 1982, and taking up the post in 1984) and Dean of this faculty in

1988. Since 1997 he has been the Coordinator of NOMRA – the Network of Migration Research on Africa, based in Lagos.

Adepoju has had a long and distinguished career in the field of international development. He was a pioneer Regional Adviser for Africa on Population and Labour Policy for the International Labour Organisation (ILO), based in Addis Ababa in the mid-1970s; a UN Chief Technical Adviser to the Swaziland Government/University of Swaziland in the mid-1980s; and in the decade 1988–1998 was United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Training Coordinator for Population, Human Resources and Development in Africa, based in Dakar, Senegal.¹⁷ This illustrious career as an international civil servant culminated in his singular effort to establish the Human Resources Development Centre in Lagos where he is currently the Chief Executive. On account of his impeccable contribution to knowledge and service wherever required, Adepoju became a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration in 2008.

In an effort to bring together migration experts as well as enthusiasts, and to mentor younger local aspirants, he revamped and reinvigorated the ailing NOMRA¹⁸ network. Since its founding in 1999, NOMRA has stimulated migration work in Africa in the form of a collaborative organisation of researchers and scholars working on migration – especially international migration in the region – organising conferences and training workshops, and producing a number of publications. Adepoju has been Coordinator of NOMRA since its inception, and remains Coordinator to this day.

17. In 1988, both UNFPA and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) prevailed upon Adepoju to develop a human resources training curriculum, to be housed at IDEP which the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), later to be the African Union (AU), had established in Dakar, Senegal.

18. See <http://www.nomra.org/>

While working full-time or serving as consultant to development partners, Adepoju has, over a number of years, assisted many African countries – among them Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia – to build capacity as well as to develop and implement population and development programmes. By residing in some of these countries, he built strong and sustained professional and social contacts with their citizens and with like-minded people who served in these countries.

Against this rich background, Adepoju's knowledge and expertise as an economist-demographer and development specialist has been used by many international development organisations on which he has served as a consultant or team leader for missions and research activities. These include the African Development Bank, the OAU/AU¹⁹, the ECA, the World Bank, the ILO, IDEP, the UNDP, the FAO, the IOM, UNESCO, the UNHCR, SID/NL, the governments of Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and others in the South-South partnership. He was research team leader for a variety of research activities on Africa's development issues sponsored, among others, by the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, UNFPA, the Smithsonian Institution, SAREC, CIDA, SIDA, the ILO, DANIDA, the IOM, the UK, UNESCO, and the Wellcome Trust. In addition he has had experience consulting for the EU, ECOWAS, CeSPI, and the OECD, and working with the UN and UNFPA.

Adepoju rendered remarkable service in both academic and policy arenas. A sample of these indicates his service as a member of the Nigerian Institute of Management, the International Advisory Committee of UNFPA, the USA

19. The meanings of these (and other) abbreviations and acronyms are given in the list near the beginning of this book.

National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Population, the Panel on the Demography of Sub-Saharan Africa, UNHCR's External Research Advisory Committee, the Editorial Board of *International Migration* and *International Migration Review*; and as President of the Union for African Population Studies (UAPS). He was also the Scientific Coordinator of the UNESCO/MOST Network of Migration Research in Africa and leader of the IOM (International Organisation for Migration)/UNFPA Research Team on Emigration Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa. He served on the Strategy and Drafting Group of the Hague Declaration on the Future of Refugee and Migration Policy, the IUSSP Committee on Economic and Social Aspects of International Migration, the IOM's inter-regional conferences on migration, and on the International Scientific Committee for the Africa Region session of the 2004 World Congress on Human Movements and Immigration in Barcelona, of which he was also an organiser.

Scientific associations of which Adepoju is a member include the International Sociological Association, the Society for International Development, the Population Association of Nigeria, the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and the Union for African Population Studies (UAPS) – indeed, as already mentioned, he served as president of UAPS for five years. Adepoju's membership of such influential associations implies an invaluable contribution to the field.

In addition to all this, Adepoju has organised, participated in and chaired scientific meetings on migration and population issues in Africa, as well as serving as a key resource person to African delegations in both international and regional conferences. Details of these are given below.

Researching migration

Adepoju's foray into field research on migration early in his career owed much to the lack of data in Nigeria on population

dynamics, and migration in particular, and the encouragement – almost a policy – by his supervisors to undertake a well-designed piece of field work including questionnaire design, sample selection, a description of the conduct of the survey, data collection, data analysis and, finally, interpretation. Difficult at that time for him, it later paid off enormously.

The field survey of Internal Migration in Southwest Nigeria 1971–72, sponsored by the Population Council, New York, was the basis for Adepoju's doctoral dissertation. And more was to follow. On his return to Nigeria at the end of 1973, and burning with enthusiasm for collecting current data on migration in medium-sized cities, he secured a research grant in 1974–1975 for a thesis entitled 'Policy Implications of Migration into Medium-sized Towns, Nigeria' from the Rockefeller-Ford Foundations Population Policy Research in the Social Sciences, Humanities and Law. The objective was to complement existing studies of major cities such as the Lagos metropolis with the dynamics of migration from, into and within medium-sized towns.

At that time, the debate on the interrelations between migration and fertility dynamics encouraged Adepoju and his colleague Dr Ita I. Ekanem to apply for grants from the Population Dynamics Programme of the University of North Carolina and from the University of Ghana to undertake a demographic survey of Warri (a petroleum oil town) during 1974–75. These grants were secured, and the work was closely followed by his 'Economic-Demographic Survey of Selected Towns in Nigeria', sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution in 1975–76.

Adepoju undertook his first major 'desk' research using secondary data in Geneva in June–October 1976. The subject was 'Population, Manpower and Employment in English-speaking West African Countries', his research sponsored by the International Institute for Labour Studies.

On his return from Europe, and having conducted a series of surveys in medium-sized Nigerian towns, Adepoju's attention shifted to rural-rural migration as a neglected area of study. His large-scale study of twelve rural localities in contrasting economic and ecological zones, entitled 'Rural Migration and Development in Nigeria', was jointly sponsored by UNFPA and the Ford Foundation in 1979–1980.

That was not all. During 1980–81, Adepoju conducted a survey, 'Migration and Housing in Medium-sized Towns, Nigeria', sponsored by Canada's International Development Research Centre, to explore the living conditions of migrants in these settings.

Before returning in the year 2000 to his passion of collecting primary data on migration, Adepoju undertook research on a number of issues, with results including 'The Population of Nigeria: An Inventory and Appraisal', sponsored by the Ford Foundation, Nigeria (1986–1989); 'Development, Gender and Fertility in Nigeria', sponsored by the ILO, Geneva (1985–1986); 'The Socio-Economic Impact of the Structural Adjustment on the Population of Africa' (1992–93); 'Gender, Work and Population Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa' (1986–90) and 'The African Family in the Development Process' (1995–97).

From 2000 to 2002, Adepoju undertook an ambitious national survey entitled 'The Feminisation of Poverty in Nigeria: autonomous female migration as a survival strategy in major cities and medium towns in the geopolitical zones in Nigeria', sponsored by the Wellcome Trust, UK.²⁰

20. The first national migration survey to be conducted by the National Population Commission was carried out in late 2010, and at the time of writing (mid-2011) its results had not yet been published.

Opening up the migration space through publications and training

For many years, the literature on Africa's migration dynamics was dominated by the perspectives of anthropologists who regarded migration as a means of satisfying 'target' wants, with concepts ranging from circulation of labour, circulatory migration, circular migration, labour migration, oscillatory migration, target migration and reciprocal migration pervading the literature. It is in this context that the series of Adepoju's publications and training activities laid a solid foundation for younger scholars to contribute more meaningfully to *African* perspectives on migration and development.

Publishing on migration

It seems almost impossible to arrive at the exact number of Adepoju's publications. The list of publications given in the final chapter of this book underlines his contribution to knowledge in a variety of constituencies. Even as this book was being prepared, the editor had to be selective in presenting the publications that best depicted his steadfastness as a migration scholar.

Adepoju has published numerous scientific articles, books and monographs on aspects of the African region's complex development agenda. The subjects covered include international migration and regional integration, human resources development, population policies and sustainable development, poverty, structural adjustment programmes, population ageing and gender. Arguably, his 72-page chapter, 'International Migration in Africa South of the Sahara' in *International Migration Today, Volume 1: Trends and Prospects* (1988) remains a seminal work and provides a point of reference for future research on migration, both intra- and inter-regional – and this in an area where very little was previously known

and where the interpretation of data was fraught with prejudices and stereotypes. Adepoju produced convincing evidence to discredit most of these, and more.

Mention of other selected books is appropriate at this stage. In the category 'publications on Nigeria' are books and monographs, as well as many book chapters and journal articles. Adepoju's publications speak volumes concerning his scholarly prowess. The subject matter of the books and monographs includes an analysis of population growth and its impact on the labour force, published by the Geneva-based International Institute for Labour Studies (1976); the problems and consequences of internal migration (1976); empirical studies of migration issues in selected medium-sized towns and rural communities in Nigeria (1982); a book on rural migration and development in Nigeria (1991); the feminisation of rural-urban migration in selected urban centres where urban poverty was evident (2003); the rights of African migrants and deportees in Nigeria (2010); and the emigration of Nigerians seeking greener pastures outside the country (2010).

Some of Adepoju's publications found their form as book chapters. Those particularly worth citing here include 'Rural-Urban Socio-Economic Links in South-West Nigeria' in celebrated political economist Samir Amin's book *Modern Migrations in Western Africa* (1974); a chapter on aspects of migration and family relationships in south-west Nigeria (1975); one on the relationship between migration and fertility (1976); a chapter on migration and rural development in Nigeria in Binsbergen and Meilink's (1978) *Migration and the Transformation of Modern African Society*; a chapter on migration and the urban poor on Nigeria's medium-sized towns in an edited book, *Poverty in Nigeria*, (1978); one on the linkages between migration, household structure and productive activities in Nigeria's rural areas, in *Population and Economic Development in Nigeria in the 1980s* by Chojnacka et al.; and

another on development programmes and population redistribution in Nigeria, in *Population and Development Projects in Africa*, edited by Clarke et al. (1985).

Some of the latest books show that Adepoju has been working with a number of migration scholars, especially on migration within and from Africa. In this context, three books particularly worth mentioning are a co-authored monograph on international migration and national development in sub-Saharan Africa (Adepoju, Zoomers & van Naerssen 2007), a study of migration in sub-Saharan Africa commissioned by the Swedish government (Adepoju 2007), and his edited work on migration within, to and from Africa (Adepoju 2010). Some of his publications have been translated into French and German in order to reach a wider audience.

Training demographers and human resource specialists

Aderanti Adepoju has been a dedicated and seasoned trainer at many levels in both academic and career settings, and it is appropriate to give here a sample of his contributions to this important facet of migration work.

He taught at two Nigerian universities, at Ile-Ife and in Lagos, and at the UN's African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) in Senegal. At the time Adepoju took up teaching on his return to Nigeria from the United Kingdom, numerous opportunities other than teaching were beckoning. Yet he settled for a relatively unglamorous career. It was a period when demography was just finding its place as a new discipline in universities in general and African universities in particular; most academics and policy makers, with whom he later interacted, had no real idea of what the discipline entailed. His *alma mater*, the London School of Economics, was best associated with economics (then an elite subject at universities), not the sub-field of demography that was to make Adepoju an economist-demographer. Only in the United States were there relevant facilities: an Office of

Population Research at the esteemed Princeton University and at an Africa Population Programme at the University of Pennsylvania which trained demographers for other population studies centres in that country.

Appointed Dean of the Faculty of Business Administration at the University of Lagos in 1988, Adepoju supervised more than twenty professors and three thousand graduate and undergraduate students – a higher level of responsibility than when he was head of the Research and Advisory Services Unit of the same faculty or while Professor and Head of the Department of Demography and Social Statistics at the University of Ife.

The IDEP programme in Senegal covered all African countries – anglophone, francophone, lusophone – and Adepoju's ten-year co-ordinatorship there was full of challenges and opportunities in respect of its wide-ranging activities: training high-level African government officials in population and development; research, publication and dissemination of policy papers; and advisory services to governments on population, human resources and development.

As UN Chief Technical Adviser in Swaziland he helped establish a training programme on population at the university; engaged in advocacy to government on population policies; and developed training curricula and training materials on population and development for officials.

With the ILO in Addis Ababa, Adepoju provided advisory services and technical assistance to African governments on population and development, as well as the articulation of population and labour policies; he organised intra-African high-level conferences on population and development; and advocated for the adoption of an Africa-wide population policies.

As part of his training activities, Adepoju expended much time and effort in conducting workshops and training sessions for a variety of persons. These included:

1999–2000: In twelve UNFPA project states in Nigeria, the training of trainers in population and development. This two-tier training aimed to incorporate population dynamics, including migration, into the planning processes; it involved first the directors of planning, then the officials responsible for sectoral planning.

1996–97: In Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Lesotho: in-country training and advocacy-cum-training on methodologies of integrating population into development planning processes, gender mainstreaming, new paradigms in population-development interrelations, reproductive health, and similar issues – for directors of planning and officials.

1993: In Nairobi: a sub-regional training workshop on population and development interrelations – for high-level planning officials from East and Southern Africa sub-regions.

1990: In Accra: a sub-regional training workshop on population and development interrelations – for high-level planning officials from West and Central African sub-regions.

1988–95: In Dakar: annual three months intensive training on population, human resources and development themes in Africa – for directors of sectoral planning ministries.

A university don

Adepoju's first appointment as a young lecturer was at the University of Ife in Nigeria²¹. For twelve years, he lectured in several courses, including the little-known field of migration,

21. After graduating from the University of Ife in 1969, young Adepoju was offered three jobs: as a manager-in-training with the then Barclays Bank, as a marketing manager-in-training at Lever Brothers and as an assistant lecturer at the University of Ife. He chose the academic career – the one which offered the lowest salary of the three, but the place in which his interest lay. This choice is a reflection of the modesty with which Adepoju went about his business: an unassuming yet brilliant personality who easily won admiration among his peers, seniors and juniors alike.

as part of demographic dynamics and development. Clearly he must have felt a bit out of place – a young academic in a virtually unknown and misconstrued discipline.²² His rapport with students soon earned him respect in the new discipline that he was determined to nurture at a time when knowledge of demography was at its lowest, even among his peers.

At the University of Ife (later renamed Obafemi Awolowo University), he was a fast-rising star, moving swiftly up the academic ladder, and within seven years of his return from LSE, he was promoted to a full professorship, and amazed many of his former lecturers, and of course colleagues, at his inaugural lecture in January 1984. Concurrently, he was appointed a research professor at the Research and Advisory Services Unit at the University of Lagos.

Adepoju has also taught in universities outside Nigeria, among them the Regional Institute of Population Studies in Ghana; the University of Swaziland; the University of Lesotho; the Institute of Development Studies in Trivandrum, India. He has also served as external examiner for many other universities, including the Universities of Nairobi, Ghana and Botswana.

Adviser to African governments

In 1977, Adepoju was appointed, as has been mentioned, by the ILO as a pioneer regional adviser on population and labour policy for English-speaking African countries, based at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This assignment was to take him to several countries, first to sensitise planning officials of various government ministries of the relationships between population and development, and later to assist in capacity-building and

22. As mentioned in the introductory pages, the notion which most academics had, at that time, of the study of population was limited to family planning propagation – which, in the critics' view, rendered its study inferior and thus irrelevant as a serious discipline.

in the preparation of policy documents on population and development. The 1970s and 1980s were peaks years of service to African governments as Adepoju criss-crossed the region as an advocate of a subject that officials had till then accorded the least priority in their planning activities. The following is a detailed list of the positions he held in these capacities.

UNFPA

Under the auspices of UNFPA Adepoju served African countries in key positions that included:

1978 Team member: Population Needs Assessment Mission to Tanzania;

1980 Team member: Population Needs Assessment Programming Mission to Tanzania;

1980 Team leader: Population Needs Assessment Mission to Swaziland;

1981 Team leader: Population Needs Assessment Mission to Zambia;

1984 Team member: Population Needs assessment Mission to Lesotho;

1984 Team member: Population Needs Assessment Mission to Botswana;

1986 Expert, UNFPA/World Bank, Geneva: meeting of donor governments and multilateral and non-governmental agencies on Population Assistance in Africa;

1987 Consultant to IDEP, Dakar, Senegal: developing a training programme on population, human resources and development for African officials;

1989 Resource person, International Forum on Population in the Twenty-first Century (Amsterdam);

- 1989–1991 Principal speaker/resource person, Accra, Yaounde and Senegal: UNFPA conferences on State of World Population;
- 1991 Team leader: Programme Review and Strategy Development Mission to Nigeria;
- 1998 Population unit expert, Pretoria, South Africa: training government officials in population-development interrelations; training trainers on integrating population into planning processes;
- 1999 Consultant, Lagos: needs assessment for training at the Regional Institute of Population Studies (RIPS);
- 1999 Consultant, Lagos: needs assessment for training in Population and Development in twelve states, Nigeria;
- 1999 Expert: assessment of alumni of the Ghana Institute of Population Studies' post-graduation activities in the labour market and their current employment status; review of the relevance of training to the labour market needs in Ghana;
- 2001 Expert, Nigeria/Pakistan South-South Partnership for Population and Development: review of the status of population programmes in Nigeria; preparation of project document for UNFPA support of Nigeria as a member of the Partnership;
- 2000–2001 Expert, Nigeria: training government officials in needs assessment in population and development planning in twelve states; training directors of planning in population and development interrelations; training officials from federal and state level ministries and parastatals; training of trainers of officials at local levels; development of five modules of training materials on population and development.

International Labour Organisation

Under the auspices of the ILO, Adepoju served as:

- 1978 Consultant and team member: Project Preparatory Mission to the Government of Ghana;
- 1979 Consultant and mission member: Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa Employment Mission to Nigeria;
- 1987 Consultant to Government of Zambia: National Commission for Development Planning;
- 2009 Consultant, Geneva: report on Social Partners' engagement with drafting of Nigeria's Labour Migration Policy.

Economic Commission for Africa

The ECA hired Adepoju as:

- 1984 Consultant, Second African Regional Population Conference (Arusha);
- 1990 Resource Person: ECA/River Basin Development Authority;
- 1991 Member: Third African Population Conference preparation committee;
- 1993 Resource person: Conference on African Family in the Context of Socio-economic Crisis (Addis Ababa).

World Bank

The World Bank made use of Adepoju's expertise as a consultant in 1988 for the Nigerian Policy-Drafting Committee, and in the Technical Committee which drafted Nigeria's National Policy on Population for Development, Unity, Progress and Self-Reliance.

African Development Bank

Under the auspices of the ADB, Adepoju served as:

1993 Resource person: Abidjan;

1993 Resource person: preparing and presenting background document for the OAU on Prospects of Population Growth in the context of Integrated Rural and Urban Development

1999 Consultant: Third General Assembly of the African Population Commission (Abuja).

Other

1986 Expert: All African Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development (Harare, Zimbabwe);

1987 Expert, Lagos: Federal Ministry of Employment and Labour;

1994 Expert, Geneva: Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life;

2010 Abuja team leader, Nigeria-European Union delegation: formulation of 10th European Development Fund Migration Project for Nigeria;

2008 Training (under the auspices of IOM) of Ghanaian officials on formulating migration policy, with emphasis on lessons learnt from Nigeria;

2008–2009 Abuja team leader, Nigeria-European Union delegation: feasibility study and review of Migration Profile for Nigeria for EU Country Strategy Paper.

Drawing together African youngsters for migration work

Adepoju is on record as one of the few specialists to engage with and witness generational change within his discipline.

He spearheaded the formation of the Network of Migration Research on Africa (NOMRA) which is housed by the Human Resources Development Centre (HRDC) he had founded earlier, and in 1999 became its chief executive. The focus of HRDC was on training, research, consulting and advisory services in capacity-building initiatives and human resources development strategies; analysis of poverty alleviation strategies; impact assessment of macro-economic policies; evaluation of population and development policies and programmes; analysis and review of development policies; demographic analysis; training and training needs assessment (with gender issues as a cross-cutting theme).

NOMRA enabled Adepoju to organise conferences and to run workshops on migration, for younger cohorts of demographers, migration enthusiasts and those willing to train in the development and the utilisation of human resources. One such recent initiative was in June 2010, when he organised a workshop on migration research for post-graduate students and young lecturers from selected West African universities and other institutions of higher learning.²³ Before this, he organised a similar workshop in Ghana for West African electronic and print media practitioners on reporting migration and development issues. An outcome of that was the establishment of a West African Journalists Association on migration work.

As UNFPA expert, Adepoju was a resource person for the UNFPA Training of Journalists workshop on basic population concepts and population journalism and reporting; as well as being a keynote speaker at the launch of the annual State of the World Population on the role of journalists in disseminating the report in Ghana in 1990, and in Cameroun in 1991.

23. The author was invited as a co-facilitator of the workshop where, among other things, the participants presented their research topics to enable them to benefit from comments.

Under the auspices of the IOM, Adepoju undertook the training of Ghanaian officials on formulating migration policy in 2008, with emphasis on lessons learnt from such endeavour in Nigeria.

In 2007–2009, the IOM also contracted Adepoju for the Nigeria sector of the project ‘Facilitating a coherent migration management approach in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Libya by promoting legal migration and preventing further irregular migration’, as part of AENEAS 2006, to undertake the training of members of a Technical Working Group – officials drawn from ministries, departments and agencies of government in Nigeria – on various aspects of the migration-development nexus. Seven training workshops were held to acquaint these officials about aspects of migration data, migration profiles, migration trends, determinants and consequences of regular and irregular migration, remittances, diaspora-home country linkages, migration bilateral and multilateral agreements and migration policies.²⁴ Another aim was to assist the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity to formulate a national labour migration policy.²⁵

Perhaps one of the most enduring of Adepoju’s contributions was the holding of the Nigeria Migration Policy Dialogue, under the auspices of NOMRA. This dialogue brought together various key stakeholders on migration in the country; to review progress in endorsing the draft national policy on migration, to collaborate in the implementation of this policy in order to achieve coherence, minimise duplication and maximise achievements; to engage periodically in further dialogue in order to harmonise diverse interests, and to ensure that officials attending international migration conferences are

24. The project report is to be published by the IOM.

25. The report ‘Labour Migration Policy for Nigeria’ has been submitted to the relevant authorities for processing.

well acquainted with current migration and development issues.

Networking with like-minded scholars

An equally enduring part of the Adepoju legacy has been his untiring efforts to network with colleagues and to cultivate sustainable interest in the study of migration and development in Africa. Towards this end, he helped found the Network of Migration Research on Africa, and serves as its coordinator. NOMRA lists about 120 specialists in migration studies within and outside Africa: Africans and Africanists, men and women, young scholars and old.

In many ways, Adepoju is perhaps better known and more appreciated outside than within the African continent – true to the adage that ‘prophet is without honour in his own country’. Over the past fifteen years, especially in the run-off to the High Level Dialogue on Population and Development held in New York in 2005, many EU countries hired Adepoju, directly or through their research institutes, to prepare background papers highlighting the pertinent migration-development issues in Africa. These included Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Of particular mention is the commissioned paper by the Swedish Government through the Nordic African Institute that became the basis of that government’s Parliamentary Position Paper on African migration.

Current research activities

Adepoju’s retirement has not dimmed his interest in doing research. His current activities include the migration of highly-skilled professionals within and from Africa; the African diaspora and links with countries of origin; migration and regional integration in Africa, and poverty alleviation strategies in Africa.

Conclusion

Aderanti Adepoju remains a household name in migration work, not only in Africa but also globally. It is virtually impossible to read any piece on African migration without encountering citations of his publications. In whatever he does, he acquits himself well as an exceptional personality with an aura of charisma, yet is too humble to project this; he is an accomplished academic whose work has been well received in academic, policy and other settings; he is a respected diplomat in the family of the United Nations where people of his ilk often acquire more foes than friends; and he has bequeathed to the continent of his birth an enviable legacy which Africa should treasure, conserve and build upon. His humility does not adequately depict his academic and professional prowess, and fails to match his status as a world-renowned migration scholar and a household name in his subject.

Adepoju's work has gone a long way to underscore the point that – even as African demographers trooped to work on issues of fertility and mortality, in the process relegating migration to an almost non-existent role – he made migration become part of the mainstream in academic, policy and developmental circles. He has been like a rain cloud that occupies a point in the horizon, turning into rain whenever desirable and providing rays of hope for those who previously had scarcely understood the nature and scope of migration work.

The author's long association with Adepoju has endeared to him the work of the migration doyen and has built a rare comradeship in African migration scholarship and in its practice. It is an association which began in Kenya's coastal city of Mombasa when, as young population scientists, the two met at a migration and human resources seminar at which each presented a paper. Since then they have cultivated a long,

frank friendship of both academic and personal flavour. In the author's view, Adepoju's work, and his rare dedication, qualifies him as equivalent to a Nobel Laureate on migration work, the most fitting prize that the doyen of African migration work deserves in the Economic Sciences.

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CHAPTER 2

Echoes in the Netherlands of an African Migration Expert

Joris Schapendonk and Annelies Zoomers

Migration is not an undesirable phenomenon: what is needed is a concerted effort to channel the energy of migrants into productive activities.

This quotation could have been taken from the most recent Human Development Report (UNDP 2009), but it actually originates from an early publication of Aderanti Adipoju (1977: 223). This indicates that the linkage between migration and development, although nowadays newly prominent on policy agendas, is not new at all. The Human Development Report (HDR) of 2009 underlines the relevance of the interconnection between migration and development policies and gives this debate a substantial and renewed impulse. Unfortunately there is still a huge discrepancy between what is stated in the HDR and migration policies on the ground, especially in the framework of the rather restrictive migration policies of the North.

It is safe to say that the general European perception regarding sub-Saharan African migration is that it is a massive, even invasion-like, outflow of desperately poor people, and that this flow is predominantly directed towards European economies (see DeHaas 2007a). Aderanti Adepoju has done much over the past decades to put such Eurocentric viewpoints into perspective. In numerous journal articles, book chapters and policy related papers, he has successfully raised a prominent African voice in debates that are dominated mostly by European agendas. His main point of departure has been that mobility must be seen as a profound and normal element of African social life, and that migration, in general, is not an undesirable phenomenon, but an inherent component of development processes (see, for example, Adepoju 1977, 1995, 2005a, 2006; Adepoju, van Naerssen & Zoomers 2008).

Our contribution here focuses on the friction between pro- and contra-mobility perspectives regarding sub-Saharan African migration. The authors use the 'echoes of Adepoju's academic voice' to reflect on contemporary European (and particularly Dutch) migration-related policy initiatives. The focus, in this chapter, is on the friction between Adepoju's perspective – generally valuing mobility as an opportunity for households to sustain a certain quality of life – and the determination of most European policy-makers to control and restrict incoming mobility from the southern parts of the globe. The migration and development initiatives of the latter group thus often aim to reduce migration, while others, including Adepoju, see mobility as a vital means of extending development (see also Bakewell 2007, Awumbila & Manuh 2008). In this framework, the authors aim, finally, to raise some important questions to stimulate the dialogue between the South and the North concerning the important topic of migration and its linkages with development.

In order to address these questions, we first discuss Aderanti Adepoju's work on migration in more detail, and

then reflect upon Europe's ambivalent responses towards contemporary African migration.

1. The voice of an African migration scholar

In one of his early articles on African migration, Adepaju criticised migration research for using 'Western models' to explain migration in general and the linkage between migration and development in particular. In his view, a different conceptual approach was needed since the patterns, motivations and consequences of African migration were 'drastically different from the experience of the Western world from which most of the theories of migration in relation to development originate' (Adepaju 1977: 210). In the same article, Adepaju argued that dominant migration models were ignoring migration patterns that differed from the regular rural-to-urban wage migration. In line with this critique, he stressed the importance of rural-rural and urban-rural migration, mentioning the importance of self-employment in the African context.

Moreover, he criticised the general notion of the migrant as an individual decision maker, arguing that 'The migration decision-making process in Africa is largely a household, rather than an individual concern, and is evidently more complex than such behavioral models assume' (Adepaju 1977: 212). For this reason, Adepaju can indeed be seen as one of the pioneers in the formulation of a critique of neoclassical migration approaches (Even earlier was the 1970 *American Economic Review* article by Harris and Todaro.) Adepaju's approach is in line with the 'new economics of labour migration' (NELM) school in emphasising the collective element in migration decisions and arguing that migration is, in general, not an act of desperation, but a calculated strategy (Stark & Bloom 1985, Palloni et al. 2001). Another important element of NELM theory is the argument that migration is not so much a matter of income maximisation as one of risk diversification.

Migrants, in other words, are viewed in this approach as insurers for a collective rather than as fully independent and individual entrepreneurs (Massey et al. 1998). As migration decisions are collectively made, so are the costs and returns collectively shared.

Aderanti Adepoju's central messages are, however, not directed only to migration theories. Instead, he has from the outset been a supporter of critical research that is policy oriented. In this context, one of his major claims is that the design of migration policies is often based on false assumptions. He warned in 1977, in the context of migrant school-leavers in Africa, against 'unwarranted conclusions that migration is massive and undesirable' (Adepoju 1977: 219), and today he has a similar message for policy-makers in the North. While public opinions and policy debates in the North are often filled with invasion-like metaphors to underscore the assumed huge numbers of sub-Saharan Africans moving to Europe, Adepoju's message is rather different. He attempts to inform the North that the bulk of sub-Saharan African migration is not directed to European economies. In fact the vast majority of these migrants move within specific African regions and thus the dominant African migratory pattern is South-South, not South-North (Adepoju 2006, 2008a). By the same token, the African contribution to migration to the North is but a small fraction of the total migration into these countries.²⁶ Moreover, the more flourishing African economies – of which the South African economy is the most important –

26. A recent report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Gnisci 2008) supports Adepoju's argument and estimates that in 2004 some 7.2 million African migrants were officially identified in the OECD member countries. This figure represents only 13% of the total immigration to OECD member states originating from non-OECD countries. Estimates are that just over half of these migrants (3.8 million) originated from North Africa, while the remaining 3.4 million came from sub-Saharan countries.

have, over the past few years, been attracting many migrants from relatively faraway parts of the continent (Adepoju 2003).

In the same context, it should be noted that migration within Africa by no means follows static patterns. Regional and domestic migrations have predominantly non-permanent and circular patterns, which change over time as local conditions change. Adepoju has always highlighted the changeability and complexity of incoming and outgoing population flows on the African continent. Countries that were once known as receiving countries (Ghana, for instance) have transformed into important migrant-sending countries (Adepoju 2005a). As a result of these complexities, many countries can now be perceived as being source, transit and destination countries all at the same time. This situation is true also with regard to the trafficking of women and children (Adepoju 2005b).

These changes in migration patterns are in line with another central point that Adepoju has repeatedly raised. He argues that we need to understand sub-Saharan African migration in the contexts of both continuity and diversity (see also Bakewell & de Haas 2007). This means that we need to historicise migration in order to understand contemporary patterns. That colonialism provided important pathways for today's migration streams is undisputed (Adepoju 1995, 1998). At the same time, it must be noted that colonisation was not a homogenous phenomenon on the African continent. Different African societies have undergone various periods and different patterns of colonisation, and colonialism thus influenced migration differently in different societies (Adepoju 1977). Within this historical context it must be mentioned – perhaps most importantly – that contemporary sub-Saharan African migration is characterised by a strong diversification of destinations. Sub-Saharan Africans who leave the continent do not move to only African destinations or former colonies

in Europe, but increasingly also go to the United States and the Gulf states (Adepoju 2003, 2006, 2008b, Awumbila & Manuh 2008).

Another changing pattern can be observed concerning the relation between gender and migration. Adepoju has pointed out that, although African migration has been traditionally male-dominated, at the same time increasingly more women are nowadays moving independently from their men to different destinations (Adepoju 2008a).²⁷

A last point made by Adepoju that needs to be mentioned here concerns the question of selectivity (who is migrating and who is not). As stated above, sub-Saharan African migration is often pictured, in the public opinion of the North, as an outflow of desperate and poor 'economic refugees' moving to metaphorical greener pastures. In fact, Adepoju is of the opinion that the notion that contemporary African migration is shaped by several crisis-like root causes such as unstable politics, persistent economic stagnation and environmental decline. However, he argues, at the same time – in line with many other migration scholars (Skeldon 1997, De Haas 2007b) – that it is not the poorest of the poor who emigrate. Migration requires financial input, and the poorest segments of the African population simply lack the resources for such investment (Adepoju, van Naerssen and Zoomers 2008). Moreover, Adepoju is one of the authors who reminds us that by no means all African people aspire to migrate. As he points out, the preoccupation of researchers with the question of why people migrate tends to obscure all sorts of issues regarding non-mobility (Adepoju 1977, 2008a). This distinction is vital because even in this so-called age of migration (Castles & Miller 2003), only three per cent of the world's population has

27. In this context, Adepoju has observed that trade-related mobility in particular has been the domain of women in West Africa (Adepoju 1995, 2006).

migrated across international borders (Adepoju 2008a). And in cases where Africans do migrate, Adepoju has always emphasised their entrepreneurial skills and their innovative power (Adepoju 1977, 2000, 2003), which is also in contrast with the general perception in the North where African migrants are very often perceived as poor victims. It is also worth mentioning Adepoju's contention that 'economic backwardness' is by no means the only motivation for Africans to migrate: the role of social and psychological factors – the desire to see the world, escape from boredom and cultural isolation – must not be overlooked (Adepoju 1977). In other words, 'adventurism' is and has always been an important component of African migration (van Dijk, Foeken & van Til 2001).

2. Ambivalent European responses to contemporary African migration

Having outlined some central points of Adepoju's voice, we now reflect on current migration policies in the North, identifying some frictions between Adepoju's perspective (generally valuing mobility) and the European policy agendas aiming to oppose, or control, migration from sub-Saharan Africa.

Within the recent significant policy shift from migration control to migration management, it is acknowledged by many European states, as well as by several European Union (EU) institutions, that migration issues demand an integrated approach in which different policy disciplines (such as justice, development cooperation, foreign affairs and employment) are brought together (MBZ 2010). One of the latest developments in this context is the creation of bilateral and multilateral agreements between European receiving countries and southern sending countries (Adepoju, van Noorloos & Zoomers 2009). Recently, the European Commission has

bundled the different migration policy fields into so-called Mobility Partnerships.²⁸ By looking carefully at these integrated approaches we may observe a distinction between hard (the security strand) and soft (the humanitarian strand) policy approaches. Although these two strands are presented below as separate phenomena, we acknowledge that in practice they are highly intertwined.

The security strand

Ilkka Laitinen, the executive director of FRONTEX²⁹, stated in 2007 that an important aspect of the protection of the European area of 'freedom, security and justice' is the control of the external borders (Laitinen 2007). In line with this statement, EU member states have identified 'illegal migration' as one of the key threats for the stability of the Union (Laitinen 2007). It is therefore not surprising that many of the EU's migration policies are control biased. Correspondingly, increasing investments have been made to improve the EU's detection and deportation of 'unwanted migrants'. Some borders have been militarised – as in the case of the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla – and/or have become high-tech in character, as with the Spanish 'Integrated System of External Vigilance'

28. In 2007, the European commission launched the idea of all-inclusive 'Mobility Partnerships' covering issues concerning legal migration, integration, migration and development, border management, identity and travel documents, the fight against illegal migration and trafficking (Reslow 2010). In May 2008, Mobility Partnerships were signed with Moldavia and Cape Verde. These Partnerships merged the several existing bilateral agreements between EU members and Moldavia and Cape Verde into one overall document. This serves as a template for many kinds of bilateral agreements between the EU's member states and its partners.

29. FRONTEX ('Frontières Extérieures') is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

(SIVE).³⁰ The security paradigm has, moreover, resulted in the digitalisation of border control, as with Europe's large-scale electronic surveillance systems, such as the Schengen Information Systems and Eurodac, which aim to collect fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in order to tighten the constraints of the Dublin convention³¹ (Broeders 2007).

In addition, border restrictions are moving southwards. Detailed legal provisions, including readmission treaties, are being forced upon all countries bordering the EU (Baldwin-Edwards 2002), not only to return migrants originating from each specific country, but also to return so-called transit migrants. North-African countries in particular are becoming transformed into 'Europe's gendarmerie' since they must now follow the European agenda of discouraging (transit) migration to European countries (compare Kreienbrink 2005, Collyer 2006a & 2006b, Sørensen 2006, Bensaad 2007, Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos 2008). Spain, for instance, has signed several agreements with Morocco (in 1999, 2004 and 2006) to facilitate the readmission of Moroccan migrants as well as of third country nationals who have entered Spain via Morocco. Italy has, in its turn, signed several agreements with Libya and Tunisia (Adepoju, van Noorloos & Zoomers 2009). In this context, however, European borders are not only shifting, in effect, to the transit countries, but even to the sending side of migration. The best case to illustrate

30. This system consists of a combination of fixed and mobile sensors, linked to a control room, which can detect vessels up to 25 kilometres from the Spanish coast (Carling 2007b).

31. The Dublin Convention (first set up in 1990), signed by signatories and non-signatories to the Schengen Agreement, provides uniform criteria for determining which state shall have jurisdiction over asylum applications lodged within the EU. It states, among other things, that those seeking asylum may apply only in the first territory in which they land.

this is Senegal where FRONTEX is currently directly involved in the surveillance of the Senegalese coastline.

The tightening and shifting of European border controls are not the only ways in which European countries aim to reduce so-called unwanted migration. There is also a strict visa regime executed by EU member states, resulting in a bifurcation into 'wanted' and 'unwanted' migrants. Most of the developing countries are on the 'black list', composed by the EU, which consists of 132 states whose inhabitants require a visa for entry into the Schengen zone (van Houtum & Mamadouh 2008). Over time, the visa requirements for particular countries have become strikingly stricter. In the case of the Netherlands, for instance, the government has designed several laws and regulations curtailing family-related migration. Between 1994 and 2006, these doubled (in real terms) the income requirement for the receiving side of the family. Moreover, citizens from developing areas who wish to become Dutch citizens are now obliged to pass an official integration test before they enter Dutch territory (Carling 2007a).³² For an average citizen of any sub-Saharan African country, a visa application for any European country is thus similar to a lottery. Such restrictive regulations are applied while at the same time universities, enterprises and state bodies play active roles in the 'cherry picking' of a small selected group of 'wanted migrants': the highly educated, the most talented (such as African football players) and the most-needed (such as nurses) (Zoomers & Adepoju 2008: 278).

32. This test must be done at an official embassy (not at a consulate). Since not every African country has a Dutch embassy, many would-be emigrants are forced to travel to a nearby country to do the test.

*The humanitarian strand*³³

Any treatment of the EU as singular, and its individual member states as homogenous actors, obscures important conflicts of interests within the same (supra-)state apparatuses (Carling 2007a). Interestingly, although the main concern of many EU countries remains border control, migration policies have shifted from predominantly repressive measures towards cooperation in combating root causes, thus boosting economies and opening more channels for regular migration (Adepoju, van Noorloos & Zoomers 2009). This change stems mainly from the conviction that migration cannot be seen as isolated from development (Adepoju 1977, Zoomers 2006). One joint EU-Africa measure aimed at managing migration has been the opening of an EU job centre in the Malian capital, Bamako. This centre, known as CIGEM (Centre d'Information et de Gestion des Migrations³⁴), aims to curb irregular migration by assisting those who want to move to the EU on a legal basis, especially those interested in working temporarily in the agricultural, construction or tourist sectors.

Besides the building of the Malian job centre, the soft approach of EU migration policies is also very visible in the bilateral and multilateral agreements promoting 'managed migration'. As mentioned above, an important element of the various bilateral and multilateral agreements has been the improvement of border controls. In exchange for their cooperation on this restrictive element of migration policy, sending countries are regularly offered generous development aid by the receiving countries in the North.

33. Although the humanitarian strand of migration policy includes the reception of asylum seekers, we consider a discussion of asylum policy to be beyond of the scope of this chapter. We thus focus here on the humanitarian approach within so-called migration and development policies.

34. Centre for Migration Information and Management.

The fact that development aid is exchanged for efforts to manage migration is only one example of migration and development being closely linked in theory as well as in policy practice. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice) has formulated six policy fields that are given priority in the migration and development practices with their partners. These six fields are:

- The integration of migration, in terms of content, as an overarching theme in relation to development issues: As is the case with the themes of 'gender' and 'human rights', there is, according to the ministry, much to win in approaching migration as another integrated theme within development practices;
- Institutional development regarding migration management: The rationale here is that sending countries need to have both the insight and the capacity to manage migration properly in order to minimise negative outcomes and stimulate migration-related development;
- Promoting circular migration and brain gain: Circular migration is often praised for being a 'triple win' situation, with sending countries, receiving countries and the migrants themselves having something to gain from migration. The Dutch government, therefore, stimulates migrants who have been in the country for a relatively long time to return to their home country in order to contribute to the home development there. According to the Dutch ministry, further investigation is needed to gain more insight into the development potential of circular migration from the sending countries to the Netherlands and back again;

- Strengthening the involvement of migrant organisations in development practice: A group of sub-Saharan African migrant organisations is already active in the field of development cooperation (see also van Naerssen et al. 2006). The assumption here is that migrants are 'development experts' because they understand the political and social practices of a specific region. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs is thus striving for a better embedding of migrants in policy processes and development practices;
- Strengthening the relation between development and remittance-sending: The Dutch government is aware that remittances consist mainly of private money, and so government interventions which aim at steering remittances in a certain direction or to pinpoint remittances to certain purposes (e.g. productive rather than consumptive spending) are seen as undesirable. However, there is a role for the Dutch government to play since the conditions under which these money transactions take place can be improved;
- Promoting sustainable returns in re-integration processes: This policy field views it as preferable for migrants who lack the correct documentation to leave the country on a voluntary basis. For this reason the Dutch government will assist returning migrants by offering financial support – as well as a non-financial support such as education and re-integration conciliation.

(MBZ 2010)

Against the backdrop of these two different strands of European policy agendas and the foregoing practical filling-in of policy

detail, the authors now reflect on these issues with the 'voice of Adepoju' in the front of their minds.

3. Reflections

There is a strong positive aspect to the current shift from predominantly control-based migration policies towards a more cooperative form of migration management, namely that migration is no longer simply penalised. The European Council confirmed in 2003 that 'an effective and coherent development policy is an essential part of an effective migration policy' (Council 2003 in Reslow 2010: 4). This does not mean that all African mobility is valued from a European perspective; however, it does signify a discourse shift towards a notion that migration can be accepted as inherent to development processes. This is important because, despite the early messages of Adepoju (1977) and other scholars (see for instance Skeldon 1997) that migration and development are closely linked, development cooperation had, until recently, paid scant attention to migration. And even where attention was paid to migration, it was generally seen as an opposite pole to development – as development failure, an expression of poverty (Adepoju, Zoomers & van Naerssen 2008, Bakewell 2007).

As a result of this discourse change, development aid and migration management are policy fields that are increasingly overlapping. There are, however, some important risks attached to this overlapping. First, there is a tendency to perceive migration control as a precondition for poorer countries to receive development aid (Adepoju, van Noorloos & Zoomers 2009). This may result in some countries (such as Senegal or Mali, which have strong outmigration flows to Europe) being more powerful in negotiating for development cooperation than others (such as Namibia and Botswana). This kind of European preference to provide aid to high migration-

volume countries is questionable since these countries do not necessarily have a greater need for development support than countries that are 'less relevant' in terms of migration volumes. Furthermore, the so-called migration and development deals and mobility partnerships are often overshadowed by the dominant Northern, and thus control-biased, agenda. The possibilities of opening up legal channels for managed migrations are explored only reluctantly by Northern partners. At the same time, migration controls are put most prominently on the agendas of migration and development deals and mobility partnerships. In fact, the mobility partnership signed by the EU and Cape Verde was an initiative of the EC's Directorate-General for Freedom, Security and Justice. It contains six subsections, of which the last one is 'Cooperation on border management, identity and travel documents and the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in human beings'.³⁵ Not surprisingly, it is this last subchapter that receives the most attention in this partnership. A similar pattern can be observed in the Dutch context. To put the six policy fields regarding migration and development into practice, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs reserved some •9 million. Of this, some •2.3 million was spent on migration control and about •4.1 million on sustainable return migration (these two 'policy pillars' thus accounting for just over 70 per cent of the total expenditure) (MBZ 2010). This demonstrates a striking discrepancy between rhetoric and policy practices: 'migration and development deals' and mobility partnerships are still very much control-biased.

It is appropriate that critical voices express their concern about this 'outsourcing' of the policing of European migration

35. The other five are: monitoring and awareness of migration flows; employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration; mobility and short-stay visas; links between migration and development, diasporas, money transfers; and asylum and immigration (Chou & Gibert 2010).

policies to countries of origin or transit through migration agreements and mobility partnerships (see for instance Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos 2008, van Houtum & Mamadouh 2008). In the light of the dominant security paradigm within the EU, these migration and development deals have created a situation in which migration regulations not only aim to stop immigrants from entering a specific country, but are also designed to prevent people from leaving their home country in the first place. This makes Article 13 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human rights (which states that every person has the right to leave his or her country of birth at any time they want to) unstable in its very essence. Mobility agreements mean immobilisation of the many while favouring, by means of 'cherry-picking', the mobility of a privileged few. As a consequence of the limited opportunities to migrate legally to Europe, many would-be emigrants feel frustrated by their involuntary immobility (Carling 2002) and seek other ways of entering their 'Eldorado' (Zoomers 2006). Mainly because of these regulations, migration to Europe has become, for a considerable number of sub-Saharan Africans, a long-drawn-out, often risky undertaking with a strongly fragmented character (Schapendonk 2009, 2010). The cumulative effect of this persistent 'unwanted' migration is, from the European perspective, an important reason to tighten borders even further. Would-be migrants and their facilitators must, in their turn, be continually developing new mobility tactics and transit solutions (Papadopoulos, Stephenson & Tsianos 2008, Schapendonk 2010).

A second major risk resulting from the overlap between migration and development policies is that, in its current form, it reinforces one of the most dominant misconceptions in development thinking: that development is best achieved 'at home'. Since migration and development initiatives aim, on

the whole, to halt migration at the outset, policy makers as well as development thinkers run the risk of falling again into the trap of perceiving mobility not as a source of development but as an indicator of underdevelopment. Insights from the livelihood debate, which indicate that the strategies of migrants living in developing countries are often diversified and multi-local in character, are overlooked (De Haan & Zoomers 2005). In addition, the fact that mobility is fundamental to any understanding of social life on the African continent is ignored (Adepoju 1977, De Bruijn, van Dijk & Foeken 2001). The notion of development as something that has to happen 'in place' and/or 'at home' misses these important points. In this context, it is striking to observe that Northern migration policies, particularly migration and development policy programmes, are now focusing on voluntary (and involuntary) return migration. As we have seen, the Dutch government has spent the most part of its migration and development budget on 'sustainable returns' – migrants being returned in the hope of preventing a new migration of these particular individuals.

Another example of a sedentary viewpoint on development comes from Senegal where the government has implemented the REVA (*Retours vers l'Agriculture*) programme in the hope of offering a lasting solution to the contemporary irregular outmigration of its citizens. This programme aims to encourage readmitted migrants, and also potential candidates for irregular migration to Europe, to build up sustainable lives in Senegal's rural areas. In our view, this programme has a strong paternalistic connotation since it points to places where people are supposed to live sustainable lives instead of paying attention to these people's capabilities. Furthermore, this plan takes little account of non-economic motivations for migration – such as 'seeing the world' after cultural isolation – that are also important in explaining contemporary sub-Saharan African migration. For these

reasons, it is not very surprising that the REVA plan is regarded by many Senegalese people as a '*rêve*' (a dream).³⁶ As an alternative we suggest taking mobility seriously as a pathway for development, as described in the most recent Human Development Report (UNDP 2009) – and as has been advocated by Adepoju for so many years. To use his words again: '[P]olicy makers need to appreciate that human mobility is an inherent – and desirable – component of the development process and that many prosperous countries and communities were built on migrant labour' (Adepoju 2005a: 13).

A third issue arising from the policy overlap is that within migration and development discussions a prominent role is reserved for diaspora organisations. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, is active in building the capacity of some African organisations and provides funds to migrant organisations in order to make them self-sustaining development agents. The risk here is that internal frictions within the diaspora are easily overlooked; different organisations often represent different groups from within a sending country. In most cases, these organisations, in all their variety, are initiatives from highly-educated migrants. This situation is of course not a problem in terms of the quality of the organisations, but it does raise questions about the representativeness of any given organisation in relation to the migrant communities in a certain country. In line with this, we could also ask why it is that only certain so-called migrant organisations are invited to the policy arenas, and not others – for example religious institutions such as migrant churches. Moreover, as with any development intervention, one must critically examine the voice of the local population in the projects that are decided upon. The wishes of migrants in the

36. This issue was raised by the Senegalese scholars Dr Papa Sow and Dr Aly Tandian during an informal discussion in Barcelona with one of the authors of this contribution.

diaspora, although they are socially and culturally close to those of the home place, are not necessarily in coherence with the wishes of the local population in the place of destination. Moreover, the social networks of migrant organisations, seen by many as a major advantage in development impact, are a double-edged sword, as is the case with most migrant social capital (Portes 1997a). Social commitment and social contacts can easily lead to social obligations at the place of destination and thus to a reduced objectivity of the actors (see also van Naerssen, Kusters & Schapendonk 2006, Portes 1997b).

Another point regarding migrant organisations is the issue of coherence between the different, often small-scale, migrant initiatives. For diasporic states such as Senegal or Ghana, it is not easy to streamline all these initiatives into integrated national and local plans (Zoomers 2008). In sum, we argue that migrant communities might indeed add value as development agents, but as with any development operator, they need some critical examination and streamlining before they can become effective.

Finally, and in line with the former point, reflection is needed regarding the different policy priorities in the North and in the South. From the perspective of the South, the migration policy agenda is not dominated by extra-continental migration towards Europe. Rather, policies relate to internal migration – for example rapid urbanisation, or how to deal with deportees or expelled groups (see Broekhuis 2006 for a case on Burkina Faso), regional migration, and the hosting of large refugee populations (see De Haas 2006 for a case on Nigeria, and Rutten & Muli 2008 for a case on Kenya) and the involvement of the diaspora regarding investments in the country (see Muhoza & Rutayizire 2006 for a case on Rwanda). With regard to irregular migration, important policy issues are the fight against human trafficking, including child trafficking (Broekhuis 2006, Adepoju 2005b), the reduction of

false documentation and, by no means least, the protection of migrant rights (Zoomers & van Naerssen 2006). Thus, if Northern policymakers are really aiming to design relevant initiatives to strengthen the linkages between migration and development, they should take first note of the discrepancy between Northern migration agendas and pressing issues in the South (see also Awumbila & Manuh 2008, Zoomers et al. 2009). To the extent that countries of destination are implementing migration and development deals, hardly any attention is being paid to the consequences of regional mobility patterns including, among others, the barriers created against incoming migration from neighbouring states (Zoomers & Adepaju 2008). We in the North may need to be reminded that emigration towards Europe is a relevant policy topic for only a limited number of African countries.

4. Conclusions

This paper has dealt with Aderanti Adepaju's work on sub-Saharan African migration within the daily reality of restrictive migration policies in Europe. His work has mainly been characterised by the difference in points of departure between North and South. The question then is: is African mobility seen in the first place as having any value to the North – or is it regarded simply as something that has to be controlled and, where possible, restricted? This confrontation between the different views is present not only when we put the perspective of an African scholar together with EU practices. It is today a serious dilemma within many African countries as well. Somewhat paradoxically, regional organisations such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States) and the African Union aim to facilitate free mobility of persons, but at the same time more and more African states are reproducing Northern agendas by discouraging mobility in significant ways (Zoomers & Adepaju 2008).

A similar friction can be observed by focusing on so-called migration and development deals. From the Northern perspective, these initiatives are perceived as opportunities to halt migration before it begins. The countries in the South, however, generally seek ways to gain as much benefit as possible from migration. To conclude this contribution we now raise three vital questions that need to be debated during partnership assemblies in which the North and the South are equally present, in order to make these partnerships more equitable, more transparent and more effective.

What types of migration should be taken into account when migration (and development) policies are designed?

We argue that, in order to optimise the link between migration and development, it is important that more attention be paid to 'normal mobility' (such as South-South migration) and that traditional development policies pay more attention to mobility in the global South. Obviously one of the most important policy documents in this field, the United Nations Human Development Report (UNDP 2009), directs us to think about how to overcome mobility barriers and improve conditions for the 'movers.' In our view, mobility channels must not only be open to highly skilled migrants, but also to would-be migrants who do not belong to this privileged section of society. If only highly skilled migrants are able to cross borders, inequalities within specific sending regions are sharpened rather than narrowed.

Towards what is development aimed in relation to migration and development initiatives?

Migration cannot be isolated from broader processes of change – it forms part of development – and rather than focusing only on its economic impact, there are important social and political dimensions to migration that need to be taken into account.

Rather than concentrating on whether or not migration contributes to development, it is important to ask ourselves: 'What development?'. Adepaju formulated migration as an *investment*, for households, in human capital – which is a profoundly different notion of development from the bare economic dimension of the remittances debate. In addition, policy-makers in both the North and the South must be aware that the potential of migration and development initiatives is shaped in a transnational space. The ability and willingness of migrants to maintain contacts with their 'home countries' is clearly linked to integration policies in the North, but depends also on the social circumstances and the investment climate in their areas of origin (see Schapendonk, Smith & Zoomers 2008). Until now, a special role has been reserved for diaspora organisations. Although we generally value the involvement of migrants in policy arenas, we have raised concerns with regard to the representativeness of migrant organisations and the expected added value of their development initiatives.

For whom should migration and development policies be made relevant?

The implications of this question not only stress the issues of the different agendas present in migration and development partnerships and the fact that some developing countries profit more than others from the discourse shift, they also open up the discussion on the micro level. It is important to note that, although migration is often valued as a tool for development, many individual migrants suffer downward (social) mobility rather than upward (brain waste) when they migrate, facing all kinds of insecurities. This is true in particular for undocumented migrants. In that respect, there is indeed much to win when the 'movers' are better treated by the hosting societies (UNDP 2009). We would also like to remind the reader that the majority of people in developing countries do

not cross international borders in order to make a living somewhere else (Adepoju 1977, 2008a). Within this context of migration and development, we would therefore stress that the 'stayers' should not be forgotten; migrant initiatives, for instance – as with other development initiatives – are not always in line with the priorities of local populations and/or local governments.

Consideration of these three questions is vital in making the partnerships created recently more effective, and, hopefully, less control-biased. In the end we have seen that, from the perspective of the South, mobility is central to the daily life and daily strategies of different populations. For now, on the plus side is the fact that migration is not by definition viewed as something negative – as poverty-driven and as some kind of development failure. More positive connotations of migration are slowly being reproduced and strengthened by several governments and development actors. On the minus side, however, is that we have come to realise, by reading Adepoju's early work, that it has taken some thirty-five years for this message to arrive in the relevant policy arenas.

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CHAPTER 3

From Colonial to National and Multilateral Management of Migration: A Century of International Migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire

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Dennis Cordell*

Introduction

Burkina Faso is the only African country to have carried out two migration surveys which are representative at the national level, one in 1974–1975 and the another in 2000. Both of these surveys were retrospective and they are entirely comparable, making it possible to use the migration histories they contain to reconstruct the past. The first survey allows us to go back as far as the beginning of the twentieth century (see Cordell, Gregory & Piché 1996) while the second fills the gap between 1975 and 2000 (see Ouédraogo & Piché 2007; Kabbanji 2008). Using these two surveys, we have synchronised the changes in patterns and characteristics of migration between

Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire between 1900 and 2000 and have linked these changes to corresponding migration policies, at both national and regional levels.³⁷

We distinguish three major historical periods, each with its migration and policy specificities. The first of these covers the colonial period (1900–1960), when migration was characterised mainly by a circular migration system between Burkina Faso (then called Upper Volta³⁸) and Côte d'Ivoire, induced by 'development' policies geared towards the needs of the French imperial power. This period can be further divided into two sub-periods, the first of which covers migrations in the years 1900 to 1946, an era associated with colonial penetration and the creation of the colony of Upper Volta. This period has historical coherence: it covers the years from the imposition of colonial rule through the foundation of Upper Volta in 1919, through the colony's dismantling³⁹ in 1932 with the transfer of the main part to Côte d'Ivoire, and terminates with the re-establishment of the original colony in 1947. In the second sub-period, from 1947 to 1960, though the country still remained colonial, 'free contract labour' replaced forced labour, as imperial policies aimed at recruiting labour for Côte d'Ivoire development projects. (The distinction between 'forced labour' and 'free labour' is discussed below.)

37. Dieudonné Ouédraogo and Victor Piché were involved in both surveys as co-directors and researchers, from data collection to the analysis of the results. Lama Kabbanji was involved in the second survey, on the analysis of the results. Dennis Cordell, a historical demographer with training in anthropology, contributed to placing the results of the first survey in the historical and anthropological contexts of migration in West Africa.

38. For simplicity, Upper Volta is referred to through most of this text by its modern name of Burkino Faso.

39. In 1932 the French colonial power split the colony of Upper Volta (Haute-Volta) into three, dividing the parts between Côte d'Ivoire, French Sudan and Niger. In 1947 France reconstituted the country called Upper Volta, with its pre-1932 boundaries.

The second major period covers the years around independence⁴⁰ (1960–1975), still characterised by circular migration but with important changes such as increased female migration and longer migrant stays in Côte d’Ivoire. Migration policies shifted to the national level and were associated with important bilateral endeavours. Finally, the third period covers the last quarter of the twentieth century, when the circular migration model fitted less with migration realities. Migration management became a regional concern – although it will be argued here that there is a wide gap between migration strategies flowing from the needs of the population on the one hand, and migration issues as elaborated in regional treaties on the other.

1. Methodology

This chapter is based, as has been mentioned, on two comparable sample surveys. The first survey, the *National Migration Survey in Burkina Faso*, was taken in 1974–1975 and collected retrospective migration histories (Coulibaly, Gregory & Piché 1975 and 1980). This sample was representative of eleven cities and two rural zones, the urban samples including 41 093 persons and the rural 52 304. The survey defined a migration as a move across a ‘*sous-prefecture*’ boundary or an international border, for a period of at least three months. For each such move, survey agents collected the following information: destination, length of stay, age at migration, marital status at migration, motive(s) for migrating, people (if any) with whom the person migrated, where the migrant stayed on arrival, and economic activity at destination (including occupational status, occupation, and employer).

40. Upper Volta became an autonomous republic within the French community in December 1958. Full independence from France was gained in August 1960.

The second survey took place in 2000 and was also based on a national representative sample, although much smaller in size (with 8647 biographies). The methodology (definition of variables, type of information collected, and so on) was seen as being comparable with the 1974–1975 survey (Ouédraogo & Piché 2007; Kabbanji, Piché & Dabiré 2007).

In order to distinguish and then analyse migration flows, we grouped the individual migration itineraries collected in the surveys into a series of ‘origin-destination’ files, thus shifting the unit of analysis from the moves of individual migrants to global flows. Here, we analyse only one flow, namely moves to and from Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. As mentioned in the introduction, the moves between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire have been grouped into three historical periods, according to the type of migration management occurring at that time: firstly colonial, with sub-periods 1900–1946 (forced labour) and 1946–1960 (‘free’ movement), then post-independence national: 1960–1975, and finally regional: 1975–2000.

The historical use of migration histories is not without problems (Cordell, Gregory & Piché 1996). Three phenomena in particular may affect representivity over time. First, some migrants die between the time of their last migration and the date of survey; their histories are consequently not included. The death of this subpopulation of migrants could bias the data set insofar as their migration histories differed significantly from those who survived until the survey. This would be the case, for example, if the migration experience itself had had a specific impact on mortality. This is not improbable for certain types of migration, for instance harsh conditions associated with forced migration, military service, or labour on colonial worksites might have provoked higher levels of mortality. If such were the case, these types of migration would be underestimated in the data set – and

increasingly so as one goes back in time. By the same token, levels of return migration would be underestimated if a significant number of individuals died abroad (see Kouamé 1990).

The second bias in these surveys is produced by absent migrants – those who were outside Burkina Faso at the time the surveys were taken. These people fall into two categories: those who had settled permanently elsewhere, and those who would eventually return but had not done so by the time of the survey. Estimates of ‘permanent’ migration are moving targets, given that migrants may decide at any time to return home. But, according to Capron and Kohler (1976), only a minority of Burkinabè migrants – a maximum of 20 per cent – had settled permanently in Côte d’Ivoire by 1973. We suggest that this proportion becomes smaller as we go back in time. If this is so, we may conclude that the migration history of migrants who did not return was not appreciably different from that of those who returned. As for the second population, made up of migrants who would eventually have returned, inasmuch as lengths of stay have not changed markedly over time, their migration histories are also likely to be similar to those of returned migrants interviewed in Burkina Faso in 1974–1975. There is however evidence that later in the century migrants did stay longer in Côte d’Ivoire. Since this increase is relatively recent, it is probably not large enough to influence conclusions for the period before the 1974–1975 survey. For the more recent survey, this bias could, however, be more serious.

Fortunately, the methodology used in both surveys makes it possible to partially offset the absentee bias. In both surveys one can reconstruct a migration matrix for the five years preceding each survey. Absentees are included in migration estimates by using information about family members living in Côte d’Ivoire who returned in the most recent five years.

There is, finally, the question of the reliability of data based on memory. One way of checking memory robustness is to reconstruct a migration period that is common to both surveys. For the period 1960–1973 it is possible to estimate migration flows using information from respondents in the 1974–1975 survey and compare them with the same migration flows estimated from the information coming from respondents in the 2000 survey. The results are encouraging, at least for men: for instance, male migrations from rural Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire for the period 1960–1973 accounted for 29 per cent of all migrations according to the 1974–1975 sample, and they account for 34 per cent according to the 2000 survey. Indeed, for every male migration flow considered, the fit is remarkably good (Kabbanji 2008). For women, the correspondence is less strong, but this could be due to the small number of women included in this flow in the 2000 survey.

Obviously these survey data cannot stand alone and we thus refer here to other quantitative studies, as well as to qualitative studies, in order to contextualise and interpret them. Since we are, in a way, dealing with oral tradition – familiar to historians writing social history – we will henceforth use the data in a qualitative mode.⁴¹

2. Colonial management era: 1900–1960

Migration has always been an important feature of West African societies and, over time, has taken several forms, most of which bridge the conventional precolonial/colonial divide (Cordell, Gregory & Piché 1996; Amin 1974). Professor Aderanti Adepoju’s prolific and crucial scholarship has played a key role in putting African migration on the world agenda,

41. A similar study has been published on the history of Malian migration to Côte d’Ivoire with an historical methodology based on oral histories and archival data (Gary-Tounkara 2008).

highlighting the importance of migration for West African societies and arguing that regional integration has a long history in Africa (see for example Adepoju 1998, 2001, 2007 and 2010).

On the eve of French imperial conquest⁴², five distinct types of migration were well established in West Africa: migrations of colonisation for the settlement of new lands, commercial migration, religious migration, slavery-generated migration, and female marriage migration. In the colonial era, all of these forms of migration continued, albeit in radically different contexts.

The initiation of international wage labour migration: 1900–1946

Migration theories assign an important role to the initiation of international migration (Massey et al. 1994). Of the five theories identified by these authors to explain the initiation of migration, only one is relevant here, namely the historical-structural theory and world systems approach, typified by Wallerstein's focus (1974, 1980) on the global expansion of the capitalist system and the process of incorporation of non-capitalist regions into a global market economy. The historical account Burkina Faso's colonial migration is one of the best-documented cases of the 'forced' initiation of market-oriented migration.⁴³

42. The French conquest was the result of a process beginning in the 1880s and ending at the end of the 1890s (see, for example, Balima 1970; Thobie 1991).

43. See Coulibaly's pioneering work (1978, 1986).

Colonial rule brought escalating demands for African labour, which was not freely available outside the domestic economy. Thus a series of measures was devised to 'free' labour. The first measure was the elimination of domestic slavery, proclaimed as early as 1848 in the French Empire, although it took many decades to eliminate the institution in the Sahel. French abolition efforts in West Africa in the first decade of the twentieth century were paralleled by the first programmes of labour recruitment (Cordell, Gregory & Piché 1996).

The recruitment of African labour took several forms. First and foremost was forced labour in the form of service or 'prestations'.⁴⁴ Young able-bodied men were recruited by the military and forced to work for the colonial administration either in plantations or on construction projects. In other cases, village chiefs had to supply a certain portion of labour (called prestations) for local projects. Military conscription was a second form of forced recruitment, with many Africans serving as sailors, soldiers and policemen (Manchuelle 1989; Traoré 1994). However, because of continued failure to attract volunteers in sufficient numbers, the colonial government passed a law in 1919 requiring universal male military service (Echenberg 1991). Despite the mobilisation of millions of person-days of labour throughout colonial Burkina Faso, many public works projects and private ventures in commercial agriculture required an even larger supply of long-term workers (Cordell & Gregory 1982). This demand led to contract labour policies, which were extremely migration-intensive and set the stage for redirecting migration flows in West Africa.

The 1974–1975 National Migration Survey shows that these colonial policies had an immediate impact on international migration flows. Three impacts may be discerned:

44. For a general history of forced labour in French West Africa during the period 1900–1945, see Fall 1993.

the emergence of new important international flows in the region, an increase in the importance of international destinations other than Côte d'Ivoire, and an increase in the importance of return migration – this last resulting in the creation of a circular migratory system.

According to migration histories collected in the 1974–1975 survey, over the first half of the twentieth century, Burkinabè men migrated mainly to international destinations rather than to internal destinations. Between 1900 and 1931, for example, 70 per cent of Burkinabè men migrated to and from international destinations, while in the period 1932–1946, the percentage rose to 80 per cent.⁴⁵ International migration in this era was mostly male, with about 25 times more men than women leaving Burkina Faso for colonial Ghana (then known as Gold Coast⁴⁶) or Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁷ International destinations varied little according to ethnic group, largely because these destinations were dictated by factors external to Burkinabè societies. In the case of colonial Ghana, geographic proximity and the less coercive character of British colonial rule were probably determining factors in attracting migrants. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere, French colonial interests dominated.

Given French colonial policies for the recruitment of labour, it seems somewhat surprising that flows to Côte d'Ivoire did not predominate over other international

45. The National Migration Survey defined international migration as movement across a colonial boundary. The figures presented here come from the sample of men interviewed in 1974–1975 who were aged fifteen years and older at the time of their migration(s) and who were absent for at least three months. Since the survey took place in Burkina, the sample obviously included only those migrants who returned. All figures used for the colonial period come from Cordell, Gregory & Piché, 1996, chapters 3 and 4.

46. For simplicity, Gold Coast is referred to through most this text by its modern name of Ghana.

47. Female international migration is dealt with in a separate section below.

destinations. According to migration histories, in the first half of the century men moved in three largely separate and unequal networks, linking rural Burkina Faso with colonial Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and other foreign destinations. The nexus of the three networks lay in rural Burkina Faso to which most men returned. At the outset, then, the migration of Burkinabè men was circular; few settled abroad. Most studies have observed that Burkinabè international migration removed large numbers of men from the rural areas. The National Migration Survey of 1974–1975 confirmed this conclusion.

Movement to Ghana was clearly concentrated in the 1920s, for two reasons. First, plantation development in colonial Ghana, which began in the 1910s, accelerated dramatically in the next decade, requiring more foreign workers (Rouch 1956). Second, the colonial government in Burkina Faso promulgated forced labour regulations in 1919 aimed at forcing Burkinabè men to migrate to Côte d'Ivoire. However, because working conditions and pay were better in Ghana, many men 'chose' this destination instead (see archival citations in Cordell & Gregory 1982). Another surprising characteristic of Burkinabè migration in 1900–1931 revealed by the survey is that mobility to other international destinations surpassed flows to colonial Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Over 15 per cent of moves took men to such places. This migration network was undoubtedly generated largely by mobility associated with military service and other labour for the colonial state.

The question of why men moved and what they did at their destinations requires two answers. The first is structural: colonial policies and the colonial economy interacted with Burkinabè societies and economies to shape mobility. The second answer focuses on individual migrants. The survey data allow us to explore how Burkinabè men and women perceived and reacted over time to the pressures to migrate and the opportunities for migration. Almost all men who

migrated in the 1900–1931 period implicitly identified movement between their rural homelands and international destinations as a journey between contrasting economic systems. Virtually all of them described themselves as wage earners. Whether men migrated as requisitioned workers to Côte d’Ivoire, or as ‘free’ labour to Ghana, or as employees of the colonial state to other destinations, they usually received some monetary compensation. Conversely, migrants associated return migration with a departure from wage labour and a return to a pre-capitalist economy. About 60 per cent returned to work their own farms and about 40 per cent to work as ‘unpaid’ family labour.

In the first half of the last century, return migration closed the circle of international migration by bringing Mossi and non-Mossi back to the pre-capitalist societies of rural Burkina Faso, with little difference between the periods 1900–1931 and 1932–1946. Nearly all who returned to the pre-capitalist rural economies of Burkina Faso either farmed for themselves or worked as ‘unpaid’ family labour. While it may be argued that this indicates that economic activity at international destinations had little influence on Burkinabè migrants, it may well be that those migrants who were not manual labourers were less likely to return to Burkina Faso than their less skilled countrymen and hence were less likely to be included in the survey. Capitalist relations were hardly more apparent in rural Burkina Faso in the period 1932–1946 than they were in 1900–1931. Most returning migrants were young single men. This is not surprising as they were young and single when they left, did not stay abroad for very long, and almost never married while away. Almost three-quarters of Mossi and non-Mossi migrants between the ages of 15 and 29 returned. Once back in rural Burkina Faso, over three-quarters of male migrants surveyed stayed for more than ten years. In the following years, however, the cyclical nature of the system became apparent.

Although the data are inadequate to provide a clear picture of this aspect of migration for the years 1900–1931, they show that 5 per cent of men who migrated in 1932–1946 left again in less than a year, another 10 per cent after one year or two, and another 8 per cent between three and nine years later. Hence a quarter of men who returned to rural Burkina Faso during this period left again within a decade.

In the social context of return migration, over half of the men who returned in both periods came back alone. Another large percentage (38 per cent in 1932–1946) returned with friends. Nearly all migrants returned to reside either with relatives or in their own houses. This pattern underscores the dichotomy that existed in the first half of the century between the pre-capitalist economy of rural Burkina Faso on the one hand, and the emerging capitalist economies of Côte d'Ivoire, colonial Ghana, and other foreign destinations on the other. Most men returned from wage labour abroad to farm outside the wage labour sector in Burkina Faso, living at their own places or with relatives. Capitalist rent did not exist, at this time, in non-capitalist rural Burkina Faso.

By 1946, a half century of labour policies designed to extract Burkinabè labour had made Burkinabè societies increasingly dependent on regions of capitalist development near the West African coast. Already in the 1920s and 1930s, the need for cash to pay head taxes and to buy imports had provoked the migration of more and more men. The continuation of requisitioned labour and the reinstitution of forced labour in 1936 swelled the numbers, as some migrants agreed to work for the colonial state and other enterprises, and as others fled to colonial Ghana where they found work on their own. By the end of the period and just before the Second World War, Burkinabè societies were sufficiently articulated with capitalist economies – on the coast, in the urban areas of Burkina Faso, and even in some rural areas of

the colony – for coercion to become much less ‘necessary’ than it had been.

Colonial era voluntary labour migration: 1946–1960

The end of the war in 1945, the abolition of ‘prestations’ and pseudo-voluntary contract labour in 1946, and the reconstitution of colonial Burkina Faso in 1947 altered the conditions influencing migration. Burkinabè and other foreign labour remained important in Côte d’Ivoire, eventually leading planters there to inaugurate a new system. In 1951, with the support of the Ivorian government, planters, as well as forestry companies, founded the Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l’Acheminement de la Main d’Oeuvre (SIAMO) (Ouédraogo 1976). The measures taken by SIAMO had the desired effect. In 1952, SIAMO contracts attracted about 39 000 Burkinabè men, and over the next seven years about 20 000 men migrated to Côte d’Ivoire annually under the auspices of the organisation (Deniel 1968). In addition, many Burkinabè migrated independently. The deterioration of the economy in Gold Coast, the boom in Côte d’Ivoire, and the slower pace of economic change in colonial Burkina Faso all contributed to this increased flow. Mandé (1992) goes so far as to conclude that Burkinabè migrants were essential for the ‘Ivoirian miracle’ of the 1950s and 1960s.

Ironically, it was only when forced and quasi-forced labour were eliminated that Côte d’Ivoire finally succeeded in attracting the needed Burkinabè migrant labour – both policies had been intended to produce increased numbers of migrants to the coast (Gregory 1974). ‘Prestations’ and contract labour before the war and freer labour recruitment afterward represented variations on a single theme: how to extract African workers from the domestic economy and redirect their energies for varying lengths of time to the foundation and

development of capitalism in French West Africa. In keeping with the concern – on the part of both advocates and opponents of colonial expansion – that the empire not drain resources from the metropolis, the administration imposed head taxes in French West Africa as early as 1900, with the provision that ‘the colonies, with their own resources, must cover all the expenses incurred by the metropolis in the colonial territory’ (Suret-Canale 1964: 432).

How did such taxation produce migration? For most households, the only option was to sell their own labour. This was not possible within the limits of most villages; hence, as Suret-Canale (1964: 437) observes, ‘[head taxes contribute] to emigration: unable to earn money locally, the Mossi or the Bambara and Peuhl “navétanes” will go looking for it elsewhere’. Obligatory cash crop production was a double-barrelled weapon: it aimed to force participation in capitalist production and to extract marketable wealth that could be used to finance the colony. By the early 1920s, colonial economic policy at the highest level had targeted Burkina Faso for cotton production.

The most important form of migration provoked by obligatory cash crop production was indirect, and took the form of flight. It was not only the obligatory production of commercial crops that stimulated this flight. To one degree or another, all the colonial policies described above produced similar responses. Even though the authorities feared flight, their policies produced it. In the years between the French conquest and national independence, many Burkinabè concluded that flight was their only viable option.

What do the data from the first National Migration Survey show for the period 1946–1960? The first important change is that international destinations other than Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana completely disappeared, so it is not possible to speak of three subsystems of international migration during this

period (see Appendix 1a). Survey data show that Côte d'Ivoire replaced Ghana as the most important international destination for Burkinabè men. These data also indicate that work, or wage labour, was the dominant reason for male emigration to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. This shift, from forced labour to work as the single most important motive for international emigration, was a watershed in Burkinabè labour history. The change is certainly not surprising, given the abolition of forced labour. Surprisingly though, some forced migration continued, particularly during 1947–1959: the data show 14 and 19 per cent of moves from rural Mossi and other rural regions to Côte d'Ivoire and 22 per cent from rural Mossi areas to other international destinations are still made under forceful conditions. This persistence of forced labour suggests that it took some time for official policy to become effective.

Data on occupational status show that the international migration of Burkinabè men in the years 1947–1959 was closely associated with unskilled wage labour. Over 95 per cent of men who left colonial Burkina Faso in these years fell into that category. The low levels of unpaid family labour among migrants reflect the dimensions of this migration: single, individual migration, for wages. In this period, the occupations of international migrants to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire remained much the same as they had been in the first half of the century. All other available data confirm this picture: by and large, Burkinabè men in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were unskilled labourers working in mines and on plantations – producing mostly coffee but also cocoa, bananas and pineapples.⁴⁸

48. For information on Mossi in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire for the period 1960–1973 see Kohler 1972, Lesselingue 1975 and Rémy 1968. For earlier years see Rouch 1965 and RHV 1972. Labour force statistics from Côte d'Ivoire paint the same picture: Burkinabè migrants occupied the bottom rungs of the occupational ladder (RCI 1960; Cornelisse 1973).

The socio-demographic characteristics of the Burkinabè migrants – the duration of migration and their ages and marital status at migration – underscore the continued circular nature of the system in 1947–1959. Duration of stay at destination continued to be short; migrants remained young and single and lived in rented lodging.

International female migration during the colonial period: 1900–1960

According to the National Migration Survey, large percentages of women did not participate in international migration in the early twentieth century. Female migration was, however, more significant than much of the literature suggests. In 1900–1931, for example, about 14 per cent of moves by Burkinabè women were to or from international destinations. In the period 1932–1946, a notable increase in international female migration was registered. As a percentage of the total, moves from and to Burkina Faso and international destinations doubled to 30 per cent between 1932 and 1946. As with men, the survey suggests that Côte d'Ivoire was the most important destination for women in this period. During the same period, the roster of other international destinations for women also diversified. A major finding of the National Migration Survey, then, is that the migration of Burkinabè women to international destinations was considerably more common than previously thought.

The period 1947–1959 witnessed a greater reduction in international migration for women than for men. Such mobility accounted for 17 per cent of female moves compared with 85 per cent for men. Circular migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana accounted for 88 per cent of female mobility to international destinations. As with men, these sets of circular flows originated from and returned to rural areas in Burkina Faso.

International female migration was motivated largely by domestic or family concerns. However, a few distinctive features are worth mentioning. In 1932–1946, forced labour led to the migration of about 5 per cent of women who went to international destinations. Most of these women probably worked as cooks for male labour conscripts or military recruits. Wage labour does not appear to have been a significant motive. Over all periods, rural Burkinabè women moving to and from international destinations identified themselves for the most part as domestic labourers. Nonetheless, a small but notable percentage of women also worked for wages as office employees, vendors and teachers. Over time, these proportions increased as employment patterns diversified somewhat with the development of the colonial administration and the capitalist economy.

Burkinabè women who migrated to international destinations were generally young. In fact, over the two periods 1932–1946 and 1947–1959, women apparently moved at younger and younger ages. Women also migrated at much younger ages than men did, a pattern consistent with the fact that ages at marriage for women were lower than for men. In addition, women remained much longer at destinations than men. In the case of migration from rural areas in particular, women stayed, on average, five years more than men. Women's patterns of residence also differed from those of men: in all periods about half of all women lived with their husbands on arrival.

Colonial management of international migration, then, initiated a sex-specific migratory system. Whether through forced or contract labour, whether because of the imposition of head taxes and cash crops, men became involved in a circular, wage-labour, migration regime while, on the whole, women stayed behind. The articulation of domestic and capitalist modes of production was made possible by this

sexual division of labour and mobility (Gregory & Piché 1985). The next section suggests that this migration regime did not change radically through the 1970s.

3. National management of international migration: 1960–1975

With independence in 1960, the new government of Burkina Faso attempted to reorient migration flows, while at the same time increasing benefits from emigration. In the eyes of the Burkinabè elite, emigration, in particular to Côte d'Ivoire, was a counter-productive colonial policy that favoured the development of their neighbour over that of their own country. They reacted by promulgating new policies aimed at stemming emigration and stimulating the development of Burkinabè agriculture, to encourage young men to stay home.

Government policies after independence were in part a reaction to colonial policy and the abuses that it had created. Officials expressed concern about the exploitation of individual migrants, the low wages paid to Burkinabè men in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in general, the limitations on the funds and goods that migrants were able to send or bring back to their families, and the collective loss of productivity to the mother country. Two important measures were taken soon after independence to alleviate this situation. In March 1960, the government signed an agreement with Côte d'Ivoire, and in June 1961 customs barriers between Burkina Faso and Ghana were abolished (Ouédraogo 1986). Following the suppression of SIAMO in 1959, which some groups in Burkina Faso perceived as a colonial institution serving mainly colonial interests, the 1960 agreement aimed at regulating labour migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. In practice, however, the agreement governed only the agricultural sector in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, the accord was undermined by the fact that most Burkinabè who emigrated to Côte d'Ivoire

did so without assistance from the Burkinabè government's employment office (Deniel 1974; Cornelisse 1973).

Apart from direct efforts to confront the emigration dilemma in the period 1960–1975, the Burkina Faso government formulated two plans to address migration indirectly. In 1967, the 'Plan Cadre' recognised emigration as a problem although it neither analysed the issue nor proposed solutions. Toward the end of the period, the five-year plan of 1972–1976 raised the topic of migration but dealt with it only superficially. Over the long term, it stressed the need to 'define the best use (of demographic potential) through judicious distribution of rural and urban inhabitants inside the borders of the country and through profitable use of the labour force which Upper Volta sent to neighbouring countries' (RHV 1972: 3). The plan further emphasised the need to control emigration and to negotiate agreements with countries using Burkinabè labour (RHV 1972). Such recommendations were in part a reaction to the increasing politicisation of the issue of foreign workers in both Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

Overall, such efforts to regulate emigration were unsuccessful. Many Burkinabè migrated outside the official system. In addition, an agreement with Côte d'Ivoire was implemented only with great difficulty. Between 1966 and the revocation of the accord in 1974, Côte d'Ivoire expelled many Burkinabè migrants. Furthermore, many employers did not make the agreed-upon payments to the Burkina Faso government to help cover costs of recruiting workers and lodging them on their way south. Finally, the presence in Côte d'Ivoire of large numbers of Burkinabè labourers who had migrated outside the official system meant that employers had little incentive to respect the terms of the agreement (Ouédraogo 1986).

Overall, then, official preoccupation with emigration in the years 1960–1975 led to little concrete change. The

government could not force compliance with agreements regarding labour mobility. Coulibaly (1978) concludes that nothing really changed after independence with respect to international migration – a judgment quite consistent with the opinions of men and women interviewed in the course of the National Migration Survey.

The government's second strategy – the promotion of development within Burkina Faso – was more successful. As noted earlier, monetary needs were the main motive for migration. To respond to this need, the new government attempted to devise programmes that would allow Burkinabè men and women to work in their own country to earn the income they needed. The post-war era marked a slow development of capitalism in Burkina Faso. Trade and production for exchange had of course existed for centuries prior to colonial conquest. European intervention brought increased commercial agricultural production and the fragile beginnings of a capitalist industrial base. Burkinabè economies and the larger federation of French West Africa were increasingly integrated into the metropolitan French economy and the larger European world economy of which it was a part.

As a partial consequence of the slow expansion of commercial agriculture, industrial development, which was dependent on the transformation of agricultural products in its early phases, also stagnated. In the 1950s, only a handful of factories existed: two small cooking oil refineries at Bobo-Dioulasso and Boromo, a cotton ginning and cleaning factory in Bobo-Dioulasso, a temporary workshop for the fabrication of concrete railroad ties (sleepers) at Dafinso, and several small workshops for the treatment of sisal. All but one closed their doors between 1957 and 1958 (Suret-Canale 1972).

If agriculture was stagnant, rural handicrafts were in resolute decline. Local cloth produced by women competed

very poorly with manufactured textiles imported from Europe and Côte d'Ivoire or made by the German-based Voltex company in Koudougou. The production of ploughs and hoes by SOVICA (Société Voltaïque d'Intervention et de Coopération avec l'Agriculture) in Ouagadougou undermined blacksmithing. Cobblers faced competition from Bata, a multinational shoe manufacturer with a large factory in Ouagadougou. Finally, the preparation of food for sale, a sphere previously dominated by women, increasingly gave way to industrial foods, including beer prepared from imported inputs (Ouédraogo 1976). But the decline of crafts production was not only the result of competition with manufactured goods. Labour shortage was also a contributory factor.

The expansion of the Burkinabè rural economy was also hampered by a lack of credit facilities. Banks invested very little in agricultural ventures, preferring to make more profitable short-term loans to commercial companies and to provide operating capital to larger firms. In the agricultural arena, the Banque Nationale du Développement (BND) limited itself to short-term loans (Sanogoh 1977). Even this credit was directed primarily to bilateral or multilateral organisations engaged in commercial agriculture (Ouédraogo 1976).

Beginning in 1966, the government attempted to tackle these problems through specific rural development policies. Successive national plans for 1967–1970, 1971 and 1972–1976, emphasised the development of the rural sector, the principal motor of the Burkinabè economy (RHV 1968, 1971). Investments in the rural sector were channelled through Organismes Régionaux de Développement (ORD –Regional Development Offices), which were intended to be the major agents of rural development. The two extensive studies that examined the performance of the ORD both concluded that the results were rather modest (Gregory 1974; Ouédraogo 1986). In conclusion, it can be said that little genuine rural

development occurred in the period 1960–1973. It was impossible for farmers to earn the money they needed in Burkina Faso; labour migration remained the only alternative. Compared with this poor record of development, the expansion of capitalism in Ghana, albeit faltering, and economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire seemed spectacular indeed.

South of the border, two underlying characteristics of the Ivoirian economy made rapid expansion possible: a highly profitable environment for foreign capital mostly from Europe and North America, and the availability of foreign labour. The foreign labour was primarily African, and half of it was Burkinabè – by and large unskilled, low-paid and poorly organised. These unskilled foreign labourers earned lower wages than Ivoirian workers, who tended to hold the more skilled jobs. Although comparative wage data are sparse, a 1967 study of wages is instructive. This analysis of the secondary sector concluded that while 68 per cent of non-Ivoirians earned a monthly wage below 15,000 CFA francs⁴⁹, only 42 per cent of Ivoirians earned this little. Conversely only 17 per cent of non-Ivoirians earned more than 20,000 CFA francs per month, whereas 47 per cent of Ivoirian workers did so (Joshi et al. 1976). Low levels of unionisation among foreign workers were partially responsible for this salary gap. Unskilled foreign labourers, often temporary migrants without political rights, constituted a docile and flexible labour force; and while they were often conscious of this situation, they did not take any serious steps to alter their circumstances.

In summary, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso represented the two extremes of capitalist development in West Africa. Ironically, it was the interdependence of the two that generated

49. The CFA franc is the common currency (within two separated regions) of 14 countries in West and Central Africa, 12 of which are former French colonies.

this inequality. A rapidly-growing proletariat in Côte d'Ivoire, much of it Burkinabè in origin, fed the capitalist expansion (Ouédraogo 1986). Wage labour (though poorly remunerated), an abundance of land, new crops, better markets for food products, and an absence of head taxes and other levies attracted larger and larger numbers of migrants from the north (Fieloux 1980). Meanwhile, in Burkina Faso, peasant households struggled to preserve a slowly deteriorating domestic agriculture in the face of the massive loss of young and able-bodied men and women who emigrated not only to Côte d'Ivoire but also to the cities and less populated parts of the country, where land is less scarce and available for settlement.

Turning now to migration patterns in the years bracketing independence, the National Migration Survey shows that Côte d'Ivoire (rather than Ghana) continued to be the most important international destination for Burkinabè men. In 1960–1973, for example, migration from rural Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire and back amounted to 55 per cent of all moves; the comparable figure for Ghana was only 18 per cent. Although the data on Burkinabè international migration found in colonial documents and other historical sources are not directly comparable to the National Migration Survey, they confirm the patterns described above. Such information points to the acceleration of movement to Côte d'Ivoire (see Condé 1978; Quesnel & Vaugelade 1975).

With respect to the social characteristics of international migrants during this period, data from the National Migration Survey on motives show that work, or wage labour, was still the dominant reason for male emigration to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (more than 90 per cent). Although they do not differentiate among flows, two other studies based on the National Migration Survey offer additional insights concerning

reasons for migration. Based on motives for first migration, Coulibaly's 1978 analysis is the more thorough and demonstrates that the need for money was paramount, particularly to pay taxes. In the second study, Coulibaly, Gregory & Piché (1980) observe that differing economic situations did not determine whether some men migrated abroad while others remained at home. Both migrants and non-migrants endured precarious economic conditions.

If that was the case, why did some migrate while others stayed in Burkina Faso? The main explanation offered by these studies is that migration is a collective household economic strategy in which some members are designated for migrant labour and others chosen to stay home to work the fields and take care of the family (Coulibaly 1978; Coulibaly, Gregory & Piché 1980). The different kinds of data collected in the National Migration Survey – individual motives and opinions as well as conclusions based on group discussions – all support this judgment. Migration was thought to be necessary for economic survival and in that sense it was perceived as a 'good' thing. It also disrupted family life and domestic production and was therefore perceived as 'bad' (Coulibaly, Gregory & Piché 1980). Thus individual perceptions and opinions are expressed with the whole family in mind.

As for occupational status, the international migration of Burkinabè men in the years 1960–1973 is, as has been mentioned, closely associated with unskilled wage labour. With respect to employers, the situations in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire remained quite distinct. In nine of every ten migrations to Ghana, migrants worked for Ghanaians. Among men who went to Côte d'Ivoire, only about two-thirds had Ivoirian employers, with European employers still important, accounting for some 30 per cent. Very few migrations involved Burkinabè as employers, underscoring the absence of

Burkinabè capitalism abroad. The absence of change over these years represents a prolongation of earlier trends.

The socio-demographic characteristics of mobility (the duration of migration and the ages and marital status of migrants at migration) underscore the continued circular nature of the system. Lengths of stay at destination continued to be short (less than two years). Migrants from the rural Mossi region still remained for shorter periods than their rural, non-Mossi counterparts. The ORSTOM survey on Mossi labour migration corroborates this finding, concluding that more than 70 per cent of moves to international destinations were for less than two years (Kohler 1972; Rémy 1968). Data from the National Migration Survey show that this pattern was also reflected in moves from other rural areas.

The durations of migrations from rural Mossiland to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, although still short, increased somewhat over those in the previous period. This decline in short-term migration has been noted elsewhere in the literature (Kohler 1972; Gregory 1974; Capron & Kohler 1976; Rémy et al. 1977; Finnegan 1980). Two economic factors may explain the more prolonged stays in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana: the rapid deterioration of the Mossi rural economy and the corresponding growth of non-agricultural employment in both destination countries. Finally, as in the earlier period, migrants remained young and unmarried.

International female migration: 1960-1973

In the 1960-1973 period, international migration remained much less important for women than for men, accounting for only 30 per cent of female moves compared to 80 per cent for men. Circular migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana accounted for 80 per cent of mobility to international destinations. Again as with men, these sets of circular flows originated in and returned to rural areas in

Burkina Faso. In the years immediately after independence, international destinations for women approximately resembled those for men, although moves between these countries and Burkina Faso made up a smaller part of overall migration.

Wage labour once more does not appear as a significant motive for women migrants. Furthermore, factors associated with female migration remained the same as for previous periods. The history of migration among Burkinabè women over the three quarters of a century between 1900 and 1973 leads to two sets of conclusions. The first concerns patterns of mobility and their significance. Although migration patterns among Burkinabè women became more diversified, most female migration still consisted of moves between rural areas within Burkina Faso. As late as the period 1947–1959, rural-rural flows accounted for more than half of all moves by women. Even so, migration to cities and to country towns had increased nearly three times over preceding periods. Migration to international destinations had also become more important but still remained marginal. Even though Burkinabè women reported a greater variety of destinations over the periods documented by the National Migration Survey (from which these conclusions are drawn), it may be argued that the significance of their migration had not substantially changed. Female migration within the rural sphere reflected domestic social relations: most women said they migrated to get married or to accompany their husbands. They worked mainly as unpaid family labour in the domestic sphere. Even among women who moved from villages to towns and cities, most did so with their spouses. Another small proportion were unmarried women who moved with relatives, probably their parents. Only a very few migrated by themselves and found wage employment in the capitalist sector.

Despite this picture, however, it would be misleading to classify the mobility of Burkinabè women as simply 'family migration'. Marriage, reproduction, and economic production are all part of the larger process of social reproduction. As such, 'family migration' also was, and is, economic migration. To a large degree, the migration of women in Burkina Faso in the colonial and early independence eras was linked to prevailing gender divisions of labour. Female migration, particularly in rural areas, may have been most directly associated with marriage, but it was also linked to reproduction and subsistence production. Although the configurations were somewhat different, this was also true for women who moved to urban centres in Burkina Faso and even to international destinations (Findley 1989).

The second set of conclusions stems from the very different, but complementary, nature of international male and female migration. The migration of Burkinabè women to international destinations was, and has remained, limited, because they have not yet been involved in wage labour migration. Those women who did migrate accompanied the very few men who migrated with spouses. It is the men who were, and have remained, directly associated with circular migration. As a system, however, circular migration involves specific sexual divisions of labour and patterns of labour mobility. Thus, female migration finds its more direct explanation in reproduction: circular systems can survive only if people are 'produced' in regions of origin. But survival is also linked to food production. The women who stayed behind played a major role in the production of subsistence foodstuffs and, increasingly, contributed to the income of the household (see Findley & Williams 1991). The circular migration of men, on the other hand, took them to destinations where they could earn the wages needed for the household's survival. But it also allowed them to return to their societies to marry and gain access to land.

Just as the circular migration system that linked Burkinabè men with the international economy changed over the four periods examined here, so the migration patterns of women also changed. And yet it is clear that maintaining the circular system was a delicate balancing act. The institutions in Burkinabè societies that governed the operation of the system, those related to reproduction in particular, changed very slowly. Female international migration on a large scale would have certainly disrupted the system. The fact that very few women migrated to international destinations, and that those who did were for the most part women accompanying their husbands, is suggestive of the high degree of control exercised by Burkinabè societies over the mobility of both men and women.

This said, there are signs that the system is changing. International female migration increased, particularly in the periods 1947–1959 and 1960–1973, and migration by unmarried women became more common. But the slow pace of both developments is perhaps more an argument for, rather than against, the very conservative character of the social institutions associated with Burkinabè migration.

All in all, then, the data on female migration are best understood in the context of the economic strategies of rural households. Female migration was, and is, but one component of the regime of social reproduction, which was, and again is, itself linked to a production regime embedded in the domestic modes of production in Burkina Faso and in capitalist modes of production in the country and abroad. The operation of the Burkinabè circular migration system has depended not only on the articulation of these two modes of production, but also on the articulation of patterns of male and female migration. This sexual division of labour and mobility and its permutations are key to understanding the history of migration in Burkina Faso and the underlying relationship between circular migration and underdevelopment.

4. Regional management of international migration: 1975–2000

Since the end of the 1970s, West Africa has been engaged in a regionalisation of migration management.⁵⁰ The first stage of this process was the elaboration of an institutional framework during the 1970s and 1980s, mostly under the sponsorship of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), aimed at managing intraregional migration to create a common market characterised by the free movement of people, goods, services and capital.⁵¹

To promote this agenda, six protocols were signed between 1979 and 1990 and included as annexes to the ECOWAS founding treaty (ECOWAS 1999). These protocols aimed to establish, among member states, right of entry, and then, in succession over a fifteen-year period, abolish entry visas for stays less than 90 days, grant right of residence, and, finally, right to permanent residence. According to the founding treaty, these protocols would be incorporated in national legislation and come to constitute the framework for the regulation of international migration among member states. Parallel to the protocols, member states agreed to maintain common policies regarding travel documents, residence cards and harmonised forms of immigration and emigration.

With respect to the free movement of persons, although significant progress has been made, many obstacles still remain (Adepoju, 2010). On the positive side, entry visas for nationals of ECOWAS countries for stays less than 90 days have been abolished in all states. However, many factors still hinder circulation in ECOWAS space. Among these are harassment by security agents and ignorance of legal instruments. Annual

50. For this section see Kabbanji 2008; Adepoju 2009 and 2010, and Ouédraogo 2009.

51. For a recent study of regional integration in Burkina Faso see Kane 2008.

reports by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS all note, for instance, the minimal application of agreements regarding the right to residence and permanent residence. Although a regional legal and institutional framework of migration management has been set up by ECOWAS, much more effort is needed to ensure its implementation (Adepoju 2009). Furthermore, from the year 2000, new migration agendas have emerged bringing changes in the form and political focus of the regional management of international migration. Overall they have undermined steps towards freedom of movement in the region.⁵²

The situation prevailing between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso seems at odds with the thrust towards regionalisation described above. The emerging economic crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s led to more restrictive migration policies and the state adopted a programme of 'ivoirisation' of the labour force (Blion 1995). Intended at first to limit foreigners' access to jobs in the public sector, these measures were extended in the 1980s to include the private sector.

In the 1990s, a law was adopted that imposed greater restrictions on the entry and stay of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire. This law required an entry visa for all except nationals of ECOWAS countries, and a residence permit for all foreigners wishing to stay in Côte d'Ivoire for more than 90 days. Existing voting rights for ECOWAS nationals were suppressed in 1994 (Bredeloup 2003). In December 1998, a new law dealing with rural land entitlement was also adopted, making the allotting of titles to private land dependent on nationality and ethnicity (Chauveau 2002).

In addition, the Ivoirian government changed its population policy in the 1990s (Anoh 2006), adopting a series

52. See Kabbanji (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of migration political agendas in West Africa since 2000.

of programmes, one of which aimed at controlling international migration. Over time, the official discourse on migration has become more and more xenophobic, promoting among other things the notion of 'ivoirité', that is, being Ivorian by birth.

Over the same quarter century, Burkina Faso itself attempted to limit emigration to Côte d'Ivoire, following the lack of implementation of the 1960 Convention. This effort took two forms: controlling departures, and encouraging return migration. In 1981, a policy was introduced which required Burkinabè nationals wishing to work abroad to apply for a departure pass, but this was subsequently abandoned. As for incentives to return, the government set up a reinsertion programme in 1984 returnees were offered the opportunity to purchase a 400m² of land for 80 000 francs CFA, either for farming or for an urban residence. The objective of this programme was to channel migrant savings towards agricultural production or real-estate development, either of which would be likely to promote employment and the generation of income (Ammassari 2004). At the same time, large-scale projects requiring significant labour forces were started. Among these were the development of the Volta River valley, and road construction in the north. Furthermore, in 1984, the government finally abolished the head tax, identified as an important cause of emigration (Coulibaly 1986).

In brief, while ECOWAS has attempted to push a regional framework for the management of international migration aiming at facilitating free circulation and granting rights of residence and establishment among its members, Côte d'Ivoire has reneged on this and instead promoted increasingly restrictive immigration policies, and, in the interest of its citizens, Burkina Faso has tried to limit the emigration of its nationals.

How did these profound changes in migration policies in the last quarter of the twentieth century impact on migration

patterns between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire? The two national migration surveys of 1973–1974 and 2000 collected data on international migration which allow us to reconstruct migration flows and compare migration trends between these two periods (Kabbanji, Piché & Dabiré 2007). Although continuities are obvious, important new features which became apparent in the 1960–1973 period are clearly confirmed here.⁵³

First of all, the analysis of migration flows in 1995–2000 shows that – as in the previous period – migration between Burkina Faso rural areas and Côte d'Ivoire remained the largest single flow, accounting for about 58 per cent of all moves. Reconstitution of the migration matrix for 1995–1999 (five years before the survey) shows that most Burkina Faso migratory exchanges were with Côte d'Ivoire, this flow representing just over 60 per cent of all migration. Burkinabè rural areas were those mainly involved in this flow, with about 36 per cent of rural outmigration having been directed to Côte d'Ivoire and over 20 per cent of return migration implying that migrants were heading for rural areas in Burkina Faso. Net migration statistics also indicate that Burkina Faso remained a country of emigration. In the 1996 Burkinabè census, net international migration for 1995–1996 was estimated at –80 243 people (INSD 2000) – more than seven times the figure of –11 359 given for 1984–1985. Migration data from the 1996 census hence confirm the results of the 2000 National Migration Survey regarding the predominance of the flow from rural areas of Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire. The main rural areas of origin were Yatenga, Boulkiemdé, Sanmatenga, Passoré and Poni.

Nevertheless several indicators from the 2000 National Migration Survey point to a deceleration of rural outmigration from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire. Indeed, although still predominant in terms of all migrations, these data show both

53. See Appendix 2.

a decrease in departures and an increase in return migration for the 1995–1999 period. In these years, slightly more than 37 per cent of Burkinabè migrations had Côte d’Ivoire as a destination, whereas the percentage had been almost 47 per cent in 1969–1973, marking a decline of close to 10 per cent. Return migration from Côte d’Ivoire amounted to about 23 per cent of the total, compared to just over 17 per cent in 1969–1973 – a 6 per cent increase. Immigration and emigration rates between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire confirm these changes.

As indicated, the increase in movements experienced in Burkina Faso in 1995–1999 as compared with 1969–1973 was due to the increase in both internal immigration and emigration rates. Most of this increase concerned rural areas, for which the total or gross migration rate doubled. For urban areas, the net migration rate remained constant (see Beauchemin 2004).

Female migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire represented 17 per cent of all migration in 1969–1973 and had increased to around 25 per cent by the 1995–1999 period. This increase, too, was mostly due to return migration from Côte d’Ivoire, which involved relatively more women than men. These findings confirm those of the 1996 census which underlined the tendency for Burkinabè abroad to repatriate women and children, while international emigration continued to concern mostly young men.

In sum, the analysis of migration flows between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire shows a continuity between 1969–1973 and 1995–1999 characterised by three factors: the predominance of migration between rural Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, a negative net migration for Burkina Faso, and the predominance of young men in these movements. These common elements indicate that the circular migration system between these two countries indeed reproduced itself throughout the twentieth century. On the other hand, the shifts noted above are also noteworthy: the intensification of return migration, the

slowing-down of rural outmigration, and a greater involvement of women in these migrations.

An analysis of the socio-demographic characteristics of migrants also sheds some light on continuity and change in migration patterns. Although men who emigrated to Côte d'Ivoire continued to be motivated by the search for wage labour, data on types of occupation and employment status show an improvement in the socioeconomic insertion of migrants. More migrants were working as independent workers and as family helpers (*aides familiaux*), indicating that they had managed to acquire land and employ (migrant) family labour. The situation of return migrants also appears to have improved over this period, as data show an increase in wage labour and independent employment, and a decrease in the proportion of family helpers. A recent study based on the same data but using a longitudinal approach confirms that the being an 'international return migrant' accelerates access to first salaried job and to independent employment (Zourkaleini & Piché 2007).

While circular migration remains important, several sociodemographic indicators point to some changes in migration patterns. For instance, there was a decrease in the proportion of young, single men, with a corresponding increase in family migration: more men were migrating with their spouses or a member of the family. On the other hand, lengths of stay in Côte d'Ivoire increased, confirming the increasing importance of permanent Burkinabè settlement in that country.

As regards women, although migration was still motivated mainly by family considerations, the comparison between the two surveys shows that more women were migrating in search of wage labour. More migrant women were also independently employed, particularly in urban areas where employment possibilities are more diverse (Lejeune,

Piché & Poirier 2004). Also of note is the quantitative importance, since the 1980s, of female migration in West Africa, as well as the emergence of autonomous female migration aimed at satisfying women's economic needs (Adepoju 2002; Antoine & Sow 2000; Traoré & Bocquier 1998). However, according to our own data, the increase in international female migration does not necessarily indicate a greater individualisation of migration since the women making this migration are generally married and accompanied by their spouse. This new trend in female migration does, however, suggest a redefinition of the roles of women in the household, indicating a greater female contribution to the household budget. These data thus suggest that the migration system based on the circulation of men and the staying behind of women, which prevailed up to the 1970s, has been changing. Women are no longer confined to subsistence production and demographic reproduction; their mobility is more and more inscribed in the market economy.

The study by Lejeune, Piché and Poirier (2004) mentioned above also showed that rural migration of women aged 12 to 25 years was still linked to marriage or to accompanying a spouse – with the exception of the migration of women to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, the two largest cities in Burkina Faso. In both cities, the proportions of single women and of women who migrate for education purposes were substantial. This said, it must be underlined that female migration is still predominantly family- and marriage-oriented (Le Jeune, Piché & Poirier 2005; Comoé 2005).

In sum, analysis of actual migration trends between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire in the period 1975–2000 seems to reveal important inconsistencies with the migration policies advocated by national states and ECOWAS in the same period. On the one hand, the circular movement of unskilled male migrants still dominated international migration although

female migration and migration for purposes of permanent settlement were both on the rise. At the same time, Ivoirian immigration policies had become increasingly restrictive and the protocols adopted by ECOWAS had not been successfully implemented. As a result, the rights to residence and settlement remained only theoretical possibilities for many migrants, especially the unskilled. Indeed, mechanisms aimed at liberalising migration have involved mainly highly qualified labourers, which, according to our migration data, are a rare species in West Africa. Furthermore, the socio-economic integration of immigrants in receiving countries – illustrated here by the Burkina Faso-Côte d'Ivoire case study – is still not on the regional agenda. Finally, recent developments in West Africa, as exemplified the ECOWAS Common Approach adopted in 2008, focus only on multilateral and bilateral partnerships with the European Union. This has exacerbated the gap between migrants' needs and regional migration policies by concentrating on combating irregular migration and imposing restrictive measures to 'keep Africans in Africa' (Kabbanji 2008 and forthcoming).

Summary

When situated within the larger context of the history of international migration in West Africa since 1900, the contemporary management of international migration management in the region reveals major, if not irreconcilable, gaps between the needs of migrants' and official migration policies. In this chapter we have reviewed evidence regarding the evolution of migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire in the twentieth century – perhaps the most significant system of circular migration in West Africa. The first period analysed here covered the entire colonial period, although we identified two sub-periods distinguished by the prevalence of forced or of free migration. Despite these differences, the

political significance of migration management remained fairly constant during the whole period. Migration policies led to a decrease in migration flows and their replacement by a migration system more in tune with the changing interests and needs of the French colonial empire. Mobility was geared towards providing labour in the plantation economy and the construction of administrative infrastructures. While the French 'colonial project' chose Côte d'Ivoire as the locus of economic investments, it faced a major challenge in recruiting labour from non-monetised societies focused on the domestic economy. The colonial state thus instituted forced labour and imposed head taxes, payable in cash, in order to mobilise labour. These policies produced a circular migration system that lasted throughout the colonial period. This system sent mostly young single men from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire to work in plantations and on construction projects for a short periods, after which they would return home to marry and till the land. This system could be reproduced only through a strict sexual division of labour, with women staying behind to maintain the domestic economy. In the colonial era, these two French colonies were thus obliged to become part of a new system of regional integration dictated by forces and needs external to the peoples of the region. This system of migration management was not entirely successful insofar as many Burkinabè men fled to Ghana to escape forced recruitment for labour or military service. After the suppression of forced labour, head taxes, the imposition of cash crop production, the increased monetisation of the economy replaced forced recruitment as the bedrock of the circular migration system characterised by the articulation of domestic and capitalist modes of production.

From independence to the mid-1970s, migration management shifted from colonial to national hands. This migration management transition recalibrated migration to

meet national goals. In the 1970s the government of Burkina Faso realised how important Burkinabè emigrants were to the economic development of Côte d'Ivoire and how their departure had perpetuated the under-development of their regions of origin. National policies then came to focus on the retention of rural populations by promoting rural development and through bilateral agreements with Côte d'Ivoire. For the latter, the Burkinabè government set up an official agency to facilitate the recruitment of migrant workers for Côte d'Ivoire and ensure decent minimal working conditions. These policies were not very effective, however: rural outmigration continued on a wide scale, with most migration to Côte d'Ivoire simply taking place outside official channels. Moreover, the agreement concerning working conditions was not respected. Thus the circular migration system remained strong although there were changes such as increased female migration and longer sojourns in Côte d'Ivoire. These trends continued into the next period.

The third period we have documented covers the years 1975–2000, but focuses on the 1990s when a second transition in migration management shifted the focus from purely national issues to regional and global considerations. On the one hand, ECOWAS multiplied efforts to liberalise the circulation of people across the region in the 1980s by focusing on regional migration management and facilitating access to residence and permanent settlement. At the same time, ECOWAS has engaged since 2000 in the formulation of new strategic orientations regarding migration. This initiative is illustrated by its 'Common Approach' to migration unveiled during the 33rd Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Ouagadougou in January 2008. This approach aims at finding ways of optimising the benefits of migration for development and minimising the negative aspects of such mobility. A comparison of documents produced by ECOWAS

and WAEMU (the *West African Economic and Monetary Union*) in the 1975–1999 and 2000–2008 periods shows that, since the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, the political agenda of migration policy has shifted to privilege the multiplication of multilateral initiatives and the increased implication of external actors (Kabbanji 2008). These new orientations are mostly geared towards global and European priorities, particularly those of the European Union. Focus is now on managing Afro-European migration and restricting mobility from the global South. Proposed policies include trans-border cooperation, controlling irregular migration, and limiting incentives to emigration. The liberalisation measures that have survived mostly concern highly-skilled migrants and investors.

All these measures are at odds with the key migration issues illustrated here using the migration data from the Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire case. First, the strong emphasis on Afro-European interests stands in marked contradiction to the reality that over 90 per cent of international migration in West Africa takes place within the region itself. Second, migration within the region involves mostly unskilled labour, while recent migration policies favour the circulation of skilled workers – mainly graduate students, professionals and investors. Third, despite evidence of increased settlement migration in receiving countries of West Africa, residence and settlement rights, although theoretically part of the ECOWAS regional framework, are still not easily accessible.

It is important to echo Adepoju’s affirmation (2010) that West Africa is the only region on the continent that has designed any kind of institutional framework aimed at managing regional migration. The possibility of ‘migration without borders’⁵⁴ in West Africa is nevertheless still beyond

54. See Pécoud & de Guchteneire 2007.

reach. Recent developments in the political agenda concerning migration in West Africa seem to fly in the face of the institutional framework formulated in 1970s and 1980 which aimed at free movement within the region. It can be argued, as do Sané and Barry in the preface of their recent book on regional integration in Burkina Faso, that developments in West African countries are erecting barriers between populations that are already largely integrated culturally and socially on the one hand, and, on the other, states that are jealous of their national sovereignty and less and less capable of meeting the basic needs of their people (Sané & Barry 2008).

In our view, West African politicians and leaders should reorient their positions so that they are more in tune with West African migration realities, both past and present. The longstanding transnational practices of people and societies in the region require policies in keeping with the needs of migrants.

Appendix 1a. Bourkinabè migration flows 1969–1973 (ages 15 years and over at time of survey)

Origin	Urban area		Rural area		Côte d'Ivoire		Other country		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Urban area	15 990	2,6	19 639	3,2	6 968	1,1	2 356	0,4	44 953	7,3
Rural area	36 000	5,9	81 163	13,2	279 895	45,6	32 008	5,2	429 066	70,0
Côte d'Ivoire	5 771	0,9	99 481	16,2	0	0	0	0	105 252	17,2
Other country	5 897	1,0	28 064	4,6	0	0	0	0	33 961	5,5
Total	63 658	10,4	228 347	37,2	286 863	46,8	34 364	5,6	613 232	100

Note: Numbers and percentages are based on weighted data.

Source: Coulibaly, Gregory & Piché, 1980.

Appendix 1b. Bourkinabè migration flows 1995-1999 (ages 15 years and over at time of survey)

Origin	Destination							
	Urban area		Rural area		Côte d'Ivoire		Other country	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Urban area	83 042	4,1	106 153	5,2	27 394	1,4	10 913	0,5
Rural area	148 766	7,3	296 633	14,7	734 490	36,3	60 968	3,0
Côte d'Ivoire	37 487	1,9	434 623	21,5	0	0	0	0
Other country	24 377	1,2	59 393	2,9	0	0	0	0
<i>Total</i>	<i>293 672</i>	<i>14,5</i>	<i>896 802</i>	<i>44,3</i>	<i>761 885</i>	<i>37,6</i>	<i>71 881</i>	<i>3,6</i>
							<i>227 503</i>	<i>11,2</i>
							<i>1 240 857</i>	<i>61,3</i>
							<i>472 111</i>	<i>23,3</i>
							<i>83 770</i>	<i>4,1</i>
							<i>2 024 240</i>	<i>100</i>

Note: Numbers and percentages are based on weighted data.

Source: Kabbajji, Piché & Dabiré, 2007

Appendix 2. Socio-demographic characteristics of Burkinabè migrants (%), 1974-1999

Flow	Motive: Work/Money		Occupation: Agric./Planters		Migration length: 0-2 years		Matrimonial status: Unmarried		Migrated alone	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Origin-Destination										
Urban to urban	64,7	35,3	1,5	4,9*	48,1	51,8	72,1	49,4	72,8	47,4
Urban to rural	46,5	14,9	51,7	36,4	54,5	44,3	73,7	26,1	78,1	58,2
Urban to Côte d'Ivoire	24,2	11,7*	51,2	18,2*	73,9	42,1	84,1	23,3*	83,0	52,2
Urban to other country	47,3	19,0*	12,7	0,0*	60,5	75,8	62,3	48,0*	73,0	38,1*
Rural to urban	55,0	27,7	15,2	11,8	46,9	47,8	77,5	34,5	77,5	52,7
Rural to rural	22,7	6,6	70,7	66,9	44,6	26,4	47,9	9,7	47,7	53,7
Rural to Côte d'Ivoire	28,2	9,1*	83,8	63,3	65,7	38,7	60,6	13,6*	66,8	32,2
Rural to other country	39,5	10,6*	59,7	49,0*	70,6	57,3	63,4	16,3*	66,5	28,0*
Côte d'Ivoire to urban	21,9	14,5	13,2	5,9*	28,8	38,3	67,4	28,0	63,9	32,6
Côte d'Ivoire to rural	5,4	2,6*	92,1	70,9*	43,9	32,5	53,0	14,0	74,6	23,7
Other country to urban	43,4	6,3*	3,4	0,0*	44,9	55,3	57,9	48,7	69,6	44,1
Other country to rural	11,1*	2,2*	85	64,5	29,6	32,7	61,4	21,1*	72,3	35,2
Total	25,7	11,0	68,7	52,3	51,4	36,3	59,8	18,9	68,9	42,5

Note: 1. Numbers and percentages are based on weighted data.

2. *percentages based on fewer than 30 observations.

Source: Kabbanyi, Piché & Dabiré, 2007

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CHAPTER 4

Aiming for Latin America: African Immigration to Mexico

Maguemati Wabgou

Introduction

Within the framework of South-South international relationships ('horizontal cooperation') generally associated with the new connections between Africa and Latin America, and between African countries and Mexico in particular, the presence of African immigrants in Latin-American regions is increasing. This is the case with Mexico, even taking into account that Argentina and Brazil are regarded as the two main Latin American destination countries for African migrants.

The increasing number of African immigrants disembarking every year in Mexico is seen to be due, at least in part, to the toughening of migratory measures in European countries of destination, the geographic proximity of Mexico to the United States, the economic attraction of Mexico, and the global effects of modern communication. In this sense,

Mexico has become a destination of choice for greater flows of immigration originating from West African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Senegal, Ghana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire.

There are few research works on the contemporary African presence in Mexico; this chapter describes and accounts for the conditions of new African migrants in Mexico, including their methods of arrival and their establishment. This analysis therefore aims to explain why Africans arrive in Mexico as immigrants, asking: What are their nationalities? How do they arrive in Mexico? What are their economic activities in Mexico?

To provide answers to these questions that will help the reader to understand the issue of African immigration into Mexico, the chapter begins by presenting a theoretical framework for analysing African migrations in Mexico, and then provides a comprehensive analysis of actual African migrations in Mexico.

Theoretical approaches to the study of African migrations in Mexico

This section sets up a theoretical framework for a comprehensive analysis of African migration to Mexico, based on the tenets of three different theories: those of 'world culture' theory (Robertson 1992), those of 'push and pull theory' (Gurak & Caces 1998; Chaney 1979) and – due to the limitation of these two theoretical approaches in explaining certain details of the dynamics of African migration towards Mexico – those of 'historical bond' perspectives (Portes & Böröcz 1998; Castles & Miller 1993). We now look at these three theories in some detail.

World culture theory

World culture theory is a globalisation theory which describes globalisation as 'the compression of the world and the

intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole' (Robertson 1992: 8). Analytically, globalisation is a set of dynamic relationships among four core units – societies, the international system, individual selves, and humankind. It is seen as involving the 'conjunction of different forms of life' (Robertson 1992: 27). (See also Emory website⁵⁵.) This is expressed concretely through the interaction of actors or groups who may or may not hold different views of the world order.

This perspective is related to the 'world-systems' approach developed by Wallerstein (2010). Wallerstein considers that, since the shock of the globalising western world encountering the cultures and civilisations of the South in the sixteenth century, western hegemonies have impelled the expansion of the European capitalist economy, in order to incorporate the other world-economies until constituting themselves as dominant in the current world system.

The world systems perspective takes account of a cultural system, also known as a 'geoculture' (of the world system), that is able to provide coherence and legitimacy to all social relations. These transformations precede the advent of capitalist modernity because, from the seventeenth century to the end of nineteenth century, the formation and expansion of European states increased globalisation. This has continued until the present day, with international communications, transportation and conflict significantly intensifying relationships across societies – on the basis of ideas such as individual self, nation-state, world-economy and world-system. Indeed, this theory describes a global interdependence and awareness of the world as a whole in space and time.

Yet, by the end of the twentieth century, the world order was getting more and more problematic, due largely to the

55. A list of websites consulted is given at the end of this chapter.

negative effects of globalisation, conceived by Fazio Vengoa as:

a pyramidal configuration, from which are derived power asymmetries and real possibilities of optimizing resources for the international integration of nations, coming along with the differentiation between nations, especially those which are located in the underdeveloped or developing world, and the individualization of opportunities while destroying the solidarity mechanisms [and dynamisms], which are favourable for a better and more equal world. (Fazio Vengoa 1999: 61)

Globalisation is seen here as a process that ultimately dissolves the autonomy of social agents and practices in the contemporary world order, while connecting and stimulating a consciousness of connections, associations and relationships. Within the context of the processes and dynamics of relativisation, all the engaged elements or participants in the process of globalisation are compelled to assume a position and define an identity related to the global world. That is to say, although globalisation does not produce a common culture in which everyone holds the same beliefs and values, it does construct a common ground in which all the social agents pursue their goals by deliberate comparison with others, on the basis of certain measurements, made up from common principles.

After end of the cold war, that marked the ultimate or definitive failure of communism, these common standards or main beliefs contributed, from a fundamentally ideological perspective, to impose a 'Totally Unique Thought'. Also called the 'pensée unique' or 'single thought', the Unique Thought group represents the interests of free-flowing international capital; its arrogance has reached such an extreme that one

can, without exaggerating, call it modern economic fundamentalism or dogmatism. In his 'duel' with Thomas L Friedman, Ignacio Ramonet wrote, with dripping irony:

The pensée unique was born in 1944, at the time of the Bretton Woods Agreement. The doctrine sprang from the world's large economic and monetary institutions – the Banque de France, Bundesbank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, World Bank, and World Trade Organization – which tap their deep coffers to enlist research centers, universities, and foundations around the planet to spread the good word. (Friedman & Ramonet 1999: 117)

The defenders of world-wide and global systems believe that capitalism constitutes 'the insurmountable horizon' or 'the end of history'. They consider liberal democracy to be a unique and dynamic political system which is the only political option, economically viable for all countries (Fukuyama 1992). Universal questions then arise about what it means to live in this world and how it must be ordered. Differing answers to these questions have been formulated from various very different perspectives – according to the position of individuals and societies seen in relation to a system of societies and to the shared properties of humankind.

These opinions about world views indicate that globalisation entails 'comparative interaction of different forms of life' (Robertson 1992: 27), which allow confrontation, discussion and debate. Thus, the development of a 'world culture', rooted in European culture, derives from the global situation, with world culture denoting the multiple ways of defining the global situation – a situation seen as a set of responses to a shared predicament, and revealed through the close linkage between the process of globalisation and the issue

of 'globality'. This latter is conceived of as the cultural terms on which coexistence in a single place becomes possible. In other words, while admitting a multitude of historical processes, globality refers to the condition or state in which things are, or have become, global, through the conscious and intentional actions of many individual and collective human actors. Again:

World culture theory is a label for a particular interpretation of globalisation that focuses on the way in which participants in the process become conscious of and give meaning to living in the world as a single place. In this account, globalisation... covers the acceleration in concrete global interdependence and in consciousness of the global whole...It involves the crystallisation of four main components of the 'global-human circumstance': societies (or nation-states), the system of societies, individuals (selves), and humankind. (Emory website)

Rather than referring to many historical processes, this concept of globalisation captures 'the *form* in terms of which the world has moved towards unicity' (Robertson 1992: 175). According to this analysis, world culture theory depicts globalisation as an ongoing and open-ended set of processes that engender continuous change or transformation. At the same time as promoting a tightly-integrated world, it brings to light profound discrepancies in political, economic and religious fields. It is with the field of religion with which we shall soon be concerning ourselves in this chapter

Although the various conceptualisations of globalisation have produced competing world representations as critical sites of dispute, these may also be converted into places of common dialogue and cooperation for the actors involved. For example, in the area of religion, although religious beliefs,

traditions, practices and movements may provoke situations of disagreement in the global world, they may also bring believers together – admittedly mainly those of the same religion – in order to share their faith and experiences. The global context demands that both individuals and national societies should interpret their particular existence as parts of a larger whole – or within a common framework – which guides them, and allows them (individuals, collectives and states) to appeal to certain universal principles. For the purposes of this work, this would include the beliefs that lie behind migrations and the free movement of people, nationalism, and the sovereignty that is seen as legitimising particularising claims, such as cultural claims.

In this context, universalism and particularism have become part of a single nexus, united in terms of the universality of experience that increasingly spurs the expectation of particularity and the expectation of universality within the perspective of globalisation. Thus, ‘the universal must be made concrete’ (for instance state sovereignty being embodied in particular forms of government), and, at the same time, the particular becomes endlessly diffused (an example being that all peoples can and must have their distinctive identity). Hence, globalisation is ‘a form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process involving the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of universalism’ (based on Emory website, quoting Robertson 1992: 102).

This situation demands an immediate and universal response to the common predicament of living in a single world – a condition that provokes the formulation of opposing world views. Some theorists, for example, portray the world as an assembly of distinct communities, and highlight the virtues of particularism, while others view the world as developing toward a single overarching organisation which represents the presumed interests of all humanity. In a

compressed world, the comparison and confrontation of world views are bound to produce new cultural conflict – such, for example, as those related to the resurgence of fundamentalist groups identified as innovative traditionalists inserted into a globalised world, and carrying with them a specific global agenda. Such conflicts make the world integrated but not harmonious – a construct of shared consciousness, but prone to fragmentation (based on Emory website). The world is thus seen as a single but diverse place; global consciousness does not necessarily imply global consensus.

There is a need, now, to clarify the meaning of ‘cultural conflict’ that we use in this text. It is quite different from the one that derives from the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ theory, supported and expanded by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. Here, for instance, it is assumed that, in such cultural conflict, religious traditions play a special role: ‘since they can be mobilized to provide an ultimate justification for one’s view of the globe’ (Emory website). European religious patterns, such as Catholicism or Protestantism, have been introduced into the other Latin American, African and Asian worlds. This is the basis of the relevance of world culture in the context of migration from Africa to Mexico.

Religion is a critical area for debates related to migration since religious traditions and movements are prominently involved in producing competing ‘world images’. In this context, religious patterns are revealed as one of the cultural characteristics that may gather people, or separate them. Religion is conceived of as being a system of beliefs and practices that dictates many of the behaviour patterns of the people who identify themselves with these beliefs, because they have been brought up and socialised within the rules and allegiances of certain sets of values, approvals and prohibitions. The function of beliefs and religious practices in daily life and within institutions is understood in terms of human relations with the transcendental (and the metaphysical)

and the resulting rules of moral conduct. So, for example, with the impulse of world-culture, the Christian faith and the practices of Christian religion have been penetrating African societies over decades and centuries, until they have eventually become institutionalised.

Some members of these world communities are converted to or 'born again' into Christianity, or simply born into a Christian family, which *ipso facto* establishes their union with the Christian community of the world.⁵⁶ Thus, through the sharing of religious values and Western beliefs and a faith around 'the sacred', these believers around the world become an active part of the religious 'Christian community' in time and space. While sharing the vision of 'the Christian sacred', they communicate with the rest of their religious world, binding themselves spiritually to one another under the universal values of Christianity. Consequently Christian 'shepherds' – preachers, clergy and missionaries of any origin or nationality – can get together as they identify themselves with the rest of the world Christian community. This facilitates their mobility to different parts of the world in order to 'share' their religious faith and experiences with others ('Christian brotherhood' or 'discipleship') through 'communion' and evangelisation. In the same way, all members of their flocks are able to share in a common world faith culture, whether it be in Africa or in Mexico.

These theoretical statements of world culture theory are, however, in themselves not sufficient to explain contemporary African migrations towards Mexico. It is necessary therefore to complement them with one of the traditional theories of the migration studies, namely the 'push and pull' theory.

56. This idea alludes to the relational function of religion, considering the etymology of the word 'religion' (and hence the corresponding concept) that is derived from the Latin word *religare*, which means 'to bind again', 'to moor again', 'to re-connect' or 'to unite again'.

Push and pull theory

The most well-known approach to the roots of international migration flows is certainly the 'push and pull' theory, which argues that:

Recent large-scale movements of people across international boundaries...are directly related to the specific nature of the disparity in growth between developed and developing countries. These movements of people in search of greater economic opportunity occur not only because of 'push factors' (population pressures, land scarcity, overcrowded cities, joblessness and underemployment), but also because of marked wage differentials between the developed and developing world. (Chaney 1979: 204)

In other words, this theoretical orientation considers the manpower flows as a result of poverty in their areas of origin and presents a series of 'push factors' – bad economic, social and political conditions in the poorest regions of the world – and 'pull factors' – comparative advantages within the more developed nation-states – as the major determining variables in the magnitude and directionality of human migratory flows (translated from Portes & Böröcz 1998: 44).

This perspective allows the elaborating of an analysis of international migration flows, originating mainly from Africa on the basis of push and pull factors, since the limited capacity of the labour market to incorporate productively the annual cohorts of job-seekers turns them into potential emigrants:

...the current unemployment rate of one-third or more among secondary school and university graduates signals a crisis of migration. In several countries, especially Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Togo, the push of abject poverty is as compelling as the pull of enhanced living conditions in the countries of the North. (Adepoju 2006b: 7)

This is true also of pulls from the South, to places such as Mexico which is considered one of the more advanced countries of Latin America.

It is helpful to think of migration as a movement that arises from the exploited immigrant's place of origin and progresses towards the country of destination – identified as the 'exploiter'. Push and pull theory explains how implied factors on the 'macro' scale – associated for example with world culture within the framework of the world-system – constitute pressures on the populations of the Third World in general, and those of Africa in particular. In this sense, migrations are considered as a product of the 'structural imbalances between the societies of origin and destination [since] these structures create pressures in favour of population movements' (translated by the author from Gurak & Caces 1998: 88–89). Nevertheless, there exist criticisms of the push and pull theory with respect to its superficiality, and also because it fails to include other important elements, such as the gaps between groups and the disparity between individuals of a same country or region, which are also favourable for the production of migrations (translated by the author from Portes & Böröcz 1998: 45). Although this approach constitutes a fruitful starting point for shedding light on the mechanisms of African migrations towards Latin America, it does not explain labour migrations sufficiently well. Even combined with the statements of World Culture theory, the economic variables relating to poverty and economic stagnation prevail as the key elements of theoretical and empirical analysis. This situation does not explain all the mechanisms of migration production, nor the orientation towards some countries of Latin America. It is thus necessary to complement this theoretical analysis with other explanatory elements for these migration flows. The historical bonds established between the territorial units determined by push and pull factors can condition or orient

migratory flows towards these destinations. Much attention is being paid to the significance of universal and universalising values and ideas, derived from the phenomenon of globalisation, and driven by a world culture that is intrinsically associated with the world-system (or the world-wide system). We therefore now examine the role of historical bonds in the production and direction of migrations.

Historical bonds

The importance of historical bonds between countries sending emigrants and countries receiving immigrants is significant as a way of explaining the direction of international migration flows in general, and those of African origin towards Mexico in particular. This notion arises as an answer to the question that is still unanswered after analysing the 'push and pull' approach: why do the nationals of certain poor countries tend to emigrate exclusively towards certain other countries?

The answer is provided, in large part, by the work of Portes and Böröcz (1998), and that of Castles and Miller (1993), which depict a structuralist perspective of the relations between international migrations and other historical processes. Some examples of such relations would be, firstly, those that can be considered to be cooperation or agreement (for instance military or commercial) and, secondly, those which can be seen as imposed (such as invasion or colonisation). In order to make it easier to understand the complexity of migratory flows: their direction, their dimension, and the moment at which they occur, these authors conceive of migrations as social processes based on historical transformations. While complementing the traditional push and pull theory, Portes and Böröcz insist that 'the beginning of the manpower flow does not have its origin in jealous comparisons of economic advantages, but in a history of previous contacts between the sending countries and the receiving ones'. There have been constant historical

relations between the two categories of countries, on account of macro-structural determinants such as the mobility of capital, goods and services, technology, institutional forms, and the diffusion of Western ideas and tastes. These have spread through the global world in different directions, mutually influencing one another, causing flows and streams, and a variety of changes and interchanges (such as cultural innovations, and changes of values and styles of consumption in the sending society). In this context, 'migration flows, just like other international processes, do not take place between national units, conceived like partitions, but within a context of a system that transcends them and that is a product of a previous historical course of action' (Portes & Böröcz 1998: 69). Bonds between people, through historical contacts between the nations – and within the framework of this system⁵⁷ – have conditioned and determined the direction of migratory movements. That is to say, the historical dimension of the relation between receiving nations and sending societies constitutes a key element in explaining the origin and direction of migration flows.

At this level of analysis, colonisation is seen as the historical phenomenon that most convincingly explains the direction of migration flows, because this trend has prevailed between colonised and colonising countries. Colonisations have been the result of political decisions determined by economic reasons. In periods when historical relationships are peaceful and can grow, the natives of a colony or ex-colony can immigrate relatively easily to the colonising state, where some may even enjoy a new nationality (Castles & Miller 1993). Over a period of time, human interchanges are established in the form of migratory flows between sending and receiving territories. Thus 'migration movements generally arise from

57. This is a system which is partly driven by world culture.

the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries, based on colonisation, political influence, trade investment or cultural ties' (Castles & Miller 1993: 21). Similarly, Dumont (1995) refers to the formation of 'migrant origin and destination country pairs' throughout history; that is to say:

history also mixes with the migratory relations: either it reinforces the pairing countries of origin with countries of destination or it gives birth to other or new pairs of historical migratory proximity...A pair of sending and receiving countries is thus formed by two countries that have been experiencing regular migratory exchanges...because of their proximity or their respective history. (Dumont 1995: 167-172)

Migration flows also arise as a result of historical contacts derived from various forms of cooperation, agreement or enforcement, which serve as vehicles of political, economic and cultural interchanges between sending and receiving nations. The combination of historical political decisions is thus a main generator of migration. It is clear, however, that these waves of migration are not the same as forced migrations, derived from conquests, the traffic of slaves, and general conflicts; they are spontaneous, arising from invitations addressed to guest workers by industrialised countries (Portes & Böröcz 1998: 46-47). In any case, it is certain that current migrations are occurring more and more as a result of personal or individual decisions – conditioned or supported by social relations that may become collective decisions or strategies. Such migratory waves are also gradually developed and influenced by resources of another nature – for example social and migratory networks that reflect relations based on kinship requirements, friendship and community. These relations,

arranged between migrant workers, serve as support to their behaviours and motivations. They preserve the ties between sending communities and receiving ones, while contributing also to the formation of enduring migratory flows, that is to say, to the formation of migratory systems.

Without ignoring the relevance of the theory of social networks in explaining African migrations to Mexico, this chapter does not include it for special discussion. The main reason for this is that the three approaches (world-system theory, push and pull approach and the historical bonds perspective) that have been discussed as complementary theoretical options seem to this author to be more significant than social network theory. Including social networks theory would, what is more, create theoretical overloading of this chapter. The chapter presents an exploration of actual African migration to Mexico; in the words of Adepaju:

A variety of interrelated factors – rapid growth of the population and the labour force, decades of stunted development, the so-called lost decade, the debt overhang, deregulation and restructuring of the economy – have rendered high proportions of the work force unemployed while wages for those in employment have plummeted dramatically. The sub-region's rapidly-growing population places tremendous strains on the development process, and creates conditions for migration through its linkages with labour force growth and unemployment. Unemployment has deepened, in part because of the rapid growth in the labour force in the face of contractionary fiscal and monetary policies which resulted in the retrenchment of workers in the public service. (Adepaju 2006b: 7)

Another factor to be considered is the influence of international networks of migrant traffickers in the continuing

of migratory flows. This allows to Portes and Böröcz make the following assertion (translated):

Nation-States play a key role, but not an exclusive one, in this [global] system that also includes the activities of a multiplicity of non-state actors, including large corporations and working class families. The activities of these non-official actors, beyond the national borders, explain the limited effectiveness of legal efforts to regulate immigration. The state policies designed to control those migration movements are often avoided or nullified by opposing actions of other participants in the process [such as trafficking networks]. (Portes & Böröcz 1998: 69)

In summary, historical processes and the global system (world culture) impose certain rules of conduct or lifestyles that condition and orient actions to emigrate, and at the same time social inequalities – such as bad economic, social and political conditions (push factors), and the comparative advantages of the more developed nation-states (pull features) – constitute the determining variables of current international migrations.

Contemporary migrations of Africans to Mexico

To study the phenomenon of the current African immigration into Mexico requires an exploration of the literature on migration to Mexico, but unfortunately there exists very little research on African migration flows to Mexico. An outstanding research work, however, is that of Cangabo Kagabo (2000) – a paper presented at the Tenth International Congress of the Latin American Association of Studies of Asia and Africa (ALADAA), and this section is therefore very influenced by his work on the current presence of Africans in Mexico.

Articulating the analysis of the African presence with the one of Mexicans of African descent, Cangabo Kagabo considers that:

...it is already known that the presence of Africa in the so-called New World in general, and in Mexico in particular, is circumscribed within the framework of the past and historical present – through which millions of Africans were brought as slaves for almost four centuries (XV–XVIII) – in America and in the Antilles, where African history and cultures are still alive through the descendants of the African victims of Black slavery. (Translated from Cangabo Kagabo 2000: 1)

Today, this African presence is much emphasised and vindicated, both by those same descendants and by a number of ad hoc research projects of which the most remarkable one for us in Mexico is the *Third Roots* (*Tercera Raíz*) project, run by Dr Luz María Montiel, senior professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. This project stresses the cultural and historical contributions of Africa to the American world and the Antilles. The word ‘Third’ refers to there also being indigenous and European roots.

In this regard, it is important to note that it was not until 1992 that the Mexican government recognised African inheritance as a third ancestral root, after the European (Spanish) and native-indigenous ones. It is also worth mentioning that most of the research on Afro-Mexicans show the states of Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Puebla as the regions with the greatest concentration of populations with African ancestry.

Traditionally, the great majority of African emigrants have been migrating to the United States and European countries, but the declared objective of Europe to restrain these migrations

has made other destinations such as the countries of Latin America more attractive. It is evident that, since the closing of European borders as a result of increased African migration at the end of the 1990s, and the toughening of European migratory policies since September 11, 2001, more and more African immigrants have been arriving in Latin America – migrating to countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil.

Africans who immigrate into Mexico are generally motivated by scientific, cultural, religious, economic and political reasons. On the basis of oral sources, Cangabo Kagabo of the National Institute of Migration (Mexico) states that around three hundred Africans were living in Mexico by the year 2000 (Cangabo Kagabo 2000: 11). This change in the traditional destinations of African migration flows should be seen in a global context, marked by the search for new destinations. Particularly notable have been the Gulf states and other Middle Eastern destinations, as well as eastern Asia ('East Asia' or 'the Far East') where, according to Coloma (2010: 28–30), China is now one of the new destinations of African migrants.

While discussing new or recent trends in sub-Saharan migration flows, Zoomers and Adepoju⁵⁸ point to the Gulf and Middle Eastern states as new migration destinations:

Restrictive policies (in the US and Europe, but also within the migrants' own regions [where countries like Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Botswana tend to restrict migrations]) have led to an increased diversity of origin and destination areas. For example, migration from Nigeria to the EU was initially directed at the UK, but more recently an

58. Similar arguments have been made by Adepoju (2000) while examining the new trends in international migration within sub-Saharan Africa.

increased number of Nigerians have migrated to countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium as well as to the Gulf states. In the 1990s, Spain, Italy and Ireland emerged as new major destinations of labour migrants from West Africa (Black et al 2004: 9). Migrants from Kenya (originally focusing on South Africa, the UK and USA) nowadays also migrate not only to the Gulf states (lowly skilled labour), and the Middle East, but also to Germany (Rutten & Muli 2006). The Burkinabé (inhabitants of Burkina Faso...) are also migrating increasingly to Italy. (Zoomers & Adepoju 2008: 273–274)

The same issue has been raised by Cangabo Kagabo when he mentions:

the case of many Africans from Western Africa who move within this same region, or massive waves, originating from Central Africa, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, etc. and reaching Botswana or South Africa; it would also be the case of South-East Asia where the Asian Tigers (Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia) constitute, due to their progressive economic growth, main poles of attraction for migrants. In the same way, some small and very oil-rich countries of the Middle East (Kuwait, Dubai, Bahrain, etc.) or big ones like Saudi Arabia can be mentioned because they have been transformed into receiving countries of foreign workers due to the fact that they also have no sufficient native manpower. (Cangabo Kagabo 2000: 2)

Economic instability of African countries

At the economic level, the economic instability of many African countries, which is reflected through poverty, has brought

about the departure of significant numbers of its inhabitants – who no longer go in search of better conditions of life only in European countries but also in Latin American ones. Mexico attracts them economically, not only because it is the only poor country bordering the major world power (USA), but also for its emergence as a country member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is a club of rich countries.⁵⁹

Thus, due to its emerging economic viability, Mexico is playing a significant role as a representative of southern countries in the discourse on South-South, South-North and North-South international migration debates. This is chapter thus aims to draw attention to the fact that many Africans migrate to Mexico either with to work in the country or hoping to assure a future in the United States or Canada – where they could realise their ‘American dream’. For these African immigrants Mexico has become a country of transit migration – a transit country to the United States and Canada: ‘...the route through Mexico is the main route for most Latin American migrants on their way to the United States’ (Zoomers & Adepoju 2008: 271). But at the same time:

Mexico is a country that for a long time has been sending migrants to the United States, a practice that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The Mexican-US border reflects a very interesting but complex set of interrelationships. A defining moment in the construction of this border was the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) through which Mexico ceded half of its territory to the United States. From that moment onward Mexicans living in the ceded territories automatically became American subjects and in most cases US

59. For more details on the 33 member countries of the OECD see http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

citizens...Reliable statistics about the extent of Mexican migration to the US are difficult to find, in part because so many Mexicans cross the border undocumented and are therefore not registered by immigration authorities. In addition, many undocumented Mexicans lie about their status when census authorities interview them. (Marchand 2008: 223–224)

According to the IOM reports on migration issues in Mexico:

...irregular migrants from Mexico, Central America and many other countries cross or attempt to cross every day the 3,141 km Mexico-U.S. border, seeking a better life in North America. Around 450,000 undocumented Mexicans enter the United States every year, in addition to others from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and South America. The Mexican southern border with Guatemala has become the key crossing point for migrants coming from Central and South America, most of them in transit towards the United States. In 2004, around 215,000 Central American migrants were intercepted by Mexican authorities and returned to their countries of origin. Hundreds of smuggling organisations use the Mexican territory for their unscrupulous activities. At the same time, trafficking in persons has been increasing, exploiting Central American women and child migrants as well as through active networks in sex tourism locations. (IOM website)

Regarding documented immigration to Mexico, it is worth mentioning the report of the OECD according to which 'the number of permanent migrants (FM2 visa⁶⁰) more than doubled

60. FM2 visas are intended for people seeking permanent residency status in Mexico, or those who may seek eventual Mexican citizenship.

from 2007 to 2008, reaching 15 000. The majority (60%) of permanent migrants comes from Central America, such as neighbouring Guatemala and Honduras, but also from South America (Columbia, Argentina and Venezuela), and from Cuba and the Caribbean' (OECD 2010: 224). Although the African immigrants who arrive in Mexico for economic reasons are mainly unskilled or semi-skilled and belong to lower or lower-middle social class, there are also migrants with better economic prospects who look for new ways to make profits: these are those – such as trade or business immigrants⁶¹ – who migrate for commercial reasons. The next section therefore tackles another type of migratory phenomenon for economic motives, namely that of professional immigrants.

African migrations for scientific and cultural reasons

African migrations for scientific and cultural reasons imply displacements of certain type of African people: those who arrive in Mexico to study, to teach, to do research or to exchange scientific experiences with Mexicans. Usually, these migrations are settled within the formal framework of cooperation programmes between the Mexican government and those of the relevant African countries. Generally there are scholarships or academic and scientific interchanges programmes established by Mexican governments and African countries, but there also exist other types in agreements, promoted by international institutions in order to promote the activities of professional workers, that is, professional immigrants. These African immigrants are skilled people, with a high level of knowledge, who may arrive in any part of Mexico to apply their profession in the branches of their specialty. The reasons for such migrations lie within the

61. Categories of business immigrants include those such as investors, entrepreneurs and independent employees who immigrate, as well as 'own-account' workers or the self-employed.

functioning of historical bonds (as described above). Nevertheless, there exist other categories of skilled African immigrants who come to Mexico through their own adventurous initiative, with the purpose of staying and working in the higher levels of the Mexican labour market. Usually, they leave their countries of origin for political and/or economic reasons, hoping to become integrated into Mexican society.

Regarding the political determinants of migrations originating from sub-Saharan Africa, Adepoju states:

Political instability resulting from conflicts is a strong determinant of migration in the region. The political landscape in the region is unstable, unpredictable and volatile. Dictatorial regimes often target, harass and intimidate students, intellectuals and union leaders, spurring the emigration of professionals and others...Repressive totalitarian regimes which divert scarce resources from development activities to military expenditure, coupled with inconsistent policies, have scared investors and stifled development (Adekanye 1998). In Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone, basic infrastructure in schools, hospitals and homes was devastated by war, and family members scattered far and wide. (Adepoju 2008: 23–24)

The migration of these skilled African immigrants should be seen within the global framework of the brain-drain phenomenon. Earlier studies (Adepoju 2007, 2008; Oucho 2008; Wabgou 2008) have addressed the African brain-drain problem, including describing its impacts and offering some solutions. It is thus considered necessary:

to mention the alarming character of the brain drain phenomenon in Africa. As a sub-Saharan country,

Senegal suffers from the loss of its most-trained people after or during their academic or professional training, mainly to Europe and North America. The Senegalese educational system faces a very serious problem related to development: the country needs these graduates but cannot offer them anything that matches the attractive work conditions which prevail in their host countries. (Wabgou 2008: 145–146)

Indeed, in Africa, the ‘reasons for the emigration of highly skilled individuals range from the breakdown of political and economic order to the globalisation of education’ (Skeldon 2005). Nevertheless the employment of immigrants is usually in ‘3-D’ jobs (demeaning, dirty or dangerous), and the employment of immigrants in specialised jobs is often at wages or salaries much lower than the norm (Oucho 2008: 52). In this context then, according to Adepoju (2008), policies have to be elaborated and implemented in order to avert the negative effects of brain drain or brain waste. He describes the way this is attempted in Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda:

Leaders in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda are exploring strategies to attract nationals back, to contribute to local development. They have held meetings with their nationals in the diaspora, encouraging them with offers of incentives to return. But leaders must also address the push factors that spurred the brain drain in the first place, and provide returnees with places to work in environments conducive to productivity, and with due reward for their efforts. (Adepoju 2008: 35)

In his endeavours to propose solutions to this highly-skilled migration which is usually a loss for African countries, Adepoju (2007) presented a paper intended to explore the ways in which governments could tackle brain drain while

providing a basis for debates on how to ensure that this category of migration – entailing highly skilled workers – could benefit countries of destination, in terms of matching labour demand and supply, and also countries of origin, in terms of development.

The specialities of the majority of skilled African immigrants in Mexico are in architecture, electrical and mechanical engineering, metallurgy, electronics, medicine, artistic work restoration, Hispanic literature, museography, tourism, theology, international relations and political science. Cangabo Kagabo observes:

Specialists in restoration (3 Senegalese) have settled well [and] have been carrying out works of monument restoration, churches, paintings of national interest etc. In the academic and research fields, the African presence is well-known in language teaching (French/English/Swahili, Arabic/Yoruba/Dioula⁶²), in the social sciences (international politics, sociology, economics etc.), in African History, African Literature, International Law etc., at various academic institutions of the country such as the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, the Colegio de México, the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, the Universidad Iberoamericana, the Universidad de Las Américas, the Universidad del Valle de México, the Tecnológico de Monterrey, and the Universidad Anáhuac. (Cangabo Kagabo 2000: 8)

Any analysis of the African presence in Mexico assumes the statements of ‘push and pull’ theory inasmuch as economic factors – at economic, academic and cultural levels – tend to dictate the decision-making of Africans willing to emigrate

62. A language spoken in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.

towards Mexico, while at the same time taking into account the search for a labour dimension in their motivations. In addition, it is assumed that historical bonds also contribute to easing these African migratory movements, since they influence their choice of direction towards Mexico.

The evidence of the effects of historical bonds on the choice of direction of African migrations towards Mexico is clear enough from a brief review of the history of international relations between Mexico and the African states since the 1930s up to now. In 1935, Ethiopia was the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with Mexico. In that year, the Mexican government supported the Ethiopian government, within the institutional frame of the League of Nations, when Ethiopia was under occupation by the Italian armed forces of Benito Mussolini. This support has, till today, facilitated understanding and cooperation between the two governments, and as a consequence, a continuous and growing presence of Ethiopians in Mexico has been evidenced, backed by subsequent different cooperation programmes between these nations.

The relations between Mexico and Ethiopia have been strengthening within a framework of international cooperation after the Bilateral Cooperation Agreements which were signed by both states in 1935. The historical significance of these diplomatic relations is reflected through the following statements of Bassols Batalla:

Sometimes history has such an effect on people that their friendship becomes imperishable, because the ties that were put down get continually stronger and stronger, instead of weakening in time of hardship. This clearly happens only when the fraternal support between two nations is strong and its effects are not merely conjectural or occasional but concrete and permanent. This was the case of

Mexico and Ethiopia...[when] the Mexican government of Lázaro Cárdenas, and all the people of our country, expressed their voice of solidarity with the Ethiopian nation...[D]emonstrations and meetings of protest were carried out in Mexico; President Cárdenas himself denounced the assault, and, in the gallery of the intimidated League of Nations, a long and unflagging speech of Narciso Bassols⁶³ was heard in defence of the right of Ethiopia to live in independence and freedom. (Bassols Batalla 1987: 2)

New political (diplomatic) relations were consolidated between Mexico and other African countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This period was marked by the development, in Mexico, of the 'Third-World Doctrine' (followed by a Third-World Agenda or policy) mainly under the administration of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976), prompting several African leaders to establish diplomatic relations with Mexico. On the basis of the principle of historical bond, established first between Mexico and Ethiopia, and then with other African countries, African immigrations to Mexico increased in the 1960s and 1970s.

At the end of the presidential mandate of Luis Echeverría in 1976, the Mexican government granted a large number of scholarships to African students (mainly Ethiopians, Tanzanians, Senegalese and Guineans from Guinea Conakry) for professional training and high school technical education. These students are then expected to return home, in order to contribute to the development of their countries of origin. Nevertheless, the truth is that only few have returned home

63. Narciso Bassols (1897–1959) was an intellectual and revolutionary Mexican who, as a brilliant lawyer, professor of Law at the National University of Mexico and a socialist politician, was representative of Mexico before the League of the Nations in 1935 (under the Lázaro Cárdenas administration).

after completing their studies, mainly due the lack of labour incentives in their countries of origin. Personal reasons should also be taken into account since some of these students marry Mexicans and prefer to stay in Mexico. A series of diplomatic contacts have now been set up and strengthened between several African countries and Mexico, with the opening of embassies of Gabon, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire in Mexico which will ease the arrival of students of these countries when they come to Mexico to acquire academic or professional training. At the beginning of the 1980s, other African countries, such as Morocco, opened their embassies in Mexico. And later, during the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), a new impulse was given to the Mexican government's African policy, at a time when there was favourable situation in the cultural cooperation of Mexico with Africa. This smoothed the progress of the opening of embassies from yet more African countries, such as South Africa (1994) and Angola (1997).

In spite of significant efforts in the matter of diplomatic dialogue between Mexico and Africa, one can observe that diplomatic relations between Mexico and African countries have nevertheless decreased over the last four decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, diplomatic relations were set up with the majority of African countries, and agreements of cooperation signed, since when Mexico has been facing an increasing presence of African immigrants. Nevertheless, under the presidency of Vicente Fox Quesada (2000–2006), African foreign policy in Mexico has been manipulated by some very political interests, through selective bilateral and regional approaches to Africa. At present, under the administration of Felipe Calderon (2006), African diplomacy is projected through different plans of action which aim at increasing the presence of Mexico in Africa through commercial agreements, conducted with the support or collaboration of the African Union.

Despite the limitations of the foreign policies of successive Mexican governments up till the present, it is certain that the stimulus for relations between the governments of Mexico and African countries through the establishment of diplomatic missions has made possible the fact that eight African countries (Ethiopia, Senegal, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, the Arab Republic of Democratic Saharahui⁶⁴, Angola, South Africa and Nigeria) currently have diplomatic and consular representations in Mexico. In addition, Mexico has diplomatic missions in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon, Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania. These relationships, based on historical ties, partly explain the great increase of the presence of the African in Mexico.

Within the favourable context of Mexico's foreign policy for Africa, an institutional framework of academic and research interchanges (cultural and scientific cooperation) has also been strengthened. It is worth highlighting the endeavour of African diplomatic missions in Mexico in following up these initiatives and processes of cultural interchange. Different Mexican governments have facilitated the invitation of academics and researchers from many African countries⁶⁵ to design conferences or to take part in seminars of interest to the Mexican academic community. At the same time, only a few Mexican cultural and academic scientists are registered in African academic institutions. Also, through Mexico's Office of the Undersecretary for International Relations for the United Nations, Africa and Middle East, some governments have granted a considerable number of scholarships for

64. This part of Africa (also known as 'Western Sahara') is not currently recognised as an independent state by the international community.

65. Ghana, Zambia, Algeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea Conakry, Tanzania, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Eritrea, South Africa, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

postgraduate study in Mexico (especially for master's and doctorate degrees), or have provided possibilities for scholarships for African students from countries such as Angola, Algeria, Botswana, Cape Verde, Uganda, Namibia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau and Equatorial Guinea.

Movements of this type – migrations for academic reasons – are normally considered to be temporary migrations because such African specialists in Mexico are legally treated as non-permanent immigrants. Regardless of whether their return time is of their own choosing or not, it is obvious that some of these students end up staying in Mexico – changing their legal status to that of permanent immigrants. This migratory phenomenon influences and stimulates the imagination and illusion of African candidates wishing to emigrate to Mexico, through pull effects and the mirage generated by previous immigrations. All these situations are based on historical bonds – such as various cooperation agreements – since they facilitate the production and persistence of constant migratory flows between the African continent and Mexico. In the words of Caganbo Kagabo:

The majority of the Africans who are now established in Mexico have come within the context of cultural cooperation agreements between the Mexican government and the respective [African] countries. These agreements include the granting of Research and Study scholarships. This way, many of them have attended Graduate and/or Postgraduate Studies in Mexican universities. However, the few who arrive at Mexico by their own means to study, have done or are still doing so in any of the universities of the country; and if they already had a higher level of training or education before arriving at Mexico, they generally start

working as professionals. So, the Africans who are in Mexico arrived, in the majority, within the frame of the cultural, scientific and political cooperation between Mexico and Africa. (Caganbo Kagabo 2000: 3–4)

Religious dimensions of African migrations

The religious dimension of African migrations to Mexico is situated within the framework of evangelising missions in the world today. Throughout the history of world, religions – including Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity (including Roman Catholicism, Oriental Orthodoxy, Eastern Orthodoxy, and many forms of Protestantism such as Anglicanism, Lutheranism, Calvinism and so on) – have contributed to displacements, meetings, agreements and disagreements between individuals and groups who belong to different cultures or civilisations. From among the diverse forms of human mobility related to religion, this chapter now focuses on Christianity – mainly Catholicism and Protestantism – addressing the issue of the initiation of migration processes of religious character by missionaries who are members of religious congregations. Since Mexican society is deeply Christian, religious (and missionary) activity acquires an unprecedented relevance in explaining, in part, the existence of African migration to Mexico.

Although there are many Africans, members of missionary institutions, who move to Mexico in order to complete studies such as theology or exegetics, there also exist African missionaries who arrive in Mexico:

...in order to evangelise people of regions which were Christianised in the past and where the Black descendants of the victims of Black Slavery do not really participate in the hierarchical authority of the

Church in Latin America...It is just curious to observe that Africans who are more recently Christianised in comparison with Latin Americans, mainly by European missionaries, are being implicated nowadays in an evangelising endeavor in Latin America, in general, and in Mexico, in particular, within the framework of a new dimension of universal religious cooperation. (Caganbo Kagabo (2000: 9)

There are registered Catholic missionaries from the DRC, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda in Mexico; they are dedicated to preaching the Gospel to Mexican Catholics, mostly in the Federal District and also in some Mexican provinces such as México, Jalisco, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Morelos. In this context it can be noted that there is also a presence of Mexican missionaries and monks (who belong to religious orders or communities) in African countries such as Angola, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal and the DRC, where they are undertaking a similar evangelising venture.

These situations correspond to the above-mentioned characteristics of World Culture, creating a desire in the willing to share their religious values and Western faith in what they regard as 'the sacred'. Thus African believers or missionaries become participants in a religious community, located in Mexican time and space, where they share a vision of 'the Christian sacred' with Mexican Christian people. Motivated by the religious will to enter into communion with Mexican Christian people, these Africa-born clerics and missionaries have relocated to Mexico. After their internalisation of universal Christian values and practices, these African Christians feel the need to share them (through preaching the Christian faith) with the Mexican Christian Community, within the framework of an increasingly global world – a world which is very largely associated with the rules and values related to

World Culture. The result of all this is the displacement of African people to Mexico, contributing to the increase in African migration to Mexico.

African migrations to Mexico for political motives

African migrations to Mexico for political motives are caused by the environment of insecurity and political instability that affects African countries. The conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa bring about a climate of fear that influences its populations, some people eventually leaving their homes in search of safer places to live. Internal conflicts, which usually arise from political differences and internal struggles for political power, result in a large number of dead, wounded, and displaced people. Also, the lack of democracy in certain countries allows the political authorities to persecute citizens who do not share the political opinions of the established regime; the persecuted then try to escape in order to save their lives. So, in search of safer places, displaced people and persecuted citizens move in the interior or abroad. This contributes to African migration flows, creating asylum applicants, the political refugees. In other words, the environment of insecurity in many countries of sub-Saharan Africa instigates the internal and external migrations within and from the sub-Saharan region of displaced and persecuted refugees inside and outside the African continent. These African migrations pass through the 'paths of fear' (Zolberg 1993), and some of them reach as far as Mexico, where they find asylum.

Due mainly to the arrival of African refugees, the presence of Africans in Mexico has increased greatly in the last eight years. According to sources in COMAR (the Mexican Commission for Aid to Refugees), in 2008 there were 190 Africans registered in Mexico⁶⁶ as people fleeing from their

66 See 'Africanos hallan refugio en México' at El Siglo de Torreon website.

countries of origin on account of political harassment or religious persecution. However, this number has been growing fast: in the first three months of 2010, a total of 396 African immigrants (184 Eritreans, 47 Ethiopians and 165 Somalians)⁶⁷ arrived in Mexico identifying themselves as political immigrants. They have been placed in the custody of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the detention centre in Tapachula (*Estación Migratoria Siglo XXI*) in Chiapas (Eurostat 2009). According to Jorge Humberto Ysar Domínguez of the National Migration Institute, the refugees willingly enter the detention centre at Tapachula, hoping to have their status in the country legalised.

Between 2004 and 2008, the number of Africans who entered the Tapachula detention centre grew from zero to more than six hundred people. Generally, the Africans who have obtained refugee status are nationals originating from zones of conflict in Africa – in particular Ethiopia, Angola, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. A comparison of this situation with that of Europe shows that in 2008 Somalians were the largest group granted protection status in Italy (with 3545, corresponding to 36% of the total number granted protection in this country), Ethiopians the second largest (1625, 17%). Similarly, Eritreans were the largest group granted protection status in both Norway and Switzerland (respectively 715 at 19% and 1355 at 24%) (INM website).

These African migration streams continue to increase and the migrants are, in the main, asylum applicants. Some of them arrive unexpectedly at this part of Latin America, where they hope to find governments more hospitable or generous than the European ones. But others, who planned their arrival in

67. This information is based on a statement of Jorge Humberto Ysar Domínguez, delegate of the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) – 2008. See El Diario de Taxco website.

Mexico, usually conceive of this country as a step or a transit to the United States, or to the ports of Argentina and Brazil. Nevertheless, all these people may live in Mexico in adverse situations. They may, for example, be forced, on arrival, to return to their country of origin, or they may face social exclusion, discrimination and racism as they attempt social integration and search for a job. With this in mind, it is worth mentioning that 'the loss of state capacities and the breakdown of states, rooted in the precarious democratisation process, the vacillating effects of structural adjustment programmes, and human insecurity have also prompted a variety of migratory movements, including refugee migration' Adepoju (2008: 23)⁶⁸.

This is the context in which African illegal migrations towards Mexico arise, while taking into account that 'the heterogeneity of migration finds expression in a great variety of migration routes. Because of rapid change in the volume and direction of migration, there is a growing complexity which is difficult to capture in a typology of migration countries' (Zoomers & Adepoju 2008: 271). Thus, people mainly from Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea are part of migrations through new and difficult routes to Latin America via southern African countries. South Africa stands out as a country from which migrants cross the Atlantic by boat or aeroplane, with the support of illegal immigration networks or international networks of human traffickers. These traffickers resort to illegal methods such as false documentation; bribing corrupt immigration agents or security personnel, passing through to the 'blind spot' security at the porous borders from Africa to Mexico. The emigrants or would-be emigrants pay very high prices for their illegal trips and often even risk their lives.

68. See also Adepoju (2006a) regarding democracy issues related to migration phenomena.

Thus, somewhat paradoxically, although there has recently been a reduction in illegal immigration from Latin America to the United States, Africans, originating mostly from the Horn of Africa, are arriving in Mexico (most of them undocumented), having crossed many thousands of kilometres. Mexico has, in fact, become both the final destination and the transition country for many Africans people who want to reach the United States while fleeing from conflicts in their countries of origin. As Zoomers & Adepoju remark:

Along with more restrictive policies, there seems to be a rapid increase in human trafficking and illegality...increasing European restrictions and controls on immigration have not led to a decrease in emigration rates...Rather, migrants are more often undocumented and their itineraries tend to be longer and more perilous...In reaction to restrictive policies, changes have occurred in the manner of migrant travel. People now travel less often by air [they are obliged to travel overland or by boat]. (Zoomers & Adepoju 2008: 274)

Meanwhile, in order to cope with the challenges of African migrations – especially illegal ones – to Mexico (including the Latin American migration flows), Mexico has been expanding initiatives, along with the countries of the region, to construct mechanisms and orient policies for providing a fast and effective answer to this increasing phenomenon. Mexico has been emphasising international cooperation as a strategy for the management of these migrations. An indication of these initiatives was the celebration in May 2010 of the XVth Regional Conference on Migration in Tapachula. The purpose of this conference, which was supported by the National Institute of Migration (INM), was to analyse migration issues. Founded

in 1996, these regional conferences involve eleven countries of North and Central America (Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the United States, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic) and aim to encourage dialogue and the interchange of information on migratory matters.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and explain the current presence of African immigrants in Mexico. The conclusions drawn fall into a number of categories.

Migrations for economic and political reasons

African immigrants who leave their home countries for economic and political reasons usually consider Mexico at least as a starting point of their displacements. For some it is regarded as a transit country, a part of their risky voyage to the United States. Whatever their initial intention, the majority of these migrants eventually establish legal permanent residence in Mexico.

Migrations for religious motives

African migrations for religious motives are usually temporary since the African missionaries or monks who arrive at Mexico may also go to other countries, according to the needs and the agendas of their churches, as directed by their hierarchies.

Migrations for scientific and cultural reasons

In the same way, African migrations for scientific and cultural reasons are usually a priori temporary migrations, although – just as happens in the case of migrations for political or economic reasons – many of these immigrants become legal permanent residents in Mexico. It should be clearly noted that,

with respect to these migrations for scientific and cultural reasons, many Mexicans have themselves been trained by African academics at various Mexican universities where they give courses, carry out research, and supervise graduate thesis research and postgraduate research. In all cases:

...while educating Mexicans, while producing materials which are indispensable for the diffusion of knowledge in their branch of specialisation, while working in companies, while evangelising, etc., there is no doubt that this African who is welcomed by the Mexican government, contributes, like any Mexican, to the development of Mexico. (Caganbo Kagabo 2000: 8 & 11)

Illegal migrations

Illegal migrations are frequently placed within the frame of migrations for political reasons. These immigrants are usually backed or supported by criminal networks involved in human trafficking and migrant trafficking or migrant smuggling. Illegal migrants are often returned (as deportees) to their countries of origin. However, since it is frequently difficult to identify the national origin of many of these, they are kept in immigration detention (or in detention) for a long periods of time without being returned. In such cases, the most obvious option for the Mexican migration authorities is to free them after a time.

All these situations show clearly that African immigration into Mexico is constantly growing and diversifying. Mexico has been facing serious challenges in the matter of extending and applying effective migratory policies, especially since the country is under pressure from the United States. The US government wants Mexico to show greater firmness in its migration policy, with stricter control over its borders, because

some migrants arrive in Mexico in order to enter the USA. An analysis by Raúl Benítez Manaut & Daniel Hernández (2007) sheds light here, as it deals with the relationship between migration and security, based on the case of the United States, Mexico and Central America. According to these authors, although there are grounds for the political perceptions of the United States regarding the chaos and lack of control of migration on the American border with Mexico:

there is a high degree of exaggeration and distortion in the interpretations being handled in public [and official] speech in the United States...The security of the US-Mexico border region has been subject to strain and has become a serious issue of debate in this bilateral relation over several decades. Even though it is obvious that it is a porous border, it is also necessary to define that porosity in the context of the dimension of the border and its flows. (Benítez Manaut & Hernández 2007: 274)

According to these authors, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the United States has also been pointing out supposed permissive migration policies in Canada.

Most African migrations to Latin America reach countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador and Guatemala, as well as Mexico. In the context of continuous and increasing African migration to this region, some of the main challenges that these countries are now facing relate to the difficulty, or even impossibility, of identifying the real nationalities of undocumented African immigrants. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of resources that could make their expulsion and repatriation feasible. Lastly, the social integration of African immigrants in Mexico implies challenges for the Mexican government in the fight against racism and discrimination. These too need serious debate in the search for solutions.

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CHAPTER 5

African International Student Mobility: Country Differences in Numbers and Destinations

Mary M. Kritz

Enrolled college students in sub-Saharan Africa are three times more likely than students in other regions to be studying outside their homelands, and their numbers have risen rapidly in recent years (UNESCO 2009b). While it is clear, given Africa's demographic and economic trends, why demand for tertiary education is growing in the region, relatively little is known about how African countries differ in their rates of outbound student mobility, where Africans go for their tertiary studies, or what implications outbound student mobility has for economic and social development in the region.

Demographic conditions that have contributed to the rising demand in Africa for tertiary education include annual population growth rates of 2.5 per cent or higher, the doubling of urban populations that has occurred since the colonial era ended, and population structures composed heavily of

rapidly-increasing youthful age cohorts. While insufficient employment opportunities and poverty continue to plague Africa, many countries in the region have achieved, or are close to achieving, universal primary completion and have had significant growth in secondary completion. Demographic growth and education advances are now stimulating increased tertiary demand, and will continue to do so for decades to come. It is also certain that to compete in the global economy, Africa needs to increase its stock of skilled workers in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, increase employment for its growing population, and increase its competitiveness in the global economy (World Bank 2009a).

Unfortunately, most African countries do not have sufficient tertiary education capacity to meet rising admission demands. Faced annually with growing numbers of eligible applicants, African public universities have increased student intakes even though investments in faculty and facilities that would permit quality training of additional students have not kept up with the demands of rising admissions. Examples abound of decisions taken by education authorities without fully considering staffing and institutional capacity. In 2010, for instance, after Kenyan public universities denied admission to 60 000 secondary graduates who had passed qualifying exams, the Ministry of Higher Education asked universities to double their annual intake from 20 000 to 40 000 students (Nation 2010; Nganga 2010). Many countries have also taken steps to expand the number of their public and private universities in order to keep up with rising tertiary education demand. Ethiopia, for instance, had only two public universities in 1990 but nineteen by 2010. In addition to coping with staffing and infrastructure issues that invariably accompany institution building, Ethiopia's universities had to deal with the quadrupling of undergraduate enrolments from 34 000 in 2000/01 to 125 000 in 2007/08 (Reisberg &

Rumbley 2010). Unfortunately, faculty shortages throughout the region have led to large increases in class sizes and teaching loads, and to the hiring of teachers with weak credentials (Kellogg et al. 2008; Lindow 2009). According to Adepoju (2002; Adepoju & van der Wiel 2010), faculty deficiencies in Ghana and Nigeria have been exacerbated by outflows of university professors to other parts of Africa, Europe, North Africa, and Gulf states and the failure of PhD-holders trained abroad to return home. Not surprisingly, claims have been made that the impressive expansions in African tertiary education that have occurred in recent decades have contributed to declining educational quality. According to the World Bank:

Tertiary education fares no better [than secondary education] in terms of quality. Part of its curriculum is often dedicated to remedial efforts to make up for shortcomings at the lower levels of education. In a certain sense, the price to African education for its impressive enrollment expansion has been a loss of educational quality. (World Bank 2009a: 71)

Difficulties in obtaining admission to universities, combined with perceptions that education quality is higher abroad, have encouraged African families that can afford the costs to send their children to Europe, North America, or elsewhere for their tertiary studies. As middle class populations in large urban areas have grown in recent decades, awareness has also grown regarding the improved employment opportunities that exist in the public and private sectors and the higher wage returns that usually accompany higher education. As a result, demand for tertiary education is rising throughout the region but it is also the case that African countries differ sharply in whether tertiary students do their studies at home or abroad (Kritz 2011). This chapter looks at how African countries differ in their numbers and rates of

outbound student mobility and considers some reasons why those differences occur. The chapter also examines where Africans go for tertiary study abroad and how destination choices are changing. Finally, consideration is given to some initiatives at country and regional levels that could change Africa's rates of international student mobility in the future.

International migration scholars have given relatively little attention to international student mobility, based on the assumption that only small numbers of students leave their homelands to study elsewhere and that most of these return home. Several studies provide excellent reviews of international migration trends and patterns in Africa and identify policies that could ameliorate any negative impacts that might result from those migrations (Adepoju 2004; Adepoju 2008; Baker & Aina 1995; Tienda et al. 2006). However, migration studies usually focus on labour migrants and refugees, and do not consider student flows – even though students who go abroad to study qualify as international migrants using the United Nations one-year residency rule⁶⁹. While it is certainly the case that there are far more labour migrants and refugees than students living outside their homelands, the latter are growing in number and when non-return rates are high, losses quickly accumulate over time. Moreover, these college students are Africa's next generation of knowledge, technical and business leaders and are thus a very important group when viewed from the standpoint of countries with limited supplies of human capital. In fact, while many studies (Chikanda 2004; Dovlo & Martineau 2004; Gaillard & Gaillard 2003; Getahun 2006; Gupta et al. 2007; Kaba

69. The United Nations recommends that countries use the 'usual place of residence' rule to identify international migrants. According to these recommendations, 'emigrants' should include nationals who go abroad to live for one year or more, and 'immigrants' should include nationals returning from living abroad for one year or more.

2004; Kefela 2010; Kingma 2006; Oucho 2008b; Tanner 2005; Terrazas 2007; Versi 2003) have examined issues that are closely related to international student mobility, including brain drain/gain, the diaspora, remittances, and return – and John Oucho (2008a: 50) calls these four issues the ‘migration quartet’ – they give little attention to student mobility itself. Professor Aderanti Adepoju, one of Africa’s leading migration experts, has pointed to the harmful effects that ‘brain drain’ flows have on tertiary training institutions in the region, which, in turn, exacerbate the training of future skilled workers and encourage further human capital outflows:

Specialists in new technologies, engineering, medicine and healthcare are a small proportion of the emigrants from, for instance, sub-Saharan Africa, but they cost the region in a variety of ways and far beyond their numbers – not least because of the lost opportunity for the training of replacement cohorts: tertiary educational institutions lack experienced leaders to train those required for a variety of development activities and to undertake research for development. (Adepoju 2007: 1)

International student mobility: data and measurement issues

Until recently, only the largest receivers of foreign students, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and a few European countries, published data regularly on their student stocks. This has started to change. Due to concerted efforts by the OECD and UNESCO⁷⁰, a growing number of countries now compile and submit data on their numbers of international tertiary students to UNESCO for publication in

70. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

its annual *Global Education Digest* and in its online database. Tertiary education statistics include data on students enrolled in college and university degree programmes or at other higher education institutions, as well as students enrolled in technical and vocational programmes that require secondary degrees as an admission prerequisite. While many countries that receive international students – including several in Africa – still do not report their numbers of tertiary students to UNESCO, South Africa, the largest receiver of international students in the region, has reported its numbers in recent years, as have Cameroon and Morocco, which are receiving growing numbers of students from some of their neighbouring countries. Partial student stock data are also available for some other countries, including Burundi, Central African Republic, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, and Madagascar.

The UNESCO tertiary student data used in this study give the total number of foreigners studying at the tertiary level in 2007 as reported by receiving countries. UNESCO does not collect data on foreign student inflows and outflows in a given year (it has data only on total student stock) or on foreign students' fields of study. It should be kept in mind that the UNESCO data are likely to underestimate African student outflows, because China, an important international receiver, does not report data on its numbers of foreign students to UNESCO. China has invested heavily in new universities and the strengthening of old ones, and is actively recruiting international students, especially from Africa – because of its expanding economic investments in the region. China also gives scholarships to potential African leaders, to enable them to do advanced studies in China (*People's Daily* 2010). There are undoubtedly other countries in Africa and elsewhere that do not report their international student numbers to UNESCO. Within Africa, for instance, Botswana, Egypt and Nigeria receive small numbers of students from neighbouring countries but they are not counted in the UNESCO data (Kishun 2008).

On the other hand, although UNESCO asks countries to differentiate between international students who have arrived for study purposes and non-citizens who have resided in the country for years, some European countries with large numbers of foreign students classify them based on nationality rather than including data on whether or not they arrived with the intent of studying.⁷¹ For this study, France is the main country of concern since it receives large numbers of labour migrants from Africa and is also the major destination for students from francophone Africa. It should be kept in mind that many of France's foreign students may be adult children of labour migrant workers who have lived in France for years but are classified as foreign students because they are not French citizens.


Global trends in international student mobility

In 2007, UNESCO reported that, across the globe, 2.8 million tertiary students were studying outside their homelands (UNESCO 2007) – more than five times as many as in 1975 (see Figure 1). The large increases in international student mobility that have occurred in recent decades are generally attributed to global economic and structural forces that have shrunk cultural and social distances between countries, leading to increasing flows of capital, goods, and people. Technological advances in transportation and communications undergird increasing global interdependence because they reduce the costs of travel and facilitate information flows. People living in the remotest parts of the globe are now able to get information from thousands of internet websites on any topic

71. According to Kelo and colleagues (2006), the nationality classification has differential effects depending upon whether the country also receives large numbers of migrant workers. They compared a set of European countries that collected data both on foreign students' nationality and their reason for entering the country and found that countries that used the nationality approach overestimated student numbers by 20 to 30 per cent.

they wish, including information about study courses offered by universities in different faraway countries, how to apply to foreign universities, and scholarship possibilities. In addition, economic and demographic growth, urbanisation and social advances in education, health and welfare have greatly increased the numbers of upper- and middle-class parents who place great value on their children's higher education and are willing to make great sacrifices to send them to the best universities they can afford, at home or abroad.

Figure 1. Global numbers of mobile students, 1975–2007



Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2006–2009

Pull factors in higher income countries in Western Europe, North America and Oceania have also played a role in rising student mobility. As population growth pushed up demand for higher education in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in recent decades, universities in demographically-ageing countries saw an opportunity to stabilise and even grow their student numbers by recruiting international students (Clark & Sedgwick; Kritz 2006; Vincent-Lancrin 2008). Cash-strapped universities in Britain and other European countries now admit large numbers of students from fast-growing economies such as China and India where many families can afford to send their children to leading world universities (Economist 2010). International students brought in an estimated almost \$40 billion (about £25 billion) to Britain in 2007, which ranks higher education as one of its most significant industries (Economist 2010). In addition to paying fees, international students also stimulate the economy by spending money on housing, food and leisure. Leading universities in the United States award generous financial assistance to most of the brightest graduate students they admit from abroad. And now second-tier universities and colleges in the USA are starting to recognise that growing numbers of foreign students are willing to pay to obtain a degree from the USA in order to improve their future economic prospects. Students from abroad are also starting to recognise that higher education and living costs vary widely within the US and are applying in growing numbers to community colleges (Azania 2010).

Differential and sustained economic growth across Asia, Africa and Latin America has broadened the number of countries that now compete for foreign students and, in response, students' international pathways have started to change. Whereas thirty or forty years ago, international students flowed mainly to the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Australia – and over half of

tertiary students continued to do so in 2007 – in recent years several Asian countries, including China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia, have invested heavily in their tertiary education systems and are emerging as important receivers that now compete for students with European and North American universities. A similar trend is emerging in Africa where flows of tertiary students to South Africa have grown rapidly in recent years. Foreign student flows to Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa are also increasing, and trickles of students are flowing into Botswana and Ghana. In addition, several Middle Eastern countries have started to compete for foreign students, including Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Elsewhere, Brazil welcomes students from Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa – although few other Latin American countries have entered the international student market. In general, the competition for foreign students has tended to occur in countries that have rapidly-growing economies and national leadership that recognises that investments in higher education not only increase a country's own human capital but also generate revenue by attracting students from neighbouring countries and elsewhere.

Unfortunately Africa stacks up poorly in terms of quantity of skilled human capital and the pace at which it is training future generations of skilled workers (World Bank 2009a). This problem has been exacerbated by the fact that large numbers of Africans who receive tertiary degrees abroad do not return. While estimates of the number of skilled Africans living outside their homelands vary widely, most reports suggest that the numbers are large. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) found that sub-Saharan African countries were among those with the highest emigration rates in the world. Kaba (2004) estimated that 40 per cent of Africa's professionals and entrepreneurs live outside the region. Tanner (2005: 88) estimated that a third of the region's skilled workers live outside their homelands

and have had to be replaced by '100 000 expatriates from the West at a cost of USD four billion a year'. Moreover, there is growing recognition among African migration experts (Adepoju 2008; Ouchou 2008a) and policy makers that skilled workers are a very important group when viewed from the standpoint of countries with limited supplies of skilled human capital in specialised science, technical and engineering fields, and that governments need to do more to stem brain drain or, at the least, to ameliorate its negative impacts.

Reliable estimates are not available for the numbers of skilled Africans living abroad who initially left their homelands as students, but it is reasonable to assume that a large share of them did so and never returned. There are also no comparative data on student return rates after they complete their studies abroad but the scant data that is available suggests that return rates vary widely depending on where students go for their studies (Tremblay 2005) and on their fields of study (Finn 2003). Since it is plausible that student return rates do indeed vary widely among different study countries, this opens up the possibility that government and university leaders in Africa and elsewhere who are searching for strategies to upgrade their skilled human capital should seek a better understanding of the determinants and consequences of international student mobility in order to assess whether, and how, flows could be managed differently in the future as a means of decreasing their country's brain drain losses.

African student flows

While only 7.8 per cent of internationally mobile students in 2007 came from sub-Saharan Africa, a relatively high share of Africa's tertiary students were studying abroad: six out of every 100 sub-Saharan African tertiary students were studying abroad in 2007 compared to just 2 out of every 100 globally (UNESCO 2009b). However, assessments about which

countries are in fact the top senders depend upon whether one looks at the total number of African students abroad, as is typically done, or at study-abroad rates, which give a different picture.⁷² Not surprisingly, Nigeria, which has the largest population in the region, also had the largest numbers of students abroad (23 044), but population alone does not explain country numbers abroad given that the other top numeric senders in 2007 had populations considerably smaller than Nigeria's. That group included Zimbabwe (20 856), Cameroon (16 962), Kenya (13 415), Senegal (11 728) and Namibia (8 615). Moreover, other countries, including Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa, Tanzania and Sudan have relatively large populations but send few students abroad. These findings suggest that it is important not only to look at numbers of students that countries send abroad but also at country study-abroad rates and study destinations.


The tertiary outbound mobility measure (TOM) standardises student outflows for cross-country differences in population size and numbers of students enrolled at tertiary level and, as such, is a better measure than simply 'numbers of students abroad' for comparing how countries differ in international student mobility. The TOM specifies the number of students abroad as a percentage of each country's total tertiary enrolment at home and abroad.⁷³ There is considerable variation across sub-Saharan African countries in their TOM

72. It should be pointed out that in this analysis Mauritania and Sudan, which are usually grouped with North African countries, are classified as sub-Saharan African countries.

73. The TOM is comparable to the Outbound Mobility Ratio (OMR) used by UNESCO in its *Global Education Digest*. The difference, however, is that the OMR is the ratio of number of tertiary students studying abroad to the number studying at home, while the TOM is the ratio of number of tertiary students studying abroad to the number of tertiary students studying both at home and abroad. The TOM ranges from 0 to 100 but the OMR will exceed 100 for countries with more tertiary students abroad than at home.


rankings and their student numbers abroad (see Figures 2 and 3 respectively). In 2007, TOMs ranged from less than one per cent in South Africa to 59 per cent in Comoros (see Table 1 column D, and Figure 3). In general, countries with small populations tend to have relatively high student outflows – population size and student outflows (TOM) were correlated at -0.49 among the 47 sub-Saharan African countries. Countries that sent the largest percentages of tertiary students abroad included Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Namibia, Gambia, Botswana, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Gabon and Congo. In that group, only Congo and Namibia had total populations greater than 2 million in 2005. In contrast, countries with relatively large populations, including South Africa, Sudan, the DRC, Nigeria and Ethiopia, had low percentages studying abroad – only one or two per cent of tertiary students from those countries were studying outside their homelands. The number of tertiary students from sub-Saharan African countries enrolled for study abroad in 2007 is shown in Figure 3. Since the listing order of countries in that chart is the same as that of Figure 2, a comparison of the two figures indicates clearly that the correlation between percentages of tertiary students abroad and absolute numbers of students abroad is not high.

Figure 2. Percentage of tertiary students (home and abroad) enrolled abroad, by origin country, 2007



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2009

Figure 3. Number of tertiary students (home and abroad) enrolled abroad, by origin country, 2007



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2009

Table 1. Study-abroad statistics for sub-Saharan African countries

A	B	C	D	E
Sending country	Population size (thousands) 2005	Number of tertiary students abroad 2007	% of total enrolled tertiary students studying abroad 2007	% of tertiary age students enrolled in tertiary studies at home and abroad 2005
Angola	16 300	7 344	13.0	3.4
Benin	9 300	3 631	7.8	5.7
Botswana	1 800	7 174	38.5	9.5
Burkina Faso	14 800	2 376	6.7	2.4
Burundi	8 500	970	5.7	2.4
Cameroon	18 100	16 962	11.4	6.6
Cape Verde	500	4 848	47.8	14.5
Central African Rep.	4 300	886	16.4	1.8
Chad	10 800	2 692	21.2	1.4
Comoros	700	2 672	59.4	5.4
Congo	3 800	4 317	26.9	4.9
Côte d'Ivoire	20 200	5 799	3.6	8.6
DRC	62 600	3 405	1.4	4.4
Equatorial Guinea	500	791	32.6	5.3
Eritrea	4 900	837	15.9	1.2
Ethiopia	77 100	3 757	1.8	2.7
Gabon	1 300	4 418	27.7	11.1
Gambia	1 500	1 013	39.2	1.8
Ghana	23 000	7 508	5.1	5.6
Guinea	10 100	4 069	8.6	3.4
Guinea Bissau	1 700	653	50.1	0.9
Kenya	36 900	13 415	8.7	3.2
Lesotho	1 800	3 899	31.5	5.2
Liberia	3 800	561	5.6	3.2
Madagascar	18 300	4 154	6.7	2.9
Malawi	13 100	1 880	22.0	5.4
Mali	12 300	3 075	5.7	3.3
Mauritius	1 300	7 574	34.7	24.2
Mauritania	3 100	2 851	19.4	3.9
Mozambique	20 400	2 433	7.9	1.6
Namibia	2 100	8 615	45.1	9.2
Niger	14 200	2 097	15.9	1.3
Nigeria	144 400	23 044	1.6	10.3
Rwanda	9 300	1 759	6.2	2.7

Table 1 Contd.)

A	B	C	D	E
Sending country	Population size (thousands) 2005	Number of tertiary students abroad 2007	% of total enrolled tertiary students studying abroad 2007	% of tertiary age students enrolled in tertiary studies at home and abroad 2005
São Tomé & Príncipe	200	792	n/a	n/a
Senegal	12 400	11 728	11.4	6.6
Seychelles	100	500	n/a	n/a
Sierra Leone	5 300	842	9.2	2.2
Somalia	9 100	1 408	n/a	n/a
South Africa	47 900	5 765	0.8	15.5
Sudan	38 600	2 861	1.3	6.6
Swaziland	1 100	3 121	5.1	6.5
Tanzania	38 700	4 274	7.0	1.6
Togo	6 600	3 075	8.5	5.3
Uganda	28 500	2 642	2.7	3.4

Sub-Saharan African countries also differ considerably in the percentages of their tertiary age populations who are enrolled in higher education. This is an important statistic because it provides insights into potential future human capital available to countries. In 2007 only 5.3 per cent (unweighted) of the tertiary age group was enrolled in sub-Saharan Africa. At the lower end, the figures were less than 2 per cent in eight countries: Central African Republic (1.8%), Chad (1.4%), Eritrea (1.2%), Gambia (1.8%), Guinea Bissau (0.9%), Mozambique (1.6%), Niger (1.3%) and Tanzania (1.6%) (Table 1, column E). Countries with the highest percentages of their tertiary age population enrolled in tertiary studies included Mauritius (24.2%), South Africa (15.5%), Cape Verde (14.5%), Gabon (11.1%), and Nigeria (10.3%). Given its population size, Nigeria's 10.3 per cent means that it has the largest number of

tertiary students in the region. UNESCO also has (weighted) data available on the percentage of the tertiary age population enrolled at home (UNESCO 2009b). In 2007, that statistic for the world was 26, with ratios of 71 for both North America and Western Europe, but only 6 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa.⁷⁴ While sub-Saharan African enrolment levels were low relative to those of other regions, they were comparable to the figure for East Asia and the Pacific in 1990. The latter had tertiary enrolments of 7 per cent in 1990 but by 2007 that figure had climbed to 26 per cent. That trend for the East Asia and Pacific region suggests that countries can improve their tertiary enrolment levels in a relatively short period of time if governments commit themselves to this goal.


Top destinations for sub-Saharan African students

In 2007, thirty countries had at least 100 tertiary students from sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 4, and Table 2 column B), and several countries had considerably more. France had the largest number (47 394), followed by South Africa (41 713), the United States (33 115), the United Kingdom (29 656), Portugal (11 603), Germany (9 541), Australia (6 500), Morocco (5 262) and Canada (4 577). The origins of students to each destination country differed considerably (see Table 2). France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom received African students largely from their former colonies while most of South Africa's students came from its nearest neighbours. The flow to the USA, on the other hand, was more diverse, and while its largest numbers came from anglophone Africa, it received many students from francophone countries as well. Only 20 per cent

74. The UNESCO statistic differs from the one shown in Table 1 because it is a weighted average based on the total number of tertiary-age students enrolled in tertiary studies in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the statistic used in Table 1 is unweighted and based on country numbers of students enrolled at home and abroad.

of Africans studying in the United States came from a single country (Kenya), compared to 35 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, of those in South Africa and the United Kingdom (Table 2 column E). Germany too was a relatively large receiver of African students, which is not surprising given that German universities have a solid reputation in engineering and the sciences and provide some fellowship support to foreign students. It is of interest that in 2007 over half of Germany's foreign students came from Cameroon, a country where Germany did have a colonial presence, albeit a brief one.⁷⁵ Germany's other colonies included Togoland (now Togo and part of Ghana), Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and South West Africa (now Namibia), from all of which it also receives students, with Togo being its third largest sender.


Figure 4. Percentage of sub-Saharan African students by destination country, 2007






Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2009

75. Germany controlled Cameroon from 1884 to 1914 but after World War I the country was divided and ceded to France and Britain. In 1961 those colonies were reunited as the independent country of Cameroon.

Figure 5. Origins of sub-Saharan African students to top destination countries





Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest Annual Report, various years

Table 2. Top destinations and flow composition for sub-Saharan African students, 2007

A	B	C	D	E
Study destination	Number of African students	Countries with 100 or more sub-Saharan African students in 2007 OR listing of their top five sub-Saharan Africa senders	No. of SSA countries sending over 100 students	% from top sending country
France	47 394	Senegal (9 301), Cameroon (5 570), Côte d'Ivoire (3 692), Madagascar (3 550), Gabon (3 401), Congo (2 906), Guinea (2 563), Mauritius (1 909), Mali (1 686), Togo (1 667), Comoros (1 296), Burkina Faso (2 140), Mauritania (1 128), Niger (866), Rwanda (599), Chad (465), Burundi (281), Kenya (226), Angola (203), Ethiopia (217), Cape Verde (170), Nigeria (153), Ghana (109), South Africa (100)	24	19.6
South Africa	41 713	Zimbabwe (14 690), Namibia (8 131), Botswana (5 079), Lesotho (3 702), Swaziland (2 885), Zambia (1 539), Mauritius (1 223), Congo DR (1 162), Angola (1 049), Mozambique (895), Malawi (679), Tanzania (647)	12	35.2
United States	33 115	Kenya (6 489), Nigeria (6 074), Ghana (3 026), Cameroon (1 839), South Africa (1 702), Zimbabwe (1 552), Ethiopia (1 357), Tanzania (1 222), Zambia (895), Uganda (759), Senegal (696), Côte d'Ivoire (672), Mali (465), Angola (452), Burkina (432), Gambia (380), Togo (374), Liberia (343), Malawi (328), Sudan (328), Sierra L. (306), Congo DR (277), Niger (264), Benin (259), Gabon (235), Botswana (232), Rwanda (215), Mauritius (210), Eq. Guinea (200), Eritrea (188), Guinea (185), Congo (146), Madagascar (139), Chad (123), Swaziland (117)	35	19.6

A	B	C	D	E
Study destination	Number of African students	Countries with 100 or more sub-Saharan African students in 2007 OR listing of their top five sub-Saharan Africa senders	No. of SSA countries sending over 100 students	% from top sending country
United Kingdom	29 656	Nigeria (11 136), Kenya (2 759), Ghana (2 675), Zimbabwe (2 475), Mauritius (1 886), South Africa (1 699), Tanzania (1 049), Uganda (910), Botswana (629), Cameroon (466), Zambia (604), Malawi (581), Cameroon (466), Gambia (356), Sudan (343), Sierra Leone (265), Angola (256), Ethiopia (230), Seychelles (160), Côte d'Ivoire (120), Somalia (120), Eritrea (115), Namibia (105)	23	37.6
Portugal	11 603	Angola (4 794), Cape Verde (4 342), Mozambique (1006), São Tomé & Príncipe (644), Guinea Bissau (426), South Africa (168), Guinea (159)	7	41.3
Germany	9 541	Cameroon (5 139), Nigeria (430), Togo (378), Kenya (328), Ghana (294), South Africa (280), Sudan (247), Senegal (227), Mauritania (163), Guinea (128), Benin (119), Tanzania (117), Uganda (114)	13	53.8
Australia	6 500	Zimbabwe (1 361), Kenya (1 278), Mauritius (1 087), South Africa (707), Zambia (552), Botswana (537), Seychelles (168), Nigeria (166), Tanzania (142), Ghana (99), Uganda (86), Malawi (85)	9	20.9
Morocco	5 262	Mauritania (853), Senegal (516), Guinea (429), Mali (357), Côte d'Ivoire (354), Niger (283), Congo (256), Chad (184), Ethiopia (172), Gabon (172), Togo (157), Ghana (97)	11	16.2
Canada	4 577	Cameroon (522), Zimbabwe (500), Senegal (420), Nigeria (405), Côte d'Ivoire (315), Gabon (237), Ghana (216), Rwanda (210), Burkina (177), Congo (171), Burundi (159), Congo DR (150), Guinea (144), Tanzania (138), Mali (132), Togo (123)	16	11.4

A	B	C	D	E
Study destination	Number of African students	Countries with 100 or more sub-Saharan African students in 2007 OR listing of their top five sub-Saharan Africa senders	No. of SSA countries sending over 100 students	% from top sending country
Italy	3 455	Cameroon (1 614), Congo (222), Nigeria (158), Ethiopia (130), Senegal (111), Togo (107), Côte d'Ivoire (104), Angola (100), Eritrea (97), Ghana (83)	8	46.7
Malaysia	2 536	Sudan (634), Nigeria (497), Somalia (424), Kenya (239), Mauritius (116), Botswana (107)	6	25.0
Norway	1 445	Ethiopia (281), Ghana (142), Tanzania (129), Uganda (97), Somalia (92), Rwanda (80), Cameroon (76), Kenya (52), Somalia (40)	3	19.4
Switzerland	1 439	Cameroon (444), Senegal (180), Côte d'Ivoire (79), DRC. (73), Guinea (72)	2	30.9
Cameroon	1 415	Chad (1 229), Gabon (51), Namibia (31), Congo (28), Nigeria (26)	1	86.9
Ghana	1 392	Nigeria (1 349), Liberia (43)	1	96.9
Finland	1 304	Kenya (312), Nigeria (233), Ghana (211), Ethiopia (134), Cameroon (107), Tanzania (110)	6	23.9
India	1 189	Kenya (442), Mauritius (370), Ethiopia (351), Seychelles (26)	3	37.2
Madagascar	954	Comoros (954)	1	100
Saudi Arabia	800	Sudan (313), Somalia (157), Eritrea (97), Mauritania (75), Comoros (41), Gambia (41)	2	39.1
Cuba	792	South Africa (243), Mali (153), Namibia (111), Equatorial Guinea (109), Cape Verde (80)	4	30.7
Greece	684	Niger (180), Ethiopia (91), Sudan (81), South Africa (63), DRC (60)	1	26.3
Ireland	613	Nigeria (202), Botswana (60), Ethiopia (51), Mauritius (38), Zimbabwe (35)	1	33.0
Spain	502	Equatorial Guinea (310), Cape Verde (49), Angola (22), Mozambique (16), Kenya (12)	1	61.8
Burundi	493	DRC (276), Rwanda (217)	2	56.0
Central African Rep.	397	Chad (397)	1	100
Jordan	371	Somalia (97), Sudan (96), Eritrea (82), Mauritania (60)	0	26.1
Turkey	320	Tanzania (88), Kenya (68), Nigeria (52), Sudan (27), Malawi (16)	0	27.5
New Zealand	254	South Africa (66), Kenya (29), Seychelles (23), Nigeria (23), Seychelles (23)	0	26.0
Belgium	117	Nigeria (103)	1	88.0
Austria	105	Nigeria (93)	0	88.6

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2009

Student flows to France, the United Kingdom, Portugal and Germany indicate that those countries continue to have close cultural, economic, and political ties with their former African colonies (see Figure 5). Flows to other destinations, in contrast, are likely to have been shaped by a mixture of geographic proximity, global economic ties, higher education institutions, and development levels and political conditions of the sending country. For instance, student flows from Zimbabwe to neighbouring South Africa stem largely from the political disruptions in recent years that have led to financial cutbacks and the flight of academics from universities in Zimbabwe. Before its political crisis, the University of Zimbabwe was one of the leading universities in Africa and sent relatively few students abroad. On the other hand, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have historically sent large numbers of students to South Africa mainly because they have small populations and limited tertiary education capacity at home and geographic proximity. Since neighbouring South Africa has several universities that offer high quality education and charge foreign students far less than universities in Europe and North America do, many students from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) find it attractive to go there for their studies.

The United States, on the other hand, attracts Africans and students from other regions because its universities are widely recognised as leading global training institutions in science and technology fields. Global rankings of universities by indicators of scientific productivity – number of publications, research support, number of scientists and engineers, and other indicators – consistently place US universities at the top of these rankings. Europe also has several universities in the top 100 but there are no African universities in that grouping (AFP/DNA 2006; Newsweek 2006).⁷⁶ In addition to worldwide

recognition for excellence in teaching and research in the sciences, technology, engineering and business, US universities have a relative abundance of funding at the graduate level that they make available to international and domestic students on a competitive basis. Many NGOs and development agencies also provide scholarship support and sponsor students from developing countries for study at US universities.

Tables 2 and 3 show that there is a high degree of selectivity in terms of where students from different sub-Saharan African countries go for their studies. Africans from some sending countries migrate almost exclusively to a single destination (see Table 3 columns C and D) but others go to multiple destinations. For instance, 20 of the 47 sub-Saharan African countries shown in Table 3 sent over half of their students to a single destination, and 4 countries (Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and Cape Verde) sent 90 per cent or more. Other countries, particularly Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Mauritius, Tanzania, Burundi and South Africa, have sent students to multiple destinations, and many of them study in non-traditional destinations (Table 3 column D and E). 'Traditional receiving countries' were classified as those in North America, Western Europe, Russia and Australia, while non-traditional receivers are other countries in Africa, Central and South America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Columns C and E of Table 3 identify destinations for countries that sent the largest percentages of their students to non-traditional countries. Malaysia, for instance, is the top study destination for students from Sudan and Somalia, and Saudi Arabia is among the top receivers for students from Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. Since Islam is the

76. According to the Times Higher Education rankings, the University of Cape Town is currently ranked 107th.

predominant religion in both these receiving and sending countries, these flows suggest that religion may also be a factor that enters into student recruitment and destination decisions.

Other non-traditional receivers beyond South Africa, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia that have attracted sub-Saharan African students in recent years include Morocco, Cameroon, Ghana, India, Madagascar and Cuba. Canada is usually thought of as a major destination for third world students, but, in 2007, Morocco received more sub-Saharan African students than Canada – 5 262 versus 4 577 (Table 2 column B). Student flows to most non-traditional receivers usually come from neighbouring countries but Morocco's inflows were relatively diversified with more than 100 sub-Saharan African students from each of eleven different countries (Table 3). Although most of Morocco's sub-Saharan African students come from francophone countries in the Sahel, it also receives small numbers from Ethiopia, a country where Amharic and English are spoken, and from Ghana (English). Overall, Morocco's numbers from francophone countries remain small relative to those in France, but if its inward flows increase in the years ahead that will broaden study opportunities for francophone students who in the past have largely been limited to study in France. Students from anglophone sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, already have multiple study options and those are growing, especially since most Asian universities and other non-traditional receivers that have entered the international student market offer their study programmes in English. However – unless they learn another language – students from the five Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé & Príncipe), are limited, outside the region, to studying in Portugal or Brazil, or, within Africa, to another country in this group. Since almost as many Mozambicans are studying in South Africa as in Portugal, it appears to be the case that geography can outweigh

linguistics if education costs and quality conditions are favourable.

The destination statistics reported in this paper focus on student levels in 2007. However, data for earlier years indicate that destination choices are changing and, in particular, that growing numbers of internationally-mobile African students are studying within the region. Whereas 18.4 per cent studied in sub-Saharan Africa in 1999, by 2007, 23 per cent did so (UNESCO 2009b). Beyond South Africa, other relatively large regional receivers include Cameroon (1 415), Ghana (1 392) and Madagascar (954). As already mentioned, most intra-regional flows occur mainly between neighbouring countries. If the percentages of tertiary students studying in North Africa and other non-traditional receiving countries are taken into account, study destinations in Africa are likely to become even more diverse in the years ahead.⁷⁷

Factors underlying country differences in study-abroad rates

The selectivity of sub-Saharan African student flows to the top study destinations indicates that at least some students from all African countries have been able to carve out a study-abroad pathway to at least one foreign destination, although most countries send students to multiple destinations. Unfortunately, given the dearth of research on international student mobility, there is almost no data available on why student outflows and destination choices differ across

77. As mentioned above, only about 8% of all international students counted in the UNESCO statistics are from sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of the world's foreign students are from Asia, particularly from China and India, but the numbers from sub-Saharan Africa are growing. Although Africans constitute a relatively small fraction of global students, most foreign students in France and Portugal are from Africa. Canada and the USA, in contrast, receive relatively few Africans; the UK has a fair number; and almost all foreign students in South Africa and in Morocco are African.

countries. The prevailing view in the past regarding the reasons for students from Africa and other developing region going abroad for tertiary studies was that they were 'pushed' to do so because of the lack of study opportunities in their homelands. That view has been challenged in recent years by experts who claim that study abroad has little to do with tertiary education conditions in students' homelands and more to do with the increased wages and opportunities that become available to students if they obtain a college or advanced degree in North America or Europe (Clemens 2009; Rosenzweig 2006). It is further argued that remittances and diaspora ties adequately compensate sending countries for brain drain losses, and that brain drain flows would be likely to increase rather than decrease as a result of investments in tertiary education at home (Clemens 2009; Rosenzweig 2006; Lowell & Khadka 2009). The quality of tertiary training available at home, together with political conditions and a host of other factors, undoubtedly enters into students' decisions about whether to do their tertiary studies at home or abroad, and – if they do go abroad – whether to return home after completing their studies. However, the lack of empirical study of these issues makes it difficult to evaluate whether and how outbound student mobility is related to increased education capacity.

The idea, current today, that students are pulled to the United States and Western Europe for graduate study because they are seeking future employment opportunities differs from the line of reasoning that prevailed at the start of the post-colonial development era in the 1960s. At that time, international student mobility was viewed as an expedient way for states emerging from colonial rule to build human capital. According to this reasoning, students had to be sent abroad to study because their countries did not have sufficient institutional capacity to train them at home. Students who

received advanced higher education degrees abroad were then expected to return home and develop university teaching and research programmes that would allow the next generation of skilled workers to be trained at home (Thompson 1974). In the 1960s and '70s, private foundations, bilateral assistance agencies and governments sponsored graduate-level scholarship programmes in collaboration with universities in Africa, Asia and Latin America that enabled thousands of African, Asian and Latin American students to go to North America and Europe for advanced specialised training. However, as evidence mounted that many students were not returning home following completion of their studies (Kindleberger 1968), investment in tertiary education fell out of favour and development experts argued that countries should invest in social welfare at home, rather than putting money into costly tertiary training at home or abroad. Their premise was that countries with scarce resources could best improve development indicators by investing in primary rather than secondary education since the latter benefited mainly the elite and served mainly as a migration pathway into the developed world. As a result, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, most governments, foundations and development agencies were no longer providing either scholarship support for study abroad or financial support to strengthen capacity at African universities. There were some exceptions. Universities in France and the United Kingdom continued to provide some graduate scholarship support to nationals from their former colonies, and universities in the United States continued providing fellowship support for advanced level studies. In addition, several francophone countries still award scholarships to their nationals for university-level study abroad and Botswana provides selective scholarship support to its nationals. Nonetheless, most African students who have gone abroad for undergraduate tertiary study in recent decades

have done so by drawing on financial support from their families, and even post-graduate students have found it difficult to locate scholarship support.

Kritz (forthcoming) has looked at why African countries differ in their rates of outbound student mobility and has identified several country-level structural correlates of international student mobility in Africa, including percentages of tertiary population enrolled at home, change in tertiary enrolments from 1999 to 2005, population size, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (purchasing power parity adjusted), and British or French colonial status. A regression analysis of those variables on the TOM measure (percentage of students enrolled abroad) showed – after controlling for population size, GDP and colonial status – that student outflows were lowest from African countries that had the largest tertiary education capacity. This study also found that, while tertiary education supply was associated with lower percentages abroad, that relationship was strongest in small countries (with populations less than 2 million). Of these small-population countries, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are all located in southern Africa and have long relied on neighbouring South Africa to train their nationals. Other small countries get help from their former colonisers: Gabon and Comoros rely on France; Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and São Tome rely on Portugal (see Table 3 columns C and D). These findings suggest that small countries find it cost-effective to send students abroad for specialised tertiary training. While most small African countries do have at least one or more tertiary training institution, these tend to focus on preparing mid-level managers and technical personnel, primary and secondary teachers, and nurses – rather than serving as comprehensive universities that offer training in a wide range of science, technology, engineering, and management fields.

Table 3. Destination statistics for sub-Saharan African countries, 2007

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Number abroad	Top five destinations	% at top destination	% studying in non-traditional destinations ⁷⁸
Lesotho	3 899	South Africa (3 702), USA (58), UK (34), Cuba (23), Malaysia (5)	94.9	95.7
Namibia	8 615	South Africa (8 131), Cuba (111), UK (105), Germany (85), USA (62)	94.4	95.7
Swaziland	3 121	South Africa (2 885), USA (117), UK (63), Australia (13), Cuba (9)	92.4	92.8
Cape Verde	4 848	Portugal (4 342), France (170), Cuba (80), USA (78), Spain (49)	89.6	2.2
Madagascar	4 154	France (3 550), USA (139), Canada (87), Switzerland (70), Morocco (57)	85.5	1.6
Sao Tomé & Príncipe	792	Portugal (644), France (38), Cuba (38), Morocco (31), USA (9)	81.3	8.7
Senegal	11 728	France (9 302), USA (696), Morocco (516), Canada (420), Germany (227)	79.3	5.2
Gabon	4 418	France (3 401), Canada (237), USA (235), Germany (184), Morocco (172)	77	5.1

78. Traditional receiving countries are in North America (Canada and USA), Western Europe, Russia and Australia. Non-traditional receivers include other countries in Africa, the Americas, Eastern Europe (Romania, Poland, Croatia, and Moldova), the Middle East, and Asia.

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Number abroad	Top five destinations	% at top destination	% studying in non-traditional destinations
Central African Republic	886	France (632), Morocco (79), USA (48), Cameroon (31), Saudi Arabia (16)	71.3	14.2
Botswana	7 174	South Africa (5 079), UK (629), Australia (537), USA (232), Canada (123)	70.8	72.3
Zimbabwe	20 856	South Africa (14 690), UK (2 475), USA (1 552), Australia (1 361), Canada (500)	70.4	70.6
Congo	4 317	France (2 906), Morocco (256), Italy (222), Canada (171), USA (146)	67.3	6.7
Benin	3 631	France (2 413), USA (259), Canada (225), Morocco (202), Germany (119)	66.5	5.8
Angola	7 344	Portugal (4 794), South Africa (1 029), USA (452), UK (256), France (203)	65.3	14.8
Guinea Bissau	653	Portugal (426), Morocco (51), France (44), Cuba (26), Italy (25)	65.2	11.8
Côte d'Ivoire	5 799	France (3 692), USA (672), Morocco (354), Canada (315), Germany (248)	63.7	6.1
Guinea	4 069	France (2 563), Morocco (429), USA (185), Portugal (159), Canada (144)	63	11.6
Liberia	561	USA (343), Ghana (43), Norway (29), Saudi Arabia (23), Morocco (21), Liberia (21)	61.1	16.8

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Number abroad	Top five destinations	% at top destination	% studying in non-traditional destinations
Mali	3 075	France (1 686), USA (465), Morocco (357), Cuba (153), Canada (132)	54.8	17
Togo	3 075	France (1 667), Germany (378), USA (374), Morocco (157), Canada (123)	54.2	5.2
Comoros	2 672	France (1 296), Madagascar (954), Morocco (228), Saudi Arabia (41), USA (40)	48.5	47.5
Kenya	13 415	USA (6 489), UK (2 759), Australia (1 278), India (442), Germany (328)	48.4	5.7
Nigeria	23 044	UK (11 136), USA (6 074), Ghana (1 349), Germany (430), Canada (405)	48.3	8.8
Burkina Faso	2 376	France (1 140), USA (432), Morocco (222), Canada (177), Germany (79)	48	9.6
Chad	2 692	Cameroon (1 229), France (465), Central African Rep. (397), Morocco (184), USA (123)	45.7	68.2
Mozambique	2 433	Portugal (1006), South Africa (895), USA (82), Australia (62), UK (61)	41.3	37.6
Niger	2 097	France (866), Morocco (283), USA (264), Greece (180), Canada (78)	41.3	13.6
Ghana	7 508	USA (3 026), UK (2 675), Germany (294), Canada (216), Finland (211)	40.3	2.1

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Number abroad	Top five destinations	% at top destination	% studying in non-traditional destinations
Mauritania	2 851	France (1 128), Morocco (853), Germany (163), Saudi Arabia (75), USA (65)	39.6	34.9
Equatorial Guinea	791	Spain (310), USA (200), Cuba (109), Morocco (82), France (33)	39.2	26
Gambia	1 013	USA (380), UK (356), Saudi Arabia (41), Morocco (29), France (26)	37.5	8.4
Zambia	4 163	South Africa (1 539), USA (895), UK (604), Australia (552), Canada (45)	37	37
Sierra Leone	842	USA (306), UK (265), Gambia (43), Saudi Arabia (37), Germany (30)	36.3	11.5
Ethiopia	3 757	USA (1 357), India (351), Germany (294), Norway (281), UK (230)	36.1	13.9
Malawi	1 880	South Africa (679), UK (581), USA (328), Australia (85), Norway (36)	36.1	37.4
Uganda	2 642	UK (910), USA (759), Germany (114), Norway (97), Australia (86)	34.4	1.1
DRC.	3 405	South Africa (1 162), France (729), USA (277), Burundi (276), Canada (150)	34.1	43.1
Rwanda	1 759	France (599), Burundi (217), USA (215), Canada (210), UK (88)	34.1	15.1

A	B	C	D	E
Country	Number abroad	Top five destinations	% at top destination	% studying in non-traditional destinations
Seychelles	500	Australia (168), UK (160), France (40), South Africa (26), India (26)	33.6	11
Cameroon	16 962	France (5 570), Germany (5 139), USA (1 839), Italy (1 614), Canada (522)	32.8	1.1
South Africa	5 765	USA (1 702), UK (1 699), Australia (707), Germany (280), Cuba (243)	29.5	5.9
Burundi	970	France (281), Canada (159), USA (87), Norway (56), UK (45)	29	6.6
Tanzania	4 274	USA (1 222), UK (1 049), South Africa (647), Australia (142), Canada (138)	28.6	18.3
Mauritius	7 574	France (1 909), UK (1 886), South Africa (1 223), Australia (1 087), India (370)	25.2	22.6
Eritrea	837	USA (188), UK (115), Saudi Arabia (97), Italy (97), Jordan (82)	22.5	27.7
Somalia	1 408	Malaysia (316), Saudi Arabia (157), UK (120), Jordan (97), Norway (92)	22.4	48.3
Sudan	2 861	Malaysia (634), UK (343), USA (328), Saudi Arabia (313), Germany (247)	22.2	38.1

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics: Global Education Digest, 2009

International student mobility trends and higher education: future trends

This chapter has described the growing demand for higher education in sub-Saharan Africa and has argued that increasing numbers of Africans go to other countries to study because tertiary education institutions in their homelands have not kept pace with rising demand. It has also been pointed out that sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest level of tertiary enrolments in the world and needs to increase its higher education capacity in order to meet growing local demands for skilled labour. The region sends a larger share of its tertiary students abroad for their studies than other world regions do, though countries in the region differ considerably in their outbound student rates. In general, study-abroad rates are highest for countries with small populations (under 2 million), probably because it is not cost-effective for those countries to develop comprehensive tertiary training in specialised fields such as advanced medical specialties, physical and natural sciences, and engineering (Martin & Bray 2009). In larger sub-Saharan African countries, research by Kritz (forthcoming) shows that outbound student rates are closely linked to tertiary training capacity at home. Countries that have the largest training capacity were found (after controlling for differences in population size and GDP per capita) to send fewer students abroad.

There is broad recognition that tertiary education in sub-Saharan Africa has to be both increased and improved, but the challenge remains as to how that can be done – given the problems and needs that exist in African universities, and the competing demands from other sectors for government and private funding. Considering that sub-Saharan Africa's GDP per capita in purchasing power parity averaged only \$2 118 in 2009 (World Bank 2009b) and the fact that African governments already contribute 4.5 per cent of their GDP to

education (Saint 2009), which is above the world average, these countries clearly have severe constraints on their funding decisions.

In 2009, the World Bank published a 177-page report addressing the crisis in African universities, entitled *Accelerating Catch-Up: tertiary education for growth in sub-Saharan Africa* (World Bank 2009a). In addition to making a strong case that investments in tertiary education and human capital will pay off in the long run by enabling countries to move up the technology ladder, compete more effectively in the global knowledge-intensive economy, and cope with their poverty and health problems, the report identified a number of reforms that could improve human capital and reduce brain drain. The report acknowledges that brain drain has imposed costs on the region but takes the view that the region receives benefits from its migration outflows that compensate for these costs: remittances, knowledge and other resources from its diaspora of skilled workers. Remittances, for instance were estimated as bringing in US \$22 billion annually to sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2009a). While the Bank's reasoning about the positive effects of diasporas and remittances on migrants' homelands has gained credence in development circles in recent years, and a growing number of organisations have been launched to facilitate diasporas ties, the reality is that relatively little is known for certain about the effects that remittances have on migrants' homelands or about actual involvements of the African diaspora in the development of their homelands or the region. After an extensive review of what is known about the effects of Africa's diaspora and remittance flows on poverty, John Oucho (2008b) concluded that the evidence was inconclusive and that further research was needed on specific countries and return schemes.

Trends in sub-Saharan African student mobility point to a potential way forward for countries wishing to improve their

human capital that is already being recognised by growing numbers of Africans. The suggestion is that, since higher education capacity, quantity, and quality already vary greatly across Africa, the best course of action would be for students to go to another country in the region for tertiary study. This chapter's analysis has revealed that there are already two regional training systems in Africa that are growing in importance. The largest of these is based in South Africa. In 2007, seven per cent of students at South African universities were from other countries as were one in four students at the graduate level (University World News 2007). While most of those students were from the fourteen other countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), growing numbers are coming from elsewhere. For SADC members, the costs of attending a South African university are comparable to those of local students. The second regional training system is based in Morocco and draws students mainly from the Sahel and West Africa. Other regional hubs could develop in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya or Uganda in the years ahead.

The World Bank (2009a) has called for a strengthening of regional training initiatives in specialised fields that would attract students from other countries in the region for advanced training. African PhD-holders working abroad could potentially be recruited either to return to Africa to work at these regional training centres or to collaborate with them in other ways. Many African PhD-holders now work at leading universities in North America and Europe and could play leadership roles in developing collaborations between their institutions and Africa. Some regional programmes of this type are already underway: for instance the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) was set up in Cape Town in 2003 as a partnership between the University of the Western Cape, the University of Cape Town, the University of Cambridge, the University of Oxford, and the University of

Paris-Sud. It offers a 10-month Postgraduate Diploma in Mathematical Sciences, and African nationals can apply for full scholarships. Another initiative is the African University of Science and Technology (AUST) located in Abuja, Nigeria. It was established in 2007 as a private, pan-African university that seeks to develop research and training institutes in centres throughout the region. It has linkages to elite international technical institutions, including IIT Bombay and United Nations University.

While the success of intra- and inter-regional ventures remains to be determined, and appropriate training models need to be developed that will assure educational quality, they have the potential to advance training and research in a context where financial resources are limited. Regional ventures could also help build collaborative networks among scholars and universities both across Africa and between Africa and other world regions. Universities in North America, Europe and, increasingly, Asia are becoming engaged in efforts to strengthen universities in Africa and other developing countries (Kritz 2006). Many Africans work at leading universities in rich countries that are developing branch campuses and other collaborations with universities in low-income countries. The African diaspora could be productively engaged in these ventures and, in turn, the region's development.

A premise underlying this study is that brain drain loss will be reduced if students study in their homelands or at other institutions in their own regions. While there is some research evidence which shows that foreign students who study in the United States or the United Kingdom have relatively low rates of return following completion of their studies (Tremblay 2005), return rates from only a handful of receiving countries have actually been examined. Unfortunately, data are not available that would allow one to say definitively whether or

not skilled workers stay abroad regardless of where they have studied, or whether the study location has an influence. Further research is needed on this topic. Nonetheless, migration research shows that the longer migrants live outside their homelands, the less likely they are to return home (Dustmann 1996). Many students go abroad for tertiary studies after completing their secondary degrees, and some then remain abroad to do graduate studies. This means that by the time they complete their studies they will probably have spent at least nine or ten years abroad. During that time, foreign students often marry nationals of the countries where they are studying, and/or enter the labour force there in order to defray their education costs. After growing accustomed to the way of life in another country and developing social and economic ties to people and institutions abroad, it is not surprising that some foreign students decide to stay on after they obtain their degrees. Conditions at home too may have changed and deter students from returning.

There are, however, points of intervention that could reduce losses to students' origin countries. The first strategy would be for sending countries to strengthen their undergraduate and vocational training capacity since research suggests that countries that have larger tertiary capacity at home send fewer students abroad to study. However, in many countries, doctorate-holders who could staff expanded tertiary education institutions are in short supply (Adepoju 2007). Virtual training programmes could be a way to supplement face-to-face learning (Hicks 2007). With the growth of the internet, universities are increasingly sharing course content and offering internet courses open to students living in other countries. In order to assist other universities in the region (or elsewhere), the University of Cape Town launched an OpenContentDirectory in early 2010 that allows academics to share their course and research materials on the internet.

A second strategy would be to limit government scholarship assistance for study abroad to advanced study in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and management (STEM) – critical fields to strengthen if countries wish to compete in the global economy. Ideally STEM training would, increasingly, take place at pan-African institutions, but since the number of students who are being trained in these fields in the region is relatively small, some training at first-world institutions would also have to occur.

Another strategy would be to build ‘sandwich’ programmes between African and European or North American universities that would permit African students enrolled in degree programmes in their homelands to go abroad for one to two years to take advantage of advanced teaching and research resources in leading universities.

A fourth strategy would be for home countries to develop policies and programmes that would draw on African doctorate holders working at universities abroad. Although Africans in the diaspora cannot be expected to take the leadership in developing programmes in their homelands – since they have full-time positions abroad and cannot be present on a daily basis to handle training issues that arise – it might nevertheless be possible to increase their involvement in short-course training or in virtual collaborations with students from their homelands.

To put these strategies in place will require strong national leadership that recognises the synergy between advanced tertiary training and economic and social development. In order to compete effectively in the global economy, African countries need to increase their skilled human capital pools, and the best way for most countries to do that is by improving tertiary education at home. Small countries, however, might be best advised to draw on neighbours or other countries for advanced specialised

training. The task of strengthening the region's human capital will not be easy – given Africa's rapidly rising demand for tertiary education, lack of sufficient laboratories and other training facilities, and shortages of graduate degree holders. While the strategies identified above suggest approaches that policymakers could consider, some countries in the region are better situated than others to take up this charge, namely those that have had relatively robust economic growth, large inflows of foreign capital investment, and strong development assistance from bilateral and multilateral agencies. The business sector and multinational corporations too can contribute to human capital improvements by building specialised training programmes for their employees.

The task of training Africa's human capital in the region should become easier in the years ahead as information and communication technologies (ICT) improve and expand throughout the region. As that occurs, communication and networking among institutions and individuals, both within the region and globally, will be increased. Improved ICT will also facilitate the dissemination of teaching and research materials to African universities, thereby enabling them to do a better job of training Africa's next generation and contributing to the region's economic and social development.

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CHAPTER 6

International Migration and Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Introduction

The violation of the human rights of international migrants is a worldwide phenomenon and up to the end of the twentieth century appeared to be on the increase. Even in Sweden, which is noted for best practice in treating migrants, there are questions about the practical effects of its policies regarding the rights of migrants and their families (Scuzzarello 2008). However, with an increasing realisation of the positive contribution of migrants to national development, and a growing international collaboration in pursuit of global peace, it may be conjectured that the risk of migrants' exposure to human rights violations is lower in the twenty-first century than it has previously been.

Operationalising the basic rights of people is at the centre of the factors that influence brain drain, brain circulation, the new diaspora, transnationalism and international remittances in sub-Saharan Africa. From the early post-colonial period, the

rapidly deteriorating political economies in sub-Saharan Africa have fostered the emigration of the skilled as well as the unskilled within and from the region – to the extent that it has become almost impossible to consider current economic and political developments in the region without recognising the significant role of human rights in the emigration process. Like all human beings, international migrants are entitled to access basic assets such as food, cash, water, fuel, education, health, and shelter. They are also entitled to legal and civil protection from abuse of any kind, freedom to express themselves and to participate in every economic and social activity in the home and destination country. To refuse access of migrants to these assets would constitute violation of their basic rights.

Negative interventions from government and the public in destination and transition countries are usually perceived by the victims and human rights activists to be in violation of the rights of migrants and their families. While this is largely true, a significant part of human rights violation lies with the nature of the political economy in the countries of origin. Moreover, there is the influence of internal conflict within migrant groups which occasionally fuels discriminatory attitudes and behaviours of nationals towards immigrants. The extension of human rights protection to all migrants is necessary. Yet doing this is fraught with difficulties related to national laws, organisational regulations and particularly politics in the settings where international migrants work. Politics is never free of dubious acts – because it is applied by management whenever there is a need to invoke non-sanctioned means to realise its objectives. In order to ensure protection of the rights of migrants and maximise their efficiency, national governments should endeavour to monitor the management systems within its public and private organisations.

The preponderance of criminal acts such as human trafficking, violence against immigrants, racial discrimination

and taking unfair economic advantage of irregular migrants is largely due to the failure of socio-political structures to mitigate these actions. Excessive and persistent acts of discrimination of minority groups such as migrants may have morbid physical and psychological effects on the victims and may be deemed to be torture.

The official definition of torture is fairly simple and raises several legal questions. The Convention Against Torture defines torture as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining...information or a confession, punishing him for an act... committed or suspected to have committed, or intimidating or coercing him...or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or consent or acquiescence of a public official or any person acting in an official capacity. (Miller 2005: 6)

Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 'No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.' Certainly withdrawal of citizenship, for example, can be seen as 'degrading treatment or punishment', but the narrow definition of torture – among other factors – often makes it difficult to charge individuals and states with torture on account of activities which can result in prolonged intense pain (Miller 2005). Many African migrants have endured prolonged and excessive pain in and out of jail due to discriminatory actions in destination and transition countries.

The primary aim of this chapter is to critically examine the role of human rights violation in motivating the emigration

of skilled and unskilled Africans. It also includes a description of the effects of poor treatment of migrants at the destination places, both within and outside the continent. Human rights here include the economic and social benefits that human beings are entitled to, including, education, health, employment, justice and freedom of speech, and so on.

Rights of migrant workers and their families

The International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families bestows upon documented migrants numerous rights, as well as equality with nationals, freedom of expression of religious and cultural beliefs and practices, social independence, medical care, education of children, and judicial rights in cases of detention and deportation. The introductory section of the Convention can give the impression that it applies in its entirety 'to all migrant workers and members of their families' (United Nations 1990, Article 1.1). However, it is only up to Article 7 that the Convention implicitly covers irregular as well as documented migrants; beyond this the provisos effectively exclude irregular migrants. Thus, the Convention is flawed by its 'ambivalence' (Bosniak 1991). While it initially bestows numerous rights to 'all migrant workers and members of their families', it recognises that sovereign states regularly treat irregular immigrants in the same way as people who have committed civil and criminal offences. Globally, irregular migrants are frequently perceived as perpetrators of crime, prostitution and unemployment. The Convention does, however, appear to recognise the effect of protectionism (in terms of employment-based immigration policies) on international migrants' rights to employment in destination countries.

It has been argued that it is only migrants who gain from extending employment rights to them, supporting the perception that migrants steal jobs from citizens. But extending

employment rights to migrants can also benefit citizens, employers and governments in destination countries considerably. The socioeconomic structures of several sub-Saharan Africa countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Botswana and South Africa would not have developed as far as they have in the absence of both skilled and unskilled immigration. Irregular migrants have also made considerable economic savings for citizens by accepting low wages while not benefiting from health and unemployment insurance. So far there is scant evidence that the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families has been effectively applied in the case of irregular migrants. Several African governments still consider irregular migration a major problem. There is no doubt that irregular migration is widespread in southern and West Africa; countries with large numbers of irregular immigrants include South Africa, Botswana and Senegal.

The great majority of irregular migrants in South Africa are from Mozambique and Zimbabwe; other sources include countries as far away as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia, with Mozambique and Zimbabwe being usual routes for irregular migration into South Africa. The presence of irregular Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa, as well as those from other countries in the region, has caused concern in South Africa, resulting in heightened xenophobia. Many South Africans look at immigrants from other parts of sub-Saharan Africa as a threat to their future economic wellbeing and as responsible for the increase of violent crime in South Africa. Consequently, unpleasant incidents are common in South Africa, including attacks of immigrants, destruction of their property, and inhuman treatment by the police. Due to social pressure in South Africa, resulting from xenophobic attitudes, local authorities have been forced to adopt restrictive measures, including repatriation or deportation of irregular immigrants. However, in its effort to

'roll back xenophobia', the social and legal situations for Zimbabweans in South Africa have improved considerably since 2008. In September 2010, the South African government offered Zimbabweans who were in the country irregularly an opportunity – between September 20 and December 31 2010 – to regularise their stay in South Africa. This special dispensation was designed to allow Zimbabweans to live in South Africa without fear, and access social and economic opportunities as South Africans would. In response to the xenophobic attacks in South Africa, some countries have taken measures to protect their nationals. For example, Malawi repatriated its threatened citizens through its mission and facilitated their re-integration into local communities in 2008 when migrants were physically abused by South Africans.

Human rights in Africa

In Africa, human rights may be perceived differently from the way they are seen in Western form of the concept – especially in relation to the level of inconvenience and suffering which people are expected to tolerate. Whereas the Western model includes the effect of psychological pain, this is almost ignored in the African model. This may be partly because it is expected in Africa that Africans have unlimited capacity to endure physical pain, but it is more likely due to the inadequate education regarding peaceful social coexistence with non-nationals which has kept most Africans from attaining modernity. Much of the abuse of individuals' civil rights in the region probably derives from the traditional opinions of development within societies where ascription⁷⁹, instead of achievement, prevails. Superstition, suspicion and dependence are common traits of the people, and tend to sustain the belief that the group or community is more

79 The arbitrary or unearned allocation of a particular social status.

important than the individual. Attempts by individuals to express their right to think, speak and act independently are often crushed, even where an independent idea may promote production efficiency and generate profit. As Mahmud (1993) observed, this line of thinking is at variance with human rights. Moreover, a community-based method of distributing goods and services does not necessarily extend to each person fair access to basic needs. Hence, even though post-colonial African governments were initially formed with the understanding that modern democracy would be sustained, this form of governance was soon abandoned in favour of the traditional political system familiar to many Africans, a system which does not seem to value individuality. When sub-Saharan Africa countries gained independence from the colonial powers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was much expectation that the development system initiated by the Europeans would be maintained – and even improved. Having established a western form democracy in the region, the English and French were particularly hopeful that this form of governance would survive after Africans attained their independence. However, events since the 1960s have revealed that few African leaders actually intended to govern within the rules of ‘Western’ democracy. On many occasions, not even electoral democracy was recognised.

In effect, the preferred traditional values, which often became norms after independence, did not bestow rights on women and children. This partly explains why women and children have been exposed to human trafficking to a far greater extent than men have. Does this imply that men did have a full complement of rights? No! Even men had very limited rights because, as Mahmud (1993) observed, what the community offered the fortunate few among the men was seen as privileges, not rights. Though every human being is born free and therefore has the right to participate freely in every aspect of their community or society according to their own

choosing, the implementation of these rights is much more complex than may be perceived by the less knowledgeable. Considering that traditional African and western systems have co-existed since the 1960s, with governments not obliged to distribute wealth fairly, populations have, for many decades, been at risk of human rights violations.

The brain drain from Africa and its causes

From the foregoing, it is apparent that human rights issues are not confined to the experiences of international migrants in destination countries. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, movement of skilled peoples frequently began with negative economic and political experiences at home which led to the brain drain that still occurs in the region. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimate that, from 1990 till 2003, 20 000 people left Africa annually to live elsewhere (Mutume 2003). By 2005, an estimated 300 000 African professionals lived outside the region, many of them being highly skilled health professionals and other scientists (Adepoju 2006). By 2000, sub-Saharan Africa had the highest probability (13.6%) of emigration of skilled people in the world, the vast majority (over 90%) of them going to Europe, the USA and Canada (Easterly & Nyarko 2008).

The cost of producing human capital in Africa is quite high. Government spending on educating its nationals ranges from 8.7 per cent of total government expenditure in Zambia to 26.9 per cent in Senegal. But since the mid-1980s the unit cost of education (i.e. the amounts spent by government) in the region has declined relative to per capita gross national product, while enrolment rates have increased (Easterly & Nyarko 2008). Deteriorating working conditions, spurred on by frequent coups d'état, as well as by the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), forced

steady streams of professionals into exile in relatively rich countries. Between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, many teachers, researchers, medical practitioners and administrators in West Africa who did not proceed to Europe or the United States (US) obtained work in Nigeria, whose oil-based economy was strong. By the mid-1980s, the economic and political problems in Nigeria coincided with economic and political progress in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. With seriously faltering economies in Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe, the movements of professionals shifted from West and East Africa to these southern African countries. Gross mismanagement of national revenue, and ethnic strife in the emigration countries led to increasing forced reorganisation of interregional migrants' plans to return home once the situation there had improved.

When Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone became independent in the 1950s and 1960s, their economies were reasonably strong and their public sectors were among the best in the sub-region. Indeed, before 1970 the state of Nigeria's economy was stronger than that of Indonesia (Collier & Gunning 1999). This position has since been reversed. In the process of post-colonial economic development, African states depended considerably on former colonialists for economic assistance. This came in the form of loans, grants, aid, training and technical assistance. It also formed the foundation of the inescapable debt trap in which these states were later to find themselves. Recognising the need to develop strong national resource bases, the anglophone governments in particular spent substantial amounts of their national budgets on educating their people locally and internationally up to university level.

Sierra Leone's experience is typical of the sub-region. In 1961, Sierra Leone received gifts of close to US\$150 000 to develop Fourah Bay College, for research, and to sponsor

students' education overseas (Roberts 1975). Until the late 1970s, students who graduated with First Class and Second Class Upper were sponsored by the iron ore mining company to obtain doctoral degrees in universities overseas. Half of the government's education budget for 1962–1967 went to the national university, and only 20 per cent of it was directed to primary and secondary education. This difference is partly because, unlike university education, primary and secondary education in Sierra Leone was not free. Due to the government's education policy, almost three decades after independence enrolment in primary and secondary schools had increased tenfold, while at the university the increase was about sixfold.

In Nigeria, the bloated enrolment rate, especially at the primary level, due to a policy of universal primary education, was compounded by poor population census data and the government's erroneous anticipation of continuous inflow of wealth from oil (Csapo 1983). Logistic difficulties, such as an inadequate supply of teachers, and the huge financial cost of implementing education policies strained the economy and compromised educational standards. In some instances there were as many African nationals studying in universities overseas as there were students in the local national universities. This was largely due to poor human resource planning, which became increasingly evident later when sub-Saharan Africa economies began to decline. Though human resource planning for medicine and engineering was initially quite good, the governments' desire to accelerate localisation (or Africanisation) policies led to a flood of skilled nationals seeking work within limited employment markets. From the early 1970s, the result of this was an increasing incidence of unemployment (real and structural) and underemployment of skilled nationals.

Military expenditure

Military governments, and especially military conflicts, have had a significant influence on brain drain and refugee movements. Military conflict in home countries is a 'powerful push factor'. It tends to reduce the opportunity cost of staying, thereby enhancing the desire to emigrate. There has been a general shift towards excessive expenditure on non-essential goods and services largely due to a tendency to prioritise national security. Several African governments have spent excessively large sums of money on arms in order to develop military forces which were seen by some as essential for national security. The transformation of several post-colonial territories into African military states, as well as the Cold War, demand an address of the effect of defence spending on economic growth in the region. Though many developing countries do not prioritise the public dissemination of military expenditure figures, the limited information available suffices. About sixty military coups d'état occurred in Africa between 1956 and the mid 1980s. In 1982, twenty-two African countries had military governments and there were as many unsuccessful coups d'état in the continent that year. Contrary to the school of thought that military expenditure boosts economic growth, the literature does not provide a consensus on the subject. While several studies indicate that increased defence spending does impact positively on national economic growth, many writers conclude otherwise. Heo (1998) observed that the effect of military expenditure on economic growth varies between countries. Increased defence spending was seen to have reduced economic growth in 63 per cent of the countries he examined.

The military coups d'état, which accompanied political and economic crises in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic and so, on from the 1960s to the 1980s, highlighted

the importance of a sector that reportedly needed upgrading to ensure national security. In this regard, expenditure on arms was increased considerably by military regimes, while the budgets for several other sectors declined – in the majority of African states in the 1980s, military expenditure on hardware and services rose faster than expenditure on education and health (Atteh 1996). The limits to expenditure on arms by civilian governments were probably influenced partly by public opinion. People's attitude was that African soldiers were good only for taking orders because most military personnel had little education. Having assumed political and economic power, the new military elites did much to demonstrate their role in the political economy by engaging in excessive expenditure on arms to improve the image of the military. The attractiveness of power and money influenced a reversal of the goals that the military initially intended to realise when they toppled corrupt, undemocratic civilian governments. Much of the national revenue was thus spent on non-essential projects and activities, contributing to poor economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003). Income inequality increased in several countries; for example in Uganda the Gini coefficient was 0.27 (low relative to many African countries) before the military regime took power in the 1970s, but rose to 0.33 by the end of the 1980s (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2003). Partly due to strict disciplinary orientation, the military soon became authoritarian and increasingly less tolerant of the nations' constitution and the social and economic rights of the population.

Though the Cold War ended in 1989, it produced war lords throughout Africa whose economic survival derived largely from wars. As a result, by 1994 the region had produced over six million refugees and asylum seekers. Approximately 22 million people were displaced in Central and East Africa alone. Almost all post-colonial African countries may be

classified as 'semi-democracies' because their governments chose to adopt electoral democracies when convenient, instead of democracies which ensure justice for all in the population. Empirical evidence indicates that countries with semi-democracies have a greater likelihood of experiencing civil war than either democratic or autocratic ones. The occurrence of numerous military conflicts in West, East and southern Africa also contributed to misplaced disbursement of national incomes, and refugee formation. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola and Mozambique are examples of countries whose economic development was, to a large degree, stifled by prolonged civil wars. These conflicts produced gross misuse of minerals – especially diamonds in West and southern Africa – to finance civil wars, while the economies that the minerals should have helped collapsed and poverty increased. In 2002 in Angola, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone, poverty ranged between 42 per cent and 70 per cent, with Angola being the highest. The poverty rates of youths in some West African countries, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, are in excess of 60 per cent. Military conflict within a country tends to divert funds from social sectors such as education and health. There is a massive build-up of sophisticated and expensive weapons, but policies might change and could have a considerable effect on international trade and currency exchange rates. Skilled populations tend to be among the most affected by the economic decisions made by military leadership and during military conflict. The potential for brain drain, therefore, thrives under these conditions.

Corruption

It has long been acknowledged – today increasingly so – that corruption is another cause of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (Johnson 2004). Materialism, ambition and greed are among the factors that are known to have fuelled corruption in the

region. While corruption may not have featured prominently in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana (see White 2003), it certainly played a major role when the Ghanaian economy ground to a halt between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. Indeed, the economic woes of the country began with Nkrumah's struggle to maintain and improve the colonialist-based development in the country. Having adopted a pro-Soviet stance during the Nkrumah regime, Ghana overshot its Second Five Year Development Plan budget of £250 million sterling by investing in large scale projects such as the Volta River Dam in Akosombo, a luxurious conference centre valued at about £15 million, as well as on basic infrastructure and education (White 2003). Meanwhile, an early 1960s decline in earnings from cocoa – the country's primary agricultural export – was accompanied by rising inflation. By the end of the 1980s, Ghana had shifted from being a major importer of labour migrants to a major human resource exporter.

Corruption and reckless spending were also largely responsible for the transition of the Nigerian economy from 'oil boom' in the early 1970s to 'oil burst' by 1980. Among the factors that helped strain the country's economy was a decision by the military government of President Yakubu Gowon to increase salaries, with arrears covering almost a year. It was not merely the salary increase that hurt the economy; it was also the government's flagrant disregard for the recommendation by the Udoji Commission to implement it in phases over two years. An immediate backlash from this massive salary increase was a spate of uncontrolled price inflation, with eventual negative effects on the nation's balance of payments and foreign reserves. In order to stay in favour with the public, successive governments freely handed out contracts to friends, relatives and powerful society members.

The All People's Congress (APC) party, which ruled Sierra Leone from 1968 to 1992, was undoubtedly one of the most

corrupt regimes sub-Saharan Africa has ever seen – partly because it existed continuously for over two decades. Its leader, prime minister Siaka Stevens, inherited a political system that was rooted in democracy, but he soon found an excuse in a failed coup d'état in 1971 to impose himself as the country's president. The state was rapidly transformed into one where organised corruption prevailed. From about the early 1970s, the APC, under the leadership of Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh, was fraught with political and economic corruption. The party was skilful in exploiting public fear. Before it was elected into power in 1967, it successfully manipulated a widespread belief that its predecessor (the Sierra Leone's People's Party) utilised every means possible to maintain power. As a government, the APC used thugs and bullets (real or imagined) to ensure that no democratic elections were held for over a decade. Citizenship rights became associated with individual accumulated wealth. The net effect was a highly repressive, anti-developmental political system that rewarded sycophancy and punished honesty, hard work, patriotism and independent thought. The psyche and aspirations of the population were abused by a new order of coercion and state violence that went far beyond the bounds of rationality. By 1976, the unwritten slogan among the youth was that it was better to seek individual financial wealth than academic leadership. Stevens's protégé, Momoh, was widely expected to reverse the country's fall into economic and moral bankruptcy, but he proceeded along the line of his mentor, even introducing ethnic bias into the equation. The inevitable coup d'état which put an end to the APC regime in 1992 set up commissions of enquiry. Between 1982 and 1987, these exposed several scandalous acts of corruption and personal appropriation of public funds within the government – referred to as 'Vouchergate', 'Squandergate' and 'Milliongate'.

Generally, venal politics and poor development policies contributed greatly to the disappointing political economies

in West, East and Central Africa. Taylor (2006) argues that the scandalous economic frauds associated with former President Moi's regime of Kenya were not easy to shake off after the opposition party of President Kibaki won the elections in 2002 – partly because the new government had already been infected with the 'corruption bug' when several of Moi's party members crossed over to the opposition before the elections. The exposure of former Zambian President Chiluba and former Malawi President Muluzi to prosecution for fraudulent acts involving state funds is testimony to the autocratic behaviour and complacency of many African leaders, and their participation in the mismanagement of national resources (Taylor 2006). The extent to which exclusiveness within the context of xenophobia is played out in politics is clear in the case of Cameroon. This occurs in several other African countries and has a high potential to spread a culture of nepotism through political bias.

Most acts regarded as bribery in western countries were until recently accepted as expression of 'gift' within the cultural framework of African societies. Thus the inclusion of 'ten per cent', or an item for 'palm greasing', in aid and other budgets – or the presentation of goods and services to a chief or governor in appreciation of their visit, attention or assistance – was accepted by all parties as normal behaviour. Only in the late 1970s did what is now seen as corruption gain enough notoriety to be included as a significant contributor to national economic failure in developing countries. Even as the dawn of the twenty-first century approached, several World Bank officials would not include corruption among the factors that were responsible for Africa's poor economic growth (Collier & Gunning 1999). Why, they said, should world economic organisations acknowledge corruption in the economic failure of countries that received loans from the IMF, when substantial parts of these went explicitly to grease the palms of politicians

who promptly deposited these 'gifts' in Swiss and other western banks? Only recently was the developed world forced to accept that these cash deposits were effectively the result of corruption rather than a 'normal' part of the transactions. The accompanying World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programmes also helped to foster economic depression in several African countries.

The total effect of corruption on individuals in Africa should be regarded as human rights violation. Considering that sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region globally, poverty may be the primary determinant of all forms of human rights violation in the region. But the 'poverty syndrome' effect is not entirely valid. The wealthiest states probably violate the human rights of their populations as much as the less-wealthy states do. But the effect may seem far less significant, partly because the public anticipate future economic rewards from the state, and this leads to a cultivation of popular silence (the 'culture of silence'). Erosion of this culture begins – and proceeds quite gradually – when it becomes obvious to the public that the anticipated rewards are unlikely to be realised. From a study of 122 states worldwide, including in Africa, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) nevertheless found an inverse relationship between human rights violation and economic development. However, when other indices of development were used, such as trade and investment, the differences in human rights violation were not significant. Interestingly, these authors found greater human rights violations in states that had been colonised by non-British governments than in those that had been colonised by the British. In view of this, it would be useful to determine if there was significant difference in the brain drains from former British and non-British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. If no difference exists, then the economy would very probably be the sole determinant of brain drain in the country. A separate empirical study by Klitgaard and

Fedderke (1995) found that, in many countries, improvement in civil and political rights did not increase investment – on the contrary, investment levels declined in such countries. While this is a good contribution to knowledge about the relationship between human rights violation and economic development, these findings require further research to ascertain their validity.

Anti-human rights migration policies

Since the 1960s, when most sub-Saharan Africa countries attained political independence, there have been numerous cases where both documented and irregular migrant workers have had their civil and economic rights violated by nationals and governments of the countries of employment. Notable examples of this are the mass expulsions of irregular migrants from Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, increasing unemployment among the skilled and the unskilled by the late 1960s was too much of a challenge for the Busia government to endure. For survival purposes, it had to find a scapegoat for the economic woes of the country. Informal trade in particular was largely in the hands of immigrants and their descendants, the majority of whom were of Nigerian origin. In 1969 the government introduced the Aliens Compliance Order which required all irregular immigrants in Ghana to legalise their stay within two weeks or leave the country (Adepoju 2007). Many of the families targeted had lived in the country for generations and even benefited from government grants, subsidies, and so on. They or their parents or grandparents had entered the country decades earlier when border controls hardly existed and, until 1969, had never been treated differently from documented migrants. This is not an isolated case. France tolerated 'irregular immigrants' in its territory until the early 1970s when about 80 per cent of all migrants were not documented (Bosniak 1991). It was therefore impractical for those in Ghana to see

themselves as illegal immigrants, let alone be expected to correct their residence status within a very short time – the large number of people in this category made it difficult for them to attain legal residence within the stipulated two weeks. Further actions were taken by the Ghanaian government to exclude non-citizens from owning certain businesses – for instance those that accrued returns of £200 000 sterling or more. Though it is unclear how many ‘irregular migrants’ were deported from Ghana, the number is estimated to be between 213 750 and 1.5 million (Adepoju 1995, 2002; Akyeampong 2006). Reportedly, quite a few of these deportees of Nigerian descent experienced considerable difficulty tracing their relatives once they returned to Nigeria. But the Ghanaian economy did not revive after this and by 1975 it had collapsed. There is a strong possibility that the Ghana government did not consider the effects of the Aliens Compliance Order on an economy that had grown for over half a century largely from the efforts of non-nationals. Ghana’s economy revived about twenty years later, through the determined efforts of the young military officer Jerry Rawlings to get it back on track. That was in about 1994, and the economy has not reversed since then.

A similar economy-induced problem in Nigeria during the early 1980s led to a parliamentary act by which an estimated 1.5 million irregular migrants (mostly Ghanaians) were expelled from Nigeria in 1983 and 1985 (Adepoju 1995). Of the deportees, 180 000 were from Nigeria, while 120 000 were Cameroonians, 150 000 Chadians, 5 000 Togolese and 5000 Beninoise. A shift from a diversified economy to one based on oil diverted valuable skills from agriculture to the urban sector. Rapid city-ward migration put increasing pressure on the job market, while agriculture failed. Between 1970 and 1976 cocoa output was reduced by about 154 000 tonnes and the country was transformed from exporting to importing agricultural

products (Joseph 1978). By 1982, the resultant increase in inflation and unemployment led Nigerian politicians to target irregular immigrants for mass expulsion. It should be noted that about 77 per cent of all West Africans living in Nigeria at that time (including highly skilled professionals) were irregular migrants. They included university professors, teachers, lawyers, accountants and medical professionals. The Nigerian public did not support the expulsion order as strongly as Ghanaians had done in their own country a decade and more before – indeed, there were Nigerian nationals who protected irregular migrants, so that there were, in the end, far fewer deportees than had initially been anticipated. Also, the Nigerian government was more considerate to irregular migrants than the Ghanaians had been by extending the original two weeks' notice by a further four weeks (Adepoju 1984). In 1983, highly skilled migrants were allowed more time to regularise their stay in Nigeria, and most of them were not expelled. Still the expulsion was deplored by international organisations. And far from improving as a result, Nigeria's economy collapsed after the execution of the expulsion order.

These experiences in Ghana and Nigeria show clearly how inhumanely international migrants (both documented and irregular) who contribute significantly to destination countries' economies have been treated by destination governments. It also demonstrates how such actions may lead to the demise of the economies in the host countries. Post-independence expulsion of non-nationals has occurred in several other African countries, including Gabon, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Botswana and South Africa (Adepoju 1995; Oucho 2000). Starting in 1967, 18 000 members of the Jehovah's Witness religious sect were persecuted in Malawi and some of their leaders were expelled from the country when they defended colleagues who refused to purchase party membership cards. Some members suffered arson attacks, or were assaulted,

imprisoned, tortured or murdered. Further persecutions in 1972 caused about 21 000 Jehovah's Witnesses to flee Malawi and seek refuge in Zambia – from where they were forcibly repatriated (see *World Directory of Minorities*, Online 2008). Expulsions continue: between 2002 and 2008, Mauritania and Libya forcibly expelled thousands of irregular migrants (*Refworld* 27 May 2009).

The negative side of irregular migration

Irregular migrants may enter a country without required official travel documents (visa, passport, temporary travel permit), or they may have entered a country with all the required travel documents but stayed beyond the expiry date of their visa. The act of entering a sovereign territory or extending one's stay in it without official permit ('overstaying') constitutes a violation of the immigration laws regarding residence in the territory. Violation of these laws induces legal connotation to irregular migration and is the reason why governments tend to consider this practice illegal and why the perpetrators are defined as 'illegal migrants'. It should be acknowledged, in this context, that the most desirable population size of a country is determined by several factors, some of which are associated with its economic ability to sustain the population within the constraints of good living standards.

Irregular migration also has security implications. The security risks faced by irregular migrants are often subtle and not easily discernable from casual observation of migrant behaviour. An example of this risk is the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Fear of the perceived negativity associated with irregular immigration has prompted several states of destination to treat immigrants as if they were criminals. Even the US Senate, which has gone a long way to pass laws in favour of irregular immigrants, in 2006 debated a bill that declared irregular entry

of the country a criminal offence and deprived irregular immigrants of any choice of becoming a US citizen. In December 2005, several US civil society organisations protested against the passing of a bill that would have made it a federal crime for anyone to assist irregular immigrants socially or economically (*New York Times*, 30 December 2005). The fact that every country is entitled to promulgate and apply whatever laws are deemed necessary to maintain peace and security within its territory makes it difficult to pronounce on the human rights violation status of the actions proposed by the US Senate. Still, criminalising irregular migrants is undoubtedly unjust – especially considering that most illegal migrants have been forced to become so by the overwhelming hardship accompanying violent political crises in their home countries. These crises may take the form of institutionalised human rights violations by political dictatorships or of violent civil or ethnic conflict – as has been the case in Somalia for over a decade. Both types of crisis have been widespread in several sub-Saharan Africa countries, and are currently being addressed through regional integration mechanisms and other similar activities.

Human trafficking

Both ‘smuggling’ and ‘trafficking’ of people involve issues that constitute human rights violation. But this is much more serious in trafficking than in smuggling. Though there is irregularity in the smuggling of people, the people being ‘smuggled’ are willing partners in the process and are likely to arrive at the ultimate destination safely, and may even profit from it through employment. Trafficked persons, on the other hand, are deceived or forced to move and the major purpose of the traffickers is exploitation of the victims for personal profit. Owing to several questions raised about the difference between trafficking and smuggling, the Population Reference Bureau made this statement:

The media, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), governments, and others have used the terms 'smuggling' and 'trafficking' interchangeably: They actually describe two separate phenomena. If a person hires an individual or a criminal organisation for assistance in moving from one country to another, then that person has been smuggled. Upon arrival at the destination, the business relationship ends, and the smuggler and the individual go their separate ways. In cases of trafficking, however, the association continues, often becoming exploitive and violent. (Orhant 2001: 4)

Trafficking of women and children is not new in sub-Saharan Africa. Trafficking of women was so widespread in the early twentieth century that it was monitored by the League of Nations; by 1933 it was evident that women were being trafficked from West Africa to the developed countries, becoming a source of concern to the British colonial office. Though it was known that women were being brought from Nigeria to Ghana (then Gold Coast) for use in the sex trade, solutions to the problem were difficult to arrive at. Sadly, state interventions still serve to obstruct investigations into human trafficking (Woolman & Bishop 2006). Trafficking in children for exploitation as domestic or farm workers occurs in West Africa, while women are trafficked from the region to Europe and South Africa, mostly for use as prostitutes. Adepoju (2005) identified the major sources of child labour as Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Congo.

Though most women who are trafficked entered into contracts voluntarily, the traffickers' objectives for assisting them (to be engaged in sex trade) was not what the women themselves had been led to believe. Still, Africa has the least incidence of human trafficking in the world (with Asia having the highest). In the 1990s, the average number of people

trafficked in the region each year was just 7 per cent of the global number of persons trafficked (Orhant 2001). Still, the inhuman process involved in trafficking of Africans is no different from that experienced elsewhere. Trafficked persons who originate in Ghana usually get taken to Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Italy Belgium, Netherlands, Lebanon, Libya or the United States. The most common destinations for those from Nigeria are Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands; those from Ethiopia are usually taken to the Middle East and Gulf States, while those from Mali arrive in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Orhant 2001). However, few countries in the region have prioritised human traffic as a policy issue.

Risks of irregular migration

It is more important to seek recognition of violations of irregular migrants' rights than those of documented migrants because the former are not only forced by economic circumstances to emigrate, but they take greater financial, health and psychological risks than their skilled counterparts. For example, the Maghreb route to the European Union (EU) is much more complex, financially more costly and physically more hazardous than routes to southern Africa. It can take weeks or even months and sometimes years, depending on the route and the financial resources available, for migrants to reach Europe through the Maghreb. There are several obstacles (climate, human, terrain and animals) to overcome and so the full journey is almost always made in step-wise movements. Those who smuggle irregular migrants from West Africa through the Sahara Desert and Mediterranean Sea do so as a business. Fees charged are exorbitant – there is a whole network of smugglers that migrants must go through before reaching their ultimate destination. In addition, a subsequent caretaker may not be as trustworthy as the previous (known) one, and temporary housing conditions may not provide the

security needed to avoid losing cash and other personal assets to thieves. Due to the high cost of air travel, most migrants prefer road and sea routes. But even here, the cost is usually high too, especially for unskilled persons with limited resources. In 2006, a reasonable estimate of the cost of boat trip from Senegal to the Spanish coast was about US\$1300, while the total expense for a journey from the south-eastern part of West Africa only as far as the Canary Islands may be over US\$4600. Where special concessions (such as reduced fees) are offered by the smuggler, these are usually at a price and frequently occur where the migrant is a woman, with subsequent payments generally having to be made through prostitution.

Apart from physical abuse that migrants – especially women – might suffer on the way, the land and sea trips to Spain, Italy and other countries are fraught with danger and many youths have perished while attempting to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa. The most extreme example of the dangers that crossing the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea offers is in the journey from Senegal to Spain. Senegal is a major transit centre for irregular migrations from West African countries (Adepoju 2002). The journey begins with land, sea or air travel from places such as Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Ghana, Nigeria and Gambia to Senegal, generally organised by traffickers who demand payment of between US\$500 and \$1000 from each person (Briscoe 2004). Usually these irregular migrants are men between the ages of 15 and 40 years, but increasingly women are participating in desperate efforts to escape poverty in a region where youth unemployment is high. Injury, or even murder, by armed robbers is also among the risks these migrants are exposed to, especially those who take the Sahara Desert route to the North African coast. The health status of migrants may deteriorate due to the very poor conditions of housing and transport while

on transit to Spain or Italy. In October 2003, thirty-seven Moroccan men died when their boat sank as they were about to reach the Spanish coast at Andalucia (Briscoe 2004) – and this is a pattern that continues to this day. One trip from Senegal to the Canary Islands of Spain in December 2006 took twelve days to execute. With very little food and water in a boat that drifted off course, less than half of the 105 men who started the journey survived, and all the survivors needed medical attention (*International Herald Tribune*, 19 December 2006). Hundreds of Africans have perished in the Mediterranean Sea as they tried to reach Spain, while others have lost their lives from bullet wounds at borders: Reportedly, a shooting incident occurred during an attempted border-jumping in which twelve Malians lost their lives. Other would-be migrants perish from dehydration and exhaustion in the desert.

Migration and xenophobia

The meaning of xenophobia

Xenophobia is a human rights problem which prevails in several societies throughout the world. It needs to be exposed and treated in the same way as racism. The similarity between xenophobia and racism has often been a subject of debate. English writers prefer to use a broad definition of racism which is inclusive of xenophobia. On the other hand, the French and, more so, Germans prefer to define racism separately from xenophobia. Several countries in Africa include people of a variety of races and it would not be fair to let xenophobia be forever hidden within race. An appropriate definition of xenophobia is ‘a negative attitude toward, or fear of, individuals or groups of individuals that are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the group(s) to which one belongs’ (Hjerm 1998: 341). By implication, xenophobia includes the effect of race and raises the question

of whether xenophobia and race are mutually independent of each other. The two are motivated by the same factors and are therefore related. A comprehensive evaluation of xenophobia as a concept has been done by this author (Campbell 2003). John Dewey (1983: 243) defined racial prejudice as 'the instinctive aversion of mankind to what is new and unusual, to whatever is different from what we are used to, and which thus shocks our customary habits'. Probably because of the hint of Darwinism in Dewey's explanation of racism, Sullivan (2004) went to some length to explain why he found it disturbing that Dewey should link racial prejudice with habit. But, as Sullivan concedes, Dewey's view of the subject is not altogether unique. Moreover, it is similar to the general observation that xenophobia is a morbid fear of people whose culture, language and behaviour are different from one's own.

The attitudes and behaviour of citizens toward documented and irregular migrants in the destination country are usually considered to be among the least of the costs of migration. But negative attitudes toward migrants by citizens in these countries are frequently manifest in behaviour that violates the migrants' rights. Though social and cultural differences between migrants and their future destinations may be anticipated, they are almost immediately dismissed as minimal, given the anticipated rewards of moving. However, it has become increasingly acknowledged that potential migrants should seriously consider their ability to withstand the hostile attitudes and behaviour of the people at the destination (Adepoju 2006). Xenophobia is among the most disturbing factors that international migrants are exposed to, both in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. It is not new – it dates back over many centuries. But what is new is its increasing intensity. As nationals become more sensitive to the extent of poverty in most African countries, there are fears of a backlash reaction from them on account of the spill-over

of migrants looking for ways out of poverty – seen by nationals as fostering unemployment and other social and economic difficulties in the receiving countries. A major concern of Namibians and Batswana is that immigration will lead to overpopulation of the country. The 1990s witnessed increased intolerance of immigrants throughout sub-Saharan Africa, especially in southern Africa. Despite this development, the pace of research on xenophobia in Africa is slow. Again, most of the studies on this subject are in southern Africa. Understandably, it is a sensitive subject because many individuals and even governments in the region are guilty of it, finding ways to justify their xenophobic tendencies.

Under conditions where one group dominates within the economic, social and political sectors, this group is likely to exhibit a superiority attitude and its behaviour would then be prejudicial to the minority group. From this perspective, xenophobia may be seen as a sociological construct whereby individuals within the in-group work towards sustaining the state of socio-economic dominance that they hold over the out-group. Any attempt by a person (or persons) in the out-group to attain equality with those in the in-group would then be thwarted by any means possible. It may be assumed that the level of prejudice inherent in in-group members may be maximised when the social or ethnic majority is numerically the minority, as was the case in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Ethiopia and South Africa. When Amiot and Bourhis (2005) tested the levels of discrimination associated with in-group and out-group identity among college students in Canada, they found no significant difference between the levels of discrimination expressed by group members, regardless of whether the outcome of resource distribution was positive or negative. They found, however, that distribution of salaries within and between groups does trigger discriminatory attitudes. The social dominance theory also postulates that

the level of group membership influences an individual's propensity to participate in collective action (Deaux et al. 2006). But as Deaux and colleagues found, this assumption should not be applied across all groups. For instance, in the USA, social diversity beliefs among non-migrant whites apparently have no significant influence on ethnic identification and participation in collective action.

Xenophobia in Africa

Xenophobia is not only about negative attitudes toward international migrants. It can also manifest itself within a country in a morbid form of ethnic rivalry, as demonstrated in the post-election uprising in Kenya in January 2008. Centuries of ethnic rivalry in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Botswana and South Africa underline this point. These five areas are now examined in more detail.

Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, the Creoles are descendants of freed slaves from the USA who were settled in Freetown after the abolition of the slave trade and considered themselves culturally superior to the indigenous peoples in the country. With their educational exposure, and their easy interaction with Europeans, the Creoles became the dominant force in the politics, administration, economy, Christian priesthood, education and society of Sierra Leone (Kandeh 1992). Their influence contributed to the Western Area having a literacy level of 70 per cent – the highest – in a country with an overall literacy of 20 per cent. The social dominance of the Creoles within a largely illiterate population of ethnic groups infused a culture of superiority in the people of this ethnic minority. They viewed people of other ethnic groups (the indigenes) with disdain. Kandeh (1992: 83) puts it succinctly, saying that Creoles referred to indigenous Sierra Leoneans as 'natives,

savages, naked barbarians and many other kindred epithets'. Until recently, it was unthinkable for Creoles to select an indigenous Sierra Leonean name for their children. Instead, the preference was for European, Nigerian and Ghanaian names. It was inconceivable for a Creole to marry an indigene. It was common practice for a Creole 'madam' to order an indigene house-servant to use the back door of the house from where she would speak to such persons, never allowing them entrance beyond the kitchen (even when it was raining). Even those who fostered children of indigenes frequently treated them with less compassion than they showed towards their offspring. However, not all Creoles were nearly as extreme as Bankole-Bright who 'likened Creole and protectorate Africans to "two mountains that never could meet"' (Kandeh 1992: 89). Not surprisingly, the Creoles who settled in Clarence (in Fernando Po) in the early nineteenth century lived more amicably with the indigenes and were described as better, and more acceptable to the indigenes than their Sierra Leonean counterparts. The colonial government helped to reduce the social gap between Creoles and indigenes by establishing very good schools in the rest of the country. An example of this was the establishment, in 1906, of a Government Secondary School in Bo, the second largest city in the country. The school was initially designed for the sons and nominees of chiefs and was patterned on the prestigious Eton College in the United Kingdom.

Liberia

In Liberia, the formation of the Americo-Liberians (or 'settlers') as a minority ethnic group was similar to that of the Sierra Leonean Creoles. Groups of ex-slaves from the USA and the West Indies were resettled in Liberia from 1822 by the US government; by 1900, their population had grown to over 15 300 (Akpan 1973). Unlike the Creole experience in Sierra

Leone, the Liberian settlers had already gained full political and economic control of Liberia in 1841 and steered the country towards a republic in 1847. Where the Creoles had patterned their lifestyle after the English, the Americo-Liberians lived like Americans. Moreover, the Americo-Liberians' management style meant that, to all intents and purposes, they owned the country. Indeed, due to the immense political power at the disposal of the settlers in Liberia, their actions towards the indigenes were much more extreme than was the case in Sierra Leone. They ensured that the indigenes did receive little in terms of development, partly by refusing them full citizenship (Akpan 1973). There was also gross physical and sexual abuse of the indigenes.

It was not until William Tubman became President in 1944 that changes in attitudes and behaviour towards Liberian natives occurred. Tubman ensured that they became fully enfranchised, with some representation in the House of Representatives (Akpan 1973). Following Tubman's reorganisation of the political and social structure, and moderation of the unequal distribution of wealth between settlers and indigenes, there was considerable improvement in the attitudes of the two groups towards each other.

In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the indigenes found the behavioural norms of the settlers repellent. It is particularly interesting to observe how the in-group/out-group effect played out in the way the Liberian system clamped down on those who demonstrated disloyalty to the standard that Americo-Liberians were expected to maintain. The administration dealt harshly with such members, regardless of which group they belonged to, although moderation was often practised where the disloyalty was from one of those in the in-group.

Rwanda

One of the most controversial political issues was the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 when an estimated 800 000 people, mostly Tutsi, were slaughtered. The diaspora Tutsi always maintained that they were the traditional rulers of Rwanda, with a hint of divinity punctuating this claim, while the Hutu have fiercely refuted it (see Nsanze 2002). Tutsi political domination of Rwanda and Burundi has on several occasions reflected signs of contempt for the Hutu by forceful confiscation of their land and cattle and crushing any resistance. But unlike the Creoles and Americo-Liberians, the Tutsi and Hutu have both been victims and aggressors in the ethnic conflict on various occasions during the past century. Still, the ethnicity in the conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu may be more the result of what political scientists perceive than the reality. As Clark (2010: 142) observed, the pre-colonial identification of the Tutsi as the supreme group was more or less symbolic and 'not ethnically based'. Influenced by economics, a Hutu may become Tutsi simply by acquiring a substantial number of cattle. Though, as Clark also noted, colonialism changed this practice, its real effect may not have been wiped out of the psyche of the people in these groups, especially as the Tutsi enjoyed much favour from the colonialists. Hence xenophobia and violent conflicts in Rwanda have been considered an effect of economic rather than race factors.

It may be appropriate to consider that the situation in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Rwanda reflects poor ethnic co-existence. While this may be the case with the Hutu and Tutsi, there was more to the relationships between the settlers and indigenes of Sierra Leone and Liberia. From the onset of their arrival from overseas, the settlers were in a real way 'superior' to the indigenes by virtue of their educational advantage. Having been exposed to 'Western civilisation' as slaves and

ex-slaves, the settlers regarded themselves as entitled to a position of supremacy over the seemingly primitive indigenes; and it is this power effect (not unassociated with racism) that is the origin of xenophobia in Sierra Leone and Liberia. While it has been demonstrated that education moderates xenophobia, it is also known that a strong correlation between education and income may fuel resentment towards the competing group (Campbell 2003). Moreover, in colonial Sierra Leone the Creoles were effectively British subjects while the indigenes did not enjoy the same privilege. The Creoles were thus 'protected persons'. A major factor that identifies the presence of ethnocentricity in these countries is the threat that the minority settlers perceived from living among the indigenes (Kandeh 1992). In Sierra Leone, to avoid any form of true co-existence with the indigenes, Creoles appealed to the colonial office at the start of the twentieth century to 'zone the city...[so that] the swarm of Mendis and other aboriginal tribes, who infest this metropolis from end to end, should be apportioned plots of vacant land in one and another of our deserted villages' (Kandeh 1992: 85). To these factors, it may be added that the preparation of national constitutions in both Sierra Leone and Liberia has, in the past, been influenced by racism.

Botswana

The Tswana population in Botswana was originally a fragmented group of tribes that migrated to the area from South Africa in several waves during the nineteenth century. During the process of settling in their new home, the Tswana have been involved in several turbulent encounters with the 'native' Basarwa (the initial occupants of Botswana) and the Kalanga (immigrants from South Africa and Zimbabwe). The early Tswana colonisation of the Botswana territory led to the systematic movement of the Basarwa away from the farming

areas and to their resettlement in the dry, western part of the country. Though the Kalanga were assimilated by the Tswana, their claim to citizenship has been deemed contentious, especially after the dehumanising treatment they have endured at the hands of the Bangwato. To this day, there is a subtle tension between the two groups because the Tswana generally still consider Kalangas as second-class citizens. However, notwithstanding the questionable relationships between Tswana and Basarwa on the one hand and Tswana and Kalanga on the other, the people of Botswana have maintained the illusion of a peaceful, unified nation and one that is welcoming to foreigners. This impression derives largely from tourists' accounts of hospitality and warmth in Botswana as well as from the government's maintenance of internal and international peace while its neighbours were being destabilised by violent internal conflicts over political independence and racism. Botswana was also exceptionally hospitable to people who sought refuge there from the civil wars in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, and many refugees and their families were granted citizenship by the government.

But underlying the calm appearance of Botswana nationals lies a feeling of ambivalence towards foreigners which surfaced when the country's vibrant economy became the major incentive for immigration of skilled labour. In response to a demand for economic and social development in the country – following the immense financial wealth that was being mobilised from diamond output, and a dire shortage of skilled workers – the government sought to attract foreign skills from Africa and elsewhere. As a result the total number of immigrants in the country increased from close to 11 000 in 1971, through more than 15 000 in 1981, and almost 30 000 in 1991, to well over 60 000 in 2001 (Oucho 2000).

During the 1990s, when increasing numbers of skilled nationals were entering the job market and aspirations to

astronomical rises in socio-economic status abounded, it was evident that the tolerance of immigrants that had existed among nationals was being eroded. Demand for skilled immigrants diminished as the pool of skilled nationals increased. The localisation policy of the government was accelerated and, in many cases, highly skilled immigrants were replaced by nationals who lacked the needed skills – because all that was required of nationals was that they had a ‘minimum’ qualification. The immigrant community declared the localisation action a demonstration of xenophobia, and they were partly right. The localisation policy itself was a logical approach and it would be incorrect for the immigrants to plead ignorance of its implications. However, in some cases, such as at the University of Botswana, the implementation methods were harsh and the attitude of the nationals venomous. In several academic departments, expatriates were informed of the non-renewal of their contracts after the end of their current contracts. Others received extensions of up to three months on their current contract without a hope for renewal for the usual two years. Promotion of expatriates was frozen for several years while others had their ranks reduced when new contracts were offered. These developments created much unease and stress among expatriate staff.

South Africa

In South Africa, xenophobia has undergone a transition with the change from minority to majority rule in 1994. Though, in places, racism in its ‘historical’ form still maintains a strong but muted presence, the striking new situation is that of black South Africans’ discrimination against blacks from other African countries.

At the end of the last millennium there had been no significant change to the limited legal protection that African immigrants received in South Africa during the apartheid era.

However, because of the government's desire for a non-xenophobic immigration policy, the Immigration Act gives some protection to immigrants. Yet, sparked by high unemployment, the unskilled population tends to vent its displeasure at the presence of irregular immigrants. Since 1994, the South African government has endeavoured to prepare and implement a humane and fair immigration policy, but there is still considerable intolerance of irregular immigrants. A 2001 study executed by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) indicates that over 65 per cent of South Africans felt that irregular immigrants should never be granted police protection or rights to social security and legal protection, and almost 90 per cent believed that irregular immigrants should never be granted voting rights or freedom of speech (SAMP 2001).

Though the South African government seemingly ignored irregular migrants during the apartheid era, it was selective in not attracting black immigrants as it did whites. The switch from apartheid to democracy has seen a transformation of attitudes from white-on-black to black-on-black discrimination, and irregular immigrants have been the primary victims of the new xenophobia. With inflammatory newspaper headlines as political speeches, which attribute crime, prostitution and sexually transmitted infections to irregular migrants, the risks associated with being an irregular migrant in South Africa have increased considerably since 1990. Excessive demonstration of anti-foreigner sentiment by South Africans occurred when two Mozambicans were burned using motor car tyres while another Mozambican and two Senegalese were chased and killed in a train. All of those killed were alleged to be irregular migrants. More widespread fatal attacks occurred in the country in May and June 2008 and immediately after the soccer World Cup in July 2010 there were similar threats which led to the hurried return of hundreds of

Zimbabweans who were living irregularly in South Africa. The 2008 incidents included a series of fatal assaults of foreigners, especially the poor, in the major cities of South Africa. More than sixty foreigners were killed and the properties of many more were burnt, looted and damaged. The effects of the 2008 attacks on foreigners prompted a review of the situation which produced a report by the Human Science Research Council with some constructive recommendations for addressing immigration issues, as well as the economic and housing problems within the country. In particular, the report acknowledges the positive economic contribution (including job-creation) of immigrants in South Africa. It also points out the need for immigrants and citizens to forge partnerships within the informal economic sector.

Political and economic dimensions

Political exclusion has, on occasion, been applied as a strategy by social majorities to maximise indigenous candidates' chances of victory in elections. Examples of this occurred in Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia where the constitutions were amended in the late 1990s requiring that both parents of a presidential candidate be nationals of the country. This strategy successfully excluded strong candidates from the presidential elections. In Gabon, the strategy was different. Politicians have frequently exploited growing attitudes of patriotism and intolerance of non-citizens among its urban population by directing these negative feelings towards immigrants in the country (Campbell 2003). As discussed earlier regarding mass expulsion of irregular immigrants, the economic factor very often has a significant effect in igniting spontaneous outburst of actions that may be interpreted as xenophobic.

The recent global financial crunch is already having severe effects on the economies of several African countries. South

Africa went into recession during the last week of May 2009 as demand for its products fell and the sale of Botswana's diamonds (its primary export product) almost stagnated. There were budget cuts in all sectors in Botswana, thousands of jobs have been lost in the country, and in South Africa and more jobs are being lost in 2010. Inflation, already in double digits in Botswana, will almost certainly rise in these and many other African countries. The question for these countries of immigration is whether public and political responses to the recession should be allowed to deteriorate to the extent that public dissatisfaction attains a xenophobic character. While it should be noted that the need to defend one's possessions is natural and instinctive in every individual, the development of an attitude towards xenophobic proportions depends largely on certain individuals' ability to whip up mass action against the perceived cause of economic distress. The responsibility for controlling xenophobia therefore lies heavily on the governments that condone it.

Attitudes of nationals toward irregular migrants

Empirical data on attitudes of nationals toward migrants (both documented and irregular) are virtually non-existent. The only such data for sub-Saharan Africa (and indeed for the whole world) were obtained in southern Africa where SAMP conducted several cross-sectional surveys between 1996 and 2006. The 1997 and 2001 surveys of public attitudes towards immigrants in southern Africa showed clearly that irregular migration is unpopular in the region. Only four per cent of the public opposed the deporting of irregular migrants. Almost 60 per cent of the public opposed granting amnesty to irregular migrants (Crush 1999; SAMP 2001). But with 76 per cent of whites opposing amnesty, they seemed to feel much more threatened by the continued presence of irregular migrants than others did. This fear may be partly attributed to the

association of irregular immigrants with rising crime in South Africa when the SAMP study was done.

The recent waves of South African citizens committing violent physical attacks on migrants in 2008 may create the impression that, in southern Africa, South Africans are the people most intolerant of irregular migrants. This perception already existed when, ten years ago, three Mozambicans were fatally attacked by being thrown off a moving train by black South Africans (*Sunday Times* 25 June 2000: Frank Meintjies 'Left Brain'). Paradoxically, even nationals such as Mozambicans and Zimbabweans, who have been victimised by xenophobic reactions to their presence in major destinations like South Africa and Botswana, are apparently also intolerant of irregular migrants in their home countries (Campbell 2003). From the SAMP (2001) data, it is clear that over half of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans would support policies by their governments that would deny legal protection to irregular migrants. The only areas in which SADC citizens gave fairly low support were tax increases for reinforced border control and for turning on the electric fence (i.e. switching the South African fence from alarm to lethal mode). This may be largely explained by high poverty levels and the fact that Mozambicans in particular have suffered quite seriously from the fatal effect of this fence when it was in lethal mode in the 1980s. According to the SAMP 2001 data, the most tolerant of irregular migrants are Swazis (citizens of Swaziland).

General intolerance of irregular migrants in southern Africa is not unique to the region. It reflects the perception of people who hold to the belief that irregular migration contravenes laws that dictate the process of international migration. Campbell (2003) noted, for instance, that a very high proportion of Botswana citizens adhere to these laws. Hence, while irregular migration benefits employers, it exposes the general population to the risk that their peaceful existence may be violated by migrants. In effect, the moment individuals

begin to live in a country without the 'legal' right to do so, they constitute a security risk and are liable to forfeit the right to benefit from the social and economic opportunities established within the laws of the country. However, most irregular movements are fuelled by poverty in the country of origin that might have morbid or fatal effects on individuals and their dependents if they could not migrate at all.

It would be inaccurate to assume that the negative feelings of southern Africans toward irregular migration is all there is to the story. Though it is a dominant attitude, and this has encouraged politicians to initiate discriminatory actions against irregular migrants, there is also some sympathy towards them. This may have influenced decisions by the South African government to invite migrants to regularise their stay in the country. The offer of amnesty to irregular migrants is not new. The most publicised such event was the offer of amnesty to irregular migrants in the USA in 1986, thereby providing them the opportunity to validate their stay in the country. Several European countries have done likewise since 1970, and South Africa has done the same at least twice. Most of the slightly over 200 000 applications submitted to the South African government for the 1996 amnesty were successful⁸⁰ (Crush 1999).

Conclusion and policy implications

Although the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families stipulates that, at the destination, every member of a migrant family should enjoy the same privileges as those extended to nationals, this is hardly ever the case. Migrants are not usually considered as 'belonging' to the destination country, even where they have

80. Of these applications 146,675 were from Mozambique nationals, 25 405 from Zimbabwe, 15 647 Lesotho, 7 744 Malawi, 2 898 Swaziland, 1 626 Botswana, 1 042 Zambia, 207 Tanzania, 145 Angola, 122 Mauritius, and 91 from Namibia.

acquired citizenship. Discrimination in the distribution of goods and services between migrants and nationals can easily instigate an outburst of xenophobia.

Few African governments have developed effective mechanisms to control this problem. Even then, as in the case of South Africa, eradicating xenophobia is almost impossible because it is not simply a sociological construct. There are also deep-seated feelings of discrimination within groups that consider themselves superior by virtue of birth and colour. This should be addressed before attempting to deal with the ambivalent relationships between migrants and non-migrants. Human rights issues extend far beyond sentiments and actions associated with xenophobia. They touch on the rights of men, women and children, the right of access to basic assets (such as food, water, shelter, health and education) and the right to free speech, to employment and to independent thought and decision. These rights also include freedom from injustice, from mental and physical abuse, and from being exposed to human trafficking and sexual slavery. However, addressing human rights issues successfully would require total commitment of governments – because the governments themselves are usually part of the problem. The violation of the rights of human beings through corruption, organisational politics and economic crime is a major contributor to brain drain in Africa. Commitment to good governance would go a long way towards addressing human rights violations, especially those of migrants and their families.

Several governments have implemented policies designed to integrate irregular migrants, in the hope that it will minimise irregular migration to the country. Millions of migrants throughout the world have had their status regularised in this way. The most notable example was when the United States government granted amnesty to 3.2 million irregular migrants in 1986. Regularisation of migrants began

in Europe in the 1970s with 12 000 in Belgium in 1974 and 15 000 in the Netherlands in 1975. Since then, hundreds of thousands of migrants in Europe have been regularised. South Africa also offered amnesty to irregular migrants several times in the 1980s and 1990s. Governments' rationale for granting amnesty is based on the conviction that it will 'integrate' immigrants into a superbly civilised social order. This interpretation of 'integration' implies that granting regularisation and amnesty to migrants is the passport to access to the same social, political and economic opportunities as enjoyed by nationals.

When the opportunity for amnesty was granted to Southern African Development Community (SADC) citizens living irregularly in South Africa, many irregular migrants in the country considered that the stated benefits of the amnesty did not outweigh the net social cost and decided not to apply for them. Integration does not provide watertight solution to the negative consequences of irregular migration or migration in general. It is clear that among South Africans there is a fine line between their attitudes towards regular and irregular migrants. Migrants are perceived to be mostly irregular, and as exploiting the limited economic resources of the country. In the wake of the South African xenophobic attacks on migrants in May and June 2008, and the threat this posed to tourist confidence in the country and its hosting the FIFA World Cup in June 2010, the government proposed integrating irregular migrants into the local society.

International cooperation is crucial to the successful management of irregular migration (Adepoju 2007). At the instigation of EU countries, North Africa seems to be faring well in the area of 'external dimension'. This is because EU countries have moved from a traditionally conservative approach to a more or less democratic one. One of the alternatives that may be adopted within the 'external

dimension' framework is for the EU to dialogue with sending and transit countries about stemming irregular migration. A second approach is to influence migrants' choice of destinations; this would include addressing causes of migration and improving migrant access to social welfare services. Within this framework, Spain has offered lucrative employment opportunities to Africans who might otherwise have been forced to take risky marine routes to Europe. Meanwhile, Britain, Senegal and Morocco now cooperate with Spain to combat irregular migration more effectively. Several scholars and politicians perceive the free movement of people between countries as the key to curbing irregular migration. But this idea was vehemently opposed by Botswana and South Africa when a Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons was drafted by the SADC countries (Campbell 2007). These are economically the most prosperous states in the region and their prolonged resistance to the Protocol may have been influenced by experiences in West Africa where the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a similar protocol.

This chapter helps to indicate the urgent need for African (and world) governments to prioritise policies associated with the rights of international African migrants. For over four decades, there have been several pleas from migration experts to international donors and governments to prioritise migration. The need for research and policies which would have helped address contemporary migration issues has been pertinently stated by several researchers. But little national and international attention was paid to the social, human and economic costs and benefits of migration until after the end of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, irregular immigration, refugee flows, brain drain and poverty have increased significantly due to policies and actions which have had devastating effects on the human rights of men, women and

children globally, and especially in Africa. Rampant corruption, human trafficking, xenophobia and the blatant violation of women's sexual rights are among the costs of international migration in Africa; and these have been partly encouraged by the decades of 'silence' among international institutions and government organisations that should long since have intervened to curb these practices. The positive responses that international migration issues have recently received from African governments hopefully indicates that the human rights of migrants will soon be prioritised by all governments in the continent.

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CHAPTER 7

Migration Law and Migrants' Rights: An Underdeveloped Branch of Law – the Moroccan Experience

Khadija Elmadmad

Introduction

In Africa – as is also generally the case in other regions – studies on migration have developed relatively recently and have attracted researchers and academics from different disciplines.

Some African institutions and some African scholars have been spreading knowledge, training and research in migration studies from the outset. Professor Aderanti Adepoju has contributed a great deal to the development of action, training and research in various fields and notably in migration studies, indeed he could be considered 'Africa's doyen of migration scholarship'. This collective book, written on 'migration in the service of African development' in honour of this great African scholar, comes at an appropriate time.

At present, migration studies in general are relatively well developed in the African continent, but legal studies are still

an underappreciated and underdeveloped branch of these studies. As stated in the presentation of the project of this book, 'migration scholarship in Africa has attracted scholars from different disciplines, among them geography, economics, demography, sociology, anthropology and statistics'. Remarkably, Professor Adepoju, too, has become involved with legal studies on migration, together with some of his colleagues, and some lawyers from universities and specialised institutions in Africa and elsewhere and has published on migrants' rights (notably Atsenuwa & Adepoju, 2009). It seems, nevertheless, that there is still a lot to be done regarding the legal aspects of migration.

Legal studies on migration concern migration law with its two branches: law regulating population movements, and law protecting migrants. The first branch includes all laws and regulations relating to entry and sojourn in a given country, and to emigration, as well as sanctioning of any unauthorised immigration, sojourn or emigration. This first branch of migration law is mainly domestic and is based on the concept of the sovereignty of states, and their discretionary power to open or close their borders. It should however normally refer to International Law and to universal and regional legal instruments regarding migration and migrants' rights. The second branch deals mainly with migrants' rights. It aims at protecting all kinds of migrants – internal and international, voluntary and forced, regular and irregular. It is embodied particularly in international legal instruments such as conventions, treaties, declarations and recommendations. States agree to these by ratifying them and undertaking to introduce them into their domestic legislation.

Among the first academic institutions to have introduced legal studies on migration was the Oxford Refugee Programme (which later became the Oxford Refugee Centre) in England, the Postgraduate Programme on Migration and the Law, and

the UNESCO Chair of Migration and Human Rights – the latter two both at **Hassan II University** in Casablanca, Morocco. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees were among the first specialised institutions to have developed studies on migration law.

Following the African states' tradition of becoming party to most international instruments relating to human rights and migration, Morocco has ratified a number of international conventions concerning migration and human rights. Since the 1990s, Morocco has been one of the few countries in the world to have initiated legal migration studies by creating specific training and research programmes on migration law – initiated thanks to a collaboration between Oxford University and Casablanca University.

Morocco has contributed, in one way, to the international development of legal migration studies. Today it is among the few African countries to have trained specialists in migration law, to have organised national and international academic meetings relating to the discipline, and to have produced publications on this theme.

This chapter, written in honour of Professor Aderanti Adepoju, describes, first, this great African scholar's work in the field of migration studies in general (especially with regard to legal migration studies), and then specifically on the history and development of legal migration studies and research in Morocco since the 1990s.

Adepoju's contribution to studies and action in the field of migration

Professor Aderanti Adepoju has contributed extensively to the development of migration studies both inside and outside Africa and was the initiator of many specialised publications on migration. He has headed many academic institutions

working on migration and was the editor or a member of the editorial boards of numerous specialised journals and reviews, such as the Journal of Migration and Refugee Studies, International Migration, and International Migration Review.

Adepoju was a pioneer in the study of population movements. For him, many things are linked with migration in Africa. As an economist, a demographer and a development specialist, he has sited most of his research and action on migration within these disciplines publishing numerous books and scientific articles on the theme. Among his achievements on migration, one could mention, for example, his valuable contribution, 'Creating a Borderless West Africa: constraints and prospects for intra-regional migration' in the book *Migration Without Borders* which was published by UNESCO in 2007 and which reminds us in its introduction that 'nowadays access to freedom of movement reflects people's unequal rights' (Adepoju 2007).

Thanks to Professor Adepoju, migration studies have known a great development, particularly in the fields of economics and demography. He has worked and written extensively on migration, particularly relating to his fields of specialisation. "His work has won the hearts of many more Africans and Africanists, especially younger ones whom he has mentored and who have found much softer landing on migration scholarship than was possible two decades ago or more" – again as stated in the presentation of this project. Indeed, a renowned demographer – Professor Victor Piché of Canada – wrote this about him early this year: "Aderanti Adepoju has written extensively on African migration. He is by far the most important researcher on the topic. It is a wonder, after all he has written, that he can still come out with very key and original ideas regarding African migration." These words were written in support of NOMRA's January 2010 book entitled *International Migration Within, To and From Africa in a*

Globalised World, edited by Adepaju himself (Adepaju 2010, back cover).

Professor Adepaju has also done research collaboratively with lawyers. Perhaps the most outstanding was the publication of *Rights of African Migrants and Deportees: a Nigerian case study* (Atsenuwa & Adepaju 2009), which reviews the situation of human rights violations of African migrants and deportees, with a focus on Nigerian nationals who migrate or attempt to migrate to other countries, and those who have been deported back to Nigeria. The study also contains information related to the situation of non-Nigerian nationals who migrated to Nigeria – the country being a source, destination and transit for migrants.

Faced with the reality that rights violations against migrants are increasing all over the world, with ever more widespread detentions, deportations, physical abuse and killings, as well as other types of violations, the study examined these abuses, notably in the African continent and particularly in Nigeria:

- human rights violations against migrants (nature and scope, common violations, and characteristics of victims);
- the causes of human rights violations against Nigerian and other African migrants, including policies and practices that support violations;
- possible legal recourse for victims of violations of migrants' rights;
- existing efforts in Nigeria to seek legal recourse on violations of migrants' rights.

More importantly, the study also explored possible strategies for change. Atsenuwa and Adepaju (2009) argue that, in spite of treaty affirmations of human rights of migrants and members

of their families, many migrants continue to experience serious violations of their rights in countries of transit and countries of destination and employment.

Many countries have yet to sign the Migrant Workers Convention and so bear no legal obligations in respect of the rights affirmed in it unless any of these rights is affirmed in other treaty instruments that have been ratified by the state in question, in which case they create legally binding obligations on the state even if it has not ratified the migrant-specific instrument.

Atsenuwa and Adepoju catalogued and discussed in great detail common human rights violations against African migrants, namely:

- the right to life;
- the right to security of person and the right not to be subjected to torture, or to inhuman and degrading treatment;
- the right to freedom from arbitrary and prolonged detention;
- the right to humane conditions of detention;
- the right to equality and non-discrimination and equality of access to justice;
- the right to due process;
- the right against collective expulsion;
- the right to work and labour rights, and
- social rights including the right to health, housing, food, education, and so on.

An important aspect of the study is the justice needs expressed by victims of violations, namely:

- respect for the human rights of victims, especially the right to a fair hearing;
- access to social services such as medical services and decent housing;
- no arbitrary removal of property, and access to confiscated property and other assets in cases of deportation;
- restoration of permission to enter or stay in a country in cases where it has been unlawfully or improperly denied or withdrawn;
- redress for violations of human rights such as the investigation and punishment of individuals responsible for violations in the case of criminal victimisation, including disciplinary sanctions and compensation for losses, ill-treatment, physical injury or loss of life.

Some recommendations that have a wider, pan-African outreach are that the African Union should take effective steps to facilitate access to its judicial bodies, namely the African Commission and the African Court, and also facilitate individual and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) access to the African Court. Also the framework of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement (the article on Migration) should be expanded to include issues of regular migration, integration and anti-discrimination, return and readmission, and recognition of migrants' rights – incorporating mechanisms for international protection in a spirit of joint responsibility.

Studies on migration law in Morocco: Cooperation with Oxford University

The teaching of migration law in Morocco started in 1992, thanks to a collaboration between the Casablanca Law Faculty

and the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University. Specialised teaching was then organised and specific institutions were created in Casablanca.

Legal migration studies started in Casablanca with a course on refugee law. This course was given as part of the Public Law Postgraduate Programme (Diplôme des Études Supérieures en Droit Public). The course was given by the author of this chapter after returning from a two-year research fellowship with the Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University.

In Casablanca, the teaching of migration law was developed further in 1993, following the signing of an academic agreement between the universities of Oxford and Casablanca. The five-year agreement, funded by the British Council, involved an exchange of teachers and researchers working on refugee law and human rights, with the acquisition of specialised documentation and the undertaking of joint research works and publications. This Anglo-Moroccan academic agreement resulted in the creation of a research group: the Research Group on Human Rights and Population Movements, known as the GREDHOMP⁸¹. It was based at the Casablanca Law Faculty and was headed by the Dean of the faculty, Professor Mohamed Bennani.

In collaboration with the Refugee Studies Programme, the group decided to undertake a general and multidisciplinary study on 'foreigners in Morocco'. Researchers from different Moroccan universities and from Oxford University contributed to the study, which was published as a special edition of the Review of the University Moulay Ismail, entitled *Regards Croisés sur L'étranger* ('Cross-Studies on Foreigners'). The book includes various contributions on immigration in Morocco, in Arabic, French and English (see Elmadmad 2001).

81. Groupe de Recherches et d'Études sur les Droits de l'Homme et les Mouvements de Populations.

In 1999, the GREDHOMP was replaced by the Study and Research Centre on Migration and Human Rights, CERMEDH⁸², which was the first Moroccan academic institution to specialise in migration law. The Centre aimed to train lawyers specialising in migration law in general, including forced migration law and refugee law. Its governing board included specialists on migration studies and was chaired by the author.

CERMEDH continued the collaboration with Oxford University and developed the academic link between Morocco and the UK. The Moroccan students and researchers benefited from the experience of Oxford University in the field of forced migration through academic visits to Oxford, and from courses and seminars given in Casablanca by specialists from this university. They also benefited from the facilities and funding offered to them by both the British Council and the British Embassy in Rabat.

The Anglo-Moroccan academic link was a good example of North-South cooperation and has been regularly quoted as a successful link. It was also taken as a model for further formal academic links between Oxford University and other Moroccan universities – such as the University of Oujda (in the east of Morocco) and Marrakech University (in the south). It particularly encouraged the Oxford Refugee Studies Programme to develop links with other universities in the global south, particularly in Africa and Asia.

At the end of the 1990s, UNESCO launched the UNITWIN UNESCO Chairs Programme (UNESCO n.d. #1) with the aim of twining and linking universities from the North and the South and developing university networking – with the ultimate objective of strengthening higher education in developing countries and limiting the brain drain from these

82. Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur la Migration et les Droits Humains.

countries and its effects. This programme focuses on graduate studies and research, and places particular emphasis on the application of research funding to specific local conditions and needs. It seeks also to provide a forum for dialogue and discussion between researchers, policy makers and practitioners.

In 1998, the University of Oxford set up a Forced Migration UNITWIN/UNESCO Network with its Southern partners. In addition to the Refugee Studies Programme, the Forced Migration Network included various academic institutions from Africa and the Middle East⁸³. The Network was a very good opportunity for all its members to work on forced migration, to develop research and teaching, and to exchange students, researchers and lecturers. The Network was managed by a governing board including representatives of all the member institutions, chaired first by Dr David Turton, the Director of the Oxford Refugee Centre (which replaced the Oxford Refugee Programme), and then twice by the author, who was also at that time the Vice-Chair of the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM), based in Oxford. The Network issued three newsletters. Casablanca University took advantage of the Network to develop further studies and teaching on forced migration law and on migration law in general. The Network was especially active in the setting up of the first Moroccan 'Migration and the Law' postgraduate programme and in establishing the first UNESCO Chair on

83. These were the Academic Programme for the Study of Involuntary Migration at An-Najah University in Nablus, Palestine; the Refugees, Displaced Persons and Forced Migration Studies Center at Yarmouk University in Irbid, Jordan; the Migration Programme at the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of Western Cape in Cape Town, South Africa; the Migration Law Study and Research Centre of the Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences at the University Hassan II Ain Chock in Casablanca, Morocco, and the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Program at the American University in Cairo, Egypt.

Migration and Human Rights – both based at Casablanca University.

Casablanca postgraduate programme on Migration and the Law

In 2000, the first Moroccan postgraduate programme on migration and the law was set up at the Casablanca Faculty of Law, coordinated by the author. The doctoral part of the programme was conceived of as a specialised curriculum, with courses on other disciplines considered important for specialists in migration law, but it was, at the same time, made as general as possible, and included fundamental teaching relating to migration law. Graduate students in Law (Private and Public Law) from all Moroccan universities could apply to be enrolled in this programme. They were selected according to their achievement during their BA studies, their knowledge in the field of migration, their interest in the theme, and their linguistic abilities. The courses were given in three languages: Arabic, French and English and the students worked in these three languages without problems. The programme consisted of two taught years, followed by the writing of a research paper, submitted after two years' research and fieldwork.⁸⁴

After their graduation, some students were employed by Moroccan and international institutions working in the field of migration and migrants' rights, notably the UNHCR, the ICRC, the previous Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights, the Moroccan Human Rights Council, the Moroccan Ministry of Moroccans Residing Abroad.

84. Further details of the programme are given in Annexe I.

UNESCO 'Migration and Human Rights' Chair and the 'Migration and the Law' NGO

As has been mentioned, in 2001 Morocco became the first country in the world to host a UNESCO Chair on Migration. The country is also among the few African and Arab countries to have created a specialised NGO on 'Migration and the Law'. This was established in 2008.

The UNESCO Chair 'Migration and Human Rights'

In 2000, at the Forced Migration UNESCO/UNITWIN Network board meeting in Cape Town, it was agreed that application would be made to UNESCO for a Chair of Migration and Human Rights to be set up at the Hassan II Casablanca Ain Chock University. The Faculty of Law of Casablanca University applied to UNESCO, with support from the Rector and from the Moroccan Minister of Higher Education. The application was successful, and an agreement creating the Chair – at that time unique in this field – was signed in May 2001. The agreed aims were to further studies, training and research on migration in relation to human rights, and migrants' rights in particular. The author of this chapter was nominated as the first incumbent and presented a plan of action in the second issue of the Network Newsletter.

The work of the Migration and Human Rights Chair is related to all kinds of human movements: internal and external migration, emigration and immigration, voluntary and forced migration, regular and irregular migration, collective and individual migration, and so on. An emphasis is put on humanitarian laws in their global meaning (laws guaranteeing dignity for all, everywhere and in all situations) and includes human rights law, humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflicts), refugee law, development law, and environment law. Its activities include specialised courses, seminars and research studies as well as an exchange of researchers and

lecturers, and scientific meetings. Since the creation of the Chair, various academic meetings and some training courses have been organised, and specific research works and studies on 'migration and the law' undertaken, in collaboration with other specialised institutions'. The partnership with the Lelio Basso Foundation in Italy, for example, resulted in the creation a course on 'Women and Migration in the Mediterranean region', run in November 2001 in Naples, in collaboration with University Federico II. The author was nominated Director of Studies for this course and some Moroccan students took part.

A number of publications resulted from the creation of the Chair, in particular a book in French on 'Migration and the Law in the Maghreb', published with assistance from the UNESCO Section on International Migration in Paris. This study concerns migration law in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. It was undertaken by migration specialists from these three North African countries and was coordinated by the author. The whole book has been published on the UNESCO web site (UNESCO n.d. #2).

The Moroccan NGO 'Migration and the Law'

A Moroccan non-governmental organisation, called 'Migration and the Law', was set up in Rabat in 2007, with the aim of combining theory and practice in the field of migration and especially with regard to migration law.

For a long time, academics in Morocco had been working on migration without any contact with the practitioners in the field. In 2007, a group of scholars contacted some practitioners and they decided to work together to defend migrants' rights. Five years earlier, in 2003, Morocco had issued new migration legislation: Law 02/03 on Entry and Sojourn of Aliens in the Moroccan Kingdom and on Irregular Emigration and Immigration was promulgated on 11 November (see UNHCR 2009). This law contained some innovations but had several

limitations: for example, it severely sanctions irregular migration but at the same time recognises that the Moroccan Government takes into consideration international law and principles relating to migration – in particular the international legal instruments ratified or accepted by the country. Law 02/03 has nevertheless gone some way towards unifying Moroccan migration law and has introduced certain rights regarding vulnerable migrants, such as minors and pregnant women, who may no longer be expelled from the country even if they are in irregular situations (Elmadmad 2003).

Unfortunately, many lawyers are not yet familiar with this law; it needs to be more readily used by practitioners and further evaluated by scholars. To this end, Migration and the Law has gathered together lawyers practising, teaching or researching migration law. The main aims of this NGO are to unite efforts to spread information on Moroccan migration law, to promote international migration law, and to safeguard migrants' rights. Its Executive includes migration specialists, members of other NGOs, and bar association members – both in Morocco and abroad. The author, as an Advocate and a law professor, was elected to be the initiating Chair.

Migration and the Law has organised national and international meetings on migration law and has undertaken specific studies in this field. In 2008, it published a book entitled *Le Nouveau Code Marocain de Nationalité et les Enfants Issus du Mariage Mixte*⁸⁵, edited by its Secretary General, the late Dr M'hamed Drissi (Drissi 2008). In 2010, the association conducted fieldwork on the socio-legal conditions of retired European immigrants living in Morocco, and on sub-Saharan immigrant women with children, in collaboration with the Salé

85. The New Moroccan Nationality Code and its Impact on Children from Mixed Marriages.

Law Faculty of University Mohamed V Souissi. Both studies are to be published as a book by the university.⁸⁶

At present, some NGOs and university programmes are working on specific aspects of migration law and migrants' rights in Morocco, for example, the rights of Moroccans residing abroad, the rights of sub-Saharan immigrants, of women migrants, and of children. A proposal has been made for a UNESCO Centre on Migration and the Law to be created, to integrate the efforts undertaken in the field of migration law in Morocco. If this UNESCO Centre comes into being, it would be the only UNESCO Centre in the world specialising in migration, and particularly in the legal aspects of population movements. It would surely contribute to the development of the legal migration studies – both in Morocco, and also in Africa, particularly in North Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on migration studies, emphasising the pivotal role played by some African scholars in the advancement of this field in general – as it is the case with Professor Aderanti Adepoju. It articulates the Moroccan experience in legal migration studies and has attempted to show how this innovative experience has advanced training, research and action on migration law in the country. The Moroccan experience needs to be developed and, perhaps, also duplicated in other parts of Africa and further afield, to promote more action and research on migration law and migrants' rights. In Nigeria, Professor Adepoju and his colleagues have set already the stage for this much-neglected research agenda.

86. For more information on the Moroccan NGO 'Migration and the Law' see Annexe II.

In 1999, a decision was taken by various Moroccan institutions specialising in migration law to commemorate annually some important international days and to make these commemorations known internationally. This seems valuable for the promotion of migration law and migrants' rights. Thus, for example, since the 2000s, the CERMEDH, the Casablanca Postgraduate Programme on Migration and the Law, and later both the Migration and Human Rights UNESCO Chair and the Migration and the Law association have been celebrating International Women's Day yearly on 8 March by organising an international forum on some aspects of feminine migration.⁸⁷ Another international day celebrated in Morocco is International Migrants' Day, on 18 December – on this day in 1990 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families was enacted (though it did not come into force until 2003). The UNESCO Chair and all the other Moroccan institutions working on legal aspects of migration commemorate this day and use it to convey information on this convention – also known as the 'Charter of All Migrants' – and to urge the Government of Morocco (which was the second country in the world to ratify this convention) to apply its stipulations to all migrants.

Despite these developments, legal studies on migration in Morocco still need to be promoted – as is the case in other African countries. Researchers in this field encounter various problems, notably those of obtaining reliable data and other information. This is similar to what happens in other disciplines, as correctly stated by Adepouju who stressed in

87. Among themes chosen were Women and Migration; Young Girls and Migration; Women, Migration and Human Rights; Women, Culture and Migration; Women, Migration and Loneliness; Migration and the Women Left Behind; Women, Migration and Old Age, and Foreign Women Living in Morocco.

his study on migration in Africa all the difficulties encountered by researchers when studying migration in Africa. He wrote: 'The problem of data on migration, in terms both of quality and availability, is a perennial one in Africa' (Adepoju 1995: 87).

In order to overcome these obstacles, Adepoju initiated the creation of the Network of Migration Research on Africa (NOMRA) in 1998, as part of the UNESCO/MOST (Management of Social Transformations) programme, and its resuscitation in 2007. One of the objectives of NOMRA is 'to train a core of young researchers in collecting up-to-date information on migration that will be factored into the data gathering procedures' (NOMRA 2008).

Another objective of NOMRA is to encourage migration studies in Africa and to launch multidisciplinary collaboration in these studies. In fact, before the creation of NOMRA, very few African researchers were engaged in migration studies – and those who were working in the field were scattered and did not network. In June 1998, a meeting of African migration researchers was held in Gaborone, Botswana, under the auspices of UNESCO/MOST with the aim of establishing a network among African researchers. Adepoju was charged with the responsibility of identifying and inviting researchers and preparing the meeting and the relevant background documents. Twelve researchers participated in the two-day meeting during which the modalities for setting up NOMRA, its structure and activities were discussed, with Professor Adepoju designated as its coordinator (NOMRA 2007).

The NOMRA network is undoubtedly a big achievement for African scholars. It does nevertheless need to promote further incisive research, training and action on migration, particularly in disciplines which still need development, such as legal studies on migration.

ANNEXE

Casablanca University postgraduate programme: 'Migration and the Law'

The Casablanca University postgraduate programme 'Migration and the Law' included two taught years, followed by the writing of a research paper, submitted after two years' research and fieldwork.

In the first year the courses were Theory and Typology of Migration, Migration and International Relations, Migration and Human Rights, Migration and International Private Law, Statistics and Demography of Migration, Migration and Environment, English for Special Purposes, and Research Techniques and Methodology. The second-year courses were Domestic Legislation and Migration, Forced Migration Law, Migration and International Organisations, The Maghreb and Migration, The Anthropology and Sociology of Migration, The Geography of Migration, The English of Migration Communication and Negotiation Techniques. In addition to these courses, seminars on specific themes were periodically organised. Examples of these were 'The Media and Migration', 'Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Morocco', 'Islam and Migration', 'The European Union Migration Policy and Legislation', 'Palestinian Refugees', 'Migration and Armed Conflicts', 'Feminine Migration', 'The Literature of Migration', 'Illegal Migration', 'British Policy Relating to Migration' and 'UNHCR and Refugee Policy'.

The seminars were given by specialists from Morocco and abroad; among these were Anthony Layden, then British Ambassador in Morocco, Dr Michel Veuthy from the International Red Cross in Geneva, Mrs Catherine Gauthier from the Jacques Berques Centre in Rabat, and Dr Manuel Lorenzo from Madrid University. The lecturers, however, came primarily from the Public Law Department and the

Private Law Department of the Casablanca Law Faculty, and from the Economics and Statistics Department of the same faculty, as well as from the Faculties of Letters and Sociology in Casablanca and Rabat, and from other Moroccan universities.

Many lecturers from the Refugee Studies Programme (later the Refugee Studies Centre) of Oxford University were funded by the British Council to come and give specialised courses on forced migration – among them Dr Barbara Harrell-Bond, Dr Effie Voutira, Dr Cathie Lloyd and Dr Gil Loescher. Other lecturers came from the UNESCO/UNITWIN Forced Migration Network, particularly from the Jordanian Forced Migration Centre, headed at that time by the late Professor Ali Zagahal.

More than seventy scholars specialising in Migration Law followed the Casablanca programme, preparing for Masters and doctoral degrees in the discipline. Among their research themes were 'The Protection of Migrant Women', 'Migration and the Law in Morocco', 'Sub-Saharan Migrants in Morocco', 'Voluntary and Involuntary Migration', 'Refugee Women and Children', 'The Integration of Moroccan Migrants in Europe', 'European Law on Migration', 'Asylum in Europe', 'Asylum in Morocco', 'The Right to Health and Migration', 'Migration in the Arab States', 'Urbanisation and Migration' and 'Migration in the American Continent'.

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CHAPTER 8

Autonomous Female Migration: A Case Study in Sokoto Metropolis, Nigeria

M.A. Iliya and Augustine Oppon-Kumi

Introduction

The chapter brings attention to a quite recent intraregional migratory process involving female migrants. It sheds light on a development-induced displacement of females from the Upper Ouémé catchment area in Benin to the Sokoto metropolis in north-western Nigeria. This undocumented migration is attributable primarily to increased poverty among the rural women in the place of origin. The traditionally male-dominated migration pattern is becoming increasingly feminised (Adepoju 2004). This novel phenomenon is now commonly designated 'autonomous female migration'.

The chapter describes a case study of fifty Beninoise migrants in the Sokoto metropolis who were subjects of individual interviews and small-group discussions. The logistic regression applied to the resulting data indicated four specific factors which have weakened the sustainable rural livelihood base of many women in central Benin, causing this

migration. The analysis also indicated that development-induced autonomous female migration from central Benin to the Sokoto metropolis is bound to continue as the price of cotton on the global market continues to fall. Monoculture in West Africa therefore needs to be critically re-examined.

While 'migration has been historically a characteristic feature of the life of the peoples of West Africa' (Adepou 2004, 2002: 1), the phenomenon has become more dynamic and extremely complex. Patterns of mobility have changed radically since the late nineteenth century (Afolayan et al. 2008). Many scholars agree with this proposition and are of the opinion that this pattern of change is likely to continue. There is a common consensus in the literature (Carney 1998; Ellis 1998; Bryceson 1996; Iliya 1999) that poor rural households in developing countries improve their livelihoods mainly through three means: agricultural intensification (at home area), migration to other agricultural areas, and diversification into non-agricultural production.

Overview of earlier work

There is a need to constantly update the dynamics of the migration phenomenon using existing background information. Adepoju (2004: 4) describes autonomous female migration as 'women who move independently to fulfil their own economic needs and not simply to join a husband or family members'. Yinger (2006: 1) puts it this way: 'the woman is not with the husband or kin to assist, control or protect her'. The feminisation of migration has not been the norm in West Africa; in fact most communities used to frown on it (Adepoju 1984). Adepoju states that the emergence and increased rate of autonomous female migration can be attributed mainly to increased poverty in West Africa; this factor has compelled women to take up many of the roles of men. Secondly, West African economies have faced serious economic crises,

especially in the 1980s and 1990s; and, as living conditions deteriorate, women have been induced to migrate principally to improve their economic status and gain control over their lives (Adepoju 2002). The emergence autonomous female migration therefore reflects the increased economic pressure on rural families in this sub-region.

Although some general causal factors have been outlined in the literature (Adepoju 1983, 1984, 2002, 2006; Oppong 1997; Zlotnic 2003) to explain autonomous female migration, the authors have indicated that independent female migration occurs purely for distinctive contextual reasons. It is plausible therefore for us to argue that each time the migration process becomes feminised in West Africa, there is an underpinning cause – or perhaps more than one – arising from the documented general causes, which needs to be studied. This chapter deals with ways in which development-induced autonomous female migration from the Upper Ouémé catchment area of central Benin to the Sokoto metropolis in northwest Nigeria has been adopted as a survival strategy by some women. The uniqueness of this study is that the migrants have gone to a destination ‘where the Islamic purdah is practised and male chauvinism predominates’ (Iliya 1988: 12).

There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that the feminisation of migration has been going on unnoticed. Zlotnic (2003) argues the phenomenon has existed for some time but that earlier studies have been oblivious of it because of the way it was conceptualised. Adepoju (1984) admits that there has been a dearth of data on female migration; the preponderance of males in migration streams seems to have overshadowed that of females, and wives accompanying their husbands are ‘invisible’. There is also the case of ‘marriage migration’ where women migrate to join males or are married at the destination and thus become hidden. Nevertheless, a consensus exists among scholars (see Afolayan 1988; Adegbola

1991; Adepoju 2004) that autonomous female migration had become evident in West Africa by the mid-1980s.

The late emergence of feminisation of migration

Various constraints retarded the feminisation of migration (Adepoju 1983). These included the structure of economic activities, socio-cultural factors defining sex roles, and the effect of education on spatial and occupational mobility. Mostly, it is men whose services are required in plantation agriculture, commerce and transport – to mention a few. Thus men migrate, usually leaving their wives at home. Moreover, employment within organised labour is correlated to higher education, and it is the males not the females who are sent to school. In West Africa very few females had the privilege of going to school to a higher level (Adepoju 1984). Consequently, women have been relegated to the tasks of housekeepers and mothers, working within household economic structures. Moreover, it has not been culturally permissible for African women to migrate leaving their husbands at home to care for children (Adepoju 2002). Where a family faced economic hardship, it was only the man who had the option to migrate, and not the woman. The feminisation of migration therefore signifies a recent significant transformation in the norms and gender roles.

Another reason for the late emergence of autonomous female migration is that rural women in West Africa are responsible for the post-harvest storage and processing of food products for both domestic consumption and the market. They are also traditionally responsible for the transporting and marketing of agricultural products (FAO 1999). As a result, they could not simply migrate because of their gender-determined roles in the household. The United Nations *Food and Agriculture Organisation* (FAO 1999) further shows that about 70 per cent of the agricultural work in central Benin is carried

out by women. Women in rural West Africa are responsible for the post-harvest storage and processing of food products for both domestic consumption and for the market. Furthermore, women are traditionally responsible for the transportation and marketing of agricultural products in the rural areas. The (Nigerian) woman performs multiple roles as a wife, housekeeper and worker, kinswoman who must attend to visitors, and a citizen who must perform certain roles in her community (Adepoju & Oppong 1994). In consequence of these varied duties, rural women in West Africa have been tied to their home places. The gender-determined duties of rural women as child-bearers and child carers, food producers and processors, and household managers thus decrease their likelihood of migrating. The feminisation of migration may therefore denote a serious decline in agricultural productivity in rural West Africa (Adepoju 1996).

A number of gender-specific problems face potential autonomous female migrants and deter them from migrating (see Oppong 1997). First of all, a woman who has access, by any means, to some farmland – or any land resource – loses it when she migrates. In addition few women can cope with childbearing and child care and still engage in a gainful employment outside their home districts (Adepoju 2002). Equally important, migration removes people from their time-honoured cultural frame and throws them as strangers into an unfamiliar cultural setting (Jansen 1974). Coping with this calls for some agility on the part of the migrant; women in general, and especially nursing mothers, lack such agility unless they are being trafficked or smuggled, and they have therefore been hesitant to migrate. Child-bearing thus to a large extent prevents women from migrating.

About 51 per cent of Nigerian women lack access to basic education (Adepoju 2002). Female illiteracy is very high across West Africa (Olabode 2005). A document *Benin Facts and Figures*

(Encarta 2009) states that only 28 per cent of Benin women are literate. Illiterate and unskilled female would-be migrants realise they have few opportunities other than reproductive work (cooking, cleaning and child care, in peoples home) which they dislike (Yinger 2006). It is therefore safe to assume that the low remuneration and unappealing nature of reproductive work which awaits female migrants, restrain illiterate women from migrating. Also, the painful ordeals recounted by trafficked and smuggled compatriots and aired over local radio and television stations in most countries in West Africa in compliance with the UN's Palermo Protocol (UN 2001) has been another restraining factor. Autonomous female migration has until recently, not featured prominently in West Africa as a result of the restraining pressures exerted by the factors reviewed here.

General causal factors of autonomous female migration in Benin

Structural Adjustment Programme

The adoption and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by West African countries induced autonomous female migration either to emerge or to increase in pace, or both (Adepoju 2002, Olabode 2005). To qualify for the IMF package to implement a SAP, countries were required to devalue their national currency in order to make their locally manufactured commodities cheaper, to attract more customers (Shah 2008). Unfortunately, although the lowering of commodity prices increases a country's export volume, the country does not get higher export earnings because of the decline in the purchasing power of the exports (Ton 2006). Consequently countries which implemented a SAP were unable to purchase the imported goods and services necessary for their sustenance, or to

generate income for the implementation of sustainable development programmes.

Ton (2006) also confirms that in Benin, rural women, as household keepers, bore the brunt of the SAP in that country. The SAP could not have been beneficial to rural women in Benin since initially they did not have enough land or capital to increase commodity output (FAO 1999). The abolition of all government subsidies meant that women could no longer afford essential farm inputs, such as fertiliser and pesticides (Gladwin & Due 1991). Adepoju (2002: 3) highlights this, saying that 'although empirical studies focusing on gender analysis of SAP and women work are few, it seems evidenced that the overall impact has been negative'. In sum, the economic base of women in central Benin has been seriously weakened by the implementation of the SAP. Their poverty has increased.

Women's limited access to farmland

Adepoju (2002) provides an idea of women's limited access to farm land in West Africa through a case study. Available data in the late 1990s indicated that less than 20 per cent of Nigerian women owned their own farm lands; fewer than 10 per cent had access to agricultural input, and less than 5 per cent had access to agricultural credit. This situation has caused and sustained female migration to Nigerian towns in search of waged employment as a coping mechanism. By extension, women's access to land for farming in Benin cannot be very different from this Nigerian case. This situation is worrying since, in most African communities, 'women are not expected to be financially dependent on their husbands' (Adepoju 1984: 62); they have particular responsibilities which they themselves must finance. The SAP in Benin therefore increased the propensity for women to migrate.

The FAO (1999) confirmed the landlessness of rural women in Benin and described how their poverty increased

under the SAP. While the average size of men's holdings was 1.76 hectares in 1976, that of women was a paltry 0.98 hectares. This was in the pre-SAP period when the demand for land and the rent required were both minimal. The scarceness of women's land, the increase in interest rates on loans from local banks during the SAP period, the high prices of farm inputs, coupled with the need to pay for services such as education, health, water supply meant that women could not offset the inherent adverse effects of Benin's SAP. Structural reforms did not benefit women farmers or female-headed households of West Africa – rather it worsened their agricultural production and appreciably decreased their income (Gladwin & Due 1991). It is thus correct to say that the SAP decimated the sustainable livelihood of rural women in Benin because they had only limited access to land. Under such circumstances, migration as a diversification and survival strategy, as Adepoju noted, becomes the only option. In the same vein, the Breton Woods Project (cited in Shah 2008) that reviewed the effect of SAPs in Africa conceded that they inherently impoverished poor rural people.

Women's disadvantaged social position

Women in West Africa generally face discrimination in employment, economic opportunities and access to credit and financial facilities, and are marginalised politically (Adepoju 2002). Nightingale (2001) notes that in many parts of Africa women are usually forced into early marriage and child-bearing, and must live by subsistence farming to produce food for the household. Girls have less chance of going to school, of getting paid work or participating adequately in social and political circles. The patriarchal nature of African society subjugates women and erodes their independence of thought, initiative, action and decision. It is therefore plausible to say that women in central Benin are in shackles of tradition and societal norms when it comes to economic emancipation.

Adepoju (1998) quotes a 1975 United Nations report to illustrate the African woman's disadvantaged social position. Before the age of 20, she carries the full load of adult responsibilities; by 25, she may have given birth six times; by the time she is 40 years old she is already exhausted by poor nutrition, illness, child-bearing and heavy work in the fields and at home; she dies young. Thus, the effective performance of (Nigerian) women's multiple roles is effectively constrained by early marriage, child-bearing, pregnancy wastage, limited access to productive and remunerative work, inadequate capacity for self-employment in the rural areas, and the drudgery of life and work (Adepoju 1984). Arguably, migration should be expected to give women access to economic independence, or at least to strengthen their financial position. Moreover, migration exposes women to wider horizons and greater opportunities.

Cotton production and land degradation

Large-scale cotton production and its attendant land degradation have been discussed above as direct and indirect push factors of female migration in central Benin. There is some evidence in the literature that attributes the emergence of autonomous female migration in the Upper Ouémé area of Benin to the monoculture dependence on cotton: the 'white gold'. Large-scale cultivation of cotton in Benin gained extra momentum during the SAP period (Brottem 2005). Cotton cultivation soared from 26 000 hectares in 1979 to 360 000 hectares in 2001 (Ton 2006). This dramatic increase indirectly acted as a 'push' factor to migration. Cotton farmers cut down the trees in and around their farms to give the crop enough sunlight to maximise output (Bradley 2002). Boko (2006) also mentions that cotton-growing in Benin has caused continuous widespread deforestation.

The finding of Glowa Impetus (2005) corroborates the fact that, since 1995, there has been a 40 per cent decrease in dense

vegetation in the cotton growing areas of Benin. Satellite imagery analyses show that the Guinea savannah decreased at the rate of over 1750 hectares per year, while the Sudan savannah shrank at 905 hectare per year. Thus cotton growing has taken up much of the available land for farming. Moreover, according to Brottem (2005), 'the proceeds from cotton sales go to husbands and not to wives', and this situation drives rural women in the Upper Ouémé area into poverty. They have therefore been compelled to eke out a living by producing charcoal, collecting firewood, or collecting vegetal materials for sale (Saidou et al. 2004). The land degradation caused by large-scale cotton cultivation should also be expected to adversely affect the production of charcoal and firewood collection. *Nation Master* (2009) reports that charcoal production in Benin had fallen from nearly 26 million tons in 1990 to 24 million in 2005. This is another indication that deforestation is adversely affecting the income of rural women. Increased poverty among women attributable to cotton cultivation is obviously a push factor to migration.

Low price of cotton in world market

Apart from the land degradation induced by cotton production, which has impoverished many women, autonomous female migration from Benin might also be a consequence of the persistently very low price of the crop itself on the global market in recent times. The cotton sub-sector has been the very basis of the rural and agro-industrial economy of Benin: its contribution to the GDP was estimated at between 10 and 15 per cent; it accounts for 70 to 80 per cent of agricultural export value and 35 per cent of fiscal income. It contributes directly to the money income of around 3 million farmers (Gergely 2009: 10). Unfortunately, 'the unit selling price of the commodity has always been below its unit production cost since the late 1980s' (Mutume 2003: 2). The

price of cotton fell by 54 per cent between 1991 and 2003 and has continued to fall ever since (Mutume 2003). This situation has definitely been plunging the rural people in Benin into a deeper cycle of poverty since their livelihoods depend on cotton. A 40 per cent decrease in farm-level cotton prices in Benin increases rural poverty by 8 per cent in the short run, and by 6 to 7 per cent in the long run (Minot & Daniels 2002). Rural household incomes in the cotton-growing areas have not been enough to support women in recent times since they depend on the benevolence of their spouses as regards any earnings from cotton. The propensity for women to migrate should be expected to be high under polygamous marriage which prevails in rural Africa.

Male chauvinism

Nebasina (1995: 2) describes the African woman as having 'no firm authority over land, credit and decision-making where she can come in, interact and check some of the negative consequences arising from economic activities in any ecological, climate, ethnic or cultural zone in which she finds herself'. In the light of this, Benin women can be seen as even prevented from advising their husbands against growing cotton. 'Since women perform the traditional roles of providing food, child care and managing the household' (Adepoju 2002: 3), it is not hard to argue that women in rural Benin should be the group worst hit in the development-induced poverty arising from persistently low cotton prices in the world market. Autonomous female migrants therefore epitomise 'people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of profound poverty' (Castles & Miller 2003: 15). Adepoju (2002) agrees strongly with this proposition.

Dantuni's *Appraisal of the Implementation of the Sokoto Master Plan* (2010) provides much insight into the geography of the Sokoto

metropolis. The metropolis covers a roughly circular area with a radius of about 16 kilometres beginning from the Shehu Kangiwa Square. The area is bordered by towns such as Kware in the north, Dange Shuni in the east, Wammako in the west and Bodinga in the south. Isolated and unoccupied areas, however, lie within this delineation. In this chapter, the Sokoto metropolis is delineated as comprising those parts of the Sokoto North and South Local Government areas where the city's influence is very conspicuous. Sokoto metropolis evolved from the historical city of *Sakkwato*, founded in 1809 and functioning as the Seat of the Caliphate of the Jihad Usmanu Danfodiyo from 1815 (Suleiman 2004). The site, situation and function of this city have attracted migrants up to the present day.

Physically, Sokoto lies on a hill that terminates in a northern steep escarpment rolling into a fertile flood plain. The city is located close to the confluence of rivers Sokoto and Rima. Water supply for irrigation agriculture and human consumption has thus always been available. This is probably why trans-Saharan traders were using the locale as a popular camping site even before the city existed. When founded, the city lay at a very strategic vacuum area between four existing empires or savannah kingdoms. Gobir lay to the north-east, Zamfara to the east, Kabbi in the south and Keltuareg to the north-west (Suleiman 2004). Sokoto, therefore, served as a link and marshalling point between the Mediterranean and the Guinea coastlands. This strategic advantage continues today.

Right from its inception, Sokoto has enjoyed an urban supremacy status and has performed various functions, including religious, commercial, administrative, judicial and educational. From 1804 until the British takeover in 1903 it served as the Seat of the Caliphate (and, since independence, has again served in this capacity), offering Islamic scholarship and jurisprudence. In tandem with this, has been the city's

role as an important trading centre, both in the days of the caliphate and during British rule. In addition, Sokoto was a colonial Provincial Headquarters (1903–1960). The five State-creation exercises of Nigeria – in 1967, 1976, 1987, 1991 and 1996 – all retained it as the administrative capital of a state bearing its name. Each State-creation exercise too seems to have added to the city's primacy in terms of infrastructure, so that it remains unrivalled among its close neighbours.

Demographic structure of Sokoto metropolis

Sokoto metropolis is a classic example of an urban primacy in north-west Nigeria (Sani 2010). About 95 per cent of the modern business and commercial ventures of Zamfara, Kebbi and Sokoto States are located in Sokoto. The population of Sokoto State is currently 3.7 million, and nearly 80 per cent of the people in the state reside in the Sokoto 'Home Districts' (Hama Ali, Acida, Gumbi, Dingyadi, Bodinga, Durbawa and Sifawa), which are, to a large extent, co-terminous with the Sokoto metropolis (Sani 2010). About 42 per cent of the people in the metropolis are below 14 years of age, and 52 per cent are aged 15 to 64 years – a very high youth to adult ratio (Muhammad 2010). The average age at marriage for a female is 17 years, and most women in Sokoto metropolis are full-time housewives; only a negligible fraction is allowed to engage in outdoor work, because of Islamic purdah.

There is a diverse ethnic composition in Sokoto metropolis (Muhammad 2010). Although the Hausa-Fulani dominate, the presence of Tuareg, Zabarmawa, Yoruba, Ibo and people from Nigeria's middle belt as well as foreigners, cannot be ignored. One can find large numbers of almost all the over 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria comfortably pursuing their legitimate businesses as employees of federal, state and private organisations in the city (Sani 2010).

Ouémé headwaters area: origin of migrants

The area of origin of the female migrants surveyed covers the headwaters of the Ouémé and Alibori rivers but, because Ouémé is the largest and longest river in Benin, this origin has commonly been referred to as the Upper Ouémé Catchment Area. The basic geography of the Ouémé catchment area is very similar to that of the Guinea-Sudan savannah areas of West Africa and therefore need not be discussed here. The Ouémé headwaters area lies between latitudes 9° 05' N and 12° 30' N and spreads from longitude 0° 44' E to 3° 45' E, covering some 82 000 square kilometres, or 73 per cent of Benin's land area. Four administrative departments, subdivided into 27 units, make up the area of origin of migration (see Table 1).

Table 1. Departments of Upper Ouémé Catchment Area

Department	Area in km ²	Population in 2006	Administrative subdivisions
Alibori	25 683	595 196	Banikoara, Gogounou, Kandi, Karimama, Malanville, Segbana
Donga	10 691	395 416	Bassila, Copargo, Djougou Rural, Djougou Urban, Ouake
Borgou	25 310	831 842	Bembereke, Kalale, Ndali, Parakou, Perere, Sinende, Tchaorou
Atakora	20 459	601 537	Boukoumbe, Cobly, Kerou, Kouande Materi, Natitigou, Pehonko, Taguieta, Toucountouna
Total	82 143	24 23 991	

Source: Compiled by author from Wikipedia 2009

Table 2 demonstrates how agricultural production has been increasing over the years in the Upper Ouémé area. This has, however, created many problems. Faure (cited in Saidou et al. 2004) reports that the Atacora Department has been experiencing an era of decreasing and unpredictable rain. Moreover, there has been a widespread and rapid decline in soil fertility due to agricultural intensification. Farmers have been unable to cope with the situation because of the high cost of organic fertiliser. The situation in the Colline Department (south of Atakora) was equally worrying. Saidou et al. (2004) indicate that there is a large-scale migration from these two departments to Borgou, Donga and Alibori as a consequence of these problems.

Table 2. Production statistics of some major crops in Benin: 1998-2007

	1998	2002	2007
Crop	Tons	Tons	Tons
Maize	662 227	622 136	900 000
Millet	29 427	40 632	40 000
Sorghum	138 429	195 468	200 000
Groundnuts	99 160	146 214	130 000
Cotton	–	–	313 5009*

*FAO estimate

Source: Aregheore 2009: 3

More than 60 per cent of the respondents in the fifteen villages surveyed in Atacora and Colline Departments embark on some form of migration to the Ouémé headwaters area, alleviating soil and land degradation problems and improving their own livelihoods (Saidou et al. 2004). This situation, expectedly, is

bound to increase the pressure of population in the Upper Ouémé area.

The gradual but increasing tempo of migration from northern Alibori, Atakora and Colline Departments to the less-populated and relatively fertile areas of Benin in the 1980s resulted in yet another problem. It caused land hunger in the area (Saidou et al. 2004). New migrants are no longer given 'free' land; nowadays they must rent land – at exorbitant prices. As a result, migrant farmers over-use rented lands and take no interest in land and soil preservation. Landowners also no longer portion out land for their wives' use because of the high demand, while migrants' own wives have resorted to cutting trees on rented lands to produce charcoal to recover part of the renting costs. It is probable, therefore, that the renting of land at high prices to migrants will result in more intense deforestation and further land degradation.

Large-scale migration to the Upper Ouémé area has also created a social imbalance. The production and marketing of agricultural produce is now dominated by migrants (Saidou et al. 2004). As a result, though the women of Donga and Borgou Departments are the landlords and indigenes, they are becoming increasingly marginalised in the processing and marketing of food. Furthermore, Fulani cattle herders have migrated to the area from northern Alibori – and they now combine cattle rearing and arable farming. The autochthonous population is gradually becoming outnumbered and marginalised. Just as the hosts have, in the past, sought to suppress their fellows in order to become dominant landlords, there is now also serious competition for local power and access to land among the migrants. The upper Ouémé area is thus rife with conflict.

Description of research

Preliminary investigation

The decision to migrate is usually arrived at through complex processes, with many contextual factors determining migration (Vandsemb 1995; Siddiqui 2009; IOM 2007; IASFM 2009). Data on migration may be both qualitative and quantitative. The data collection, which was conducted in March 2010 and is briefly described in this section, used a structured interview schedule and a Likert item questionnaire to generate data. A 21-question structured interview schedule was used to collect data at individual, household and community levels. The schedule was pre-coded to allow data to be processed using a logistic regression method. Vandsemb (1995) strongly advocates the use of interviews in migration studies – which the logistic regression method is easily able to process. Several scholars, including Findley (1994), Bilsborrow (1998), Zhu (1998) and Ezra (2001) have successfully used this (logistic) approach of estimation to analyse migration data containing similar individual, household and community level contextual factors.

The Likert item questionnaire contained 18 questions; it was applied to validate the responses generated by the structured interview schedule. Although some scholars, for example Kuzon et al. (1996), disagree with the idea of applying parametric analysis (regression) to the ordinal 5-point Likert scale, others – such as Knapp (1990), Moge (1999), Wuensch (2005) and Blaikie (2003) – agree with the increasingly common practice of assuming that Likert-type categories constitute interval measurements. We subscribe to the idea that the contextual nature of rural out-migration can be examined in depth by using a Likert item questionnaire, and we therefore employed this tool.

Four transect surveys and a two-week longitudinal study of migrant female hawkers in the Sokoto metropolis indicated

that the Beninoise migrants prefer work sites outside the old Sokoto city wall. The reason for this is that the female migrants are Muslims and find it embarrassing to be seen fending for themselves in an environment where purdah is practised. Consequently the initial search for the Beninoise migrants focused on the Sokoto South, parts of Wamakko, Kware and Dange-Shuni Local Government areas of the metropolis. Parts of the Sokoto North Local Government area outside the old city wall were also surveyed.

Preliminary contacts with the Beninoises indicated that they work as cooks and servers in local restaurants (*gidan abinci*) as nannies and cooks in the homes of the well-to-do, or operate as hawkers of locally-prepared drinks and herbal medicines. Though all denied it, some of the migrants could be suspected of being commercial sex workers. The preliminary survey also revealed that most of migrants reside in their work places.

Research details

Using the snowballing technique, fifty Beninoise migrants were purposively sampled from the ten largest *gidan abinci* in the Sokoto metropolis and subjected to both structured and unstructured interviews. The proprietors of the *gidan abinci* were also interviewed. Two focus group discussions were organised for five sets of migrants, each containing five discussants drawn from the non-sampled migrants for in-depth information. A multilevel binary logistic regression was then applied to the data.

Table 3 presents the work place, the estimated number of Beninoise migrants in these areas, and the number surveyed. The compilation of the list was based on counts of the female workers and customers at restaurants identified in the area, as indicated in Table 3, at peak periods (from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m.) for fourteen consecutive days. The mean of the counts was used to select the ten most popular worksites (in terms of number

of customers). The information for inclusion of the private home was volunteered by a worker who thought the researchers were potential employers. Prior contacts were made with each restaurant owner for permission to conduct an interview.

Table 3. Sampling frame

Serial number	Work Site/Name of street	Number of shops	Estimated number of migrants	Number of migrants sampled	% of total
1	University Mini Market UDUS	4	25	9	18
2	Gidan Mai Ada/Kalambaina Roundabout	2	21	7	14
3	Gawon Nama Market/Birnin Kebbi Road	3	16	5	10
4	Federal Low Cost Junction/Secretariat Road	3	15	5	10
5	Sama Road Junction/Secretariat Road	2	12	4	8
6	Karra Market/Ahmadu Rufai Road	3	18	6	12
7	Kasuwar Daji/Ramin Kura	4	16	5	10
8	Mahauta Junction/Western Bypass	3	12	4	8
9	Residence X*, Lamido Adamawa Road	1	5	2	4
10	Opposite Teacher's College, Abdullahi Fodio Road	2	4	1	2
11	Opposite SURPB office, Abdullahi Fodio Road	1	6	2	4
<i>Total</i>		28	150	50	100

* 'Residence X' is a private residence

Source: Field survey, March 2010

As shown in Table 3, the average number of migrants is about 5 per work site. The selection of total respondents in each site was based on the total number of workers counted. Some 50 out of the 150 migrants counted in the 28 restaurants were surveyed, being roughly a third of the work force in each site. The rating of the Likert item questionnaire was done by a group composed of the owner of each restaurant and four female migrant workers.

Table 4 shows the number of migrants interviewed and which Department they came from in Benin.

Table 4. Home Departments (in Benin) of the migrants sampled


Serial number	Department	Number interviewed	Percentage of total interviewed
1	Alibori	3	6
2	Donga	15	30
3	Borgou	12	24
4	Atakora	1	2
5	Colline	10	20
6	Zou	6	12
7	Plateau	3	6
	<i>Total</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: Field survey, March 2010

Conceptual framework of the study

Carney's 1998 Sustainable Rural Livelihood (SRL) framework was adopted as the conceptual framework for the study because of its inherent appropriateness in explaining autonomous female migration. The basics of the framework are presented in Figure 1. The SRL assumes that all rural households possess at least five principal resources (capital assets) which can be used to sustain livelihood. (Appendix 1 gives further detail on capital assets.) The capital resources of the rural areas exist in many vulnerability contexts, which refer to the ease or difficulty in using a capital asset to sustain livelihood. For example, an area's natural assets may be adversely affected by high pressure of population, climatic changes, government policies, conflicts or cultural practices. (Appendix 2 gives vulnerability contexts.)

Figure 1. Sustainable Rural Livelihood framework



The SRL framework recognises governmental and institutional interventions as engines that can change and transform a rural area's capital assets and vulnerability. For example, government policies and interventions may indirectly promote or discourage migration. Three livelihood strategies are recognised by the SRL framework: agriculture and other primary production, diversification, and migration. The recognition of migration as a factor is what makes the SRL appropriate to this study. The livelihood outcomes of rural people are also outlined in Figure 1. In theory, the motives for autonomous female migration studied in Sokoto metropolis may accord with the livelihood outcomes of SRL.

The dependent variable Y (Logit M) in this study is the mode of migration of Beninoises into Sokoto metropolis. This variable was binary-coded (0/1): autonomous migrants (those who arrived unaccompanied) were assigned the value 1, and accompanied migrants 0. Our interest lies in the autonomous females. Some twenty independent variables which were deemed likely to have caused their migration – following Ezra (2001), Zhu (1998), Bilsborrow (1998), and Asante and Anarfi (2003) (coded as Xs, Ys and Zs) – were used to collect data. The data was analysed using the following logistic regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Logit M} = & b_0 + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3 X_3 + b_4 X_4 + b_5 X_5 + \\ & b_6 X_6 + b_7 X_7 + b_8 X_8 + b_9 X_9 + b_{10} X_{10} + b_{11} Y_1 + b_{12} Y_2 \\ & + b_{13} Y_3 + b_{14} Y_4 + b_{15} Y_5 + b_{16} Z_1 + b_{17} Z_2 + b_{18} Z_3 + \\ & b_{19} Z_4 + b_{20} Z_5 + e. \end{aligned}$$

Concisely, the (modal) equation states that autonomous female migration to the Sokoto metropolis (Logit M) is (suspected to be) the result of (a combination of) the following factors: gender (X_1), age (X_2), literacy level of migrant (X_3), marital status (X_4), proximity and ability to visit or hear from home (X_5), occupation prior to migration (X_6), availability of menial jobs for females

in Sokoto metropolis (X_7), ecological degradation at migrant's home prior to migration (X_8), size of migrant's ethnic group in Benin (X_9), livelihood options in rural Benin (X_{10}); mode of decision to migrate (Y_1), status of female farmers in Benin (Y_2), core reason for migration (Y_3), migrant's assessment of cotton as a monoculture crop in Benin (Y_4), women's access to farmland in rural Benin (Y_5); land quality and availability in rural Benin in recent times (Z_1), experience from previous migration (Z_2), nature of fosterage in rural Benin (Z_3), introduction to Sokoto (Z_4), and the attraction of Sokoto metropolis to migrant (Z_5).

Research results

Manner of migration

The survey showed that 18 of the Beninoise migrants (36%) entered the Sokoto metropolis either in the company of other migrants or came with a married woman whose husband resided in north-western Nigeria. Most of the migrants did not 'leapfrog': 60 per cent travelled directly via Malanville (in northern Benin), then through Kamba (a border town in Nigeria) to Sokoto. The remaining 40 per cent did a stepwise migration from their homes in Upper Ouémé: they first went to a south-western Yoruba city such as Ibadan or Oyo (in Nigeria), then passed through Ndali (headquarters of the Borgu Department of Benin), where they worked in businesses such as food-vending for about two years; they then returned to their homes before deciding to move on to Sokoto. This group of migrants seems to have been motivated to move first to south-western Nigeria by the presence of a fairly large number of Hausa traders in central Benin who trade in foodstuffs, cattle and other merchandise which are transported to south-western Nigeria. Responses from the migrants revealed that Hausa migrants in Upper Ouémé were living there without their wives; so, before

they went on to south-western Nigeria and Sokoto, some of the female migrants used to cook and sell food to these men.

Social and economic data

The marital status of migrants appears confused. Some 52 per cent of the migrants surveyed indicated that they were married, but it is likely that many felt shy to say that they were married. With 64 per cent aged between 20 and 45 years, the mostly illiterate (76%) migrants had come to Sokoto because they were facing increasing poverty. About 68 per cent of the migrants work as employees, being paid N300 per day and sleeping in the eating halls after close of work. Their work begins at around 4.45 a.m. and terminates around 10.30 p.m. The migrants stay for 24 to 30 months before going back home. This allows them to accumulate some money – ranging between N150 000 and N200 000. According to the respondents, this amount of cash enables them at least to begin a non-agricultural livelihood at home. Nearly three-quarters (71.5%) of the migrants came to Sokoto because they suspected that there would be a high demand for female labour there – because the local women live under purdah and are thus not permitted to stay or work outside their marital homes. About two-thirds of the migrants (68%) visit their homes to celebrate the Muslim annual Sallah, but stay only a few days, so as not to lose wages when the celebration is over.

Analysis of Likert item questionnaire

The 5-point Likert item allows a quantitative value to be ascribed to qualitative data, allowing the data to be amenable to statistical interpretation. By assigning a numerical value to the Likert item, the mean which represents the overall attitude toward that choice can be calculated (Karl 2005). Thus a Likert scale allows the researcher to apply the features of parametric statistics to the data. In this study, five groups of migrants

with five respondents in each were requested to rate items in a Likert item questionnaire, with a 5-point scoring, ranging from 5 = 'strongly agree' to 1 = 'strongly disagree'. The inferences set out below were based on the resulting analyses. The Likert scale and coefficient of variation for each inference follow in parentheses.

Respondents could not tell when the migration of females from Benin to the Sokoto metropolis begun (Likert scale 3.6; coefficient of variation 36%); however, it was accepted that this was probably already happening by 1989 (when President Kerekou introduced the SAP in Benin) (4.0; 18%). Husbands permit wives to migrate to diversify the household sources of income (4.4; 20%), and women migrate because their husbands are unable to support them adequately (4.8; 10%).

Some push factors of migration emerged from the study. Land colonisation in the Upper Ouémé catchment area in the 1980s seriously restricted (indigene) women's access to fertile farmlands (Likert scale 4.8; coefficient of variation 10%). Large-scale migration to the area was listed as a cause of rural women's poverty (4.6; 10%). Migrants came to Sokoto metropolis mainly to acquire cash and thus abandon farming (4.2; 12%). During the 1980s and 1990s farming had not been profitable for many rural households in the Upper Ouémé area (4.0; 0%). There were seven widows and six divorcees among the migrants; they spoke of some painful ordeals, ranging from having used witchcraft to kill their husbands and children, or giving birth to only females. Cultural factors thus play a role in Beninoise migration.

Five significant pull factors attracted the female migrants to Sokoto. First, this metropolis represents an uncompromising Islamic society: purdah practice is enforced and husbands do not permit their wives to work outside the home. In addition, Sokoto, the Seat of the Caliphate still retains much of its aristocracy. Together these two factors create a high

demand for migrant female workers in reproductive work (daily tasks such as cooking, cleaning and child care that are necessary to keep a household functioning) and in the restaurant business. Secondly Nigeria's apparent prosperity (beginning from the oil boom days) compared with Benin's poverty continues to lure migrants. Thirdly, migrants from Benin already resident in Sokoto have formed many hometown associations which offer some assistance to female migrants. In addition, the significant presence of migrant Hausa traders in the Upper Ouémé area initiated a degree of interaction between the Beninoises and the Hausa; a fair number of the Beninoises learnt to speak the Hausa language through this interaction. Lastly, some of the women had previously migrated to work in restaurants in Sabon Gari, the Hausa quarter of Ibadan, as well as in Oyo and other large towns and cities in south-western Nigeria, and thus have some experience of migration. This wealth of experience induced them to emigrate to the Sokoto metropolis where they can earn more.

Interpretation of results of interviews

The interpretation of the results of this study was based on probability values and odds ratios ($\exp \hat{\alpha}$). The odds ratio is a measure of association which approximates how likely or unlikely it is for the outcome to be present for values of independent variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000). It will give an indication of how much more likely it is that someone who *is* exposed to a certain factor will develop a certain outcome, compared with someone who is *not* exposed to that factor. The Wald Chi-square statistic, also used here, indicates the relative weight of each explanatory variable in a model and allows the researcher to assess the role of each independent variable in the prediction of the value of the dependent variable. (See also Garson 2010.)

An SPSS (version 10) logistic regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between the autonomous female

migration from Benin and the socio-economic data collected from the migrants using the backward stepwise (likelihood ratio) method. The variables detailed above were entered into the equation at the beginning (step 1) of the iterative processing. (Variable X_1 (gender) was omitted since all the respondents sample were female.) Fourteen of the variables were then eliminated by the iterations of the analysis, after which (step 16) only variables X_6 , Y_3 , Y_4 , Y_5 and Z_3 remained, indicating that they were the ones influencing the migration. However further data analysis (at 95 % significance level) revealed that only the first four of these could be considered statistically as the predictors of the Beninise migration. The logistic regression coefficient ($\hat{\alpha}$), the standard error of the mean (SE), the Wald Chi-square test statistic, the number of degrees of freedom (Df), the significance level (Sig) and the odds ratio ($\text{Exp}(\hat{\alpha})$) of the variables found significant are all presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Variables in the equation at last iteration (Step 16)

Item	β	SE	Wald Chi-square	Df	Sig	$\text{Exp}(\beta)$
Occupation before migration (X_6)	0.803	0.374	4.593	1	0.032	2.231
Core reason for migration (Y_3)	0.861	0.353	5.936	1	0.015	2.366
Dependence on cotton growing (Y_4)	2.107	0.381	30.611	1	0	8.220
Women's access to farmland (Y_5)	0.766	0.358	4.478	1	0.032	2.151
Constant	-1.348	0.511	6.952	1	0.008	0.26

Table 5 shows the four significant factors which predict the Beninoise migration to Sokoto metropolis. They are, in order of significance: the dependence on the monoculture crop cotton in the rural areas of the Upper Ouémé catchment area (Y_4), the increased poverty of rural women in the locality (Y_3), the non-profitability of farming as an occupation in the rural areas of origin (X_6), and rural women's decreasing access to farmland and other productive resources (Y_5). The fact that husbands, older children and relatives agree to care for the dependants left behind (Z_3) is important, but is not a statistically significant factor.

Conclusion

The migration of women from central and northern Benin to north-western Nigeria is strongly influenced by an increase in poverty. There are a number of causes of the problem: firstly, land and soil degradation in the Upper Ouémé catchment area due to widespread cotton cultivation; secondly, the non-profitability of cotton farming as a result of the low price of the crop on world markets – far below its production cost in recent years; thirdly, the high pressure of population in the Upper Ouémé catchment area due to 'land colonisation' – the immigration by people from the outlying regions in the mid-1980s, and, finally, the combination of sex-role constraints and the decline in status of women in (polygamous) marriage.

As well as denying women access to land for farming, the vast deforestation in the area for large-scale cultivation of cotton has deprived women of alternative sources of making money (firewood collection and charcoal burning). Moreover, proceeds from cotton sales go to their husbands, who give almost nothing back to the women. Declining cotton prices have significantly reduced family incomes, with women bearing the brunt of the problem. Widows and divorcees are left to cater for themselves. The autonomous Beinoise female

migrants in Sokoto metropolis migrated there as a result of the non-profitability of farming as an occupation, land degradation, limited access to land, cultural suppression by their communities and the fact that they are able to get some care for the dependants they leave behind.

There are strong indications that more female migrants will move to Sokoto metropolis, since some of the older migrants have come more than once. An inescapable conclusion from this is that monoculture in West Africa needs to be reviewed.

Appendix 1. Migrant capital asset categories

Natural capital

The natural resource stocks from which resource flows useful for livelihoods are derived (e.g. land, water, wildlife, biodiversity, environmental resources).

Social capital

The social resources (e.g. networks, membership of groups, relationships of trust, access to wider institutions of society) upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods.

Human capital

Human resources (e.g. skills, knowledge, ability to work hard, good health, the ability to pursue different livelihood strategies, self-confidence).

Physical capital

The basic infrastructure (e.g. transport, shelter, water, energy and communications) and the production equipment and means which enable people to pursue their livelihoods.

Financial capital

The financial resources which are available to people (e.g. savings, availability of credit, regular remittances, pensions, allowances from husbands) and which provide them with different livelihood options.

(After Scoones 1998)

Appendix 2. Analysis of livelihood vulnerability contexts

Component	Key issue	Example to look for
TRENDS		
Resource stocks	What is happening to natural resource stocks and quality?	Degradation/renewal trends; loss of resources to urban use
Population density	What is the current population density and how is this changing?	Density figures; population growth figures; information on out-migration
Technology	What technologies exist which are of likely benefit to people in the area?	Technology database; local knowledge/varieties; technologies in use in this (and similar) areas
Politics	How are people in the area placed in terms of political representation?	Voting figures; local support for party in power; ethnic origins; distance to nearest seat of government
Economics	How do economic trends affect livelihoods?	Price trends of locally produced goods; percentage of local goods traded
SHOCKS		
Climate	How does the climate affect people's livelihoods and well-being?	Annual rainfall; rainfall variability; climatic disasters; perceived recent changes in climate/weather patterns
Conflict	Is there any civil or resource conflict (or likelihood of such conflict) in the area?	Accounts of conflict or expected conflict; legal cases pending
CULTURE		
Culture	What effect, if any does culture have on the way people manage their assets and the livelihood choices they make?	Unexplained differences between this and other areas; accounts of the way things are done (and constraints)

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CHAPTER 9

Internal Lifetime Migration Patterns and Processes in Botswana: Policy Challenges and Options

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Introduction

Since the early 1980s, Botswana has been experiencing significant internal migration, in response to various environmental, economic and socio-economic factors. To address the issues arising from the relocation processes of the population, the Government of Botswana has initiated various policies for managing and regulating the spatial population distribution phenomenon in a sustainable manner. The most noteworthy of these policies include the Local Rio Agenda 21 Declaration on Sustainable Human Settlements, the National Population Policy (Botswana Republic of Botswana 1997), Vision 2016 (Botswana 1999), the National Settlement Policy (1998), the Revised National Settlement Policy (2004) and the National Conservation Strategy.

Based on the evidence from the 2001 Census on Population and Housing, the study described in this chapter seeks, firstly, to identify the main causes and spatial patterns

of life-time internal migration in Botswana. It also aims to assess the extent to which the policies currently in place have succeeded in regulating the process, and, based on accepted best practices, to suggest sustainable alternatives for managing internal migration.

The term 'migration' has assumed various connotations due to the diversity of disciplines which study this demographic phenomenon. To minimise ambiguity, it is thus important to contextualise the process and settle on a working definition. Technically, migration is part of general spatial mobility. The term 'mobility' includes both short-term cyclical, circulatory and oscillatory moves which are undertaken either daily, periodically, or seasonally between the places of origin and destination. It can also entail long-term and permanent relocation. The word 'migration' refers specifically to the permanent relocation of individuals, from one administrative unit to another. Data available from the Botswana 2001 census do not reflect attitudinal intentions regarding permanency of relocation by those who moved from one normal place of residence to another. It would therefore be technically more accurate to regard these people as 'movers' rather than 'migrants', but for practical purposes, and to ensure comparability with previous analytical reports, movers and migrants are here regarded as synonymous.

This chapter is organised into five main sections. The next section sets the theoretical and conceptual context of the study. The socio-demographic profile of migrants is then considered, followed by a discussion of their areas of origin and destination. An analysis of internal migration trends precedes the conclusion and recommendations of the study.

The space-time context of internal migration in sub-Saharan Africa

Any meaningful typology of migration should be sensitive to its space-time dimension (as explained in Adepaju 1984, 1995).

Four migration typologies, based on origin and destination, have generally been used in studies of African migration: rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-urban and urban-rural. The relative importance of these varies by country, depending on regional development programmes and levels of economic development.

Rural-rural: Rural-rural migration accounts for the majority of population movements in sub-Saharan Africa (ECA 1983; Oucho & Gould 1993). Available evidence indicates that voluntary intra-rural migration primarily reflects ecological and economic motives on the part of migrants, who are mostly illiterate, unskilled young adult males whose major goal is to exploit agricultural, and related potentials in other rural areas. Examples include nomadic pastoralists and arable agriculture migrant labour. Adepoju has noted that two-thirds of Somalis pursue a nomadic or semi-nomadic life (Adepoju 1994).

One form of permanent rural-rural migration is by the occupation of 'free lands' – the colonisation of frontier regions by migrants. This has happened either in the form of spontaneous 'extensification' or as state-assisted relocation from overpopulated rural lands (ECA 1995). On the positive side, this obviously brings latent land resources into productive use, to the benefit of both the migrants and the nation. However, serious environmental problems, which threaten sustainable development, have also been noted in this context. The state has sometimes intervened to promote intra-rural mobility in order to relieve certain areas of population pressure whilst at the same time ensuring equitable access to social services and infrastructure. Classic examples include the once-celebrated Ujamaa 'villagisation' scheme in Tanzania, the relatively recent Zimbabwe resettlement programme, and the earlier Kenyan land settlement programme (Oucho 2002).

Involuntary rural-rural migrants are usually conventional refugees, moving either because of war and internal civil strife

or because of environmentally-induced crises (Makannah 1993). These migrants are referred to as 'internally displaced persons'. They consist mainly of the most vulnerable groups, namely women, young children, the elderly and the incapacitated.

Rural-urban: The African continent has the highest rate of urbanisation globally, at over 4 per cent per year (UNCHS 2001), resulting in more and more new urban areas, as well as the spatial expansion of existing metropolitan areas. This growth is attributed to the combined effects of natural increase, reclassification of settlements, and rural-urban migration.

About forty per cent of Africa's population is currently urban, and it is anticipated that by the year 2025 fifty per cent of the continent's population will be living in urban areas, and that by 2030 this will have increased to 54 per cent (UNCHS 2001). The main reason for rapid urbanisation is rural-urban migration – translocation from rural areas to towns and cities (Gugler 1982, Van Westen & Klute 1986, Silitshena 1996). This is in contrast to Latin America and much of Asia (Simmons 1997).

Spatially, urbanward migration draws from two main sources: the rural settlements, – seen to be the main contributors to urban growth (Gugler 1982) – and other lower-order urban centres.

Urban-urban: Urban-urban migration may involve chain migration and/or step migration. Chain migration is associational and takes the form of individuals from a common origin obtaining information and support from earlier migrants and relocating to a common destination. Step migration involves individuals moving up the settlement hierarchy in search of higher-order services such as education, or as a result of upward social mobility.

Urban-urban migration may be either intra- or inter-urban. Horizontal inter-urban moves may take the form of workers

retiring to towns near their home areas or entrepreneurs setting up business and homes in other towns (Silitshena & McLeod 1998). The former normally occurs in response to upward mobility and/or progressive shifts in the lifecycle of migrants within urban centres. The latter is usually characterised by a stepwise relocation process in which the individual moves up the urban hierarchy in response to more lucrative life opportunities.

Urban-rural: Urban-rural migration usually involves retired target workers, who eventually settle at their places of origin. Other urban-rural migrants are unsuccessful and disillusioned job-seekers who come to the realisation that the bright lights of the city are but an illusive mirage. A third category is entrepreneurs who relocate and set up businesses in rural areas (Silitshena & McLeod 1998). The second and third generations, however, seem to have a firmer and more permanent foothold in the socio-cultural and urban economic milieu.

Conceptual typologies modelling mobility in Africa

Migration typologies can take two broad conceptual forms: normative and behavioural. The former may be further categorised into deterministic and historical-functional frameworks (See Ravenstein, 1885; Fei & Ranis 1961; Okun & Richardson 1961, and Todaro 1969 for deterministic, and Zelinsky 1971; Amin 1974; Adepaju 1988; Adepaju 1994; and Adepaju 2006 for historical-functional).

The distinguishing feature of normative migration models is that they specify predefined areas of origin and destination, and assume predictable, rational, predetermined and mechanistic human responses to resource differentials between such areas. However in the process, these models fail to account for frequent unexplained variance in human behaviour, associated with its unpredictability. This conceptual

drawback has given relatively greater credibility to behavioural conceptualisations of the migration process (Wolpert 1965; Mabogunje 1970; Golledge & Stimson 1997; Gugler 1982; Kerven 1983). The behavioural approach places much more emphasis on cognitive and decision-making processes rather than on the systems elements per se – in other words on the person or people involved, rather than simply on the physical circumstances.

Kerven has adapted the 'survival strategy' notion from Stark (1984), and used it as a marginal mini-maximisation model, to explain migration in Botswana (Kerven 1983). Stark expanded this conceptualisation from the original Latin-American context by showing that rural families use rural-urban migration as a wealth maximisation (risk-alleviating) strategy, through the remittances sent home by the migrants (Stark 1984). Households adopting this survival strategy belong to the lower socio-economic strata and, for them, migration by some of their members is a necessity for generating sufficient financial resources for the survival of its members. Such households send at least one of their members to participate in temporary migration.

Each potential destination provides unique economic opportunities. Household units therefore weigh their chances of success in exploiting such opportunities on the basis of the personal attributes of their members – for example age, sex and level of education (Jelili & Mzali 1998). They also assess the relative place utility of the various potential destinations, with household members collectively calculating what is, in effect, the marginal utility of their labour for the different potential destinations of the space economy, while seeking to minimise the risk of failure and maximise their gains (Wolpert 1965). This response process of household members dispersing and relocating into different economic zones thus reflects the household's overall mini-maximisation solution, through a

consensual household decision-making process. One or more household members will therefore consciously and strategically relocate in various destination settlements on the basis of a consensual household decision-making process.

Kerven's marginal mini-maximisation approach to analysing internal migration in Botswana (1983) appears to be the most realistic. First, it caters for all four migration typologies. Second, it is sensitive to household rather than individual decision-making, which precedes any move. In Africa, migration is not a private affair, but for many years the decision to migrate was explained in terms of individual motivations and characteristics. Developments over the past few decades show, however, that migration is the result of household, rather than individual, decision-making processes (Adepoju 1981). Mabogunje (1970) identifies control subsystems which regulate migration at household and community level. So migration is rarely a solitary affair; potential migrants do not weigh their decisions in isolation but rather with their families and in their local communities (Gugler 1982). The decision to permit a migration to take place is based on well-known information and knowledge about places and individuals. It involves the weighting of opportunity costs, relocation costs, and intervening barriers and opportunities.

Whilst economic gains loom large in the decision to migrate, other gains of a purely socio-cultural dimension may be equally important. Rural-rural migration for marital reasons falls into this category. The migration pattern and process is self-selective, being based on the nature of the place of origin, the characteristics of the migrant, and the attributes of the destination.

Internal lifetime migration patterns and processes in Botswana

The 2001 census schedule in Botswana recorded data on place of birth and present residence; these constitute the basis for analysing lifetime migration patterns. Not included are any previous intermediate destinations where the migrants in question could have initially intended to settle permanently. About a third of the Batswana have changed their place of residence since birth, compared to about 10 per cent over a twelve month period preceding the census.

Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of lifetime migrants

This section highlights five different data categories, giving a summary of the 2001 census results for each.

Gender and age: According to the census, males and females who had relocated from their place of birth were almost equally proportioned in Botswana in 2001, although there was a slightly larger percentage of males, at 50.2 per cent. Probably because of socio-economic and socio-cultural reasons, males could be assumed to be comparatively better-placed to relocate from their places of birth than females.

The relocation process from place of birth appeared to be age-selective. The economically-active age group (15 to 64 years), especially the youth, were, at the time of the 2001 census, more likely to relocate from place of birth than more elderly lifetime migrants (who constituted 61 per cent of the lifetime migrants). Younger people are more mobile for socio-economic and economic reasons. The more elderly have been comparatively more stable throughout their lives, probably due to relatively limited social and spatial mobility, especially in the past.

The migrant cohort aged below 19 years was dominated by females, suggesting either associational migration or

reasons for migration that were not directly related to work – such as for gaining an education. However, those aged 19 and above were mainly males, with sex ratios being over 105, most likely as a result of the socio-cultural and economic reasons that regulate internal migration.

Education: According to the 2001 census, most Batswana who had relocated from their place of birth had attained either primary (40%) or secondary (57%) levels of education. Slightly more females than males had attained these levels. Similarly, among these lifetime migrants, a slightly higher percentage of women had pre-school and non-formal education. Overall, among those who had relocated from their place of birth, women tended to be better-educated than their male counterparts. The reasons for this could be historical, due to male-dominated emigration from Botswana which demand less education and/or traditional socio-cultural roles in terms of the customary division of traditional rural economic activities which have denied most young males access to educational facilities and opportunities.

Highest level of training: The majority (71%) of those who had moved had no vocational training, suggesting that they had relocated to pursue some form of training. The remainder, who had already acquired some vocational training, had probably moved to engage in employment related to this training. Of those with no training, just over 50 per cent were females, and slightly over 60 per cent of those with vocational training were males. Similarly, males constituted about 60 per cent of the secondary-level migrants. However, among those with other college and university qualifications, females predominated. The overall picture is that, in terms level of training, male migrants have had a competitive edge in the job market.

Occupation: Lifetime migrants were highly differentiated by occupation. They were mostly engaged in elementary

occupations (25%), crafts (20%), services (16%) and clerical work (12%). Male and female lifetime migrants in elementary occupations were almost equally proportioned. However, about 80 per cent of the craft workers were males. In the services sector male migrants (53%) outnumbered female migrants, but female lifetime migrants constituted a major portion (66%) of those in clerical work. Overall, there therefore appears to have been vertical occupational segregation based on gender among lifetime migrants, with males being dominant in administrative/managerial, professional, skilled agricultural and machinist occupations. Normally, jobs in these occupational categories tend to be better paid.

Economic activity: According to the 2001 census, lifetime migrants were mostly in paid employment (77%), followed by those seeking employment (14%), and those in the self-employment sector (8%). Among those in paid-cash employment activities, about two thirds were males. The picture was almost reversed for those seeking work. Female lifetime migrants constituted the majority of the self-employed (57%), working as petty traders, whereas males constituted 65 per cent of those in larger and probably more remunerative micro-scale enterprises which engaged labour additional to that of the sole owner. Male lifetime migrants made up over three-quarters of cattle- and land-owners. These patterns demonstrate the relatively precarious nature of the non-agricultural economic activities in which female lifetime migrants find themselves compared with their male counterparts.

Lifetime migrants who were economically inactive were made up mainly of students (52%) and home-makers (42%). Three-quarters of the homemakers were women. Slightly over half of the students classified as lifetime migrants were females, as were three-quarters of the homemakers. Among those who regarded themselves as 'sick' and were residing

away from their place of birth, 56 per cent were women. The patterns displayed by the sick suggest associational relocation (i.e. dependent on the presence of a spouse or relative at the place of destination). Those who retired to destinations outside their places of birth were mostly males, which implies autonomous moves by this gender group.

Spatial patterns of lifetime migration

Certain districts of Botswana have experienced above average in-migration rates. All the modern towns have experienced a more than the national average rate of inflow of persons who have moved from their place of birth. This is mainly due to rural to urban migration, in search of better socio-economic and economic opportunities.

According to the census, there were two rural districts which experienced above-average in-migration rates. These were Ngamiland Delta and Kgalagadi North. The elimination of disease vectors and the growth of tourism could explain the relatively high positive inflow of lifetime migrants into Ngamiland Delta, and the designation of Hukuntsi as a sub-district centre and the pull of population by the TransKalahari Highway to certain villages could explain the inflows into Kgalagadi North. This is often referred to as an 'element of fixation'. Whilst road development of this nature normally attracts work-seeking migrants, it can also facilitate out-migration from such remote and relatively underdeveloped districts.

A number of districts recorded more than average out-migration rates. Districts with above-average lifetime out-migration included Lobatse which has, over the years, failed to attract any significant investment while experiencing the fluctuating fortunes of the main local employer, the Botswana Meat Commission.

Overpopulated rural districts with their environmentally-threatened agricultural base such as the Northeast, Barolong

and Ngamiland West have proved economically unattractive. Other rural districts with above average out-rates also have an insecure economic base. Of course the accessibility factor may also have an influence, where new roads facilitate outward movement from unattractive localities.

Deliberate resettlement of the population from the Central Kalagadi Game Reserve probably accounts the above average out-rate which the District experienced.

The net rate confirms patterns of district out- and in-migration rates; the 'efficiency ratio' shows that only Gaborone and the mining towns – with the exception of sluggish Selebi Phikwe – have experienced significant population input rates (relative to output rates). Because of tourism, the Ngamiland Delta has also experienced lifetime in-migration that is higher than out-migration.

Table 1 gives figures for those who had moved from their places of birth, showing that all the national Planning Regions⁸⁸ except the eastern region experienced lifetime migration gains. The Planning Regions that experienced the highest gross interchange are the most populated and developed ones, namely, the South-eastern and Eastern Regions. Accessibility – facilitated by well-developed transportation infrastructure and communication facilities, and by geographical contiguity – has been a catalyst for the movement from the Eastern to the South-eastern Planning Region. This is consistent with the 'gravity principle'⁸⁹ of spatial interaction.

88. The 1998 National Settlement Policy divided Botswana into four 'Planning Regions'.

89. See, for example, <http://web.pdx.edu/~stipakb/download/PA557/ReadingsPA557sec1-2.pdf>

Table 1. Gross and net lifetime migration between Planning Regions*, 2001

Region	In	Out	Gross	Net
South-eastern	115 045	40 570	155 615	74 475
Eastern	37 569	115 817	153 386	-78 248
North	15 597	13 237	28 834	2 360
West	11 461	10 048	21 509	1 413

*Excluding intra-regional moves.

Source: Botswana 2001


Table 2 gives a breakdown of these lifetime migration movement figures (for each direction) between the Planning Regions.

Table 2. Lifetime migration between Planning Regions, 2001

From To	South-east	East	North	West	Total
South-eastern	–	102 052	5 426	7 567	115 045
East	29 950	–	6 167	1 452	37 569
North	3 124	11 444	–	1 029	15 597
West	7 496	2 321	1 644	–	11 461
Total	40 570	115 817	13 237	10 048	179 672

Source: Botswana 2001

Figure 1. Percentage volumes of lifetime migrants by region of destination



As an illustration of the significance of the arrows in Figure 1: of the total out-migrants from the Eastern Region, 88.1 per cent were destined to the South-eastern Region (thick arrow), 9.9 per cent to the Northern Region and only 2.0 per cent to the Western Region (both thin arrows). The spatial patterns thus reflect the figures given in Table 1.


The spatial pattern parallels for current migration were described earlier in the chapter, and can be explained by similar reasoning.

The important points which emerge are:

- The highest interchange occurs between the most developed, contiguous, densely populated, well-connected Planning Regions of the hardveld⁹⁰, where net losses are lowest for the South-eastern Planning Region;
- The Western Planning Region derives more migrants from the South-east than from other Regions, but even this is not a high percentage;
- Most of the migrants to the Northern Planning Region are from the Eastern and South-eastern Planning Regions;
- The interchange between the Northern and Western Planning Regions is very low, in spite of their geographical contiguity – reflecting the absence of inter-regional connectivity and complementarity in terms of transport and communications, markets, employment and services.

Figure 2 provides data that could be useful for prioritisation in terms of forward regional planning for lifetime migration.

90. A geological term referring to the rocky hills and shallow sand areas of south-eastern and east-central Botswana – where the population density is greatest and economic activity most concentrated.

Figure 2. Relative importance of lifetime migration flows over space

Source: Botswana 2001

As can be seen, rural-town migration ranks marginally highest in long-term migrations, with rural-rural relocation second in importance. The predominance of rural-town and rural-rural moves suggests a close correspondence of migration with the 'early transition phase' (Zelinsky (1971)⁹¹.

Rural to urban movement

Some of the major causes of lifetime rural-urban population relocation in Botswana include:

- Urban-biased policies in public and private sector investment in economic, commercial and socio-economic facilities and physical infrastructure;

91. Zelinsky identified mobility phases through which various countries pass. Countries with a predominance of rural-urban and rural-rural migration pattern belong to the 'early transitional phase'.

- Wage disparities between the urban-industrial sector and the rural sector;
- An educational curriculum biased towards the blue- and white-collar employment that is found mostly in the urban sector;
- Low agricultural commodity prices offered by the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board, making agriculture an unattractive occupation, even in good rain seasons;
- Weak agricultural marketing systems and policies;
- Land-use conversions from subsistence to commercial tenure, leading to either the absorption or the displacement of certain rural communities;
- Rapid population growth, especially in rural areas, leading to unemployment, and to the over-exploitation and degradation of the environmental resource base;
- Periodic droughts and desertification which have forced the rural population to relocate to the larger centres, in order to have access to a reliable water supply, drought relief, rations, and work. With the looming global climate changes, droughts could become chronic rather than periodic;
- Termination, from the early 1980s, of South Africa's formal international migratory labour system from its neighbouring countries to its mining sector.
- (Gwebu 1983, 1987)

Rural to rural movement

It is suspected that the rural-urban movements have been to the larger settlements, particularly to the urban villages

(traditional villages that have assumed an urban status), which offer better life chances. Rural-urban migration often consists of step-wise movements of people from the smallest villages to larger ones, in search of services, employment and food, especially during drought years.

Town to rural and town to town movements

Town-rural mobility might be associated with either the strong traditional ties which the indigenous population retains with its origins, or with the retirement of civil servants and other urban workers who came originally from rural areas. Other reasons might include marriage-related movements, or the overspill of population from towns and cities due to urbanisation diseconomies. Finally, inter-town migration is likely, on the whole, to be employment-linked, as workers seek to move up the employment ladder.

Policy context for internal migration

The strategic thrust of the National Population Policy, which was formulated during the late 1990s, was mainly with rural to urban migration (Republic of Botswana 1997). The Policy seeks to:

- Stimulate development in the rural areas by expanding and improving physical and socio-economic infrastructure;
- Create alternative growth points to achieve a more even population distribution;
- Create employment opportunities in the rural areas.

The National Settlement Policy (DTRP 1998: 2) is expected to:

- Facilitate the promotion of a more spatially balanced development, that ensures optimal distribution of productive activities and population;

- Facilitate the orderly transition from a predominantly rural to a largely urban population;
- Serve as a basis for physical planning, including land-use planning.

The National Conservation Strategy Authority maintains that all aspects of the Town and Country Planning Act will be enforced to ensure the improved provision, design and management of human settlements, including public open space and recreational facilities, and the conservation of natural resources within the Planning Areas of all settlements (DTRP 1998).

Two of the relevant intentions of Vision 2016, with regard to internal migration, are the creation of a prosperous, productive and innovative society, and the creation of a just and caring society through income distribution (Botswana 1999).

Conclusions and recommendations

Over a short-term period, most of the population of Botswana are 'stayers'. However, from a long-term perspective the population has been very migratory. About a third of Botswana have changed their place of residence since birth, compared to about 10 per cent over a twelve month period before the census.

The above analysis of migration demonstrates that rural-urban migration is but one form of the migration which underlies population redistribution in Botswana. The other components (urban-rural, rural-rural, and urban-urban) are equally important, defining the various niches in the space economy as conceptualised in Kerven's marginal minimisation model (Kerven 1983). Such issues have also been discussed for the African sub-continent by Adepoju (2005). Taking a broader view shows that these are part of larger-scale moves between the country's Planning Regions.

The United Nations periodically sends out questionnaires on population dynamics to member states. African countries have attempted to devise regional development strategies for managing and directing mobility, in order to achieve sustainable development. Botswana has consistently advocated for an even population distribution. Earlier studies on patterns of population redistribution in Africa have also underlined the need for regional equity (UNECA 1989, El-Shaks & Amirahmadi 1986).

Lifetime migration in Botswana is selective in terms of age, sex, education, training and economic activity. At the district level, areas which record above average net immigration are those which offer better economic and socio-economic opportunities. The elimination of disease-carrying vectors has encouraged growth in certain rural districts. Out-migration appears to be a common feature among remote districts with limited economic activities and also those whose economic base has been threatened – such as by the problems of the Botswana Meat Commission in Lobatse. Certain urban districts have experienced outmigration due to agglomeration diseconomies. Government-sponsored relocation has prompted above-average outmigration from the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve.

The country's Planning Regions have experienced differential migration rates. There are distinct regional growth imbalances due to population redistribution. The net transfer of population among the Planning Regions, on both short- and long-term perspectives, reinforces the urbanisation pattern in which the national population is gravitating to the South-eastern Region. These regional imbalances in population distribution are caused by inequities in the distribution of socio-economic opportunities over the space economy. This is both unsustainable and undesirable.

The centre of the *hardveld* lies in the Eastern Region, where the country's water and energy resources are concentrated.

Perhaps, in the long run, it might be desirable to reverse the negative net population flow from the Eastern Planning Region by creating an alternative growth pole in the *hardveld*. This would not only be easily accessible from the north and south of the country but would be closer to the main natural water and energy supply sources. It would further create better prospects for revitalising alternative employment opportunities in the heavily populated primary and secondary centres on the Serowe-Palapye-Malapye axis. This is in accord with proposals for creating and strengthening of alternative growth centres, and facilitating a more equitable distribution of employment opportunities in the country. This type of initiative has taken place in other developing countries such as Brazil, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania. Evidence from the 2001 census is that urbanisation of the Northern Planning Region has been increasing only gradually. The development of the natural resources of this region needs to be strongly supported in order to divert the population from moving to the congested regions.

Because of Botswana's vulnerability to drought, there needs to be support for irrigation, and remunerative non-farming activities such as cottage industries, fishing, and services such as community based eco-tourism should be promoted, to retain the rural population. The development of non-farming activities, such as *small and medium enterprises* and community-based eco-tourism will require the retention and provision of adequate support personnel, as well as capital and financial credit for low-income households. Physical and communication infrastructure will also be needed, to ensure access to markets. Adepoju and Farooq (1976) have discussed similar issues in the West African context and discussed ways in which they could be expedited.

Over-concentration of population in a small part of Botswana has been responsible for several environmental problems and created serious land-use conflicts. This is

contrary to goals of sustainable development as envisaged in the National Settlement Policy and the National Conservation Strategy. Decentralisation and devolution would ease these problems. It would also create more equitable employment opportunities – as intended by the National Population Policy and Vision 2016, and at the same time address the environmental concerns enunciated in the Millennium Development Goals.

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92. less/least developed countries

CHAPTER 10

The Evolution of Internal Migration in Uganda since the 1950s

James Ntozi, Abel Nzabona and Fredrick Tumwine

Introduction

Migration has been described as the movement of people in space, often involving a change in usual place of residence; internal migration is such a movement within national boundaries. As migration is a continual, often-repeated process rather than a single event, it is not easy to measure.

Migration is an important research area and needs to be considered both in its own right and to assert its importance alongside fertility and mortality as a component of population dynamics, especially in Africa. In Uganda, migration often intensifies population pressure on fragile ecosystems in destination areas where it increases population size.

The Government of Uganda, through relevant agencies, periodically collects and analyses migration data. The migration-defining area is often the district and much of migration analysis is done at district level. Consequently,

migration streams, patterns and rates are commonly presented at this level.

This chapter begins with a brief presentation of the methodology often used for migration analysis in Uganda. This is followed, in part 3, by a description of the origin and flow directions, dominant streams and migration patterns of internal migration in Uganda from the 1950s until 1970. Part 4 details these patterns from 1970 to 1991, and those since 1991 are covered in part 5. Part 5 also focuses on forced migration, specifically on internal displacements arising from human and natural disasters during the period after 1990. The effects of migration are then highlighted, and finally some policy recommendations are presented.

Data source and methodology

The main source of data for migration analysis in Uganda has been population census data. The questionnaire used during the four most recent censuses (1969, 1980, 1991 and 2002) included questions asking for the respondents' birth places. The question was to be answered by district of birth for those born in Uganda, and country of birth for those born outside Uganda. The data collected by this question was then tabulated at district level. The tabulation was done in two ways. The first uses three broad birthplace categories: those born within the district where the enumeration took place, those born elsewhere in Uganda, and, finally, those born outside Uganda. The second tabulation method was by sex, within district or country of birth. These tabulations provide a basis of direct measurement of migration. In addition, the results of the questionnaire give information on migration in the form of indirect indicators such as district population, age distribution and sex ratio. These indicators, however, only show the net effect of migration, rather than the direction of flows, and are of limited quantitative value, though they may act as a qualitative check for estimates based on other sources of data.

Internal migration in Uganda 1950s to 1970

Movements within and across the country have been documented in Uganda for several decades. The period 1950–1970 was associated with movements from one region to another across the country. The volume, direction of flows and migration patterns are examined below.

The 1969 districts of Uganda

The number of districts in Uganda has been increasing over the years. Whereas presently there are over 100 districts, the number was 17 at the time of the 1969 census. This soon increased by 1 to 18 when Sebei separated from Bugisu (see Table 1). These districts are named as origins and destinations of internal flows. The changes of district names may be puzzling to the reader, but an effort has been made to refer to old names, to help with understanding.

Birthplace categories by district: the 1969 African population

Table 1 shows birthplace categories by district in 1969. As would be expected, the largest population for each district was of persons born in that district. The number of persons born elsewhere in Uganda was, however, substantial for certain districts such as West Mengo (which includes Uganda's commercial and administrative capital, Kampala), East Mengo and Busoga. Busoga was particularly attractive to in-migrants as it contained Uganda's premier industrial town of Jinja.⁹³

93. This comparison is not on a percentage basis but with respect to absolute numbers. Busoga's number of persons born elsewhere in the country (123 063) was much bigger than that for either Mubende (79 278) or Bunyoro (89 794).

Table 1. Birthplace categories by district, 1969 African population

District	Born in district where	Born else elsewhere in Uganda	Born outside Uganda	Not stated	Total	% of total who were born else where in Uganda
West Mengo	453 998	226 809	122 066	733	803 606	28.2
East Mengo	522 721	189 753	134 335	180	846 989	22.4
Masaka	486 232	54 160	96 611	40	637 024	8.5
Mubende	204 044	79 278	46 611	65	329 998	24.0
Teso	542 872	19 159	3 833	39	565 903	3.0
Bugisu	433 679	30 466	15 872	77	565 903	5.4
Bukedi	497 679	15 665	10 955	425	480 094	3.3
Busoga	745 001	123 063	64 995	197	933 256	13.2
Karamoja	237 811	8 102	8 610	29 232 ⁹⁴	283 755	2.9
Kigezi	616 983	9 574	19 582	588	646 727	1.5
Ankole	724 309	98 359	36 410	31	859 109	11.4
Toro	435 320	73 138	59 424	–	567 882	12.9
Bunyoro	214 214	89 794	46 236	50	350 294	25.6
West Nile	527 387	8 965	35 687	254	572 293	1.6
Madi	75 891	5 354	8 573	18	89 836	6.0
Acholi	394 959	37 799	29 216	112	462 086	8.2
Lango	469 295	29 114	4 157	62	502 628	5.8
Total	7 582 395	1 000 291	743 173	32103	9 497 383	10.5

Source: Uganda 1976

94. This high figure has been checked from the 1969 census report. It is not surprising given that the Karamoja population was, and is still, largely illiterate.

Inter-district migration

The questionnaire question on birthplace was used to generate migration data. However, birthplace data is not ideal for research on migration flows since it shows only the total number of people resident in an area at a given time. These people were not necessarily born there, nor does the data give information about date of arrival, length of stay, previous migratory movements or intermediate steps between places of birth and current residence. Nonetheless, analysis of the 1969 census does give estimates of total net migration into or out of each district during the period prior to 1969. The data available are the birthplace data for 1969, and the tribal information⁹⁵ for 1959.

Table 1 shows that West Mengo, which at that time included Kampala, attracted the highest proportion of in-migrants relative to the district total (28%). This is followed by Bunyoro (26%), Mubende (24%), East Mengo (22%), Busoga (13%) and Toro (13%). These figures can probably be explained by considering that migration into these districts was largely for wage employment. Most of these migrants would have been motivated to move out of their districts towards the mentioned destinations in the expectation of advancing their socio-economic status. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s many people were attracted to East and West Mengo for paid employment in the sugar and tea plantations and the industries in these districts. In addition, Kampala and Entebbe were commercial and administrative capitals and thus had many employment opportunities in formal and informal sectors to attract rural residents.

Similarly, a large number of migrants moved to Bunyoro at that time because of the availability of free and fertile land,

95. Unlike in 1969, the 1959 census asked for 'Tribe', not birth place, of respondents.

where the governments of the day encouraged people from crowded districts to move to and develop sparsely- or moderately-settled areas. The attraction to Toro district can, in part, be attributed to the employment opportunities offered by Kilembe Copper Mines and the tea estates in the area, and the availability of virgin land for cultivation. Figure 1 summarises the broad migration flows.

Busoga district was a district of relatively heavy in-migration. This is because the district was home to the Madhvani-operated Kakira sugar estate and factory, which provided many employment opportunities. In addition, the district houses Jinja town, which was a centre of multiple small-to medium-scale primary, secondary and tertiary industries, including Nyanza Textiles Industries Limited (NYTIL), the largest of its kind in East Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. Owing to the existence of so many industries, Jinja was the undisputed industrial town of Uganda at the time and thus a hub of migrant attraction. Migrant labourers came to the area from various corners of the country, such as West Nile and Kigezi districts, and even from as far as Rwanda, Kenya and other contiguous countries.

Another feature of the migration of those born in Uganda is the expected interaction between adjacent districts, caused by minor, short-distance movement across district boundaries.

Differential migration by sex ratio, 1959 to 1969

An assumption usually made about migration is that it is age- and sex-selective. Figures from the 1969 census reveal that males aged 15 to 44 were more migratory than those from other age groups. In the Buganda districts of West Mengo, East Mengo, Masaka and Mubende, as well as Toro and Bunyoro, which were areas of heavy in-migration, the sex ratio was well above 100, indicating a surplus of males. This could be attributed to socio-economic conditions: migration into the

Buganda districts would have been due largely to wage employment which tended to have a greater bias towards males of working age. It is interesting to observe that although a sex ratio of over 100 is reported for Bunyoro district, this is less than those of the Buganda districts. This is partly attributable to whole families moving together in response to the need of acquiring land with intent to do agriculture and settle permanently (Uganda 1976).

Of the districts with low sex ratios (less than 100), Kigezi recorded the lowest (less than 70), followed by West Nile (just under 80), Ankole and Bukedi. These districts experienced an outflow of adult males who were probably moving to other districts in search of paid employment.

Trends in internal migration from 1970 to 1991

During the period from 1970 to 1990, several factors accounted for internal migration. Among these was the government resettlement policy, especially from Kigezi area in the south-western part of the country which had high population pressure. The opening up of new areas through the eradication of disease vectors such as the tsetse fly, would prompt the re-direction of population from this densely populated area towards the planned tsetse fly-free zones. This policy contributed to migration, mainly from Kigezi and Bugisu areas, to Ankole, Toro and Buganda districts.

Another factor of internal migration was civil unrest. In the Central Region, the early 1980s were characterised by civil war and insurgency against the second Obote government (1981–1985); in the Eastern Region against the Museveni Government (in the late 1980s), and in the Northern Region in the late 1980s and the whole of the 1990s. These events led to migration from war-affected districts, mainly to neighbouring districts and urban areas – followed by return migration when relative peace again prevailed.

The districts worst affected by civil unrest in the early 1980s were those belonging to what was termed the Luweero Triangle. This was an extremely insecure area, mainly in Central Uganda (Buganda), composed of several districts that included Luweero and Mpigi, Mubende and Kiboga, and Mukono. These districts were home to large numbers of people displaced from their usual places of residence. Some found shelter in churches and schools, others moved to relatively safe urban centres, while yet others crossed vast territories to live with their kinsmen in other parts of the country (Uganda 1976).


Economic considerations were another factor. Labour migration, especially from West Nile area, contributed to the outflow to plantations and industries in Jinja industrial zone for employment opportunities. In the 1991 census, close on 2.9 million people (nearly 18% of the population) were classified as internal migrants (MoFPED 1995). In terms of percentages, the in-migration rates ranged between about 2 per cent (Kabale) and 58 per cent (Kampala). In-migration rates of between 5 and 25 per cent were recorded by 25 of the 34 districts. Four of the six districts with rates above 25 per cent (Mubende 27.5, Mukono 27.6, Kalangala 40.0 and Kampala 57.5) are in the Central Region, showing high levels of in-migration to this region. Out-migration rates ranged between 4 and 36 per cent. There were 28 districts with out-migration rates between 5 and 25 per cent, and only one (Kotido) with a rate below 5 per cent. The relatively narrow range for out-migration rate, as compared with in-migration, implies that migration is determined more by pull factors in destination districts than by push factors in the districts of origin (MoFPED, 1995).

Figure 1 shows that, in absolute terms, Kampala, a primate city, was the biggest recipient of in-migrants, with nearly 435 000 internal migrants, which is just over 15 per cent of the

total. After 1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government embarked on rehabilitating Uganda's economy, Kampala developed into an industrial city, as well as being the commercial capital. This led to significant rural-urban migration. Busoga region was the second-largest recipient, with migration mainly to Iganga (nearly 196 000) and Jinja (over 130 000) – these streams attributed to the pull of the Kakira sugar factory and many other industries in Jinja district. The other major destinations districts were Mpigi and Mukono (both slightly less than 220 000), and Mbarara (almost 186 000) (MoFPED, 1995).

As far as out-migration was concerned, Kabale district had the largest number of out-migrants, amounting to well over 318 000, or 11 per cent of the total. This was followed by Mpigi district with over 208 000 – more than 7 per cent of total out-migrants (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Total in- and out-migrants by district, 1991



Source: MoFPED, 1995

As regards inter-district migration, figures show that there were five streams with over 50 000 people each. These were Bushenyi to Masaka (just under 75 000), Kabale to Mbarara (about 92 500), Kabale to Mbarara (somewhat less than 61 000), Mpigi to Mubende (almost 82 000) and Tororo to Mukono (well over 81 000) (MoFPED), 1995).

Volume of migration is affected by the distance that migrants have to travel from origin to destination. The shorter the distance, the easier for the migration to take place and the lower the risk. Out of 35 dominant out-migration streams by district, as many as 31 are to a neighbouring district and constitute 69 per cent of the total volume of the dominant out-migration streams. The equivalent number for major in-migration streams is 31, which is 84 per cent by volume of the in-migration. More than two-thirds of both in- and out-migration streams were thus to or from or neighbouring districts at that time.

Internal migration in Uganda since 1991

According to Uganda's 2002 Population and Housing Census, the Central Region had the biggest share (57 per cent) of the then recent internal in-migrations in the country, and the Northern Region had the least, with only 7 per cent. This is an expected pattern since the Central and Western Regions were the fastest-developing regions, and the Northern Region was engulfed by conflicts, as well as having too little development to attract migrants. More detail is given in Table 2, which also gives out-migration figures. The Western Region contributed the largest percentage (44%) of the total out-migration, with the Central Region, in strong contrast, contributing a mere 0.5 per cent. The largest out-migration, from Western Region, is mostly due to people who had been living on small plots of land in their original areas finding and moving to larger pieces of fertile agricultural land elsewhere in the country, and settling

there. The small out-migration from the Central Region is not surprising since this region is home to Uganda's capital city. As has been mentioned, Kampala is now also the centre of industrial activity – as well as of most of the country's socio-economic facilities – big shopping malls, schools, universities, good hospitals and suchlike. Such prosperity normally attracts in-migrants and there is little incentive to leave.

Table 2. Internal migrations by region, 2002

Region	Recent in-migration		Recent out-migration	
	Total	%	Total	%
Central	764 476	56.6	4 708	0.5
Eastern	209 377	15.5	308 545	35.8
Northern	99 638	7.4	166 985	19.4
Western	275 873	20.4	381 613	44.3
Total	1 349 564	100	861 851	100

Source: UBOS 2006

The period since 1991 has witnessed a continuation of internal movements arising from the usual economic factors but a new factor was the influence of government policy – as well as man-made and natural disasters. Kampala City has had the largest percentage of in-migration because of being completely urban, attracting migrants who hope to improve their livelihood by getting paid employment (UBOS 2006).


A direct result of government policy decision was the establishment of the second resettlement scheme at Bugangaizi. The Bugangaizi scheme in Kibaale district, established in 1992, consisted mainly of involuntary resettlement of the Bakiga evicted from Mpokya Forest in

Kabarole district, with each family being given five hectares of land. There have been other, voluntary, settlements outside the official settlement schemes, for example the heavy settlement of Bakiga in Igayaza and Kikwaya parishes in Bugangaizi County (UNFPA 2006).

In the period since 1990, internal migration within Uganda has also been influenced by both man-made and natural disasters, as is discussed in the next sub-section.

World-wide, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) receiving protection and assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was 12.8 million at the end of 2006 (UNHCR 2006). Uganda was one of the countries that contributed to this huge number of internally displaced persons. According to Figure 3, Uganda was one of the top three countries worldwide – and the highest in Africa – with an internally displaced population in excess of 1 million, which confirms that forced migration in the country has been a huge population issue in the last two decades.

Figure 3. Top five countries with a large IDP populations, end 2006



Source: UNHCR (2007)

Internal displacements from natural hazards and disasters

Natural hazards have affected and continue to affect countries and regions of the world. Uganda has had a fair share of the effects of natural hazards causing substantial migration effects in the country. Floods, hailstorms and landslides have led to significant internal displacements of people. We now focus on two of them as examples of natural disasters causing forced internal migration.

The 2007 El Niño rains, floods and internal displacements in Teso, Eastern Uganda

Uganda has been devastated by the El Niño climate phenomenon which periodically affects various parts of the world. The country experienced intense and prolonged rains in the recent past, especially between July and mid-September in 2007, which caused extensive flooding in the eastern part of the country. These heavy rains displaced whole populations from their home areas to other places that were relatively drier and safer, where they were temporarily relocated in makeshift camps.

Several districts in the Eastern Region were severely affected. In Soroti, Amuria, Katakwi, Bukedea, Kumi, Lira and Sironko, there was destruction of infrastructure and farmlands. It is estimated that approximately 80 per cent of the crops were submerged and several roads and bridges were washed away, and the government declared a state of emergency in the affected areas. Many agencies, including the Uganda Red Cross Society, responded to the crisis, stepping up humanitarian operations to save the lives of those in the most vulnerable flood-affected communities.

Mudslides and internal displacements in Bugisu, Eastern Uganda, March 2010

One of the deadliest landslides in the recent past occurred in early March 2010 on the slopes of Mount Elgon about 275 km

north-east of Kampala. The mudslide in the Bududa district is thought to have led to well over 100 deaths when homes, schools and whole villages were swallowed by fast-moving walls of mud and rocks. The mudslide, which was as high as ten metres in some places, buried a substantial number of structures.

This natural disaster caused the displacement of thousands of people from their usual areas of residence. By April 2010 an estimated 5000 people were believed to be internally displaced and re-located in relatively safer areas at Bulucheke. At the time of writing (late 2010), there is a suggestion from government to move about half a million people from their homes in mountainous areas of Uganda to safer areas because of the risk of future mudslides.

The circumstances that led to this natural event are several and inter-linked. One of them has a demographic dimension. Uganda's population growth rate of 3.2 per cent (UBOS 2006) is one of the highest in the world, demanding more cultivable and settlement land as well as an increase in the need for wood fuel. This has contributed to the deforestation of steep, precipitous and fragile mountain slopes; as more people settle on the mountains, more trees are felled to make way for agriculture and provide wood fuel, making mudslides and flooding more likely to occur.

Displacements from man-made disasters

The largest wave of displacement in Uganda occurred in 1995 and 1996, when the government forced civilians in northern Uganda into protected villages, to control the high rate of abductions and killings of civilians by the Lord's Resistance Army at the height of the insurgency. These protected villages later became IDP camps. At the same time, another insurgency group, the Allied Democratic Front, was operating in the western districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kabarole. By the

end of September 2000 it was estimated that there were nearly 640 000 people living as IDPs in Uganda. These included 2000 in Adjuman, 114 000 in Bundibugyo, 370 000 in Gulu, more than 11 000 in Kabarole, 20 000 in Kasese, 82 600 in Kitgum, 5000 in Masindi and 35 000 in Teso region (Lomo et al 2001).

After 2000, the population of internally displaced persons continued to increase, largely due to civil unrest in northern Uganda. By 2006, their number had risen to approximately 1.8 million (UNHCR 2006). However, since the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army in 2006, about two-thirds of the 1.8 million internally displaced persons who lived in camps at the height of the crisis have re-migrated towards their areas of origin.

Effects of migration

Currently, the resettlement of the Bakiga into the Kibaale districts of Buyaga and Bugangaizi account for just over 50 per cent of the population in the area, causing violent conflicts between the indigenous Banyoro and in-migrant Bakiga, also referred to as 'Bafuruki' (UNFPA 2006). There are three main reasons for the unrest. First, the migration of Bakiga into Kibaale has put pressure on these areas and the resulting deforestation has reduced opportunities for traditional and customary sources of livelihood such as hunting, and affected bio-diversity. Second, the in-migrants are now the majority group in these areas and are taking an upper hand in political governance, which is being violently resisted by the indigenous Banyoro. Third, the internal displacement of people has had a number of repercussions: when people are forced to flee, they lose their land, which is usually their only viable means of livelihood, and their social networks are destroyed. Their dependency on the ecosystem is hampered

also because they find themselves in different environmental conditions (UNFPA, 2008).

In addition, from 1986 to 2006 when the war ended, districts in Northern and North-Eastern Uganda have had to grapple with the effects of gender-based violence as people were moving from their homes to IDP camps for safety, which caused untold suffering, including serious effects on the sexual and reproductive health of the population, including through sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDS (UNFPA 2006).

Linkages between climate change, conflict and migration are more evident in the 'cattle corridor'⁹⁶ and the Karamoja region in particular. The persistent droughts, driven climate change, cause scarcity of water and pasture, forcing the Karamajong cattle herders to move long distances into neighbouring districts of Teso, Acholi and Sebei – which in turn increases the potential for conflict (UNFPA 2009).

Lastly, the resettlement of displaced people is a strain on the government's scarce resources which could otherwise be utilised in developmental activities. For example, resettling between 500 000 and one million people from mountainous areas of the Eastern Region would cost about UG Shs1 trillion (approximately US\$440 million), which is about 14 per cent of the national budget (Haywood 2010).

Conclusion

Uganda does not have a migration and resettlement policy. There is a need to develop such a policy, to address the increasing number of migrants and to explore the root causes of migration. Second, there is need for government to sensitise migrant and indigenous ethnic groups so that they can learn

96. This area ranges from the south-western areas of Ntungamo, Mbarara, Sembabule and Rakai Districts through the mid-central Districts of Soroti, Kumi and Nakasongola, to the north-east, in the Karamoja region.

to live together and reduce the potential for ethnic violence that could lead to genocide. Third, populations in overcrowded areas should be assisted in adopting family planning in order to reduce population pressure and thus halt out-migrating. Furthermore, the government of Uganda needs to set aside money to buy land for resettling internally displaced people fleeing from natural calamities such as landslides, drought, earthquakes and floods.

In addition, the precise extent of the phenomenon of internal displacements in Uganda has not been professionally and competently quantified. The current situation of relying on line ministries, civil society organisations and the media for information on internal displacements can no longer be tenable. There is, therefore, a need for government and development partners to mobilise funds for conducting internal migration studies. The time is opportune for migration professionals to undertake research on internally displaced persons and to collect relevant disaggregated empirical data for use in development planning.

Finally, implementation of Uganda's population policy should embrace and assemble relevant migration data. Such action would translate into improved ability to accurately measure migration and its overall effect on national development in future.

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CHAPTER 11

Problems and Opportunities of Displacement for Policy Action: Lessons from the 2007 Post-Election Violence and Refugee Camps in Kenya

Elias H.O. Ayiemba

Introduction

From a global perspective, internally displaced persons (IDPs), like refugees, have been variously perceived and labelled as; 'problem categories, vulnerable groups, beneficiaries, or target groups' (Hampton 1998). Such perceptions, attributed to policy-makers and international and local aid agencies, portray displaced persons as 'needing resources, technical assistance' and different kinds of aid. These 'angels of hope', however, have also presented the plight of internally displaced persons and refugees as series of linked unfortunate events that cannot be solved without policy-based programmes (Hampton 1998). Such stereotypical perceptions have neglected to examine the ample opportunities that displacements provide for the sustainable development of the livelihoods of internally displaced persons and refugees.

The 1998 *Guiding Principles on IDPs* of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) defines internally displaced persons as:

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (IDMC 1998)

A refugee experiences similar conditions, except that, in the case of a refugee, the person crosses an international border to seek refuge in another country. According to several international conventions and protocols, a registered refugee is under the care and protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and should live in a designated camp in the asylum country. This is a privilege which excludes internally displaced persons.

This chapter briefly examines those historical factors of colonial administration which are probably the major root causes of ethnic conflicts in Kenya (Oucho 2002), and the concomitant consequences of population displacement in the country. Environmental factors, mostly environmental hazards, are highlighted, as well as issues related to poor governance. The analysis further exposes the needs of internally displaced persons and refugees, placing emphasis on food, health and shelter – among others – before examining details of the livelihoods of encamped displaced persons. Coping strategies are broadly discussed, as both positive and negative, embracing a range of factors such as family identity, social networks, self-help structures, environmental degradation, prostitution and the manipulation of international aid. The

chapter ends with a description of post-conflict rehabilitation initiatives by displaced persons, as well as activities launched by the Government of Kenya and other local and international agencies. It concludes with a discussion of the opportunities and challenges of displacement in the context of social and economic opportunities, especially for women.

Genesis and persistence of conflicts in Kenya

Kenya has had a modest share of the increasing population of internally displaced persons and refugees within the African continent. The global rise in the internally displaced person population, and the magnitude of their humanitarian problems resulted in the issuing of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* by the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDMC 1998). These principles were based on existing humanitarian law and human rights instruments (Kamungi 2001), and their major objective was to standardise the manner in which governments, international and local aid agencies, as well as the private sector and individuals, provide assistance and protection to the traumatised and marginalised displaced population.

Background issues to ethnic conflict

Political hazards

Kenya is a relatively young African state, and in December 2010 the country celebrated forty-seven years since independence in 1963. Like many other African states, the country has had a history of relatively poor political governance. Kamungi (2001) reports that a culture of authoritarianism and oppression dominated the transition from the single-party era of governance (de facto 1969–1981 and de jure 1982–1991). To illustrate: in 1969, the assassination of Tom Mboya, an illustrious politician with wide political

backing in the country, nearly plunged Kenya into civil war. The political oppression and dictatorship that followed led to the unsuccessful military coup of 1982, and increased political dissidence against one party system of governance. Prior to the reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1992, election violence was common in most parts of the country. The troubles were, however, localised and had limited effects, as conflicts erupted between supporters of different candidates, as the protagonists competed for power and influence in the one-party system. Consequently, the population of internally displaced persons during this period was negligible. Kamungi (2001) further illustrates this view by stating that, in the single party system, communities lived together harmoniously, notwithstanding latent disputes about land, cattle and natural resources, as well as being influenced by cultural and political differences. The government usually mediated when these disputes escalated.

The return to political pluralism, with the support of the international community, was a turning point because the violence took on a different dimension. As a political tool it became more vicious and assumed a different label, being referred to as 'ethnic cleansing', or simplified to 'land clashes'. Such conflicts erupted in many parts of the country during elections and greater impacts on displacements were experienced, mostly in multi-ethnic regions such as Rift Valley, Coast and Western provinces (Kamungi 2001). It should, however, be emphasised that electoral violence was not new, neither was it restricted to the multi-party era. Increasing concern over election violence has, however, been caused by the intensity and magnitude of the violence that characterised the general elections of 1992 and 1997, and – the worst of all – the post-election violence of December 2007 and January 2008. Multi-ethnic communities that had lived peacefully in different regions were suddenly at war with one another, causing the

massive displacement of about 600 000 people. More than 350 000 were rendered homeless in the violence that also resulted in the death of at least 1300 people ('Post-election violence', *Daily Nation*, 3 June 2010).

The internally-displaced persons were, therefore, forced to seek alternative land where they could construct temporary shelters. Here they endured difficult living conditions, forcing the government, through the Ministry for Special Programmes, to intervene. The Ministry then initiated a resettlement programme in May 2008, designated 'Operation Rudi Nyumbani', which is translated as 'Operation Return Home'.


Natural hazards

Elements of eco-stress, commonly manifested in the form of environmental hazards such as floods, droughts and disease epidemics, have also been a major cause of internal displacements. Many countries in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions have experienced prolonged armed conflicts together with severe droughts and famine, causing massive population displacements and humanitarian crises (Jacobsen 2002; UNHCR 2005b; Lind & Sturman 2002). In 2008, there were about 2.8 million refugees and internally displaced persons in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region (UNHCR 2008).

Kenya, which has remained an island of peace in the region, continues to shoulder the greatest burden and the consequences of population displacements, both from neighbouring politically unstable countries and from within. As a result, the Government of Kenya established sixteen camps to host the thousands of war-displaced refugees (Ayiemba & Oucho 1995). The continued influx of refugees has besieged the country, with the Somali refugee crisis clearly having been the centre of this situation since 1991. The majority of these refugees have become trapped in what is now referred to as 'protracted refugee situations', which end up in a situation

of dependency, poverty and marginalisation (UNHCR 2009a). Most of the refugee camps were eventually closed down and the majority of refugees relocated to consolidated camps in Dadaab division (in Lagdera district close to the Somalia border) and the Kakuma camps (in Turkana district bordering southern Sudan) – see Figure 1 for a percentage breakdown (Ayiemba 2009).

Figure 1. Refugee arrivals in Nairobi, Kakuma and Dadaab, March 2009



Source: UNHCR 2009b, Fact Sheet, March

Kenya's arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) make up more than 80 per cent of the country's land area, support nearly half of the livestock population of the country, and are home to over 30 per cent of the human population. The ASALs are prone to harsh climatic conditions, rendering the communities within this region vulnerable to natural hazards, mainly droughts. Due to their fragile ecosystems, unfavourable climate, poor infrastructure and historical marginalisation, the ASALs represent a major development challenge for the Government of Kenya and its development partners, and for the affected population.

Drought is the most prevalent natural hazard in Kenya, affecting mainly the Eastern, and North-Eastern Provinces, and parts of Rift Valley and Coast Provinces. Floods seasonally affect various parts of the country, especially along the flood plains in the Lake Victoria basin and along the Tana River basin. Landslides occur during the long rainy season from March to May, and Murang'a District in Central Province and areas surrounding the Mount Kenya region have been affected several times.

A brief literature survey

A scrutiny of the literature reveals that numerous published and unpublished works exist on this topic, but only a few of these – those critical and relevant to the understanding of the situation in the African continent – are examined here. Adepoju's article, *The Refugee Situation in the Horn of Africa and Sudan* – a situation which he rightly calls a 'human tragedy', is a masterpiece on African refugee circumstances (Adepoju 1982a). In another article, *The Dimensions of the Refugee Problem in Africa* (Adepoju 1982b), he expresses similar views. In the early 1980s the African continent had over 5 million refugees, who constituted over 40 per cent of the total world refugee population. Adepoju examines the plight of refugees in the continent's hot spots that continue to generate and to absorb large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons. These regions extend beyond the borders of the countries in the Horn of Africa and Sudan, and incorporate southern, central and western African countries.

Adepoju also examines the many possible causes of refugee movements, prioritising them as environmental hazards (drought, internal strife and war triggered by boundary disputes), conflict over access to, use of and control of natural resources, and poor governance. He also considers the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of

refugees from the hot spots of African continent. Adepoju observes that refugees often seek asylum in equally poor countries, thus causing what he calls 'the crushing burden' (Adepoju 1982b: 31) for the poor economies of asylum countries such as Somalia, Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda. In the 1980s, children aged below fifteen years constituted over 60 per cent of the total refugee population, and 30 per cent were adult women. It is my opinion that this demographic structure prevails today among refugee population.

The distressing plight of refugee children is well-documented in the UNHCR 1979 publication *The Refugee Child*. This article summarises the deplorable situation of refugee children, who are traumatised both physically and psychologically due to constant abuses. Thirty years later the situation is no better.

The grim picture of the African refugee situation, graphically portrayed by Adepoju (1982b), has attracted the support of UNHCR and other international and local aid agencies who provide rehabilitation services and assist in refugees' return to their home countries. These interventions have however yielded mixed results – depending on the political and economic stability of the home country. (This paper of Adepoju's does not examine in detail survival strategies of displaced people.) Otinda's (1990) article, *Africa's Refugee Situation: demographic and socio-economic implications in sub-Saharan Africa*, gives an impressive statistical information on the magnitude and distribution of refugees in Africa in the 1980s. It also portrays the plight of Africa's refugees and discusses the implications of the refugees' burden for the asylum country and home country. Ouch's (2002) *Undercurrents of Ethnic Conflict in Kenya*, is an excellent scholarly exposé of the determinants of the movements of refugees and internally displaced persons in sub-Saharan Africa using Kenya as a case study. It corroborates most of the issues raised by

Adepoju (1982a). Oucho reiterates that in Africa conflicts persist with no end currently in sight. However, he warns that it is risky to generalise the situation on such a large and diverse continent. This scholarly piece of work has three major parts. Part One examines evidence and conceptual issues regarding African ethnic conflict, giving detailed historical, social and demographic factors as evident in patterns of conflict in Kenya. Part Two focuses on the nature and magnitude of ethnic conflicts in Kenya, and considers both internal and external causes. The final section examines the consequences of ethnic conflicts and puts forward some possible solutions. The publication does not place much emphasis on the potential contribution of displaced persons in the development process. Oucho's conclusion is that ethnic conflict will recur unless lasting solutions can be found.

Lind and Sturman have edited a scholarly book entitled *Scarcity and Surfeit: the Ecology of Africa's Conflicts* (Lind & Sturman 2002). The book is a historical treatise on colonial and post-colonial political economy and uses empirical data to explain the origin and consequences of ethnic conflicts in the Great Lakes region, and selected neighbouring countries. Its emphasis is on Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The thrust of their argument is that poor governance (political maladministration) is the root cause of conflicts in these countries, and that politics is used to control access to natural resources and services, as well as controlling their use and distribution, resulting in great inequalities in the socio-economic development of different population sub-groups within the same country. Massive poverty and inequalities affecting the political underdogs, who are mostly rural farmers, or ethnic groups who are less privileged, cause bad blood between these relatively powerless people and the political elites or privileged ethnic groups – who have access to social services, control over the

production and marketing of natural resources, especially agricultural products. Such glaring disparities lead to political agitation and ultimately to civil war.

In his book, *Internally Displaced People: a global survey*, Hampton (1998) highlights most of the issues raised by Adepoju and Ouchou, detailing causes of displacement in global hot spots, including those of sub-Saharan Africa. His analysis exposes the limitations of aid provided to refugees and internally displaced persons by national and international aid agencies. This exposé summarises the rights of displaced persons within the framework of international conventions and the institutional arrangements put in place for providing humanitarian assistance to displaced people. Unlike most publications on displacement, this book examines the problems and opportunities of displacement using case studies from different regions and cultural background in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Latin America. The challenges faced by displacement are well articulated, with particular attention, based on regional profiles, being paid to the needs of children and women.

Needs of camp-settled internally displaced people and other refugees

Figure 1 gives a general picture of the distribution of refugee population in Kenya. The refugee population is dynamic and changes from time to time, depending on a multiplicity of factors. It is also evident that substantial numbers of people are not encamped and that the majority are from the republics of Sudan and Somalia as portrayed in Table 1.

Table 1. Refugee locations, March 2009

Country of origin	Dadaab	% of total	Kakuma	% of total	Nairobi	% of total	Total	% of total
Somalia	244 580	95.7	19 431	38.5	14 580	42.3	278 591	81.8
DRC	58	0.0	93	0.2	2 015	5.9	2 166	0.6
Sudan	640	0.3	24 986	49.5	2 139	6.2	27 765	8.2
Ethiopia	10 273	4.0	4 865	9.6	9 489	27.6	24 627	7.2
Rwanda	18	0.0	356	0.7	2 148	6.2	2 522	0.7
Uganda	75	0.0	404	0.8	2 313	6.7	2 792	0.8
Eritrea	82	0.0	74	0.1	675	2.0	831	0.2
Burundi	14	0.0	284	0.6	1 075	3.1	1 373	0.4
Other	8	0.0	8	0.0	2	0.0	13	0.0
Total	255 748	100.0	50 501	100.0	34 436	100.0	340 680	100.0*

* Rounded figures can create approximate percentage totals.

Source: UNHCR Fact Sheet, March 2009b

Food, health, and housing needs

People's survival depends on adequate food supply and the maintenance of sufficient nutritional status. During conflicts, maintaining an adequate food supply becomes a serious challenge. People's short-term nutritional status, health and future survival and well-being are determined by food security. In refugee camps, and in some IDP camps in Kenya – as in other parts of the world – people are completely dependent on humanitarian assistance and food aid. The humanitarian situations in Kakuma and Dadaab Refugees camps are well documented (HRW 2008). The camps are continually faced with a serious nutritional situation. In 2008, acute malnutrition stood at 13 per cent and therapeutic feeding activities were threatened with funding constraints (HRW 2008). The most affected group was children under the age of five. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2008 reports that, according to the World Food Programme (WFP), all registered refugees should receive a minimum of 2100 kcal of food per day. The situation is aggravated by refugees selling their rations to purchase shelter, as well as essential non-food items such as wood (for fuel and shelter) and basic household items. In addition, refugees share everything they have, including food, with new arrivals who are not yet registered.

Similarly, camps set up for internally displaced persons after post-election violence had a majority of people completely dependent on humanitarian assistance and food aid. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (UNGPID) stipulates that governments should, at the minimum, and without discrimination, provide internally displaced people with safe access to essential food and potable water. However, in most IDP camps, the food is inadequate. Food items are distributed in an unequal manner, causing many internally displaced persons, especially women and children, to seek alternative means of survival. This could

explain the rise of reported incidents of women, including single mothers, forced into 'transactional sex' to get food – as reported by the Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW 2008). Food shortage has also led to cases of sexual violence in IDP camps.

Large influxes of refugees crossing a border unexpectedly and sudden mass movements of the population of internally displaced persons cause camps to be established without adequate pre-planning. Such hastily-constructed facilities often create problems of overcrowding, poor sanitation, and the spread of contagious diseases such as cholera and typhoid. Other health problems prevalent in such camps include skin infections, sexually transmitted diseases, psychological illnesses associated with trauma, and injuries due to violence (which may have been inflicted prior to entering camp, or while in the camp). Women, children, and the aged, in particular, frequently suffer from the effects of malnutrition. Shikanga et al. (2008) reported that a cholera outbreak with an unusually high mortality rate occurred in western Kenya during the civil unrest after the disputed presidential elections in December 2007.

Displacement therefore exposes internally displaced persons and refugees to new hazards and accrued vulnerability. These dynamics result in greater risk of illness and death. Often, access of internally displaced persons to health care and humanitarian assistance is deliberately jeopardised by conflicting parties. Furthermore, the arrival of internally displaced persons can strain local health systems and the host population ends up sharing the sufferings of the internally displaced. Health care services easily become compromised in such situations. To illustrate: during the post-election violence of 2007/2008, an increase in the incidence of water-borne diseases and respiratory infection was noted in most IDP camps in Kenya (IDMC 2008). In other cases, dramatic increases were documented in the mortality rate for children

under five years and in maternal mortality. Polio eradication and malaria control also face daunting challenges in countries undergoing complex emergencies caused by displacement. In addition, HIV/AIDS is of paramount health concern in such situations.

Displaced people are often faced with a massive shortage of adequate shelter, with most of them living in tiny makeshift shelters built from branches and plastic sheeting. The Norwegian Refugee Council reports that, by the end of 2007, Dadaab's more than 170 000 refugees lacked some 25 000 shelters (see HRW 2008). The destruction of thousands of houses in the Kenyan 2008 post-election violence and the massive displacement of population have increased the number of people who cannot enjoy their right to adequate housing. The conditions at IDP camps are deplorable, and the poor shelter and living conditions affect the daily life and health of the displaced persons (IDCM 2008). Most internally displaced persons are subject to wretched living conditions, enduring crowded accommodation as well as often being exposed to harsh weather. Poor housing is a feature of all IDP camps; at some camps, internally displaced persons' tents are torn and leaking. Some internally displaced people are living in classrooms as they have no tents, and some are forced to sleep on the floor without blankets or mattresses. Others are hosted by relatives and friends in crowded tents of up to twelve people (IDCM 2008).

Adequate shelter is needed to protect people against harsh weather elements. It enables people to live in a dignified manner and reduces exposure to communicable diseases. It should be emphasised that the concept of adequacy is relative depending on environmental conditions. The UNGPID states that all internally displaced persons have a right to an adequate standard of living. The state is obligated to provide internally displaced persons with safe access to basic shelter, regardless

of circumstances and without discrimination. Similarly, Article 5 (5) of the 2009 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (IC-GLR) Protocol places on government the responsibility for the provision of adequate and habitable sites.

Water and sanitation

Despite access to water and sanitation being a basic human right, majority of refugees and IDP camps are located in arid and semi-arid areas of the country. Water inadequacy is therefore evident in most IDP camps. Access to and distance from water collection points is also important as it affects the time and the amount of energy spent on this task.

Data on the availability on latrines is unfortunately only anecdotal (HRW 2008). However, the Oxfam assessment mentioned in this HRW article shows that, at that time, about 6000 refugees had no access whatsoever to latrines. At least 20 per cent of the camp residents (50 000 refugees) had access that did not conform to international aid standards, and there was not enough data available to conclude whether the remaining 80 per cent had adequate access or not (HRW 2008). Women and children, who make up the majority of camp populations, very rarely have access to latrines. For the women, this is because the sanitation facilities are not segregated, which is unacceptable to women in some cultures – for example to Somali women. Children cannot compete with men because of the overcrowding. Generally, latrines are poorly maintained and dirty, and refugees do not have either soap or latrine-cleaning materials. Thus, minimum standards of access, design and use of toilets for the disposal of excreta are not being met, creating a public health problem.

Psycho-social needs

The extreme danger and struggle faced by internally displaced persons and refugees – in their home communities, during

their journeys and in the camps – leaves many of them psychologically traumatised. Most of the internally displaced persons in Kenya were traumatised as a result of the post-election violence in December 2007. Many were attacked and threatened; some were severely injured. Houses were burnt and properties looted. As a result, they had to flee their homes and were forced to hide for days before they could reach a safer place. Some families were scattered during the turmoil and some children lost their parents, brothers and sisters. Young people had to interrupt their education or their ongoing projects. Many lost all their documents making it difficult for them to apply for jobs or further education.

One consequence of this trauma is fear. There is a fear of returning home, and many internally displaced persons are also frightened of leaving the camps or sites because of this perceived danger. Another consequence can be resignation and total passivity because hope has been lost. A third consequence is hatred and violence.

Many women were traumatised because of sexual violence and rape related to the conflict (Lubbock 1994). Sexual violence is used as a tool to terrorise families and individuals and precipitate their expulsion from the communities in which they live. Some women expressed reluctance to report threats or incidents of sexual violence to police because of a lack of confidence in the ability of police to protect them. Even the camp management and administration processes on which they depend for safety and security may be at the core of sexual abuse. Some reports suggest that sexual exploitation ‘rings’ are being organised by profiteering men, both within the camps and from the host communities.

Livelihood and coping strategies

Jacobsen (2002) uses the term ‘livelihoods’ to refer to the means used to maintain and sustain life. ‘Means’, here, connotes the

resources (including household assets and capital, social institutions and networks: kin, village, authority structures), and strategies available to people through their local and transnational communities. Sustaining the livelihoods of displaced persons embraces a variety of strategies. People must consider the resources that are available to them, develop strategies to mobilise and access these resources, and define their goals and priorities. Jacobsen (2002) notes that the immediate livelihood goals of refugees and internally displaced persons as including physical safety from violence, or threat of violence, or intimidation; reducing economic vulnerability and food insecurity; finding a place to settle, and locating lost family members.

Many displaced people, especially refugees, have their access to the local labour market and freedom of movement restricted, and most camp refugees depend on the distribution of food rations and other goods as their main means of survival. Some do, however, struggle to find alternative livelihood strategies. These range from subsistence farming, to trade, production and services, as well as through doing 'incentive work' for aid agencies and receiving remittances from family members abroad, but many have nevertheless been pushed into an array of negative coping strategies.

Agriculture has been cited as one of the means through which refugees earn a living (Jacobsen 2002). Due to the insecurity caused by mass unemployment in camps, the owners of land surrounding the camps are forced to abandon their agricultural activities. This arable land thus becomes available for the refugees to cultivate. Jacobsen stresses that in some cases this has resulted in conflict between the refugees and the host communities. Host communities tend to be unwilling to allow refugees to use those resources, and host governments are likely to restrict refugees' freedom of movement and settlement. The situation is further complicated when refugees turn out to be more productive farmers than

the local people, able to put the land to better use, and profiting from their labour. Even without access to traditional farm land, refugees sometimes manage to produce crops for sale within camps or even on local markets, as well as for their own consumption. For example, in Kakuma camp, people use the few open spaces between shelters or the verges of the main roads, and even the compounds of the public facilities in the camp, to grow crops such as green vegetables and tomatoes (Jones 2002a). In countries such as Belize, Uganda and Tanzania, the government has developed policies that allow the settlement of refugees in agricultural land, using the refugees as a source of labour for the production of farm produce (Jacobsen 2005).

Refugees also engage in livestock activities, especially if their lives had been traditionally centred on animal herding. Cattle are the backbone of pastoralists' community livelihoods in the Horn of Africa; they form part of the people's culture and identity. During displacements, the loss of cattle is devastating. Restocking cattle is often a first priority, but keeping livestock while living as refugees is a very difficult task. Refugees struggle with locals over access to water and rangeland, and cattle can seldom be kept in refugee camps. Nevertheless many refugees develop strategies to keep livestock, striking deals with locals, hiring out children to do cattle herding, and so forth. According to Jones (2002b), livestock are the main wealth source for many Somali refugees in Kenya, even though they are not formally entitled to keep animals. Reports by Crisp (2002) indicated that in the Dadaab camp complex there were about 30000 goats and sheep, 9000 cows, 3500 donkeys and 500 camels. Some of these livestock are sold to supplement income which may be used to support other development projects back home in Somalia

Employment with humanitarian agencies, or incentive work where formal employment is not allowed, can provide

an opportunity for refugees to earn a regular income. Positions commonly occupied by refugees are as teachers, nurses, community workers, office staff, cleaners, cooks and gardeners.

Another source of livelihood for refugees is humanitarian assistance, which comes in two forms. First, formal livelihood support programmes such as income-generating activities directly implemented by aid agencies in camps and official settlements in the host community itself. The provision of economic inputs and training for livelihood activities – agriculture, service provision (such as food vending or charcoal making), trade, and so on – enables refugees to some form of self-sufficiency. For example, a refugee micro-credit programme led to a successful soap-manufacturing venture in Kakuma camp, on Kenya's Sudan border. A group of five refugees formed a soap-manufacturing business. But they soon realised their soap products had a limited market in the camp as there was a general UNHCR soap distribution to all refugees in the camp every month. In order to sustain the business, they approached an NGO, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), for support through its micro-credit programme. This helped them increase output and improve the quality of the soap which soon met the requirements of the Kenya Bureau of Standards. The UNHCR then began to buy this soap for the general monthly distribution in the camp – instead of transporting other soap from Nairobi. The original five then began training other interested refugees and locals, and were soon employing over forty men and women in production, training and management. The IRC helps them in preparing financial reports and in general bookkeeping, and the UNHCR supports their logistics in terms of transporting chemicals from Nairobi and carrying the (well packaged) soap to distribution centres free of charge. Personnel monitoring ensures that the employees are not exploited in terms of working hours and wages. The UNHCR has benefited too, as it was able to reduce

transportation costs of over thirty tons of soap every month from Nairobi to Kakuma Camp (Arafat 2000).

Second, refugees' livelihoods are supported by humanitarian assistance through indirect economic stimuli to the economy of the refugee hosting areas (RHAs). Relief agencies create new economic inputs, with resulting demands, that spread beyond the camps, creating livelihood opportunities for both locals and refugees. New demands include the need for services such as trucking and delivery and construction, as well as administration and translating. New inputs take the form of relief commodities that are traded throughout the RHA, often creating entire new regional economies. For example, the trading of food aid and merchandise from refugee camps within RHAs and across borders has evolved into a complex and multifaceted system, supporting the livelihoods of different social groups, including unaccompanied youths. It is common for some parts of UNHCR/WFP food packages to be bartered in exchange for missing or desired items of food available locally in the host community. On food distribution days in Kakuma camp, owners of retail food shops stock rations to sell or exchange later if the WFP 'food pipeline' breaks down. Both refugees and locals are also employed to buy food at distribution centres. When food stores in the camp become large enough, and, depending on market demand for particular foods, business extends outside the camp, where the food entrepreneurs engage with both Kenyan security and self-proclaimed middlemen to negotiate access to markets in nearby and even distant towns. (Arafat 2000).

Remittances and social networks can also provide important livelihood avenues. For instance, estimates from Dadaab camps suggested that at least ten to fifteen per cent of the population benefited directly from remittances received from the Somali diaspora (Horst 2006). The UNHCR (2007a)

explains that social networking – inside the camps, within host countries, in the countries of origin, or even in third countries – increases information flows, enables trade and relocation, and provides support when required. Although some people never receive remittances, many refugees receive money from time to time from relatives overseas. This assistance commonly comes from husbands, siblings and adult children, although other relatives also remit. The relatives, friends and business partners who send remittances live mainly in Europe and North America, though they may also be in the Middle East, South Africa and elsewhere. Remittance patterns vary; some recipients get a set sum of money on a regular, usually monthly, basis, while others receive variable amounts on an ad hoc basis (Jacobson 2002).

A strategy adopted by some displaced persons, involving either entire households or specific members of households, is to leave the camp and look for opportunities elsewhere – even when this is considered illegal. Despite the Kenyan government's attempts to contain refugees in remote regions, many of them end up in Nairobi and other towns or cities. A minority of Somalis arriving in the 1990s had the means to set up home in Nairobi or Mombasa, or stay with relatives, and never declared themselves to UNHCR (Farah 1996). Most of these people now live in Nairobi's Eastleigh residential area, located far to the east of the central business district. Lindley (2007) gives a list of activities that businessmen, including incoming refugees, are involved in: investing in import and export businesses, retail outlets (from small-scale hawking and street stalls to large shopping malls), property letting and real estate development, taxis and long-distance transport, as well as pharmacies, hotels, lodges, *miraa*⁹⁷ (also known as *khat* or *qaad*) outlets, cafés and restaurants, phone and internet

97. A flowering plant whose leaves are chewed as a mild stimulant, especially in the Horn of Africa.

bureaux, and international money transfer and exchange services.

Negative coping strategies

Negative coping strategies are often applied when no other available alternatives can provide structural relief, or when households or individuals are faced with immediate crisis situations. These strategies include selling vital assets such as domestic items, clothes and blankets or part of the food rations, reducing food intake, or negotiating loans that cannot be repaid.

Environmental depletion

It is widely recognised that civil strife, the internal displacement of people and economic disruptions are one of the main causes of environmental degradation. There is ample evidence that where there is high-intensity conflict and large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, environmental pressures arise making the problem much more serious. Where conflict escalates, normal economic activities take strain, and social services cease. When people are fleeing conflict, they do not have access to their normal means of livelihood and often do not get the nutrition they need. In many IDP and refugee settings, the primary cooking system used is 'an open fire surrounded by three stones on which cooking materials rest. This method is simple, but very inefficient in terms of energy loss, the result, in some instances, has been an excessively high consumption of firewood, with consequent environmental damage' (UNHCR 2002b).

Finding themselves in a situation where they have no access to land, refugees may resort to unsustainable or illegal agricultural practices in order to meet their food needs. Such habits include non-selective tree-felling and indiscriminate land clearance, as well as shifting cultivation without a

sustainable rotation strategy. In both Kakuma and Dadaab camps, wood fuel (firewood) is supplied to refugees in the amount of 10 kilograms per person per month – which is never enough (UNHCR 2002b). Many families therefore supplement the official supply by buying extra firewood or charcoal from local people. Some refugees have taken on the role of middlemen, either to buy from locals or, in the case of Dadaab, to harvest firewood themselves. It is widely acknowledged that the impact of refugees on the host environment can be severe; their primary concern is their own immediate safety and welfare, and not the protection of the environment and natural resources. In a matter of weeks, tens of thousands of people are grouped in crowded refugee camps often situated in barren and treeless areas, where firewood is scarce and expensive.

Manipulation of international aid

The manipulation of international aid becomes the only solution for refugees when there are few other options in sight. The sale of food rations is a coping strategy that many refugees have admitted to using at one point or another. When asked to explain why they would sell their food items in the local markets, the explanations all gave amounted to the need for cash to purchase non-food items that had not been included in the assistance package – for example personal hygiene materials, or food of personal taste and, sometimes, cigarettes and alcohol.

Power relations in the camps

During conflict, flight and displacement, women and children are at a heightened risk. They are more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Women and girls are often the systematic target of sexual violence, have special health needs that are often neglected, and lack the protection formerly afforded by their families and communities. Children may be separated from those who care for them and put at risk of

sexual abuse, exploitation and even recruitment into armed forces. Their entire childhoods may be disrupted, with little access to education and few opportunities as they grow older to take on the usual roles and responsibilities of adulthood. While these issues affect all refugees, research shows that internally displaced women and children usually face even worse problems.

Life in displaced situations often brings about changes in gender roles. Women are usually the sole caretakers of children, the sick and the elderly, but they also frequently have to assume additional tasks and roles traditionally allocated to men, including physical labour, heading the household and providing food and protection for their families. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHRC 2009) points out that massive displacement following the post-election violence of 2007 in Kenya affected many children and women. Many female-headed households were further burdened with taking care of abandoned or orphaned children from other families. Children were also affected, with their rights to food security, education and protection from sexual and gender-based violence being violated.

Women and young girls seeking sanctuary in IDP settlements and refugees camps face greater risks of sexual violence than those on the outside. The women fear sexual violence because of makeshift sleeping arrangements on the sites, where men and women (not of the same family) are forced to sleep together under one tent or out in the open. Also fuelling the violence is the lack of regulation in the camps, which allows men from outside to enter unchecked by camp officials. There is also fear of sexual victimisation linked to camp design and services, including lighting, water and sanitation facilities, and the availability of firewood (KNHRC 2009).

Throughout any emergency, refugees are particularly vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This

is the case, not only in the most chaotic initial phase of disruption and movement, but also in later stages of stabilisation, as well as in protracted refugee situations – to the extent that it is among the most prevalent of the protection issues within refugee camps. Cases of sexual assault in IDP camps are on the rise in Kenya, but collecting comprehensive and reliable statistical data on sexual and gender-based violence is challenging, because of cultural taboos and for security reasons (UNHCR 2007c).

Other gender and GBV concerns of internally displaced persons and refugees continue to surface in the camps. Domestic violence has been identified as an issue, due to shifts in traditional spousal roles, idleness among the men, stresses associated with camp living, and so on. Increased rates of divorce and separation have also been noted, sometimes occurring along tribal lines, and often leaving women as the sole caretaker of their children (Myrum et al 2008).

Commonly reported concerns for young girls include early marriage and trafficking for domestic labour, due to increased poverty and the inability of parents to provide for their children. For example, at Tigoni police camp some girls were married off against their will by their parents to men living at the camp who were internally displaced persons from different provinces (IDMC 2008). Their young age made the girls vulnerable due to their inability to make informed decisions; they were looked at as an easy way of getting money for their parents to buy new property and relocate – leaving them to start up new families they could hardly fend for. Many young girls are not able to continue with their education, although boys are usually granted that privilege (IDMC 2008). According to reports, these young girls are also exposed to HIV infection and other sexually transmitted diseases since the men they are forced to marry are old and have had multiple sexual partners. In addition, early marriages pose a threat to

the reproductive health of the young girls as a result of bearing children at an early age. Thus, their health is negatively impacted due to lowered immunity, making them, unwillingly, unproductive members of society (IDMC 2008).

These risks to women and girls are compounded by a general failure to include women in camp decision-making and coordination processes. Equal participation by women – as compared to men – in IDP camp management committees is not evident in any of the Kenyan camp sites. Similarly, camp-based facilities, such as reproductive health services, designed to meet the specific needs of women and girls – including access to antiretroviral (ARV) drug therapy – are almost non-existent in the majority of camps. In addition to the lack of health services, women are in need of basic necessities such as underwear, sanitary napkins and contraception (Myrum et al 2008).

Family and community identity strategies

Networks made up of relations with family members and friends may be seen as an important source of capital that immigrants and refugees can draw on in order to improve their economic and social circumstances. Studies have shown that ethnic networks and strong ethnic communities provide new internally displaced persons and refugees with assistance such as information, and access to work and housing (Aquilera & Massey 2003). For Somali refugees in Kenya, the daily process of survival and maximising livelihood resources involves making claims to old and new collective identities that are sometimes complementary and at other times conflicting. These camps are cosmopolitan in nature, and the concentration of different ethnic groups within them creates a high potential for the rapid diffusion of cultures, so that the camps become cultural melting-pots (Ayiemba 2009). One aspect of this development is the emergence of different types of social

networks – constituting different components of social capital (Ayiemba 2009).

Research has revealed that extended families across international borders create functional family networks that reinforce the easy absorption of refugees from both sides of the political divide (Ayiemba & Oucho 1995; Kibreab 1993). The Kakuma refugees' camp has a good mix of people from different ethnic backgrounds and from different countries. A strong emphasis is placed on tribal groupings in terms of agency programming, accommodation arrangements and social activities. A good example is the clear distinctions made by the Sudanese between the Equatoria, Dinka, Nuer and Nuba tribal groups. The main religions in the Kakuma camp and its local community are Christianity and Islam – the Sudanese are mainly Christians while the Somalis are Moslems.

Alternatively, it has been argued that refugees' networks represent a source of 'negative' social capital. This mode of interpretation suggests that reliance on intra-ethnic friendships tends to constrain the opportunities that members of minority groups can access (Aguilera & Massey 2003). Clanism among the Somali community is a source of violence because some clans claim superiority over others. The Somali-Bantu are segregated from other Somali clans because of the stigma arising from their once having been slaves in Somalia.

The family unit is a major source of capital for refugee traders (Lindley 2007). For example, family members may be employed as incentive workers by the UNHCR and some NGOs. Receiving remittances is then their primary or only livelihood strategy, providing regular stipends to cover living expenses. Within family groups it is not unexpected that some members rely on others to provide for them. Most regular stipends come from close relatives, reflecting a traditional relationship of support – for example husbands supporting wives and children, or adult children supporting elderly

parents. Thus, emigration and remitting can often be seen as the main livelihood strategy for a family unit. As regards those who are traders, many of them receive financial support from their relatives working in richer western European asylum countries (Lindley 2007). In the case of Somali emigrants, the money is transferred through Somali companies called *hawilad*. For non-Somalis, remittances are usually channelled through the many international money transfer systems such as Western Union, MoneyGram, Postpay and others.

An assessment of most IDP camps in Kenya reveals ethnic dimensions. A fundamental characteristic of these camps is that they were ethnically divided, reflecting the currently existing ethnic divisions (IDMC 2008). This is best captured in a testimony given by a district commissioner in Nakuru. In his testimony he said: 'When the violence erupted, the IDPs were initially taken to the police quarters at Kasarani and the Central Police Station and thereafter relocated to one of two camps'. He explained that, when non-Kikuyu internally displaced persons were taken to the Nakuru ASK Showground camp, they were rejected by the internally displaced persons already there and had to be moved elsewhere. Depending on their ethnicity, internally displaced persons opted to go to one of two camps: the Luos, Luhya, Kisii and a few Kalenjin were accommodated at the Afraha Stadium IDP camp while most Kikuyu internally displaced persons chose to proceed to the Nakuru ASK grounds; only the Kisii ended up in both camps (IDMC 2008), probably because they had supported both of the two dominant political parties during the 2007 election.

Social networks within and outside the camps

The development of a parallel market alongside the 'official distribution', in which the goods delivered by relief agencies are sold and the resulting money used for something else, is a common phenomenon in refugee camp situations (Kibreab

1993). Because of shortages, refugees are forced to sell a portion of the food distributed to them in order to purchase the items that they lack such as shoes, clothes, meat, milk, pasta, kerosene, matches, etc. Also, the concentration of a large number of people in the same place attracts local traders. In 2009, the total population in Dadaab camp was over 270 000. These were mainly Somalians (96%), with the remaining 4 per cent coming from Ethiopia, Sudan, the DRC, Uganda and Eritrea. Fifty per cent of the population were children aged below 18 years (UNHRC 2009). In addition, the significant impact of the humanitarian aid machine on the local situation in terms of quantity of resources displayed contributes to the situation, with trading networks inside the camps supplying the surrounding areas, including even the refugees' countries of origin. Goods such as the products of development projects within and outside the camps, and trees planted to provide firewood for refugees are appropriated and sold along the trading chain.

Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) described the way in which each community developed its own patterns of trading, which take into account the cultural background of its members. The Sudanese in Kakuma trade with the south-western part of Ethiopia where they had previously-formed trading networks. Similarly, Somali refugees in Dadaab are business entrepreneurs. The Hagadera market, where the site benefited from careful preparation, is considered to be the largest in the three camps, and has a reputation for being run by businessmen of urban origin. Their network extends up to Somalia, especially for selling *miraa*. Kenyans operate as wholesalers, whereas refugees are retailers, and supply the camp's markets, where they claim to run about a quarter of the stalls (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000; UNHCR 2005a).

Through all the above activities, a complete transformation of the nature of the Kenyan camps occurred.

The new shops, the circulation of goods, the movement of people, can be viewed as contributing factors in the socialisation of the areas, replacing the artificial establishment of the original camps. Indeed, it has been suggested that, given their size, their population, permanence and other features, camps like the Dadaab group (Ifo, Hagadera & Dagahaley) have features resembling those of cities rather than of camps (Montclos & Kagwanja 2000).

Self-help structure and systems

Traditional systems of justice exist in Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, providing refugees with access to an alternative form of justice. Despite an awareness of insecurity and lawlessness in refugee camps, the provision of justice or legal remedies for human rights violations has been given little attention by the government. The rule of law is weak in the province, and perpetrators of crimes are rarely held accountable for their actions. For example, between 1997 and 1999, Kenyan courts convicted only five people for rapes committed in Dadaab. The presence of Kenya's national legal system in the camps is limited to a one-week per month visit of the mobile courts. These have the status of magistrate's courts and were established in the late 1990s as a result of the UNHCR negotiations with the Kenyan judiciary; their presence has been regular since 2004. Earlier, refugees in Kakuma and Dadaab had to travel to the nearest district centre to bring cases before a Kenyan Court. Lodwar, for example, with about one third of the population in Kakuma, hosts a permanent magistrate's court, high court and appeals court. But the distance between Kakuma camp and the Dadaab camps is more than 100 kilometres. Restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees, lack of transport (including the transportation of witnesses), and the bad and dangerous roads, severely limit access to the courts. In this vacuum, and also because of the

absence of a legal system in Kenya that refugees found accessible and compatible with their cultural norms, both the Somalis and Sudanese have established traditional systems of justice to adjudicate disputes arising in the camps (Griek 2006).

The traditional legal system used by the Sudanese in Kakuma consists of an intricate and well-structured system of bench courts, which apply Sudanese customary law. These bench-courts, established by the Sudanese community, and initially supported by the Lutheran World Federation and UNHCR, preside at different levels and within different communities. There are, at least, six different bench courts in Kakuma; about seven elders or magistrates conduct the hearings in public, frequently in a circle in the shade of a tree. The lowest level of bench court is at the county (region) and includes the Nuer Bench Court and a number of regional Dinka courts. UNHCR records show training of bench court elders in 2004 for Duk and Bor courts. When a conflict occurs in the community, refugees initially report it to group leaders, refugee caseworkers, or Sudanese security officials, who may refer it to refugee elders for arbitration in a bench court. If the elders fail to resolve a case, they may report it to the Kenyan police, the UNHCR protection unit, or an NGO (UNHCR 2008).

Cross-cultural issues – adaptation and assimilation

Cross-cultural issues include communication issues as well as issues of cultural expectations and conflicts of cultural norms (Bradford-Watts 2003). In complex emergencies, differing cultural expectations and norms may lead to the marginalisation and disenfranchisement of populations, resulting in threats or acts of violence against these populations. Ikanda (2008) examined the social effects of the refugee presence on the host population from near the Dadaab

camp and found the relationship to be more complex. He argues that it cannot be assumed that hosts perceive all refugees similarly. The origins of the various refugee populations at Dadaab have determined how the locals interact with different refugee groups: the Somali, for example, are regarded as likely to view people from other ethnic groups as inferior to them. Despite inter-clan rivalries, they appear to tolerate other Somali refugees better than those from the Sudan and Ethiopia – whom they usually treat with open scorn (Köhler 2003).

The study done by Ikanda (2008) in Dadaab also revealed that the locals attribute all manner of social ills – including what locals perceive to be a deterioration in cultural norms – to the presence of the refugees. Some practices deemed by the locals to be immoral according to the tenets of Islam – for example mixed marriages, drinking alcohol, and playing loud music – which are now evident at Dadaab, are associated with the refugee presence. The opposition to the ways of life of other groups involves local administrators such as chiefs, who are against the introduction of churches for non-Muslim refugees and the ‘scanty’ clothing worn by female agency workers and non-Muslim refugee women. Ikanda (2008) found that the locals view refugees as cultural pollutants. HIV / AIDS is a serious problem facing many refugee camps, and the emergence of the HIV / AIDS pandemic in Kenya is blamed on the refugees – this idea is particularly dominant among local village elders.

Refugees and internally displaced persons also experience difficulties arising from conflicts of cultural expectations and norms when interacting with local and international organisations. Some examples include varying reactions to sexual assault, reactions to genital mutilation, and the distribution routes of supplies within refugee and IDP camps and settlements. Finally, when refugees or internally displaced

persons begin to communicate with local and international organisations, they often need to communicate through translators, and problems associated with translation and representation frequently arise.

Host communities often see refugees and internally displaced persons as a drain on their already meagre resources, and assistance provided to them may become the source of resentment from hosts. The scarcity of natural resources around many refugee and IDP camps has often been a cause of conflict between hosts and displaced people. Jacobsen (2002) has observed grave competition between the host community and internally displaced persons for resources for economic security. Even where the relationship between displaced people and hosts is relatively good in terms of most aspects of cohabitation, the fight over natural resources has often led to open rivalry (Lyytinen 2009).

Various solutions have been implemented to enhance and improve mutually beneficial relations between host and displaced populations. For example, the Kenyan Dadaab camp-stove project has positively affected a wide range of situations, including 'the improvement of living conditions of both refugees and the immediate host communities, the promotion of both inter-agency and stakeholder collaboration in addressing issues and ensuring stability of asylum by promoting harmonious coexistence between refugees and their host communities' (UNHCR 2008: 85). The establishment of environmental working groups involving both refugee and host members has also improved relations between the communities. The Kakuma camp in Kenya has a policy discouraging refugees from using the limited local natural resources, and because these restrictions are well-known to both refugees and locals they have contributed to a lack of conflict over resources. The policy of refugees buying additional firewood from the local community has also

improved relations between the two sides (UNHCR 2008). It has not yet been established whether refugees and host communities experience more conflict over natural resources than internally displaced persons and their hosts, given the fact that internally displaced persons are citizens of the same country as their hosts

Refugee and IDP camps are inherently disruptive environments, which may separate young people from family and community sources of learning, recreation and support. This alteration of community routine, normalcy, boredom, and lack of positive alternatives may precipitate young people's involvement in risky behaviours, including early sexual activity and unprotected sex. Youth are also likely to face increased exposure to sexual coercion and violence. For example, in refugee camps in Northeast Kenya, there are reports of young girls as young as ten years old being attacked and raped when they leave camps in search of water or firewood (Lane 2008).

Post-conflict rehabilitation initiatives


Re-settlement programmes

The return of populations displaced by instability can be a lasting solution for refugees and internally displaced people themselves and is often an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Return and reintegration is positive for development as it encourages refugees and internally displaced persons to re-invest their skills, capital and resources in rehabilitating and rebuilding their countries and communities of origin. However, 'the simple movement of groups of displaced people from one area to another without long-term plans to support their sustainable reintegration risks destabilising the peace' (Holtzman 1995: 15).

The Kenya Red Cross (Red Cross 2008) reported that in May 2008 the Government began a resettlement programme

with support from humanitarian agencies. Through the resettlement programme, Operation Rudi Nyumbani, the Ministry for Special Programmes facilitated the return of over 255 000 persons to pre-displacement areas or new locations. The Government also disbursed Ksh10 000 to each household for families that were willing to return to their farms. This ‘start-up funding’ was meant to support internally displaced persons in buying basic items to restart their lives in return areas. In addition, the Government also promised to reconstruct 40 000 houses destroyed in the post-election violence. The number of internally displaced persons and camps has steadily reduced since the start of Operation Rudi Nyumbani. Figures for December 2008 showed that only about 5000 people remained, in four camps, including one in Mount Elgon. Figure 2 illustrates this trend.

Figure 2. Number of internally displaced persons and number of camps in 2008



Source: Kenya Red Cross 2008

Seeking durable solutions

Relocation

Individual households and groups of internally displaced persons have moved away from pre-displacement areas to new locations they consider safe. The movement pattern indicates internally displaced persons are unwilling or unable to return to original home. Some access their farms during the day from transit camps (where security allows), while many have established other homes in urban and 'ancestral' districts (Kenya 2009).

Integration

Success in integrating internally displaced persons depends on a number of factors: the location of the area of temporary settlement, ethnic and religious affiliations, and family ties and networks (Hampton 1998). In Kenya, an unknown number of internally displaced persons have integrated into Kenyan host communities and urban areas. However, there is compassion fatigue in host families and increased competition for resources, jobs and social facilities in host areas as is the case in other global hotspots for displacement (Hampton 1998). This has led to xenophobic attitudes towards internally displaced persons, such as associating them with increased crime. These attitudes could escalate to violence in host areas at any time. According to the Kenya Red Cross (2008), 'the internally displaced persons and host communities both adopt symbolic names denoting either war and devastation ('Bosnia', 'Rwanda' and so on), or standing for new hope and the promise of peace or abundance ('New Canaan', 'Jerusalem')'.

An education programme

In 1998, the UNHCR launched a Peace Education Programme (PEP) in Dadaab and Kakuma. It has two major components: a

schools-based programme and a community programme for youth and adults. PEP promotes individual learning over time, through long-term programmes: a twelve year programme in schools and an initial 12-unit community workshop reinforced by follow-up activities over the years. It is a skills acquisition programme targeting various peace-building skills such as cooperation; communication skills including enhanced listening; speaking skills and the skill of remaining silent; skills of trusting, of practising empathy; skills of assertiveness deriving from enhanced self-esteem and self-image; the skill of taking increased individual and social responsibility for one's life and decisions, and for other people; the skill of controlling one's emotions; mediation skills (conflict resolution, together with problem solving, negotiation, and reconciliation skills) derived from an increased attitude of tolerance and open-mindedness (Obura 2002).

Economic opportunities and challenges

Refugees, generally, are trapped by their legal situation and local environmental conditions. Consequently, they are usually unable to support themselves with income-generating activities. The semi-arid climate of Kakuma is ill-suited to agriculture, while restrictions on employment deter refugee job-seeking. Those who work with NGOs receive a small incentive payment for their work, but incentive-giving staff represents only a fraction of the refugee population. Arafat Jamal concludes from his evaluation of Kakuma camp that, 'Anyone confined to a place like Kakuma is rendered automatically dependent on some form of hand-out' (Arafat Jamal 2000).

For a large proportion of refugees in the camp, unemployment, idleness and dependency associated with stress and frustration are rife. However, encamped refugees with some skills, or who acquired such skills through training

received in the camp, may be employed by NGOs and paid 'incentives'. In 2005, nearly 600 vulnerable individuals were issued with loans for income-generating activity. In Kakuma in 2006, the Laundry Soap Project was the most successful income-generating activity run by refugees. As mentioned above, the soap factory supplies the UNHCR with soap which is distributed to the refugees (UNHCR 2006a).

Kakuma and Dadaab camps reveal that they are not merely a place of residence for refugees. They have all the characteristics of a large town (Montclos & Kangwanja 2000). People of different nationalities and ethnic identification, speaking multiple languages all live there. Their cultural and religious backgrounds are also different. Each camp has kindergartens, primary and high schools, vocational schools, a hospital, clinics, libraries, community centres, churches and mosques. People briskly engage in business at restaurants, general stores, butcheries and vegetable shops. There are theatres that show videos of various movies and promotion videos of popular international singers such as Michael Jackson. Several restaurants have satellite broadcast dishes, and people can watch soccer games taking place in countries such as England and Italy. There are also copy services, international telephones, and international remittance services. Bicycle-taxis come and go busily on the roads of the camps. They surpass all we usually imagine when we think of refugee camps (Montclos & Kangwanja 2000).

Education opportunities and challenges

While governments and international organisations view food, water, shelter and health care as basic necessities during emergencies, education does not always have a similar level of support, particularly in the emergency phase of the cycle of displacement. However, there are numerous reasons why both formal and non-formal education are important for refugees

and internally displaced persons – in particular for children and young people. In addition to providing the essential building blocks for learning, in emergencies education can protect against exploitation and harm; offer structure, stability and hope in a time of crisis; promote the acquisition of skills for life; and support conflict resolution and peace building (UNHCR 2007b).

Education is a right of all children. Article 22 of the 1951 UNHCR Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides that ‘Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education’ and ‘treatment as favourable as possible’ with respect to secondary and other education. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR reaffirmed the right of refugee children to primary education in Conclusion 47 (1987), the role of education as an aspect of protection in Conclusion 84 (1997), and the link between education and durable solutions in Conclusion 59 (1989). In practice, however, at least a third of refugee children are not in school and are thus exposed to major protection risks such as child labour, trafficking, forced recruitment, and gender-based violence.

Many factors exacerbate the lack of educational opportunities for IDP children and youth, even relative to refugees. The quality of education in IDP camps is generally much lower than that provided by international agencies in refugee camps (Buscher & Makinson 2006). More than one third of all internally displaced persons remain beyond the reach of United Nations assistance (WCRWC 2008). Vocational training programmes benefit men and women equally and have a positive impact in enhancing self-esteem and in teaching useful skills – for the time within the camps and for when durable solutions have been achieved. However, the scale of these programmes is extremely small and the opportunities for students to utilise their newly acquired skills are limited (UNHCR 2005a).

The challenge of educating refugee girls

The majority of girls in the camps do not have access to safe school environments, post-primary educational or livelihood opportunities, or to any other form of education (UNHCR 2007b). The main causes of drop-out are that girls are expected to help out during planting and harvesting seasons, and undertake domestic chores generally, including taking care of their younger siblings. For 2007, a global assessment of primary enrolment found that only 37 per cent of the camps with available statistics met the standard of full enrolment (UNHCR 2007d). In other cases, refugee girls living in fragmented family situations, such as families with one parent or families in which the girls serve as the household head, never get an opportunity to attend school.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that internally displaced persons and refugees in Kenya, like their counterparts elsewhere, are a marginalised group whose livelihood strategies are, of necessity, dynamic. They are communities whose resource potentials have not been fully utilised because of commonly misguided management practices regarding their welfare perpetrated by local and international aid agencies.

It is evident from the experiences of both internally displaced persons and encamped refugees that, given opportunity, these people are innovative, hard-working, motivated and can forge effective social and economic, as well as cultural, networks that are effective for sustainable community development. It is these resource potentials that the host government and other support partners need to target by formulating appropriate policies that enhance their structure and development.

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CHAPTER 12

Cycles of Climate Vulnerability and Migration in the Sahel: A Case Study of the Niono District of Mali

Sally E. Findley and Seydou Doumbia

Introduction: climate variability and economic vulnerability in the Sahel

Most migration research has focused on why people move, yet as our esteemed colleague Aderanti Adepoju pointed out as far back as 1977: 'The preoccupation with the question of motivation (why people migrate) tends to obscure the other side of the picture – and indeed a large part – which deals with the question of non-mobility, that is, why most people do *not* migrate from the rural environment' (Adepoju 1977: 217). Given the not insignificant challenges of generating a livelihood from farming, one might expect more migrants than non-migrants. Yet, non-migrants often predominate over migrants, who tend to be young, better educated, and seeking non-agricultural work – which they are less likely to find in the rural environment. There is also the group of 'marginal

migrants' – possible migrants who are not fully committed to moving and are less likely to move because they are connected to or based in their home environment. Nonetheless, they may move if they are influenced by information, contacts, or social-psychological factors (Adepoju 1979). Recently, researchers have begun differentiating between the 'stayers', the returnees, and those who have a foot in both worlds, circulating between two lives, 'away' and 'home' (Collinson et al. 2006; de Haan et al 2002; Findley & Sow 1998; Hampshire 2002). Yet there remain many unanswered questions about what distinguishes movers from non-movers, and particularly the middle group of 'marginal migrants'. We also do not know if the non-movers are those who stay because they have succeeded without moving, or are non-movers because they have failed in migrating, possibly because they lacked a successful support to migration, such as skills, resources, information, contacts, or social support for moving.

Perhaps one of the best places to learn about the non-movers is in a place where we might expect more movers than non-movers – as would pertain in particularly challenging farming situations such as very poor soils, hostile topography or lack of water resources, so that non-movers would have to overcome many obstacles, and thus their adaptations would, presumably, be stronger and more in evidence than in areas where staying is less challenging.

The Sahel in West Africa is just such a location. As Adepoju has pointed out: 'Agriculture is the lifeline of the people, and for many decades a delicate balance was maintained between the extensive, long-fallow agricultural production system and the fragile environment' (Adepoju 2009: 4). Eighty per cent of the population of the Sahel are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Most crops are rain-fed, with the dominant crops being a mixture of subsistence cereal grains (sorghum, millet, maize), additional vegetables, fruits, and some cash crops (such as cotton,

groundnuts, irrigated rice). The farming mode is pastoralism, of both large and small ruminants. Except in areas with access to irrigation, cultivation is compressed into the rainy season, generally from June through October, with longer durations in the southern sections of the Sahel where rains start earlier and end later due to the south-north movement of the inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCZ).

Agricultural prospects in the Sahel vary considerably from year to year. Sandwiched between the Sahara and the more tropical zones of coastal West Africa, the Sahel has long been considered one of the most vulnerable ecological zones in Africa. Droughts – single or multiple years of abnormally low or non-existent rain – are the source of much of this vulnerability. In the twentieth century, the Sahel experienced three major drought periods: 1910–1916, 1941–1945, and then a long slow period of drying from the early 1970s through the 1980s and into the 1990s (Batterbury & Warren 2001). Averaged over thirty-year intervals, annual rainfall across the Sahel fell by between 20 and 30 per cent between the pre-independence period (1930s to 1950s) and the decades since (post-1960s) (Lamb 1978; Giannini et al. 2003). Observers agree that the periods from the 1970s through to the 1980s show evidence of climate variability (Giannini et al. 2003; Kandji et al. 2006). There is mounting evidence that the Sahel's significant inter-annual variation in rainfall is linked to the long-term changes in the north-south Atlantic Ocean temperature differentials – the 'Atlantic dipole' – which are in turn linked to atmospheric temperature and cloud-cover changes in the Sahel (Hulme 2001). In the case of the Sahel, climate change has been associated with a long-term drying (Giannini et al. 2003), nevertheless with much variation, as was evidenced by the very wet year of 2005 (Thiaw 2007).

The Sahelian climate is also affected by the ITCZ system of storms. These fluctuations in annual rainfall are governed

by the movement of the ITCZ, which moves north-south with the seasonal progression of the overhead sun and reaches its maximum northward extent in July/ August, and its minimum in January. The movement of the ITCZ's northern boundary is not regular, and short-term oscillations of as much as 500 to 1000 kilometres may occur over a few days, causing erratic starts to the rainy season. All this contributes to high potential agricultural production losses associated with drought – from 25 per cent to 100 per cent, depending on the specific location and drought conditions (Boubacar 2010). It is likely, then, that this level of actual or potential loss would propel out-migration, and there is evidence that climate change with its higher temperatures and increased rainfall variability is indeed associated with the significantly higher rates of permanent rural-urban migration observed in sub-Saharan Africa, as compared to other developing regions (Barrios et al. 2006).

Many have argued that the provision of irrigation reduces potential losses from drought or rainfall variability, since irrigation permits successful cultivation during a dry year as well as into the dry or counter-season (Diemer & van der Laan 1987; Adams 2000; Brown & Nooter 1992; Poussin et al. 2005; Tychon et al. 2003). However, even in such circumstances, there are many challenges to attaining high production levels, including land levelling, soil quality, the timing of inputs, and even the cost of irrigation pump fuel and pump maintenance (Adams 2000; Poussin et al. 2005; Wopereis et al. 1998). Other adaptations may be needed for families to sustain themselves through a drought period.

Although climate variability undoubtedly poses an enormous challenge to farming and pastoralism in the Sahel, there are further and continual challenges created by accelerated environmental degradation in the Sahel. The Sahelian soils are low in organic matter and plant nutrients, which makes them fragile and at great risk to degradation.

During the drought periods, herds move south and/or west in their foraging, resulting in great concentrations of stock, which in turn leads to overgrazing, compression, and permanent reduction in the vegetation cover, with resulting increases in wind erosion (Findley et al. 1995). The monsoon rains of the Sahel further compound the problem of soil retention. When heavy rainfall hits the bare soils, they develop a crust, which actually reduces water absorption and increases water runoff. Finally, the Sahel is further degraded by deforestation and vegetation loss associated with sedentary agriculture and human foraging (for firewood, fruits, construction materials, or feed for their animals (Kandji et al. 2006). While the evidence is not yet conclusive, many now suggest that this loss of vegetative cover feeds the climate change cycle through its impact on reflectivity, temperature increases, and atmospheric dust (Zeng et al. 1999).

Together, climate variability and land degradation pose formidable challenges to Sahelian farmers. In better rainfall years, families may harvest enough to meet their needs, but in average or below-average years, their food security is challenged. To stay and survive in such a variable production context, families have to develop alternative strategies for coping with the different types of rainfall situations they may experience.


Further complicating households' options for reducing their vulnerability to climate variability are long-term economic cycles. These cycles include periods such as the current 'great' recession, or periods of major price variations, when the terms of trade for agricultural goods are dramatically worsened. Faced with both chronic and short-term fluctuations in income, Sahelian families and communities have developed a wide range of coping mechanisms to offset both the gradually persistent encroachment and the short-term threats to their livelihoods (Adams, Cekan & Sauerborn 1998; Toulmin et al.

2000). Those adopted include agricultural intensification within the dry farm systems (Adams & Mortimore 1997; de Haan et al. 2002), diversification of income sources (Findley & Sow, 1998; de Haan et al. 2002) and reduction of risk by accessing irrigation during low rainfall years (Findley & Sow 1998).

In addition to all the potential strategies which enable a family to continue to farm productively in the face of these challenges, migration may be include as an additional mechanism for sustaining the family through periods of heightened vulnerability. As Adepoju has observed, since shortly after the major drought of the 1970s, one of the most well-described patterns of response during major drought periods has been migration, involving millions of people over the last four decades (Adepoju 1977, 1995). But, as Adepoju further notes, a migration response to the stress of drought cannot be seen as a 'one-time' response. In the last few decades, the crisis drought response has been affected by the background of continuing environmental degradation (Adepoju 2009). While definitive out-migration may still be the preferred option for households seeking to avoid further exposure to the risks of drought, some adopt other migration patterns, including circular migration within the home rural area or between a rural and an urban area (Barbier et al. 2009; Cordell et al. 1996; de Haan et al. 2002; Findley et al. 1995; Findley 1994; Findley & Sow 1998).

Figure 1 outlines a conceptual model for an integrated response to economic and climate swings.

Figure 1. Conceptual model for incorporating migration as a response to climate variability in the context of chronic economic vulnerability



We (the authors) conducted a case study in Niono in Mali, from 1999 through 2003, to assess how irrigation and migration might combine to reduce vulnerability to climate variability. Niono lies within a district with a large irrigation network, established decades ago. This irrigation system gives families the option for counter-season crops (such as tomatoes), as well as sustaining high cereal yields. We explored the ways in which the presence of the irrigation system alters coping patterns, compared to similar regions in Mali and the Sahel. We were particularly interested in the ways in which families combine their usual farming activities with other activities to reduce the risk of large variability in rainfall – excess or deficit. Most families concentrate on enabling a very high level of short-term circulation, which enables them to maintain sufficient resilience to allow them to continue living in the region.

Case study of climate variability, irrigation, and migration in Niono, Mali

Study setting: Niono, Mali

The study site was the district of Niono, in the region of Segou, Mali. Niono is located 330 kilometres northeast of Bamako and 100 kilometres north of the Niger River. The region

experiences a single annual rainy season, usually peaking in August, when the ITCZ reaches its northernmost extent. Niono district was selected because of the potential for climate-related variability in rainfall and temperature. Rainfall records show significant climate variability: the last three decades have seen wide fluctuations, with negative anomalies in ten of these years, and positive anomalies in six.

The district of Niono encompasses three major ecological zones: a semi-desert area (where agro-pastoralism dominates), a central, irrigated zone, and a savannah zone, with a mixed agricultural economy. This variability provides a context in which to explore alternative household adaptations to different livelihood threats. The district is home to a major irrigation scheme, with 50 000 hectares managed by the Office du Niger along the Canal du Sahel, fed by the Niger River. The possibility of work in irrigated fields attracts migrants from the nearby Sikasso Region, as well as from Nara, Goundam and the areas to the north of Niono. Many households in Niono send members to work in the irrigated areas, particularly during the planting and harvesting seasons.

A year-round road links Niono to Segou, the regional capital and the second largest city in Mali. There are several major agricultural development projects in Niono District, including programmes for farming irrigated rice, cotton, and sugar cane. These activities generate a strong labour demand, and the in-migration rate to the Segou region is second only to that for Bamako. The 1998 census shows above average in-migration rates to the central, irrigated sections of Niono, while there was high out-migration from the dry northern zones (DNSI 2001).

Selection of the study villages

We purposefully selected eleven villages to include representatives of three of the major ecological-production

zones found in Mali – as shown in Figure 2. The villages selected span the North-South gradient of the irrigated zone, located between 15° N and 13° N (Table 1).

Figure 2. Health Area Zone Locations, Niono District, Mali




Table 1. Characteristics of villages in the study


Study village	Irrigation	Health area	Km to CSCOM	Km to Niono	Latitude N	Longitude W	Population in 2000
Nampala	Dry	Nampala	0	185	15.3	5.55	1017
Farabougou	Dry	Dogofry	30	105	14.8	6.25	1905
Djenne Coura	Irrigated	Dogofry	10	85	14.8	6.02	1273
Niessoumana	Irrigated	Diabaly	5	65	14.8	6.06	645
Famabougou	Dry	Sokolo	18	93	14.7	6.12	513
Toukoun							
Coura	Irrigated	Bolibana	7	37	14.5	5.95	805
Socourani	Irrigated	Molodo	7	12	14.3	6.05	577
Dogobougou	Dry	Boh	10	55	14.3	6.60	430
Nadani	Dry	Siribala	10	55	14.1	6.11	913
Tinesana	Dry	Pogo	18	73	14.0	5.80	734
Dossiguella	Dry	Pogo	9	64	13.8	5.90	714

Sources: Carte Sanitaire de Niono, DSSS-Niono, 2001; CPC/FEWS estimated precipitation: <http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/fews/data.shtml>
 See Herman et al., 1994 for methodology.

In the dry, northern zone the dominant crop production patterns are those typical of the Sahel: millet, with groundnuts and legumes, and small-scale pastoralism. In the irrigated villages, especially those closer to the town of Niono, rice cultivation dominates. In the southern dry zones, rainfall levels are higher, and millet cultivation dominates – with productivity levels higher than in the northern dry zone villages due to greater periods of precipitation through the earlier arrival of the ITCZ.

The areas in which the eleven villages are located had striking differences in their peak July-August-September (JAS) rainfall figures for 1995–1997 as against the years 1999, 2001 and 2003 – as reported by the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) for Mali (see Figure 3). In 1996 the rain deficit in all but one district was more than one standard deviation below the decade average, and in the remaining district it was more than half a deviation below average. The rains in 1997 are of particular interest given the variation in the rain shortfall: some were a half a deviation below the decade average for August (therefore normal), but in two districts the deficit was one full standard deviation below average. The opposite held for 1999, an exceptionally rainy year, with dry and wet years alternating for 2000 through 2004.

Figure 3. Rainfall deviations from the 10-year mean, Niono Health Zones JAS 1995-2004



Source: Calculated by the authors using the estimated rainfall for each district from CPC/FEWS precipitation database: <http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/fews/data.shtml>

Methods

We conducted baseline surveys in October 2001 for an initial six study villages, and in January 2002 for the remaining five villages. We interviewed one randomly selected household per compound in each village, resulting in a sample size of 406 households, with 5192 members. The baseline surveys obtained a listing of all family members, recent demographic events (births, deaths, migrations), the family migration history, agricultural production in the recent past, socio-economic status, illness episodes in the past month, and selected health behaviours. The baseline survey included several questions about the known rain deficit (1997) and excess (1999) years, as well as details about the 2000 and 2001 production seasons.

There was a total of four rounds of observations, with the final round of interviews conducted in October 2003. Subsequent rounds included re-interviews with more than three-quarters of the household heads. At the follow-up surveys, we obtained details on changes in household composition, detailed information on migrations in the intervening period, and details about births, deaths, and illness episodes for children under the age of 5. The household characteristics derive from the baseline interviews conducted in October 2001 and January 2002, while the migration information comes from the migration questions in all four rounds, and was observed prospectively, from 2001 forward. As detailed assessments of the households' economic situations were made only from 1999 forward, only moves from 1999 forward were included. Data were linked by household and individual members, to create records containing observations from all four rounds. We excluded 208 marriage-related migrations and the migrations of 443 children under the age of 15, as the focus of this analysis was on the relations between climate variability, household economic vulnerability, and labour migration.

Because the focus in this analysis was the association between climate variability and migration patterns, we classified migrations by whether the year in which they took place was a year in which the precipitation was average (within one half a standard deviation from the 1995–2004 mean of estimated precipitation for Niono district), or dry (less than half a standard deviation from the 1995–2004 mean precipitation) or wet (more than half a standard deviation from the 1995–2004 mean precipitation). Moves which occurred in January to May of a year (prior to the arrival of rains) were coded, based on the precipitation of the previous year's rainy season. Any respondent who indicated that their move had been related to drought or climate had their move coded as a 'dry year migration'.

We further classified migrants by whether their movement was into the household, out of the household or a circulation. In-migrants were those reported as resident for 6 months or more, and out-migrants were likewise those reported resident for 6 months or more. For each person changing residence between our visits, the household head was asked if the migration was definitive. If not, and if the person was absent (or returned) for a period of less than 6 months, the migration was defined as circular or temporary.

We first examined differences in production and economic situations of the households by access to irrigation. We then examined the contrasting climate-related migration patterns, focusing on the underlying differences in access to irrigation, production levels, and household labour resources. The households' agricultural production levels and sensitivity to rainfall variations were assessed by their average millet and rice production levels in a dry year (2000) versus those for a wet year (1999). We used bi-variate analyses (t-tests and chi-square) to test for differences in means or proportions of the individual and household characteristics of the three different

climate-variations in migration, using adult non-migrants as the reference group. We then used multinomial logistic regression to estimate the predictors of each type of migration. Stata 11.0 was used for the analyses.

Results

Household production by access to irrigation

As shown in Table 2, variations in access to irrigated land are associated with significant differences in household composition, wealth, and production. The households with access to irrigation have a lower child-dependency burden, are more likely to have a head who has at least some schooling, and are more likely to have consumer durables indicating some wealth acquisition (radio, bicycle or motorcycle). Although only 40 per cent of the families with access to irrigation indicated that they were able to cover their needs through their own cultivation, this is approximately twice the self-sufficiency rate among the households without access to irrigation. The households with access to irrigation have markedly different production regimens, virtually all of them cultivating rice and very few cultivating millet. Their total grain production (rice plus millet) is roughly twice that of families without access to irrigation. Village elders indicated that the lower level of production for households with irrigation during a rain excess (1999) year reflected the fact that crops had become flooded at a critical time, which resulted in grain loss.

In contrast, the households without access to irrigation are almost exclusively dependent on millet cultivation. Further, their millet production levels are low and variable. In the wet year of 1999, they averaged 1022 kg of millet produced per household, while in the dry year of 2000 their average production dropped to 947.4 kg (an average drop of 7.3%). In the dry zone, village elders indicated that the failure

of rains at critical times in 2000 had reduced germination, growth, and ripening, and hence the harvest. While 82 per cent of those without access to irrigation also grow rice, this is on marginal lands that may or may not be flooded, depending on rainfall and on overflows from the irrigation canal system, and their production is less than one-fourth of the output of the households using the controlled irrigation system from the Office du Niger. Further, less than half of these households raise any crops during the dry or 'counter-season'. Thus, only 22 per cent of the households without access to irrigation are self-sufficient.

Table 2. Average characteristics of households by access to irrigation, Niono, Mali, 2001-2


	Irrigated	Non-irrigated	Chi square	Significance level
Socio-demographic				
Number of married women in household	3.6	3.0	8.24*	< 0.001
Number of children under 15	8.4	10.8	12.3*	< 0.001
Household head without any schooling (%)	50.7	66.1	17.2	< 0.001
Economic				
Millet producer (%)	7.9	95.0	442.6	< 0.001
Rice grower (%)	97.6	81.8	48.5	< 0.001
Counter-season crops (%)	84.5	43.4	110.4	< 0.001
Self-sufficient in farming (%)	39.7	22	14.2	< 0.001
Supplemental non-agricultural activity (%)	78.9	58.3	255.7	< 0.001
Wet year rice production (kg if > 0)	2908	727	26.7*	< 0.001
Dry year rice production (kg if > 0)	3316	723	28.8*	< 0.001
Wet year millet production (kg if > 0)	110	1022	9.73*	< 0.001
Dry year millet production (kg if > 0)	57	947	13.0*	< 0.001
Living standard				
Radio (%)	95.7	84.3	23.6	< 0.001
Bicycle (%)	79.9	71.2	5.75	0.016
Motorecycle (%)	59.8	23.7	70.0	< 0.001
Plough (%)	84.2	90.9	5.2	0.024
<i>n</i>	241	165		

* Statistical significance tested by t-test

We turn now to the patterns of migration accompanying these household production patterns. For the period 1999–2003, there were a total of 801 labour migrations observed in these households, with an average age of about 22 years. They were evenly split between males and female (49.5% male), mostly without any education (74.2%), and 36 per cent had been unemployed prior to their move. The most common type of migration was out-migration (46.7%), followed by circulation (40.0%), and in-migration (13.4%). Almost half of all migrants moved to another location in the district of Niono (45.8%), followed by destinations in the immediate region of Segou (32.3%), other locations in Mali (19.0%), and other African nations (2.9%). Two-thirds (65.6%) of all these migrations were to an irrigated zone.

Out of the 406 households surveyed, over half (56.7%) had at least one adult migrant. Households without access to irrigation were more likely to have migrants (63.6% vs. 51.9%, Chi-square = 5.52, $p = 0.019$), and among those without irrigation, the households who had not had their needs covered in the previous harvest were the most likely to have migrant members: 56.0 per cent, compared to 36.0 per cent among those who were self-sufficient or had their needs covered by the harvest (Chi-square = 3.07, $p < 0.001$) (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Households by irrigation, self-sufficiency and migration status



Most migrations occurred in 2001 (40.2%) and 2002 (38.2%), with only 14.0 per cent in 2003, 4.8 per cent in 2000, and 2.8 per cent in 1996–1999. Reclassified by the relative rainfall level of the migration year, 18.2 per cent of the migrations occurred in an average rainfall year, 33.8 per cent in a dry year, and 48.1 per cent in a wet year. Migrations during the average and relatively wet rainfall years were significantly more likely to be circular, compared to migrations during the relatively dry rain years. (63.0% and 47.6% versus 16.2%, Chi-square = 144.0, $p < 0.001$). During the relatively dry rainfall years, almost three-quarters (71.8%) of the migrations were out-migrations.

The agricultural production levels for households with any migrants by the three relative rainfall categories are shown in Table 3. There were 37 households with migrations from two rainfall level categories, and these have been included in both relevant categories.

Table 3. Agricultural production of households with migrants, by relative rainfall of migration date

	Average Rain% (<i>n</i> = 24)	Relatively Dry % (<i>n</i> = 75)	Relatively Wet % (<i>n</i> = 122)	Non- migrant% (<i>n</i> = 186)	Chi- square
Access to irrigation	11.6	59.5	51.4	54.4	90.6
Self-sufficient in farming	61.0	41.4	39.0	25.9	87.4
Household with supplemental economic activity	19.7	76.0	77.1	63.5	174.8
Counter-season crop	16.3	66.9	57.2	71.9	97.4
Wet year had best harvest	76.5	47.3	35.0	71.8	47.2
Rice production 1999	1484*	2079*	2032*	2405	
Rice production 2000	1586*	2634	2144*	2564	
Millet production 1999	1344*	1196*	1061*	838	
Millet production 2000	1270*	974*	660	754	

* Non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals with non-migrants. All chi-square values significant at $p < 0.001$

Households with migrations happening during each of the three relative rainfall periods (average, dry, wet) differ significantly in their agricultural production characteristics. Compared to the households without any migrants, those moving during the years of average rainfall were least likely to have access to the irrigated fields managed by the Office du Niger. The households with migrations taking place during the years of average rainfall had the least access to irrigation or the most limited production related to irrigation. Only about one in ten of these households had access to irrigation, and they were the least likely to produce a counter-season crop. Their millet production (their main crop) was almost double the level found among non-migrant households, and over half were self-sufficient in the most recent harvest. Among these households, it is likely that the lack of access to supplemental economic activities (only 20% had wage earners) is the main driver of migration.

Contrary to expectations that household economies would differ between those with dry versus wet year migrations, the economies of households with dry-period migrations were fairly similar to those with wet-period migrations. Over half of both these types of household had access to irrigation, but their rice production in an excess rain year was significantly below the average for households without migrants. Similarly, their dry-year rice production was also below that for the non-migrant households with irrigation. Both groups of households were less likely to have been self-sufficient than households with no migrants. They were also the most likely to have members engaged in supplemental wage labour, complementing their own household's agricultural production, and they were, in addition, more likely to produce counter-season crops (such as onions and tomatoes).

The households without migrants had higher average millet production levels, with the household migration patterns most influenced by their dry-year millet production levels. The households with migrants did not excel at rice or millet production. Their mediocre performance may be reflected in their choice of year for their best harvest, which was a wet year for only 47 per cent of the households with migrations during a dry year, and 35 per cent among households with migrations during a wet year. The high level of cultivation of counter-season crops among households with migrants during both dry and wet periods suggests that their migration strategy involves cultivation of a counter-season crop. Likewise, the high number of wage-earners among both types of households suggests the possibility of wage labour in Niono or elsewhere during the dry season.


In Figure 5, migrant/non-migrant household rice and millet average production differentials are displayed according to the rainfall period during which the migration was observed. Values above 1 indicate that the average production of that

crop by migrant households exceeded the equivalent value for non-migrant households, while values less than 1 indicate the opposite. The graph clearly shows the different patterns of association between migration and average household production of each grain.

During *average* rainfall years, the migrants come from households which typically have 160 per cent higher millet production but only about 60 per cent of the average rice production of non-migrant households. In both dry and wet years, the migrant/non-migrant differentials in household average grain production are much smaller. During the *dry* years, households with and without migrants had virtually no difference in their average rice production levels, while those with migrants had average millet production levels 1.4 times greater than households without migrants. This pattern was reversed during the *wet* years, with the households with migrants having almost no average millet production differential but a 20 per cent lower rice production level than households with no migrants during the wet years.


These patterns suggest that migration is part of the households' complex production strategy, and that the adaptation varies by climate variability and within the context of their overall or average production of both rice and millet. During the average rainfall periods, higher millet production and lower rice production are complemented by migration, while during the dry years, household migrations are responsive to smaller millet production differentials and insensitive to rice production differentials. Conversely in the relatively wet years, lower average rice production levels are associated with migration, while millet production differentials have little influence.

Figure 5. Migrant/non-migrant production differentials in average rice and millet production by relative rainfall of migration year



The migration destinations selected during each type of rainfall period also differed, and these differences provide a clue to the differential production patterns associated with the migrations occurring in each rainfall period. As shown in Figure 6, during the average-rainfall years almost 80 per cent of migrants went to locations with irrigated fields, while during wet years only half of those moving went to irrigated zones, and during dry years 62 per cent of those moving went to irrigated zones (Chi-square = 13.7, $p = 0.001$).

Figure 6. Migration by relative rainfall period and irrigation of destination



We next used multinomial logistic regression to estimate the combined effect of household and individual economic vulnerability factors together with rainfall variability on the likelihood that an individual would migrate during a dry, an average, or a wet year. For these analyses, we included only out-migration and circulation, as we were focusing on the ways in which households' economic vulnerabilities and the particular strategies adopted by families influenced their choice of out-migration/circulation patterns. The dependent variable was the individual, with migrants assessed by their most recent migration, in the case of multiple migrations, and non-migrants assessed by the 230 household heads of households in which there were neither out-migrants nor circulators in the 1999–2003 period. In this way non-migrants served as the reference category for the dependent variable.

The migrants were distributed as follows: 234 dry year movers, 145 average year movers, and 315 wet year movers. The independent variables were those discussed above, individual and household characteristics. There were 663 cases

for which complete observations were available for all variables in the model.

As shown in Table 4, the differences in agricultural production associated with migration during an average rainfall year (as shown in Table 3 above) continue to be observed after controlling for the simultaneous influences of individual and household economic factors. After controlling for other factors, self-sufficiency in the previous harvest was not a significant predictor of migration during any of the relative rainfall periods. However, household composition was a strong predictor. Each additional adult male (an estimate of the size of the available labour force) increased the likelihood of migration in any of the relative rainfall periods by a factor of 1.2 to 1.3. Low levels of human capital (lack of education) increased migration by 12 times during an average-rainfall period, compared to only by 3 and 2.5 times in the relatively dry and wet periods respectively. During all periods, migrations were associated with households ranking their best harvest as a wet year harvest, but this association was about twice as strong among migrants who moved in the dry and average periods than among migrants moving in the relatively wet years. Access to irrigation altered the relative risk of migration only during the average-rainfall years. Migration during dry *and* wet years was associated with higher rice or millet production levels (as in the dry year of 2000), however during the average rainfall years, migration was more strongly associated with higher millet production (as during the wet year of 1999). Finally, it is only the millet production level for a wet year that influences wet year migrations.

This model explained 20.1 per cent of the variance in migration patterns (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.201$, likelihood ratio (27) = 351.4).

Table 4. Predictors of migration 1999–2003 by relative rainfall of migration year

Variable	Dry year migration			Average year migration			Wet year migration		
	RRR	95% CI	<i>p</i>	RRR	95% CI	<i>p</i>	RRR	95% CI	<i>p</i>
<i>n</i> = 663 Pseudo <i>R</i> ² = 0.201									
Household self-sufficiency	0.848	0.451–1.59	0.607	0.531	0.223–1.26	0.152	0.905	0.505–1.62	0.738
No schooling of household head	3.108	1.77–5.56	0.000	12.13	3.30–44.6	0.000	2.598	1.60–4.22	0.000
Number of men in household	1.350	1.19–1.53	0.000	1.343	1.15–1.57	0.000	1.212	1.08–1.36	0.001
Wet year seen as best harvest	5.164	2.61–10.2	0.000	6.729	2.77–16.4	0.000	2.500	1.32–4.74	0.005
Household has irrigation	1.008	0.495–2.05	0.982	1.493	0.408–5.46	0.000	0.742	0.393–1.40	0.358
Dry year millet production	1.022	0.999–1.05	0.051	1.001	0.978–1.02	0.000	1.006	.984–1.03	0.560
Dry year rice production	1.001	1.00–1.01	0.023	1.006	1.00–1.01	0.030	0.999	0.994–1.00	0.705
Wet year millet production	0.999	0.984–1.01	0.903	1.026	1.01–1.04	0.001	1.015	1.00–1.03	0.034
Wet year rice production	0.996	0.991–1.00	0.159	0.0995	0.988–1.00	0.272	1.002	0.998–1.01	0.207

Discussion

Irrigation is often promoted as a way for farmers to maintain production levels in dry years, and thereby forestall migrations. In this case study of the irrigated zone within Niono, Mali for the years 1999 to 2003, access to irrigation was associated with higher rice-production levels. Households with access to irrigation were relatively more affluent: more of the household heads had gone to school and had desirable durable consumer items such as a radio, bicycle or motorcycle. In contrast, households without access to irrigation were more likely to have migrants, and among those without irrigation, households which did not have their needs covered by the last harvest were most likely to have migrant members. This suggests that irrigation access enhances a household's production, so the members do not need the additional contributions that would be made by migrant members.

This does not mean, however, that households with access to irrigation avoided migration. Half the households had migrant members, whether or not they had access to irrigation. Even those with access to irrigation, who were self-sufficient through their own production, had migrant members, albeit less frequently. Among households with access to irrigation, migration is most likely during the relatively wet years. In these years, the additional rainfall extends the area under irrigation into 'spillover' zones, creating additional opportunities for members to earn money or in-kind grains through assisting in the cultivation or harvesting of grain on other lands than their own.

However, after controlling for individual and household characteristics, and average levels of production, access to irrigation was found to be associated only with migrations during the average rainfall years. Contrary to the overall pattern expected, during these years households with access to irrigation were 1.5 times more likely than those without irrigation access to have migrant members, and 80 per cent of these members went to other locations with irrigation. Among the group of households with access to irrigation, those with migrants were relatively less well-off. Thus, it became apparent that, for the less well-off, irrigation does not sufficiently increase their production, and they still need the income that members earn through work for others with irrigated fields.

In years of climate variability, when rainfall drops below or rises above the average level for the period, access to irrigation does not deter migration. Given that almost half of migrations in this district are circular, it is likely that, during both dry and wet years, migrants move to take advantage of localised opportunities for counter-season cultivation or wage-labour in harvests occurring at different times than those of their own fields.

There was little evidence that the migrations were a response to rainfall shortfalls in specific years. Migrations were

not clustered in the dry years, but instead were spread among the years with average, dry and wet relative rainfall, with the greatest concentration (48%) being in the years with relative rainfall *above* the decade average. This pattern suggests that migration in Niono may reflect long-term strategies to use migration as part of livelihood strategy. With this strategy, the primary household remains intact while one or more members move; migration of some members permits the other family members to stay and not migrate. This pattern is fairly common in other nearby locations in Mali, as well as elsewhere in the Sahel (Adams & Mortimore 1997; Barbier et al. 2009; Cordell et al. 1996; de Haan et al. 2002; Findley & Sow 1998; Hampshire 2002; Konseiga 2006)

Another indication that these migrations are more than a response to short-term fluctuations in climate variability is that they include movements both in and out of the households. Some households received labour in-migrants, while others sent members out to work. During the dry years, the modal migrant typified the expected response to drought, namely out-migration, but during the average and wet years most migrants were circulatory, suggesting that migration is part of the household's long-term production strategy, which includes retaining the benefits of its own labour, rather than shedding it (Cordell et al. 1996; Massey 1990).

We used the households' average production of millet and rice in a dry year (2000) and wet year (1999) as a measure of the influence of rainfall variation on household crop production. Our analyses show that the variability in household production during dry versus wet years influences migration patterns linked to relative rainfall variability. *During a relatively dry year*, households that average relatively high millet production are more likely to have migrant members. Dry-year migrants move mainly to the irrigated sector of Niono where they obtain wage labour cultivating counter-season crops, or use some of their own crop revenues to invest in

their own production of a counter-season crop. We believe that this accounts for their producing rice during dry years, as this is an indication of their regular reliance on migrant-produced rice as part of their strategy in dry years. *During an average relative rainfall year*, households with especially high millet production have migrant members, but households with high millet production in wet years are more likely to have migrants during the average rainfall years than any of the other household groups are. Those which are typically at the low end of rice production during a wet year also are likely to have migrants during average rainfall years. Households with migrants during the average relative rainfall years are the least prone to produce a counter-season crop, so it is likely that their migrations involve the pursuit of wage labour, either harvesting in others' fields, or in occupations in the town of Niono, or elsewhere in the region. Finally, *during a relatively wet year*, households which typically have higher millet production levels during a wet year are likely to have migrant members. While over half of these migrants work on counter-season crops, it is likely that during the relatively wet years most migrants are likely to seek wage labour – similarly to dry-year migrants.

The influence of both rice and millet production on migration patterns reflects the diversification of household cereal production in Niono. Millet was typically grown by households in the non-irrigated areas, while rice was grown in the irrigated zone. But it appears that this specialisation is being replaced by more diversification, with the majority of households without access to irrigation now being also involved in rice production and counter-season crops. Since they do not have access to irrigation for their own lands, they produce these crops by migrating to other parts of Niono, where they either cultivate them on land they rent or work as wage labourers, paid in kind. Village heads indicated that more and more households were establishing seasonal settlements

near or in the irrigated zone to facilitate access to irrigated agricultural opportunities. In this case, rice-growing serves as a cash crop for families. Households with access to irrigation also show some diversification, with almost one in ten cultivating millet either on marginal lands at the edge of their irrigated areas or as migrants or wage labourers on land outside the irrigated zone.

Our study illustrates a potential cascading impact of climate variability on the livelihoods of families in Niono, and the potential for irrigation to facilitate alternative adjustments to climate-related changes in agricultural production. Households with access to irrigation had higher standards of living than those without such access to irrigation, but both types of household were subject to production variability associated with climate variability. The patterns of migration from these households show that migration may be a critical link allowing families without irrigation to compensate for anticipated production losses in a rainfall-deficit year by moving to an irrigated zone. But access to irrigation does not necessarily mean that households can depend on their own production to support themselves. The analyses presented here suggest that those with and without access to irrigation for their own lands both take advantage of the irrigation in the district to seek out additional earning opportunities. While the patterns of these migrations vary, depending on the household's production levels and the relative rainfall of the year, it is clear that migration to work on others' irrigated lands is a widely used strategy to complement a household's own production. Thus, irrigation and circular migration become key elements of household strategies for staying in Niono.

Current forecasts for the Sahel suggest temperature increases of 0.2 degrees centigrade per decade, accompanied by more rainfall, but the duration of the rainy season is expected to be shorter, so the net effect of climate change may be to lower cereal production levels (Kandji et al. 2006). In

order for families to continue to live and work in the district, more of them will need to gain access to irrigation, and more of them will further need to combine irrigation and migration strategies. While the canal irrigation model existing in Niono may not be sustainable due to high rates of water loss and salinisation (Kandji et al. 2006), a recently recommended drip-system irrigation (see Eichenseher 2010) may actually have greater potential to expand access to irrigation. Currently, households have to move to the managed areas near the canal to access irrigation, but with drip systems it may be possible to extend the irrigation over a broader area, permitting greater access with less migration. Failing such an outcome, it seems likely that Sahelian communities such as Niono will continue to combine various permutations of irrigated and non-irrigated cultivation, with migrations within the zone and to nearby areas enabling households to tap into alternative livelihood possibilities.

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Bequeathing Migration Work to Younger Generations: Aderanti Adepoju's Legacy

T.O. Fadayomi

Introduction

Aderanti Adepoju's extensive works – from the 1970s to the present day – on internal and international migration and development in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, and his role in institutional development and capacity building for the expansion of migration studies and the advancement of migration management in Africa, constitute the focus of this review.

After the end of the Second World War, migration studies and research received considerable emphasis in the developing countries that were at that time just beginning the process of rapid socio-economic transformation. This was fuelled largely by the exigencies of colonial economies and administrations which were bringing about a noticeable drift of people from their erstwhile rural and familiar communities to the towns and cities. This pattern of socio-economic change, built up gradually into a new urban way of life for many in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and gave birth to generalisations

initially drawn from the Eurocentric experience of industrialism and urbanisation and observations of rural-to-urban labour transfers. This was happening, however in the context of rapid population growth and rudimentary transport and communication networks. An additional factor was the export of raw materials from the rural hinterlands of the colonial settlements to the major cities, through colonial intermediary commercial organisations situated in the few towns that were relatively well infrastructurally-equipped.

The social and economic development experiences of Western Europe and North America were characterised by the gradual reallocation of labour from agriculture to industry through rural-urban migration, both internal and international (Todaro & Smith 2006). This led to the association of urbanisation with industrialisation in the process of economic development and served as a blueprint for the development of third world countries, as formulated in Arthur Lewis's general theory of the development process (Lewis 1954).

In the Lewis model, the underdeveloped economy consists of two contrasting sectors: a rural economic sector characterised by surplus labour whose productivity is marginal to the rural economy, and an urban sector whose industries are an attraction for the rural surplus labour. According to this model, the rate at which labour moves out of the rural subsistence economy depends on the rate of industrial investment and capital accumulation in the modern urban economy. Modern-sector employment expansion is therefore assumed to continue until all surplus rural labour is absorbed in the new industrial sector. But overwhelming evidence since the 1950s, when developing nations started to witness a massive migration of their rural populations into urban areas – despite rising levels of urban unemployment and underemployment – weakens the validity of the Lewis two-sector model and calls for alternative explanations of rural-urban drift in developing countries (Todaro & Smith 2006).

One explanation was found in the Todaro-Harris model which tried to explain the apparently paradoxical relationship of accelerated rural-urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment and rural stagnation (Harris & Todaro 1970). According to this model, migration proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in *expected* income rather than actual earnings. Hence, migrants consider the various labour market opportunities open to them in the rural and urban sectors and choose the one that they expect will maximise their gains. In this context, it is possible to have continued migration despite the existence of sizable rates of urban unemployment, and this is why high rates of urban unemployment in developing countries are inevitable outcomes for as long as imbalances in economic opportunities between urban and rural areas are perceived by potential movers as favouring the urban.

It is against this migration-development paradigm of the second half of the last century that we would discuss here, and fully appreciate, Adepoju's works on internal migration and development in Africa – works which span the 1970s to the end of the last century.

Adepoju's works on international migration, which came into prominence right from the 1980s, are an off-shoot of his interest in the field of migration and his concerns about its development impact on international relations between Africa and Europe. They are empirically based on the general movement of persons from postcolonial Africa to countries of the North – a movement which can be conceptualised as an 'international version' of the Harris-Todaro model. Theoretically, the outflow of African manpower to the North hinges, in most cases, on the difference between actual wages at the migrant's origin and the expected wages at destination. This difference must then be adjusted for migration costs such as restrictive policies in immigrant countries, transportation costs from origin to destination, time and ease of adjustment

to the social and political environment of the immigrant country, and so on.

Apart from the wage and migration cost effects, the literature points to current demographic trends – both in the countries of the North and in developing countries such as those of Africa – as being a crucial factor in South to North migration. The labour force in many countries of the North is expected peak around the present time (2010) and then decline by around 5 per cent in each of the subsequent two decades, accompanied by rapid increases in dependency ratios, resulting from ageing. Conversely, the labour force in many African countries is expanding because of the onset of fertility transition, resulting in declines in dependency ratios. This imbalance was expected to reduce the restrictive policies in countries of the North, encourage the liberalisation of immigration policies, and generate a strong demand for workers from developing countries. It is also argued in the literature that the emigration of skilled professionals from developing to developed countries would tend to raise the expected benefit to individual migrants from education and training. It would also induce additional investment in education, engendering an increase in the average level of education and in the skills of emigrants. However, this form of ‘brain gain’ may not bring higher wages to migrants at their places of destination. Skilled immigrants may earn less than nationals of the country of destination even if their skills are equal to, or even superior to, those of the nationals of the host country, thus experiencing ‘brain waste’ due to discrimination or excessive restrictions to entry in certain professions.

To appreciate Adepaju’s contributions, it is appropriate to juxtapose them with some of the afore-mentioned prevailing generalisations about the North-South migration. This chapter elaborates on the theoretical perspectives of Africa-Europe migration (Fadayomi (2010).

Another contribution to the field of migration in Africa – which reflects Aderanti Adepoju’s passion for this subject – has been his pioneering efforts at mobilising African researchers and scholars in the field of migration to build a viable regional migration research network that can sustain continued interest, especially among a new generation of scholarship in the field. His major contributions in this regard form another focus of this review.

Adepoju and internal migration in Africa

Aderanti Adepoju’s work contains a great deal of search and review of the literature, especially regarding Africa’s internal and international migration since the end of World War II. Instead of detailed referencing within this text, therefore, bibliographical references are provided in the list at the end of this chapter of some of the relevant works that Adepoju himself has referenced over the years.

Adepoju frequently directs the attention of his readers to the paucity of reliable and up-to-date data for migration studies in Africa. While censuses have provided some useful information on migration, the census operation itself is often restricted in terms of the amount and type of questions it can provide – they normally contain only limited direct questions on migration. Another problem is the long intervals between censuses: they are normally conducted at only ten-year intervals, and tend to underestimate migration rates where repeat, circular or return migration are significant phenomena. They are thus not suitable for collecting detailed data on issues such as reasons for migrating, repeat migration, and so on. For these reasons, sample surveys are increasingly used to gather information on migration, from both rural and urban areas.

Large-scale surveys are few, while existing small-scale surveys have provided detailed information, particularly of a

retrospective and prospective nature, and are more flexible than national censuses. Information on motivations and patterns of migration, remittances and links with the origin-places of the migrants have been obtained through these small-scale surveys. However data derived from sample surveys are location specific and are in most cases not generalisable to the larger population.

Adepoju's works on Nigeria are based on micro-surveys carried out in selected rural and urban communities of South-West Nigeria and the findings have provided a platform for his reflections on similar studies carried out in other African countries. He observed that African societies have specific patterns and motivations – and their consequences – which are extremely different from the experiences and motivations of the countries of the North – from which most theories of migration in relation to development originate (and to which they do largely apply).

Adepoju's studies and observations confirm the selectivity of migration in terms of age and education, and in the ability of the more educated rural youths to assess the risks and the potential opportunities in the city employment landscape. He sees rural-to-urban migration as involving many people in a network of relations at urban destinations, with new arrivals staying with relations and friends before and after gaining an urban job. Contact with origin is kept both by going back on home visits, and by participating in remittances to origin. Data on remittance-sending is sparse; remittances tend to defy exact calculation since they often include presents and other goods.

With respect to migration decision-making, Adepoju observed that the process in Africa is largely a household rather an individual concern. Who it is that moves and who stays in a particular destination is in part a function of an individual's disposition to migrate in terms of attributes such as education,

skills, awareness of opportunities at destination, family members and friends who have previously migrated, availability of transportation, financial support at destination, and so on. But, over and above all those, this decision depends also on familial consent and support. The household plays an important role in the allocation of resources to its members and in expected contributions by its members to the survival of the household as a primary – and decision-making – unit. This empirical observation is more realistic than the assumption underlying the classical migration behavioural model.

Whereas the Todaro model was concerned with the problem of urban unemployment, a substantial proportion of migrants in Africa seek self-employment in the urban informal sector. Thus the towns attract not only labour migrants but also entrepreneurs, craftsmen and even small-scale industrialists who serve as the bedrock of informal training centres for apprentices.

In the case of wages, migrants may not achieve the expected urban wage – one commensurate with their education and skills – as their experience and knowledge relate only to working conditions and wage rates in rural areas. Since their knowledge about prevailing wage conditions in the towns may be limited, they are more likely than local people might be to take up low-paying jobs, thus ensuring their quick absorption into the labour market.

The Todaro model emphasises wage differentials between urban and rural areas and the impact of increases in urban wage rates on migration and unemployment, but Adepoju has remarked that this has not improved our understanding of the causes of non-mobility among a large proportion of the rural population. The emphasis on rural-urban migration in the migration model has obscured other dominant migration types that were more prevalent during the colonial period.

An example is rural-rural migration within countries which consisted predominantly of middle-aged persons, mainly illiterate, whose major motivation was to exploit the agricultural and related potential in the rural areas. This type of migration, which may also take the form of group movement from a common origin to a common destination, started during the colonial era but gained considerable momentum after the end of World War II, particularly, in Nigeria, in the cocoa- and rubber-growing regions of the South-West.

By looking at migration in colonial times, Adepoju has unearthed other factors of African internal migration triggered by colonial economic policies. Apart from the development of an export-economy with the attendant creation of prime cities, he has pointed out that the imposition of tax on the adult population led to migration into wage employment away from the usual subsistence farming in the rural areas. The creation of seasonal short-term migration was a viable means of meeting the needs of this new economic order. The introduction of internationally-accepted currency to replace the various forms of local currencies for the purchase of new goods and services, and to pay colonial taxes, was a major inducement for migration in colonial times. Similarly, the development of rudimentary transport and communication systems, and the cessation of internecine warfare and political rivalry fostered internal migration.

During the postcolonial period, African countries built their development strategies on colonial economic models, thus intensifying the export orientation of development, and concentrating infrastructural facilities and services in the towns – to the neglect of the rural areas. The export-oriented development path and the concentration of massive investments in a few cities have been a major cause of the regional inequality which has further paved the way for migration.

Some of the other factors affecting internal migration in African countries relate to postcolonial policies designed to alter population distribution. In former centrally-planned African economies such as Tanzania, Zambia and Somalia, experimental programmes, including rural development, agricultural projects, village regrouping and so on, have been created to encourage youths and adults to remain in or return to rural areas. Farm settlement schemes were set up in the early years of independence in Ghana and Nigeria, to absorb young potential migrants in the rural farming economy. In other countries with free market economies, policies designed to stimulate the development of secondary towns by providing economic and other incentives, and the creation of new cities such as Dodoma in Tanzania, Yamoussoukro in Côte d'Ivoire, Abuja in Nigeria for strategic and political reasons, has indirectly influenced population distribution and the movement of persons to urban centres.

In many parts of Africa where agricultural production deteriorated considerably in the late 1970s and early 1980s, migration to urban areas became a survival strategy designed to produce cash income, and diversify family income, as a means of reducing absolute dependence on agriculture.

Adepoju and international migration within and outside Africa

Adepoju's foray into the international dimension of migration started with the study of intra-African migration from the 1980s. He has looked at the issues of migration of ECOWAS⁹⁸ nationals into Nigeria for employment (Adepoju 1988a, 2002), migration to and from South Africa (Adepoju 2003), the expulsion of illegal migrants in African countries (Adepoju 1984), and the role of African economic communities in intra-

98. The Economic Community of West African States.

African migration (Adepoju 1998, 2001). His further studies on international migration have examined African migration to Europe, its implications for the origin and destination of migrants (Adepoju 1991, 2006a), and the linkages between the migrants and their African origins (Adepoju 2010b).

International migration within Africa

Adepoju has pointed out that the free movement of people in Africa has a long tradition which pre-dates the colonial period. Pre-colonial population movement involved large groups of people moving over great areas – as farmers, nomads, traders, warriors and pilgrims – unrestricted by formal regulations or borders created by the colonial partition of Africa. Even, when the colonies were created, few African countries articulated immigration laws, and far fewer were able to enforce them rigidly as migrants often flouted such regulations – either deliberately or out of ignorance. This is still the case among ethnically homogeneous groups split by artificial national boundaries.

Free movements have been facilitated by the cultural affinity of communities divided by international boundaries and the colonial policies of both the French and the British in West Africa, and of the latter in East Africa, that actually encouraged labour reserves. In addition there are the nomads of Somali stock, and the nomads of Sahel countries in West Africa. These nomads pay little attention to international borders, and their migration patterns are largely undocumented, even in national statistics.

The attainment of political independence substantially altered the erstwhile free movement of persons across African countries. With independence, free international (or inter-ethnic) movements were further restricted by the imposition an elaborate system of visas, passport regulations and customs procedures, as well as the demand that foreign workers obtain

work permits, and the new restrictions on repatriated savings. The newly-independent countries imposed these barriers in order to reserve available employment opportunities for their own nationals and thus raise the standard of living of their citizens.

Initially, most of these restrictions were hardly enforced, but as economic hardships began to take their toll on the living standards of citizens, each country became stricter in the monitoring of its borders to control 'illegal' incoming workers. In addition, employers were required to check the immigration status of potential employees before offering employment. Nevertheless, the lack of integrity and corrupt practices of immigration officials who collude with illegal migrants hinder the effective implementation of these laws. The corruption of officials and administrative laxity that prevail in African countries make it difficult for citizens in need of passports to obtain them within a reasonable time. The difficulty in obtaining such documentation may thus force migrants to leave their countries illegally, thereby compelling them to enter the host country illegally.

Long porous borders, virtually uncontrolled and often lacking any physical landmark, facilitate the unrestrained movement of people along bush paths – for example to Nigeria, Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire, where superior economic situations provide an attraction for migrant workers from neighbouring countries.

At the supra-national level, members of regional economic communities such as the defunct East African Economic Community, the Central African Federation and the Economic Community of West African States pursued, among others, a policy of free movement of persons within the respective communities. The existence of these institutions is therefore among the factors that no doubt accelerate the tempo of both legal and undocumented migration in Africa.

Expulsions and deportation are common policy measures directed at illegal migrants resident in African countries. Waves of expulsions of non-nationals were recorded in the 1960s in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea and Cameroon, in the 1970s in Chad, Uganda, Zambia, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire and Kenya, and in the 1980s in Nigeria and Liberia.

The Nigerian experience

In his exposition on Nigerian immigration, Adepoju has drawn useful lessons from similar studies elsewhere in the continent. In the pre-colonial era, Nigerian immigrants in Ghana established a network of economic contacts between the two countries. These migrants specialised in certain activities: the Yorubas were mainly traders, the Hausas were unskilled labourers and traders, and later Ibo immigrants were employed as skilled and semi-skilled workers in the gold mines, and as labourers and domestic stewards.

During the colonial era, a series of economic and recruitment policies was employed to stimulate regional labour migration. The development of plantation economies in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire attracted labour from both within and beyond national borders. Free movement of labour was encouraged from Mali, Togo and Burkina Faso to such development projects in Senegal, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Transport development also facilitated labour migration by reducing the distances and hazards of journeys characteristic of long distance migrations.

The deteriorating economic situation and the unstable political scene among Nigeria's neighbours (especially Ghana in the late 1960s) led to a massive exodus from the country of both skilled and unskilled persons. On the other hand the rise in oil revenue in the early 1970s led the Nigerian government to embark on various socio-economic development

programmes aimed at generating demand for labour – at all skill levels – within the country. The wage increases in the mid-1970s generated huge wage differentials between Nigeria and its neighbours. At the same time, several factors acted as a strong push from the neighbouring countries: problems of sluggish economic growth, food deficits, unemployment, foreign exchange shortages, political instability, and drought in the Sahelian region, especially Mali, Niger and Chad.

With the coming into force of the ECOWAS treaty in 1979, thousands of aliens of West African origin – especially from Togo, Benin and Ghana – immigrated into Nigeria. Even though the majority of these migrants did not possess legal entry documents, they were readily absorbed into the construction industry as labourers, artisans, domestic workers, drivers, cleaners, and so on. By the end of the 1970s or in the early 1980s, however, the economic boom in Nigeria had receded, and the effect of rapidly-declining oil revenues became highly visible in terms of worsening unemployment. Workers were retrenched. Anti-alien sentiments built up, and in January 1983, most illegal aliens were expelled.

In the Nigerian case, as other places in Africa, the events leading to the expulsion of aliens were gradual, but in all cases the actual expulsion or decision to expel was usually sudden and dramatic. These decisions are based on national interests – in contradiction to the regional community treaties which encourage free movement of persons, relocation of economic activities, and right of residence.

In general, migrants are viewed as a force of disruption rather than as one of economic progress. Whenever and wherever economic fortunes deteriorate, migrants are very often seen as the ‘culprits’. Wavering political will and a lack of commitment to a regional community, together with political instability and a reluctance to surrender national sovereignty to a sub-regional union have rendered the African

economic communities ineffective. Persistent border disputes in the recent past have resulted in the expulsion of community citizens in contravention of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, and have retarded progress in the ratification and the implementation of this and similar protocols. Growing xenophobia is often fanned by media misreporting and by politicians hastily blaming so-called illegal migrants for all society's ills.

In spite of these intra-regional migration hurdles, poverty has propelled a wide variety of migration configurations, including autonomous female migration and trafficking in women and children. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, a large proportion of economically dependent women in the continent have been increasingly pushed into the labour force. The main reasons for this have been a fall in real household wages, rising unemployment, the removal of subsidies on basic goods and services, the introduction of charges for health and education, and worsening conditions for the sending of remittances by migrant members of the household, as well as for income supplements from the main bread-winners. The economic downturn and social disintegration have reduced women's family resource bases, and increased their responsibilities. Hence we are witnessing today a phenomenon of female migration directed toward attaining economic independence through self-employment or wage income.

The South African experience

Adepoju describes the international migration patterns to and from South Africa in terms of continuity and changing configurations. Continuity and change, in his view, indicate that some of the features of pre-apartheid migration persist along with newly-emerging patterns of post-apartheid migration.

In the apartheid years of the early 1970s, South Africa's neighbours – for example Lesotho, Malawi and Mozambique

– dominated the supply of labour to South Africa as unskilled farm labourers and mine workers. This pattern has, to a large extent, continued since majority rule in 1994, along with the arrival of new types of immigrants from north of the Zambezi, including a significant number from West Africa who are highly skilled professionals and teachers. Many of these are employed in universities and other professions, and along with them are tradesmen from countries such as Senegal and Mali, often working as street vendors and small traders – joining their counterparts from Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. Yet others come from Ethiopia, Somalia and the East African countries.

A major cause of immigration into South Africa is the disparity in economic development and living standards between South Africa and other African countries. This phenomenon has attracted migrants of all categories from Africa and beyond despite the daunting problems of unemployment, crime, widespread poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Significant numbers of Africans migrated clandestinely to the former apartheid ‘homelands’ of South Africa to work mainly as teachers, university professors, doctors and engineers. This was in contrast to the traditional sources of semi-skilled and unskilled migrant labour, notably from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi, and Botswana. Majority rule in 1994 opened up prospects for immigration from other sub-Saharan countries whose nationals had till then been barred by the apartheid government from migrating to the country. While South Africa is experiencing immigration, it is also a major exporter of skilled migrants, so the incoming professionals have, to some extent, been replacing skilled white engineers and doctors who have emigrated to countries such as Australia, Canada, the USA and Britain.

During the era of apartheid, the black population was united against the ruling-class perpetrators of apartheid. In

recent years, however, xenophobia against immigrants has emerged among the local populace, and has even been demonstrated by some politicians. The immigrants – both legal and illegal – are accused by many South Africans of adding to crime, of taking scare jobs through low-wage competition, and of exploiting local girls by marrying them solely to obtain residence permits. In 1994, more than 90 000 illegal immigrants, mostly Mozambicans, were deported, while the recent violence directed against aliens – especially that of mid-2008 – has affected all African immigrants. The decades of apartheid, segregation policies, and the iniquitous ‘pass laws’ have left South Africa without an informal sector, where you now find some immigrants and their local employees.

International migration out of Africa

Adepoju characterises emigration from Africa as ‘South to North’ migration, that is from African countries to the more developed countries of Europe, North America and the Middle East. His observations echo some of the findings on intra-African migration. While migrants within the region include farmers, pastoralists, nomads, refugees with mixed characteristics, labourers and traders, South-North migration involves a substantial number of highly-skilled persons originating from countries where economies have collapsed and where both secondary and tertiary education, which expanded tremendously after the late 1960s, have created a pool of educated and skilled cadres.

In most African countries in the 1960s and 1970s, education expanded faster than the absorptive capacity of their economies. What initially surfaced as school-leaver unemployment has increasingly taken the form of graduate unemployment. In addition, the deteriorating working conditions of professionals adversely affected the efficiency of professional and technical cadres, some of whom have, in

frustration, opted for employment in developed countries where their skills are in demand. In an unstable political climate or in poor economic conditions, both of which affect security of life and general living standards, skilled professionals and technicians are often the first to leave – seeing themselves as being ‘forced out’ – as was the case in Ethiopia and Uganda. In Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana and a few other countries that have devalued their currencies, living standards have deteriorated drastically, the salaries of professionals have slumped, and real purchasing power has declined in the face of high inflation.

Adepoju examined the impact of emigration on Africa, at both personal and national levels, in terms of domestic employment, production, wages and remittances, and human capital. He tentatively concluded that the demographic, economic and political situations in Africa signal the possibility of increased migration to the North in the years ahead. He assessed the economic situation and the prospects for economic recovery in Africa during the last decade and came to the conclusion that prospects for economic recovery are bleak, hence the proliferation of economic crises in African states – even in attractive migrant-receiving countries. The rapidly-growing labour force and the backlog of educated but jobless youths suggest that the pool of the unemployed will increase. As these processes take root, the lure of countries of the North, he believes, will wax strong. Those in diaspora are likely to stay on, as prospects for return to devastated economies and war-torn countries are unattractive.

Adepoju frequently draws the attention of his readers to the current restrictive immigration policies of the countries of the North, which he sees as being largely in response to high domestic unemployment and the xenophobic reactions to immigrants, and suggests that economic integration in Africa offers an alternative as a long-term prospect for stimulating intra-African labour mobility.

Policy significance of Adepoju's findings on internal migration

In addition to his elaboration on the nature of internal migration in Africa, and in Nigeria in particular – especially from the period after World War II – Adepoju has put forward some significant policy implications of his findings.

In Africa, the bulk of the annual entry into the labour force comes from the rural areas, and the continent's major manpower problems lie in the rural sector, which is also the source of the bulk of migratory movements in the country. Thus, in most African countries the success of development plans depends largely on the success achieved in developing the rural sector. In order to address the problem of the rural sector, what is needed, Adepoju says, is an integrated rural development programme which encompasses improvements in rural human capital, improvements in land utilisation, land tenure, reduction in unemployment and under-employment, and changing the exploitative village-town relationship. Improving rural incomes is also desirable. Few non-farm occupations, such as small-scale cottage industries and crafts, are economically viable in villages because of the high level of poverty, the poor purchasing power of the usually small population base, inadequate transportation, a lack of marketing facilities, and competition in towns from mass-produced goods – all of which effectively limit the extent of the market for rural informal activities.

Unlike most young unemployed city-bound migrants, who often remain unemployed for some time at destination, rural-rural migrants can make a very considerable contribution to the growth of the economy of their destination areas; they also serve as change agents, introducing new crops and new farming methods to the local populace. For this reason, existing land tenure systems should be liberalised to facilitate land

ownership and commercial transactions for a more effective exploitation of the natural resources by migrants.

Farm labour has become increasingly scarce and relatively more expensive. Adepoju's exposition has shown that diminishing farm productivity results from the ageing profile of the agricultural population – especially since age and productivity are directly related in a hoe-and-cutlass farming. The drain of rural manpower through the outmigration of youths, and the resulting dependence on scarce and expensive migrant labour, call again for concerted and integrated rural development programmes to address the employment challenges of rural youths and prevent a sizeable proportion of them from migrating to urban unemployment.

It is now increasingly realised by government planners that, in dealing with migration problems, disproportionate emphasis has been placed on the symptoms of migration to urban areas – especially the slums and shanty areas – through a series of accommodationist policies such as the expansion of city infrastructures to cope with rapidly growing demand for urban services, rather than making attempts to find lasting solutions through balanced urban-rural development. Since the problems in the towns are rooted in the rural areas, causes and solutions must be sought in the broader context of comprehensive development strategies that focus on integrated urban and rural development.

Unless effective and relevant long-term migration policies and measures are formulated as a part of each country's development strategy, efforts to promote economic growth might be frustrated by uncontrolled city-bound migration with the attendant economic, social, political and administrative repercussions.

Policy significance of Adepoju's findings on international migration

Within intra-African migration, Adepoju identifies the current centres of attraction as well as those of emigration. There is substantial intra-African migration from Burkina Faso, Uganda, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Rwanda, Burundi, Tunisia, Algeria and Mozambique, and the main receiving countries he identifies as Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and until recently Nigeria, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

The phenomenon of intra-African migration, which has been on the increase since the 1970s, has been attributed to the tightening of immigration laws in developed countries, increased employment opportunities in the region, the formation of economic cooperation unions with protocols on the free movement of citizens of member states in these sub-regional unions, and the oil-led growth of some African economies.

In spite of these favourable conditions for intra-African migration, the balkanisation of sub-Saharan African countries along erstwhile colonial lines – franco-, anglo- and lusophone – has hindered rather than promoted regional integration and the free mobility of labour in the region. In addition, the regional economic unions are often dominated by the economies of a single country – for example South Africa in SADC⁹⁹, Gabon in UDEAC, Côte d'Ivoire in CEAO, Nigeria in ECOWAS, and Congo in CEPGL – leading to mistrust, suspicion and xenophobic reactions. Also, community laws, regulations, policies, protocols and strategies are often overridden by national interests expressed in terms of an indigenisation of rules and laws. Where national interests and

99. The full titles of these economic unions are given in the 'Abbreviations and acronyms' list at the front of the book.

community aspirations conflict, national interests prevail, to the disadvantage of migrants.

Adepoju thus calls on African leaders and policy makers to see the potentials of regional economic communities in respect of international migration. Economic integration in the region offers a long-term prospect for stimulating intra-regional labour mobility. Persistent political unrest and the fragmented, weak national economies make the success of regional and sub-regional economic groupings imperative. Regional communities must however address the issues of rights of residence and establishment of migrants – as well as the rights and obligations of host countries. Concerted advocacy and public education on the positive aspects of migrants as agents of development (in both source and destination countries) will be required if the hostility against migrants is to be halted.

According to Adepoju's accounts, international migration from Africa to Europe was occurring along the colonial routes to the metropolis long before the political re-organisation in Europe that led to the formation of the EEC. Observers fear that the EEC countries may now find it politically expedient to give preference to migrants from Eastern Europe rather than to those from Africa – as evidenced by the recent xenophobic reactions to African immigrants in France, Germany, Holland and even Sweden.

With respect to migration from Africa to the North, Adepoju has highlighted the issues of disaffected highly-skilled Africans, differentials in employment opportunities and professional advancement between Africa and the North, general economic recession and the deteriorating working conditions of professionals and academics, legal migration types, and clandestine migration and its drawbacks and dangers, restrictions, expulsions and deportations, and the issue of remittances.

Young African migrants have, over the years, been adopting more sophisticated, daring and evasive methods to

enter the countries of the North as these countries tighten their border controls. Some of these migrants enter the host countries legitimately as tourists or students but overstay their visa period and work and live there without officially changing their status. Others travel via intermediate countries such as Gambia, Cape Verde or Guinea Conakry to obtain false documentation for a fee and then travel to Spain, Portugal, Italy or Libya, at times via another intermediate country, giving rise to a multi-polar and multi-dimensional migratory path. So, while some continue with the traditional two-step moves from a village to a coastal city and thence, later, to Europe, many others pursue varied itineraries through Sahelian or coastal African cities to reach Europe, the ultimate destination.

Young Africans are now willing to take greater risks to gain entry into Europe. Although firm statistics are not available, it is evident that trafficking in illegal migrants, previously a rare phenomenon, is on the increase. There are many accounts of unscrupulous agents who exploit youths with promises of passages to Italy, Spain and France via Dakar and Las Palmas. Some of these would-be migrants are stranded on the way; others find their way through – often only to be apprehended and deported on arrival or soon after. In addition to sporadic incidents of stowaways on board boats to southern Europe, there have been reports recently of clandestine travel to places as far away as East Asia.

When this situation is juxtaposed with the weakening and disintegration of family control, the high aspirations of the youth, and the unemployment and poverty they experience as fallout from the insufficient economic fortunes of the region, stronger regional economic communities with emphasis on faster rates of economic and social development and integrative institutions are clearly highly desirable. They could serve the purpose of retaining potential migrants, brain circulation and precipitating the return of North-based

emigrants and the African diasporas, with their remittances as a viable source of additional investments.

Lastly, Adepoju laments the paucity of information on the stock and flow of Africans abroad, and the fact that such information is wholly absent from the literature of most governmental and non-governmental sources. Hence he recommends the establishment of a data base on African experts at home and abroad, highlighting existing knowledge and gaps that can be exploited for the purpose of capacity building in national development priority programmes and projects.

Adepoju and the NOMRA legacy

Given his commitment to the studies of migration within and out of Africa, Adepoju, with institutional support from Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convened the first meeting of the Network of Migration Research on Africa (NOMRA) in June 2007. NOMRA is a collaborative organisation of researchers and scholars working on migration, especially international migration, in the region. Its overall aim of building up a viable regional migration research network and the research capacity of young scholars, and developing active focal points throughout the continent sets it apart from other networks.

NOMRA's key objectives are to assist in raising international migration issues and discourse at the highest political level; to develop capacity by training officials to help governments better understand migration management, and to develop research capacity in the region and enhance knowledge in migration research through the training of researchers. NOMRA also provides high-level advice and research services, on demand, for policy makers at national, sub-regional and regional levels while also assisting in raising the quality of international migration data-collection through innovative field research.

The regular activities of NOMRA include publishing and disseminating a quarterly 'Newsletter on Migration' in the

region in English and French; publishing and disseminating a bulletin and books on migration; doing research on topical migration issues; running training workshops for young professionals and government officials, and arranging conferences and collaborative activities with similar organisations.

NOMRA has collaborated with a number of research centres and institutions engaged in migration and development activities. For example, in 2009 NOMRA organised a regional workshop, 'Migration in West Africa and the Maghreb', jointly with the Hague Process on Refugees and Migration Policy. Other collaborations include those with the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana, the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at University of Warwick, the African Diaspora Policy Centre in Amsterdam, the Population Studies Centre at the University of Mozambique, and the Department of Demography and Social Statistics at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria (NOMRA n.d.).

NOMRA supports research projects for young researchers attached to more senior mentors, and in 2009 launched the inaugural conference on 'Challenges of African Migration in a Globalising World'. The outcome of the conference is a published volume: *International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World* (Adepoju 2010a). Chapters of the book deal with regional economic commissions and intra-regional migration potentials in Africa, the emigration of skilled professionals, the African diaspora and remittances flows, irregular migration within and from Africa, an institutional framework for the management of migrants in Africa, and promoting managed migration through bilateral and multilateral agreements between Europe and Africa. The volume's introduction, 'Rethinking the dynamics of migration within, from and to Africa', by Adepoju, sets the tone of the following chapters, written by NOMRA's senior scholars.

A major initiative of NOMRA in terms of the collection of data was the publication of Nigeria's 'Migration Profile', based on a project which is expected to be extended to other ECOWAS member states. As a result, NOMRA recently published *Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: a migration profile for Nigeria* (Adepoju & Van der Wiel 2010), a unique and comprehensive eighteen-chapter book which has brought together much information relevant to migration and development in Nigeria. This premier publication was based on data obtained from different sources relevant to migration policy and covers issues such as the labour market situation, labour demand and supply, skills needs in the country, skills available in the diaspora, migration flows, migrant remittances, return and integration of returnees, retention and reintegration of nationals and so on.

As a coordinator of this vital institution in migration research and information dissemination, Adepoju has placed much emphasis on the mentorship and induction of young scholars into migration scholarship – meeting a major challenge facing many African universities and research institutions today in respect of the dearth of relevant textbooks and journals dealing with migration, for the training of a new generation of African scholars. There are few specialists on migration in Africa, and these few are over-stretched by demands from governments, international development agencies and development partners. For this reason, Adepoju has striven to transfer expertise to a crop of younger persons, especially in institutions of higher learning where such training can have multiplier effects. In furtherance of this goal, NOMRA organised a carefully-packaged training for fifteen young professionals in migration research from West Africa in July 2010.

In Africa, as elsewhere, the mass media are extremely influential in shaping public opinion as many rely on television and newspapers as key sources of information. But

reporting on migration is often filled with prejudice, misinformation and xenophobia – in part because the media practitioners are themselves poorly informed about migration dynamics. Many rely on reportage from global networks which are filled with sensation rather than facts. In order to help cope with this problem, in May 2010 NOMRA undertook the first in a series of annual workshops for training both electronic and print media practitioners from Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The workshop, for sixteen media executives, was held in Ghana and enabled them also to share their experiences. Another result was the formation of a pioneer media migration network at the sub-regional level, with migration desks at national levels, creating a critical mass of migration reporters in these countries. The resulting West African network of journalists on migration aims to advance the vision of NOMRA.

Adepoju and the new generation of migration scholars

The brief review of Adepoju's works on migration in and out of Africa undertaken here is but a miniscule reflection of his discourse in print and on the podium. However, an attempt has been made to highlight his major thoughts, based on his empirical work and a literature review on Africa's internal and international migration. The policy thrust of Adepoju's deductions has been captured. Perhaps the significance of his work for a new generation of migration scholars in the field of migration, development and international relations lies most of all in the challenge he has thrown down in form of a road map of research priorities in the field. This challenge arises from the fact that one of the essential roles of research is to increase our knowledge base and guide policy makers in formulating appropriate policy measures to deal with specific problems, in this case, migration.

With regard to the discourse on internal migration in Africa, Adepoju's research draws from the literature on East, Central and South Africa which has been confined largely to labour migrants whose primary interest is wage employment in plantations or mining, or in industrial and administrative centres. The literature on West Africa looks at rural to urban and small town to city migration for formal- and informal-sector employment opportunities; at rural to rural movement for agricultural employment; at urban to rural for commercial activity, and at the return migration of some migrants to their origins.

As has been mentioned, Adepoju argues strongly that the household or family unit, rather than the individual, is the main decision-making unit on matters of migration in Africa, since migration is a phenomenon with costs and benefits which have extended implications for other members of the family. The neo-classical theories of migration, which place emphasis on the individual's decision-making and motivations, therefore need to be reviewed.

Along the same lines of criticism, Adepoju cautions younger researchers to note that, even though economic motives of migration are dominant, the roles of socio-cultural and psychological factors must also be taken into account as people migrate – on account of several non-economic factors such as the above-mentioned desire for a change of location, escape from boredom and cultural isolation in the African rural setting, joining family and friends, the attractions of specific social services located in the cities, and so on.

While most of the studies on internal migration have concentrated on the movers, Adepoju divides the population of a locality into three categories in respect of migration behaviour: high-potential movers, marginal movers, and the non-migrant sedentary population. While the motives for migration in the case of the first two groups appear increasingly

clear, our knowledge of the factors which inhibit migration among the last group is limited and a deeper investigation is called for. The findings of such studies could lead to the formulation of a more relevant strategy for improving the rural environment and thus reducing the incidence of migration among marginal migrants, as well as ensuring a more stable sedentary population.

The direct contribution to population growth by primary and follow-up migrants appears fairly measurable. However, the relative contribution of migrants to population growth – the differential contributions to the rate of natural increase by the fertility behaviour of migrants and non-migrants, and among the former, by those of rural and of urban origin – is not yet clear. Research into these issues could be very useful in determining whether the process of adaptation to urban living has an effect, in the long run, on behaviour relating to family size, and thus in formulating relevant reproductive health policies.

Innovative activities have featured in the movement and impact of migration at destination. We need, therefore, to explore the role of migrants as agents of diffusion of techniques, of material objects and of investments in the economic development of other African sub-regions. Such findings would aid governments in adopting appropriate policy measures to stimulate and develop the creative and competitive ability of these migrants in resource development.

The issue of urban to rural transfer of earnings accompanying urban-ward migration in African countries also needs further exploration, in order to gauge its impact on rural socio-economic transformation in Africa. Similarly, circular migration, or 'return migration', in which migrants initiate and terminate their migration career at the home place, needs further investigation with respect to its impact at origin.

Migration to small and medium-sized towns has not received adequate attention. These places serve as ports of

call in the process of step-migration from rural areas to the larger cities, as well as being the place of origin for some migrants and the ultimate destination for others. Studies which focus specifically on the existing role of medium-sized towns and their potential for growth could lead to a comprehensive development strategy under which a carefully-chosen few of them could be developed as secondary growth poles – that is, as alternate centres of development.

The movement of refugees is an important aspect of population distribution within Africa. For example, in the Horn of Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia all have significant refugee populations. As they cross international borders, refugees are regarded as international migrants or internally-displaced persons. Today, Africa is the continent with the largest number of refugees in the world. These refugees come predominantly from the most vulnerable groups: women, young children, the elderly and the handicapped. Research paying attention to refugees as migrants, studying their demographic characteristics, their relocation processes, their assimilation (or lack of assimilation) into host societies, their impact on population redistribution and so on, would indeed be worthwhile.

Other new forms of migration of increasing proportion, such as autonomous migration of females, both internally and internationally, have come to the fore in recent years. Women are becoming more autonomous through education, which facilitates their entry into the organised labour market, as well as increasing autonomous migration in western and southern Africa. We need to address this trend critically by making an analysis of the historical, structural and related factors which facilitate or inhibit female migration in different socio-cultural settings.

The number of undocumented or illegal migrants moving in and out of Africa may not be known, as only estimates are

available. Nevertheless, it can be speculated that undocumented migrants outnumber legal migrants. African youths are especially at risk because of their exaggerated aspirations, high levels of unemployment, and the deteriorating socio-economic and political environment. There is a need for further study into the circumstances of these youths in terms of their family situations. Among these are the ability of families to meet the basic needs of their members, the weakening – sometimes even disintegration – of family authority, and the influence of unscrupulous agents who entice youths with false information on migration opportunities.

Closely linked to the latter is the need to continue the ongoing study of brain drain and gain in Africa, with its attendant issues such as remittances and their utilisation in the development process at the places of origin of the migrants, and the role of the diasporas.

This review of Adepaju's works on both internal and international migration in Africa has clearly indicated how open the field of migration is to fresh hypotheses, and shown how many potential areas of further investigation await the new generation of migration scholars. This new generation have much benefit to derive from NOMRA – which was established precisely for the furtherance of the migration agenda in Africa. Adepaju has equally provided the basis of migration-management policies in African countries through a research-based rationale for integrated rural development and the fostering and strengthening of Africa's regional economic communities.

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CHAPTER 14

Internal Migration in Nigeria: Aderanti Adepaju's Research on Changing Dynamics and its Relevance to Development Issues

Akanni Akinyemi and Modupeola Kuteyi

Introduction

Nigerian migration studies between the 1970s and 1990s witnessed a significant number of research activities on both internal and international migration issues. However, the subject of migration in this period (and even before) was regarded as more or less secondary to other ongoing population and demographic events. Studies in the sphere of fertility and mortality appeared to have gained an upper hand, with much more interest and resources being devoted to these areas by researchers, as well as by both development (funding) partners and policy makers. At this time, the status of the country's migration configuration, in spite of its undoubted importance, remained in alignment with Prothero's 1968 description of migration as the 'Cinderella' of population

studies. It attracted very little interest from stakeholders, with internal migration being the least investigated in demographic enquiries in Nigeria. Data on migration were therefore very scanty, and analysis was less complete than for other demographic data (Prothero 1968).

This unhelpful label notwithstanding, progress in Nigerian migration studies was recorded by a few researchers who made an impact on this section of population dynamics – chief among them being Aderanti Adepoju. The focus of this chapter is on Adepoju's work on internal migration as evidenced by the contributions he made through several writings on issues that were very relevant at that time. His thorough study of the rural and urban Nigerian milieu not only provided immense insight into the state of migration affairs but also advocated a way forward, particularly regarding impending migration-related matters that were likely to be of serious concern in the not too distant future. His enthusiastic approach and efforts to make a positive impact in this field of study must, we believe, have been influenced by his very early observation that the deep concern expressed by Government and researchers for this branch of population study had not been matched by the requisite well-organised action-oriented research (Adepoju 1974b).

This chapter thus aims to catalogue some of the deeply significant contributions of this renowned migration scholar and icon – specifically with regard to internal migration research in Nigeria – by setting out his earlier perspectives and reflections, and describing their impact on the topic and the attendant policy options for the country. The rest of this chapter consists of an overview of pre-Adepoju writings on internal migration, followed by details of Adepoju's contributions to internal migration studies in Nigeria with the discussion focusing on rural migration and development, migration to medium-sized towns, remittances, autonomous

female migration, and migration research policy. The chapter concludes with suggestions on charting the gaps in knowledge as well as setting down some possible directions for future research.

Overview of pre-Adepoju writings on internal migration

This section presents a synopsis of some ideas on internal migration studies in Nigeria before Aderanti Adepoju came on the scene. There are many possible approaches to introducing outstanding scholars – for example by capturing the main contributions to the field, or by setting down the major thrust of thoughts in the context of larger thoughts, or by tracing the historical build-up to the field. In this writing, we have adopted the last of these options and now set the background by acknowledging the scholarly discourse in the Nigerian migration context preceding Adepoju's entry into the field.

Dominant among these earlier writers is the work of English scholar Mansell Prothero (1957, 1959, 1960, 1961).¹⁰⁰ His writings, from the pre-independence era, were focused in particular on labour migration in Nigeria, and its seasonal variations. He also linked migration to health issues such as trypanosomiasis¹⁰¹ (Prothero 1965).

Other significant research was that of indigenous scholars Mabogunje and Olusanya who began their work on migration in the early post-independence years. Olusanya's major writing during this period was on socio-economic aspects of rural-urban migration (Olusanya 1969). In the context of

100. Despite an extensive search on the Internet, we found it difficult to access many of these earlier writings.

101. The name of several diseases caused by parasitic protozoan trypanosomes of the genus *Trypanosoma*. Approximately 500 000 people in sub-Saharan Africa suffer from human African trypanosomiasis. Transmitted by the tsetse fly, this disease is commonly known as 'sleeping sickness'.

increasing urbanisation and the attendant growth of urban slums, Mabogunje devoted his early writings on migration to issues of urbanisation (1968), migration policy and regional planning (1970), and the growth of major poles of attraction (1971). He also developed a systems approach to the study of rural-urban migration in Nigeria.

Many other scholars focused on sectoral analysis of migrants' behaviour and the understanding of individual migrants' characteristics. These scholars include Imoagene (1967), writing on psycho-social factors in rural-urban migration, Goddard (1965) on the study of town-farm relationships in Yorubaland, and Schwab's (1965) with a study of Oshogbo and the prospect of migration. Ejiogu (1968) examined a cross-section of Lagos migrants, while Udo (1967) examined the impact of internal migration on the growth of the city of Calabar.

It is important to note that there were other scholars whose work is not cited here but whose writings have included reflections on migration.

Adepoju's early work on internal migration and developmental issues in Nigeria

The early 1970s witnessed a major surge in migration and mobility research in Nigeria. This coincided with the return of Adepoju from the prestigious London School of Economics (LSE) where he gained his PhD in demography in 1973. He was thus among the pioneer members who developed the Institute of Population and Manpower Studies (later upgraded to the Department of Demography and Social Statistics) at the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University).

Three major events shaped migration issues in Nigeria in the 1970s. First was the oil boom of 1970–1981, secondly the Nigerian civil war of 1967–1970, and thirdly the drafting, in late 1970, of the country's Second National Development Plan

(for 1970–1974). Oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta. The discovery was made by Shell-BP, the sole concessionaire at the time. Nigeria joined the ranks of oil producers in 1958 when its first oil field came on stream. The end of the Biafran war in 1970 was followed by the 1973 rise in the world oil price, and Nigeria was able to reap instant riches from its oil production. Petroleum production and export play a dominant role in Nigeria's economy and account for about 90 per cent of her gross earnings. This dominant role has pushed agriculture, the traditional mainstay of the economy, from the early 1950s and '60s, into the background. The oil boom increased government spending and diverted a larger proportion of able-bodied people away from agriculture and out of their rural settlements. At the same time the cities were attracting more government attention and infrastructural developments. This accounted, to a large extent, for the massive rural-urban migration during this period in Nigeria.

The First National Development Plan (1962–1968) focused mainly on agriculture and its primary aim was to improve agriculture and make it a major source of foreign exchange earnings for the country. By the early 1970s, with the dominance of oil in the economy, the need for a Second National Development Plan had been identified. This stimulated a number of scholarly writings – either as input to the Plan or as a critique of it. Migration issues were in the frontline of such scholarship, and the context of the Development Plan made it clear that this was an acknowledged need as it stated: 'for Nigeria, the distribution and movement of population to reflect relative economic opportunities is probably more important in the short run than the aggregate size of the country's population' (FMI 1970: 77).

Adepoju, as a young scholar, first made public his thoughts on migration issues by investigating the linkages between migration, poverty and the living conditions of

migrants in selected communities in Nigeria. These views were articulated in his study on socio-economic issues and migration in Nigeria (Adepoju 1974b). He investigated the living conditions of migrants in medium-sized towns in Nigeria (Adepoju 1974a). Further, in a study with Ita Ekanem (Ekanem & Adepoju 1977), the nature of the role played by medium-sized towns in relation to recent migratory movement in Nigeria was established. Adepoju also linked urban poverty to migration issues in medium-sized towns (Adepoju 1978b) and this was further pursued and published as a selected publication by UNESCO (Adepoju 1983b). He also examined the migration-inequities patterns in his study on urban migration differentials and selectivity (Adepoju 1977c).

During this period, Adepoju also made significant contributions to issues related to migration and national planning and development, and a number of the articles he wrote in the 1970s were devoted to this. He reflected on and made a critical appraisal of the perspectives, problems and prospects for development (Adepoju 1975). He examined the linkages and pathways between migration and rural development in Nigeria (Adepoju 1978a), and also on the demographic problems of development (Adepoju 1979). The concern that the influx into cities and urban areas has inherent consequences, particularly on the labour force, employment and work, was also addressed by Adepoju. He made inputs to scholarly views in linking migration and labour force issues by first examining the characteristics and employment-generation of small-scale industries in western Nigeria (Adepoju, Farooq & Farooq 1976). He further examined the connections between migration, economic opportunities and occupational mobilities (Adepoju 1977a), and also provided empirical evidence and insight into the prospect of population growth in Nigeria and its impact on the labour force (Adepoju 1976b). Adepoju's other publications during this period were

focused on linking migration to different demographic dynamics, particularly to fertility (1976a, 1977b).

Adepoju's postulates, assertions and policy options on internal migration

In the course of his thorough investigation of internal migration, Adepoju clearly and systematically expressed his views on migration-related subjects. The following subsections are presented to set out some of his thoughts on major concerns on the migration-development nexus. Some of Adepoju's assertions and postulates still form the basis for contemporary investigation of the relevance of internal migration to development.

Migration to and within rural areas, and resulting development issues

Migration to and within rural areas is not homogeneous; most notably it includes rural to rural and urban to rural migration. This notwithstanding, and in spite of the significance of the economic role of the rural sector – as highlighted by the research of the time – Udo noted, in the 1970s, that research into these types of rural migration was a 'neglected aspect of internal migration in Nigeria' (1975: 4). Likewise, Adepoju, in his work on rural migration and development in Nigeria, supported this view (Adepoju 1991; first published in 1982 and revised in 1986). He noted that, apart from the increasing role of rural-rural migration in resource development, rural dwellers – who at that time constituted the bulk (75%) of the nation's population – had not been effectively integrated into the development process, even when increasingly available evidence supported the contention that a large number of migrants had originated from, and were circulating within, the rural sector.

The rural sector then, occupied a central position in Nigeria – as was the case in most African countries – especially

with respect to food production, labour force and population dynamics. In Nigeria in 1980, for instance, agriculture accounted for about two-thirds of total gainful employment (mainly self-employment) in the economy. Relatedly, the Third National Development plan (1975–1980) indicated that the agricultural sector would continue to generate the bulk of employment opportunities, meet the food requirements and the raw materials inputs for processing industries and export to enhance foreign exchange earnings in the country (FMED 1975).

A large proportion of the poor was located in the rural areas where the inhabitants did not have ready access to social amenities, land and capital. According to Olatunbosun (1975), over the years the living standards of the rural poor had stagnated, and in some cases, considerably deteriorated. Unfortunately, the combined influence of rapid population growth, the pressure on land, the prevailing land tenure system, access to the maldistributed land, and declining productivity had resulted in rural poverty, and in some cases had influenced the incidence and rate of rural exodus. Indeed, since that time, widespread under-employment has continued to be associated with poverty and has, in turn – and increasingly – stimulated migration away from the rural areas.

In Adepoju's detailed and extensive study (published as Adepoju 1991, on work done in 1982 and revised in 1986), data was derived from a survey of rural migration in twelve villages located in four states in southwest Nigeria. Adepoju noted that the prevailing rural to rural migration within the country (colonising, seasonal and temporary labour migrations) reflected the diversity of ecological features and the varying local resources and opportunities, as well as land tenure arrangements and the cyclical demand for labour from various parts of the country. Focusing his work on the rural areas permitted a detailed study of the causes, characteristics and

consequences of out-migration, return migration, volumes of flow and the significance of remittances in both rural-rural migration and urban-rural (colonising) migration. At the same time he explored the causes and implications of non-mobility among rural dwellers. Based on the information thus gathered, Adepoju was also able to state that rural migration patterns in Nigeria reflected the diversity of economic resources, as well as population size and the distribution of population between and within rural and urban areas of the country.

The villages under study were drawn from both predominantly cash-cropping and mainly subsistence-cropping zones. They varied in size (but all were localities of less than 20 000 inhabitants, conforming with the United Nations definition of a rural area), as well as in proximity to major towns, in settlement patterns, and in population composition. The survey population consisted of indigenes, in-migrants, return migrants and out-migrants: the villages had been experiencing in-migration from, out-migration to and return migration from other localities – both rural and urban – within the country. These migrations appeared to have shaped the current socio-economic structures, in particular the observed out-migration of youths to urban areas, which implied that the age-profile of the rural population reflected an older population than that of the country as a whole.

Interestingly, the bulk of the migration to the surveyed villages was of the colonisation type, from urban to rural areas. The migrants attracted to these villages were mostly step migrants who had earlier migrated elsewhere (including urban to urban moves). They were younger and relatively more educated than the native population. A higher proportion (than of non-migrants) were engaged in non-farm occupations and they tended to dominate the rural informal sector activities, especially in trading, services and crafts. The households of the survey villages had, on average, two members currently

living outside the village, but they also contained, on average, one returned migrant. Out-migrants, return migrants and in-migrants maintained close links with their home places through visitation and by sending remittances. Adepoju pointed out that the flow of remittances was not unidirectional as some out-migrants sent money home while others received remittances from their parents in the rural areas. Household heads were sampled from among out-migrants, return migrants and in-migrants, and most of them were found to remit money home to supplement the living conditions of their household members.

Adepoju's findings suggested that rural migrants contributed simultaneously to the development of their areas of origin (home place) and of their destinations (the survey villages), while parents indicated that they would prefer their children to live and work in urban rather than rural areas – a reflection of the bias in the Government's development strategy in favour of towns. Returnees included those who had lived in the towns, and had acquired additional skills. The successful ones had transferred the skills and experiences acquired during their migration careers to home place (the survey villages). Adepoju speculated that these attributes could enhance the development potentials in the rural areas, and that the activities of returnees as self-employed artisans, traders, and so on could be of considerable help in diversifying the rural economy.

Based on the outcome of his 1982/86 study, Adepoju (1991) identified significant areas of consideration for policy makers and proposed attendant policy options to that effect – since he saw the study findings and recommendations as relevant to rural areas in general, and not simply confined to the survey villages. He pointed out that the out-migration of young persons was resulting in an increasing drain on the family labour pool, in turn affecting labour supply, and hence

food production, across the rural areas. The rural population structure was biased towards the old, and was thus likely to affect the replacement of farm population when old farmers eventually had to stop working. The implications of this situation in the 1980s would have been critical, since farm production relies heavily on physical input, and food production is to a large extent a function of physical labour input. Adepoju noted that the heavy food import bill already being incurred by the Federal Government clearly attested to the inability of the Nigerian agricultural sector to feed the country's rapidly increasing population. He therefore recommended that, to make a positive impact, Government campaigns (such as Operation Feed the Nation and the Green Revolution) should be paralleled by appropriate strategies to enhance living and working conditions in the rural areas. If all such efforts succeeded, he said, they might attract, and retain more youths in the rural areas. Besides, the provision of basic services, especially piped water and electricity, could enhance living conditions there and make rural areas more attractive for youths to live and work in – for example as 'modern' farmers.

Regarding economic activities in the rural areas, Adepoju suggested that it was necessary to encourage the growth and development of those rural informal sector activities which already engaged a substantial proportion of the rural population. Apart from diversifying rural employment structure, incomes generated from the sector could enhance the ability of local farm workers to purchase farm produce, while farmers themselves would be potential users of the range of services provided by the informal sector. As these sectors are independent, the spread effect between them could greatly boost activities in the rural areas. Access to land poses a problem for most migrants, particularly those in cash-cropping areas. Hence Adepoju maintained that the objectives of the

Land Use Decree should be vigorously pursued, especially in encouraging the free movement of labour and access to productive land in all parts of the country (Adepoju 1991). To this end, at both the local and state government levels, the terms of land ownership (a major asset in rural areas) should be considerably liberalised to guarantee great security of tenure, especially to migrant tenant farmers in the rural areas.

Adepoju was able to show very clearly that out-migration was impacting significantly on the age- and sex-composition of rural dwellers. Also, because this was usually selective, it impacted on the economic sector of rural communities. For cases of out-migration related to the pursuit of higher education, at the end of which most migrants remain in the towns to work, Adepoju advocated the provision of post-primary educational institutions close to villages. He noted that five states in the country (Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Bendel and Lagos States) had already implemented programmes of free education at the secondary level by providing schools within walking distance of the villages under study. Other states were urged to adopt similar programmes. Also put forward for consideration was the re-orientation of school curricula to reflect more closely the environment in which the majority of school leavers were expected to live and work, i.e. the rural sector. The central message of this proposition was that curricula should be designed with the aim of keeping a high proportion of the school leavers gainfully employed in the rural sector. Experience shows, however, that this is a difficult thing to achieve unless the scheme is backed by appropriate employment strategies.

Another reflection by Adepoju was on what he considered to be the disproportionate attention that planners – especially those from sectoral planning ministries – were focusing on the urban areas, where the problems of migration were more glaring and seemingly more critical. In Adepoju's view, the

wide rural base of the population and the growing body of data on urban-rural as well as rural-rural migration suggested that rural migration was numerically significant, as well as being important in terms of its potential contribution to development. Thus, he argued, migration-related (responsive) policies such as low-cost housing, infrastructural facilities, and small-scale industrial projects should not be confined to urban areas where the provision of such facilities and services inevitably attracts additional migrants. To this end, rural areas and rural migrants should be integrated more effectively into planning processes at all levels, which would include the provision of facilities and relevant job opportunities in these areas, tailored particularly at retaining their youthful population.

Migration research policy

On the subject of research needs, Adepoju noted that the scarcity of aggregated data on migration in Nigeria had till then restricted any attempts at a rigorous analysis of the interrelations between migration and the various aspects of socio-economic development. He suggested that the scarcity of migration data from censuses could be partially overcome by including questions on migration in surveys which were not specifically designed for purely demographic purposes – for example household budget surveys, and agricultural, labour force, and small-scale industrial surveys undertaken by federal agencies such as the Federal Office of Statistics and the National Manpower Board. In his view, for the outcome of these studies to be policy-relevant, research on migration should embrace the study of both behavioural and structural relationships between migration and a series of demographic, social and economic variables. Adepoju also proposed that such research should no longer focus on the descriptive profiles of who migrates and who does not; emphasis should shift to a

critical analysis of the sets of historical and contemporary socio-economic, political and environmental factors which either facilitate or inhibit migration in different settings. In addition, he recommended that researchers should strive to examine simultaneously both the micro and macro aspects of the decision-making processes regarding migration at both the household (micro) and societal (macro) levels – both to understand more clearly the factors operating in the selectivity processes usually observed in migration studies, and to facilitate the proposal of more appropriate policy measures. A more critical and analytical approach, he said, was required in explaining the decision-making processes involved in migrating. Overall, Adepoju's principal reflection on migration research was that there was a need to advance the analysis of migration beyond what was at that time the conventional level, in order to improve the knowledge base and to assist policymakers in formulating appropriate decisions.

Migration to medium-sized towns

In a short essay that examined the pattern, mode and direction of migration in Ife and Osogbo in south-western Nigeria, Adepoju (1976c) stated that, contrary to prevailing opinion, migration does not usually take the form of direct movement from villages to major cities. Migrants from villages and small towns in search of employment in the major cities usually make the medium-sized towns (otherwise classified 'intermediate towns') their first 'port of call'. Some moved first from rural villages to small towns, and thence, in step migration, to medium-sized towns. These towns would often be places where the new migrants had relatives and could more easily adjust to urban life. Adepoju's study showed that substantial migration to the major cities or 'primate' towns thus took the form of step migration from these intermediate towns.

In spite of repeated moves, most migrants spend between one and five years at each destination before moving on, mainly for economic reasons. A longer duration of stay suggests that the migrants are probably approaching the end of their migration career, and have become less mobile with age and increased family size – in other words a long duration of residence in one place reduces the probability of moving. Adepoju also found that, at the end of their working life in the cities, terminal migrants usually returned to their home-places equipped with skills and innovative ideas, thus serving as channels of cultural diffusion and agents of socio-economic development (Adepoju 1977a).

In Adepoju's view, his studies did not support the opinion common in then contemporary literature that African migrants were mainly target workers who migrated to the towns and returned to the villages as soon as the limited objectives which had prompted the migration had been achieved (see Mitchell 1959). Besides this, he noted that as the economy, and the occupational structure became more diversified, and the level of educational attainment among the population increased, the volume of migration was likely to increase, and with repeated moves, the urban population was unlikely to be stable.

Still on migration to medium-sized towns, Adepoju in collaboration with Ita Ekanem conducted a study based on survey data collected between 1971 and 1975 which attempted to establish the nature of the role played by medium-sized towns in relation to recent migratory movements in Nigeria (Ekanem & Adepoju 1977). Their view was that insufficient attention had been paid to this particular phenomenon since research at that time focused largely on migration directly from rural areas to major cities (Adepoju 1983b). In fact these towns perform an intermediary function by serving both as reception centres for migrants from surrounding small towns and

villages and as areas of origin for migration to larger cities.

In the bid to examine the role of medium-sized towns with respect to migration and development processes in Nigeria, the study utilised data covering six medium-sized towns in five states: Osogbo and Ife (Oyo State), Warri (Bendel State), Calabar (Cross River State), Ilorin (Kwara State) and Abeokuta (Ogun State).¹⁰² For the purposes of the study, medium-sized towns were defined as localities serving as divisional or provincial headquarters, with population size ranging from 50 000 to 250 000. Some of these were centres of commerce, administration or education, some of which have become state capitals since 1976.

An analysis from the study noted that the strategy of economic development in Nigeria had led to a polarisation of economic activities between the rural-based agricultural sector and the urban-centred industrial and services sector. The development strategy had inadvertently generated the perception that the 'normal' migration route was from rural areas directly to the major cities. Existing studies of migration had been restricted largely to obvious centres of out-migration (rural areas) and the major receiving areas (the large urban centres). As a result, studies of movements to and from medium-sized towns were few. Consequently, medium-sized towns had not been effectively integrated into the development process, and their potential role with respect to migration had been inadequately exploited. In Adepoju's view, the importance of the study of migration to medium-sized towns could not be overstressed. Such a study would require an examination of the 'pull' forces these towns exert on surrounding villages and small towns, and of the type of people attracted there – their origins, skills and occupations.

102. An exception to the definition was Ilorin which had over 250 000 inhabitants at the time of survey, but nevertheless shared most of the characteristics of other survey towns.

By comparing these characteristics with those of the indigenous inhabitants of these towns, it might then be possible to explain why people chose to migrate to the medium-sized towns in spite of the fact that employment opportunities there were inadequate and less favourable than in the large cities.

Adepaju's study thus found that not all migrations were directed to the large cities, and that not all migrants were of rural origin. Even educated young rural out-migrants sometimes made medium-sized towns their first port of call in the process of adjusting to an urban socio-cultural milieu. These towns possessed characteristics relatively similar to those of their rural experiences, and for some, such localities soon served as the ultimate destination; they were absorbed into the urban informal sector, working at crafts, small trading, small-scale cottage activities, and so on. More than half of the migrants had moved directly from their home-place to the survey town, and this was thus their first experience of migration. They had been attracted to the survey towns and learnt of conditions there through news media and through contact with family members. On arrival, they resided with relations, friends and townspeople. The attractions of these towns were both social and economic – the latter related to search for work or transfer and the former as a result of proximity to home-place and because of known experiences of other migrants. Unlike the situation in larger towns, where migrants generally live in slum areas, a large number of migrants in medium-sized towns live in relatively good neighbourhoods. An examination of their living conditions – proxied by income of household heads, housing tenure, facilities and amenities in the houses, as well as type of house construction and density per room – showed that those of migrants attracted to medium-sized towns compared favourably with those of non-migrants who had remained in the rural areas.

Adepoju pointed out that the case of medium-sized towns was different from that of large cities in that such towns usually attracted people with specific skills that – depending on the town's occupational structures and the economic activities taking place there. The economic structures in the medium-sized towns centre largely on commerce, trade, craft activities, small-scale industries and informal sector activities which are relevant to the skills and experience of a large number of indigenous inhabitants, as well as the migrants, most of whom are drawn from neighbouring towns and villages. Such activities offer readier employment opportunities than large-scale, capital intensive industries do. Adepoju noted that the setting up of small-scale industries in these towns was desirable, firstly in view of the relevance to the skills of both natives and migrants; secondly to stimulate the growth and development of these towns, and thirdly to bridge the missing link in a comprehensive development strategy.

Adepoju's position regarding directions of migration was quite apparent from his contributions: he strongly criticised the neglect of medium-sized towns in policy formulation. He observed that, as would be expected, planners and policy makers had become increasingly worried about the influx of large numbers of people (particularly unemployed young school-leavers) to a few major cities, since this was compounding problems of housing, sanitation and unemployment, and was stretching the available social services to the limit. This, he pointed out, generated social, economic and political consequences that led planners to hastily adopt and execute migration-responsive and migration-influencing policies that were either only partially successful or even produced contradictory results. The migration phenomenon had not been tackled in an integrated way because the focus of policy measures on only the rural and major urban areas, as the origins and destinations of migration respectively, was misplaced.

Adepaju also noted explicitly that research efforts being restricted to villages and major cities meant that very few studies had addressed movements to medium-sized towns, and that even fewer had provided policy makers with any pertinent data on which relevant migration policies could be formulated. The role of medium-sized towns either as sources of migration or as migration destinations had not been adequately explored. For policy measures bearing on migration to be relevant and effective, Adepaju said, the rural areas, medium-sized towns and capital cities should be seen as and effectively interlinked as a migration continuum. In this way, medium-sized towns would be integrated into the main stream of migration-development interrelations.

In Adepaju's view, it is the role and responsibility of researchers to document the forms, patterns and character of migration in the country and examine their policy implications. Since migration has both negative and positive aspects, each should be critically examined. The findings of such studies would be relevant in proposing redirectional migration policies aimed at deflecting migration away from larger cities (centres of large concentration of migrants) and directing it instead towards viable medium-sized towns. Similarly, the effects on migration of alternative development policies such as the location of productive activities and projects in medium-sized towns needed to be examined. Such research should also address itself to an assessment of the resource potentials of medium-sized towns, and their viability for growth and development.

Adepaju has therefore continually recommended that this and other research topics should be policy-relevant and that research findings should be communicated to policy makers. Such results should, as far as feasible, be presented in formats easily comprehensible by policy makers. To enhance the chances of such findings being used by planners,

communication between researchers and policy makers in Nigeria also needed to be considerably improved. Furthermore, in order to minimise duplication of efforts, a bibliographic catalogue on migration studies should be set up, and researchers should work in closer collaboration with policy makers to ensure the relevance of research to priority areas of policy, and to disseminate more effectively the results of such research.

On a final note, Adepaju stressed the importance of robust information on the demographic components of fertility, mortality, migration, age structure, rate of growth and so on. This was because the quality and relevance of any policy measure depends largely on the availability of adequate data on which decisions can be based. Hence, he said, the need for timely and adequate demographic, social and economic data for planning and the formulation of policy, population or otherwise, cannot be overstressed.

Remittances

Adepaju's work on remittances and rural development dates back to the 1970s. Indeed, his thoughts from that time are now visibly expressed in contemporary reflections on remittances. For instance, results given in his 1974 study 'Rural-urban socio-economic links' showed that rural-urban migration can forge strong links between the rural and the urban areas. This study showed that, for most migrants to Osogbo (the urban area), the tie with the home place was manifested by periodic visits. Invariably, frequent home revisits served as channels of cultural diffusion thereby preventing social change from becoming isolated within the urban area. Contact was also maintained through a flow of wealth from the urban areas to the villages. Adepaju clearly showed that it was 'wealth' rather than simply money that was flowing from the towns to the villages and other parts of the country as these migrants took

with them presents and other goods during their periodic visits to the home place.

It was also found, from this study, that many village households depended on remittances for maintenance and would have been poorer but for the continued economic links with their migrant members. Although no attempt had been made at the time of analysis of study data to calculate the total wealth moving each year from the survey town to the rural areas, yet the data showed that a substantial part of the migrants' income flowed out in the form of remittances, gifts, goods and savings to the migrants' home communities. Adepoju was, therefore, able to conclude that the remittance system had made it possible for a large number of people in rural areas to benefit from the development and growth of the urban economy, and that these people were enjoying a higher standard of living without themselves being town dwellers. Importantly, Adepoju also reported in his study (1977a) that socio-cultural and economic links were not confined to periodic home visits and remittances of money and other gifts. He points out that migrants living in towns or cities often receive visits from relations or other people from their home places in rural areas or smaller urban areas. In most cases they provide these visitors with shelter and food, and they are always willing assist any newly-arrived migrant in their search for a job.

Remittances of money can be more readily quantified than other subjective gains, and in his study 'Migration, economic opportunities and occupational mobility' (1977a), Adepoju noted that such remittances reflected more realistically the level of commitment of migrants to their various areas of origin. Migrants interviewed in this study remitted varying sums of money to their parents and relatives at home. For instance, 62 per cent of the migrants interviewed in Ife, and 54 per cent in Osogbo (both being survey areas), stated that they remitted money home – this apart from the gifts (including money and

consumer items) which they would normally take home during their periodic visits, and quite apart from money gifts given to visiting relations. In his study of medium-sized towns, Adepoju (1983b) found that most migrants maintained links with families and relations at the home place – in the form of home visits and remittances of money, the latter aimed at improving living conditions of ‘home’ households. In his opinion, the economic ties expressed in the transfer of money, goods and consumer items to the home place were – and remain – an important aspect of the migration scene in Nigeria, as was the case in other developing countries (Adepoju 1978b).

Results from this study (Adepoju 1977a) showed that the extra earnings from remittances sent home to boost the earnings of migrants’ families usually outweighed the family income foregone through the migration of members to the towns. Given the poor conditions of farming in most rural areas – such as antiquated tools and techniques of production, diminishing returns and so on – it was, in the long run, beneficial for families to sponsor members to migrate to the town, in return for their remittances. Families subsidised migrant members during their initial transitional stage of securing an urban job, in view of the expected future higher earnings and the remittances likely to be sent home.

According to Adepoju (1977a) an important consideration was that these remittances sustain, and at times raise, the level of living of the migrants’ rural family and relatives. Indeed, a substantial proportion of remittances sent to the home place were found to be for consumption or feeding the family members at home. If possible, some part of the remittance would be saved, or else used for capital investment such as building a house or the education of children. Adepoju found, in addition, that remittances also serve as security in the event of a return migration at the end of the migration career or at old age. In this way the remittance mechanism can benefit the

migrants themselves and represents an investment after a successful migration career in town.

Another of Adepoju's findings from as far back as the 1970s was that in south-western Nigeria most urban in-migrants belonged to what were called 'improvement unions', set up by these now out-migrants to promote self-help schemes such as the building of hospitals, access roads and bridges, schools, providing electricity in their home villages (Adepoju 1974b). In this way, migrants were serving as development agencies. Quite apart from their individual remittances, urban migrants were found to contribute substantially to these unions; the feeling of 'village patriotism' was strong among most migrants and this attachment to the home place was shown in the mass 'census migration' back to the home place during the 1962/63 population count in the country. Remittances of various sorts represented substantial contributions from migrants' income from relatively more-developed areas to relatively less-developed ones, ensuring that the benefits of development generated in both the rural and the urban centres were not concentrated in the towns alone (Adepoju 1977a).

The remittance system was thus helping to siphon off the 'excess' to economically more stagnant rural areas. Adepoju saw this as an indirect, but effective way of reducing inequality in income between these sectors of the economy. Remittances thus contribute to the promotion of a balanced economic development by fostering rural development: some of the remittances were being used to set up small-scale industries, establish commercial farming or petty trading at the migrants' home place (Adepoju 1974b). Because 'sentimental' attachment to parents and relations at the home places was strong, migrants felt a sense of obligation, both individually and collectively, to provide some urban-type facilities to the 'sedentary' rural population (Adepoju 1983b). Quoting from

the United Nations definition¹⁰³, Adepoyu therefore described this community development as:

a process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, and to integrate these communities into the life of the nation... through the participation of the people themselves in efforts to improve their level of living with as much reliance as possible on their own initiative. (Adepoyu 1991: 137)

Autonomous female migration

During the 1970s, Adepoyu also contributed to the growing debate on female migration. His interest in the relevance of the study was expressed in his observation that, although migration affects a woman's life in a variety of ways, its main significance is that it gives her access to or strengthens her economic independence and, very importantly, exposes her to wider horizons and opportunities (Adepoyu 1984). In addition, female migration is associated with changes in the traditional roles of women, in particular those related to child-bearing and child rearing, housekeeping, sexual division of labour, assistance on the farm, and the sale of farm produce. In this process, Adepoyu noted that education and age are crucial change agents which influence the aspirations of women and the range of opportunities available to them in the labour market.

In one of his early studies, Adepoyu examined the influence of migration, education and occupation status on the reproductive behaviour of a sample of married women in Abeokuta, Ogun State, in South-West Nigeria (Adepoyu 1976a). He found out that the migrant women surveyed were younger

103. Annex III of the 20th Report of the UN Administrative Committee on Coordination (1956).

and better educated than the non-migrant women, that a higher proportion of them were found in professional categories, and that they tended to participate more in formal organisations than non-migrants did.

In another study, Adepoju (1984) examined the interactions between patterns of female migration and the types of economic activities in which females engaged in the rural and urban (formal and informal) sectors in south-western Nigeria. He presented findings based on data from three different surveys which indicated that, on average, more migrant than non-migrant females were gainfully employed, with the proportion being higher for female migrants of urban than rural origin. Additionally, he found that the tradition of urbanism had greatly influenced the extent to which female migration was accepted, and, more importantly, the participation of women in out-of-home economic activities (Adepoju 2003). Besides this, he established that female migration is not uni-directional; it is not directed to urban areas alone as women sometimes accompany husbands who migrate to rural areas as tenant farmers. Nevertheless, whatever the direction of the migration, the act of migration of itself enhances women's participation in economic activities and, in particular, the occupational mix among these women.

In Adepoju's opinion, female migration had been conditioned to a greater extent than male migration – by the structure of economic activities, by socio-cultural factors defining sex roles, and by the effect of education on the spatial and occupational mobility of females (Adepoju 1983a). Hence, the opportunity structures for females, and the nature of employment available to them in Nigeria were conditioned largely by their skills levels, by the prevailing sex segregation and discrimination in the organised labour market, by the perceived 'traditional' role of females, and by the types of occupational structures available. For instance, the cultural

factors which initially favoured the education of males over females had had the effect of confining women to the lower cadres of formal employment as employment in the organised labour market was highly correlated with education. In most of Nigeria, employment structures – in plantation agriculture, industry, commerce, and transportation – required mostly male workers, while women were confined largely to commerce and the distributive trade. Besides, this scenario had shaped the perception of sex roles regarding division of labour which tended to associate women almost exclusively with being housekeepers and mothers, and with the household economic structure. This translated into men tending to migrate alone, leaving behind their wives and children (who might later join them), in the care of the extended family.

Adepoju viewed female migration as of considerable interest, but to him this became even more important when the focus shifted to include female migrants (as opposed to those who merely migrated to accompany or join their husbands). In his opinion, autonomous migration had received relatively little attention compared with male migration because of the long-standing focus of researchers on economically motivated migration which, over time, had stereotyped women migrants as merely associational migrants – that is, followers of men rather than free decision makers – dependent on the decision and act of migration by their husbands. This trend had been supported by survey findings that did not ask women themselves about their migration experiences but simply assumed that the major motivation for female migration was for marriage or to join family members (Makinwa-Adebusoye 1990).

In order to study the seemingly intricate trends of autonomous female migration (also referred to as the feminisation of migration) effectively, Adepoju realised that it was essential to examine several patterns – such as the

changing gender division of labour, decision strategies for migration, the dynamics of the migration process and the consequences of migration on the family, the community and society. His study (Adepoju 2003) was therefore an extensive exercise, aimed at fully understanding the underlying perceptions of the pockets of resistance to autonomous female migration, and to gain deeper insight into the prevailing gender systems and the pressures on decision-makers that give rise to autonomous female migration. This was an all-embracing research, based on a national study carried out in selected cities and towns: Lagos and Osogbo in the west, Port Harcourt and Enugu in the east, and Jos and Gombe in the north – these representing a range of towns in varying geographical, ecological and economic zones, and reflecting different economic activities and population sizes. Studies of this nature and this breadth are very rare and the ensuing findings of were of the utmost importance, with considerable and far-reaching implications.

The authors of this chapter, consider it instructive to present here some selected information from Adepoju's 2003 study, namely:

- In spite of a variety of customs, job segregation and discrimination in the urban labour market which tended to restrict autonomous female migration, this kind of migration – directed toward attaining economic independence through self-employment or wage income – was intensifying. As structural adjustment policies had had serious consequences for the family and for women in particular (forcing many to do more with less), selective migration survival strategies for families began to include autonomous female migration. As a result, traditional male-dominated long-term and long-distance migratory streams were becoming increasingly

feminised and female migration was on the increase – especially the new phenomenon of females migrating internationally, leaving their husbands behind to cater for their children. This signified a turn-around in sex roles and was rooted in the new dynamics of family survival strategies. By the time of this study, this migration of skilled female migrants, which had begun in the early 1990s, had become well-established and was no longer confined to national borders. For example, female nurses and doctors were being recruited from Nigeria to work in Saudi Arabia, and others were taking advantage of the handsome pay packages in the USA to work there for a while, to accumulate some savings to keep them through harsh economic conditions at home. Yet others were migrating with their children to pursue their studies in the USA and the UK, as the educational system in Nigeria had virtually collapsed (Adepoju 1995).

- Access to education was playing a major role in the increasing number of women entering the waged labour force – a factor to be taken account of along with the diminishing of family resources in the face of the inflation that was rendering family income grossly inadequate for the sustenance of its members. Until recently, the bias rooted in traditional sex roles limited the access of females to formal education, especially beyond the primary level. Increasing access to education by females in recent times however means that educated women have greater opportunities for employment in the urban formal sector. It also enhances their ability to compete and participate – increasingly, and more effectively – in non-domestic and formal-sector activities. Also of

significance with respect to the increasing proportion of females being educated is the accelerated migration of females (especially young ones) into urban areas to seek further education and jobs, and internationally in search of greener pastures.

- As mentioned above, in a reversal of traditional sex roles, female autonomous migration, especially of the educated and the more commercially enterprising, has led to a situation where men are left at home to look after the children in the absence of the womenfolk. The worsening economic conditions which turned autonomous female migration into a survival strategy – though largely still a new phenomenon – have essentially forced communities to condone, and even accept, female migration, indicating the extent of the important changes in gender roles in the country.
- In many parts of Nigeria, autonomous female migration had previously been generally frowned upon, and lingering resistance to this migration was usually blamed on culture and religion that regarded the migration of single females or unaccompanied married women as inappropriate. However, a shift in this stance is now reflected in more single girls being permitted by their families to live and work in towns because some of these families benefit through remittances. Indeed, some respondents insisted that female migration was continuing because migrants and their families were generally better off than families who do not migrate. Most female migrants send money home to support their parents and pay school fees for their relatives, while also making substantial contributions towards developmental projects at home – for example building classrooms

in primary and secondary schools, hospitals, postal agencies and churches.

- On the other hand, the woes of female migrants are not few. As the phenomenon of increasing numbers of women migrating alone (i.e. without husband or kin to assist or protect them) becomes widespread, women have been evolving a series of initiatives to survive the economic crisis and the prospect of a dismal future. One such is women clustering in the informal sector where they generally perform low-productivity, labour-intensive work both as income earners and house-makers. Unfortunately female migrants who do not have special skills to market in the town may be forced to take up menial jobs, engage in street vending, or remain unemployed. Meanwhile, some unscrupulous employers exploit the vulnerable situation of newly-arrived female migrants desperate for a job by offering extremely low wages. Sadly, rather than improving their lot, the result of this is overwork and low pay and harder times for their families. Besides this regrettable situation, one of the major difficulties such women face is sexual harassment while searching for employment, or because of their inability to secure employment. Coupled with this is another undesirable outcome, namely women who are unemployed at destination finally becoming sex workers – and consequently contracting sexually-transmitted infections, or perhaps becoming single parents, and thus a burden on the families they had hoped to help. Other challenges await lone female migrants even after they have survived discrimination in educational opportunities, as they face discrimination in securing accommodation in town, and stiff competition with men for employment.

- Another aspect highlighted by Adepoju was the situation in cities which he described as 'worrisome': the overcrowding, with many people living in slums, the rapid growth of shanty towns, the heavy traffic, young people and old unemployed and in a desperate search of means of livelihood. These unpleasant and sometimes appalling conditions are frequently accompanied by social vices such as prostitution and armed robbery. Yet the cities remain attractive to migrants – both male and female alike – most of whom find their way into sordid slums and dilapidated shanty towns. This unwholesome state of affairs led Adepoju to recommend that, as urban populations increase and become more heterogeneous, urban management be developed, with far better arrangements made to provide, maintain and expand social services, in particular water and electricity supply, and the disposal of wastes.

In his concluding comments, Adepoju presented his opinion that focusing on this aspect of female migration had indeed deepened his own and his researchers' understanding of the roles and constraints women face with respect to participation in development, access to and control of land, labour and production activities. Therefore, he said, the position of women in migration decision-making and control of resources should be critically evaluated, as should also the influence of culture and religion on female migration as this was a process likely to increase rather than decrease in the future.

The way forward

This final section highlights the course which the study of internal migration in Nigeria has taken in recent times,

describing particularly what has transpired since Adepoku's last major contributions in this sphere of migration studies. It is a brief attempt to chart the gaps in current knowledge in order to suggest directions for future research and to highlight key policy options for the country. Nearly all the works reviewed here have been those dealing with internal migration studies in Nigeria as conducted by Professor Aderanti Adepoku. This erudite migration scholar has also published extensively on international migration matters – focusing not only on intra-regional migration within Africa but also on inter-continental movements.

Since the time when Adepoku's papers were published, the attention of migration scholars and researchers, as well as that of policy-makers, non-governmental organisations, developmental partners, civil society officials – and indeed of the public in general – has largely shifted to other issues. These include international migration; the development, implementation and evaluation of population policies and programmes (including those specific to migration); the emergence of human trafficking and smuggling; brain drain and brain circulation; the emigration of skilled professionals; irregular migration, including youth and student emigration; forced migration (with a specific focus on refugees); the diaspora (including their involvement in homeland development and the evolving trend of transnational migration); remittances, and return migration. All these, and more, have emerged as matters of topical concern. Many of them are either touched on or dealt with in detail in this book; they are matters which researchers should now be concentrating on for further investigation. Indeed, this focus requirement undeniably goes hand in hand with an urgent need for adequate and reliable migration-related data that would ensure that relevant development-oriented decisions and policies are arrived at. This is not to say that no work has

been done so far but rather that there is a pressing need for more concerted efforts and studies to document the forms, patterns and character of migration, particularly with respect to the contemporary issues highlighted above which are now of increasing national and global interest.

Adepaju's postulates, assertions and policy options as set out and discussed have been significantly reflected in contemporary migration discourse. This review of his work on internal migration in Nigeria – rural migration and development, migration to medium-sized towns, remittances and autonomous female migration – shows clearly that all these issues had their genesis in the rural areas, as do various other current migration-related topics. Besides this, a significant change to take note of is one which has occurred in the nomenclature. For example terms such as 'rural and urban linkages' are now being commonly referred to as 'networks', 'socio-economic links' is presently expressed as 'remittances', and the blanket term 'female migration' has given way to phrases such as 'autonomous female migration' and 'feminisation of migration'. These and similar changes have been easily absorbed into current internal migration research.

One final and vital remark is this: Adepaju's series of studies also raised the issue of interrelations between fertility and migration; that is, the fertility behaviour of migrants as opposed to that of non-migrants, and the relative contribution of migration and fertility to (urban) population growth. This last aspect raises challenges for policy-relevant research on migration-fertility-population growth interrelations and its urgent policy implications.

Finale

Aderanti Adepaju's research activities in Nigerian migration studies dominated much of the discourse on internal migration between the 1970s and 1990s. His writings

demonstrated great insight into issues of importance at that time, as well as into concerns that were likely to prove troublesome in the not-too-distant future. His painstaking fieldwork on migration in rural, medium and large cities generated a wealth of empirical data for policy prescriptions, at a time when interest in migration was still only peripheral among researchers, development-funding partners and policy makers. The keen expression of his thoughts stimulated scholarship to recognise the relevance of internal migration to development, and some of his early assertions and postulates still form the basis for contemporary investigation. It can safely be said that Adepaju changed the shape of migration research in the last decades of the twentieth century and that his legacy lies, in part, still in the future.

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CHAPTER 15

Adepoju's Written Legacy: A Publication List

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Aderanti Adepoju has had a long, distinguished and pioneering career in the international development field. Over the past thirty-five years, he has assisted several African countries in capacity-building and in the formulation and implementation of population and development programmes. His knowledge and expertise as economist, demographer and development specialist have been used by many international development organisations – he has served as a consultant or team leader across a wide variety of missions and research activities. Details of Adepoju's achievements are given in Chapter 1 by his long-time friend and colleague, Professor John O. Ouchó.

We are proud to list below an extensive, though not completely comprehensive, list of Aderanti Adepoju's many publications: books and monographs – authored, edited and co-edited – chapters in other books, and journal and conference papers. There are many other papers by Adepoju available on-line. A short list of examples is given below the following main list.

Selected list of publications

Adepoju, A. 2010	<i>Facilitating a coherent migration management approach in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by promoting legal migration and preventing further irregular migration. AENEAS 2006 Report on Nigeria. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.</i>
Adepoju, A. 2010	Formulating Migration Policy at the Regional, Sub-regional and National Levels in Africa. In A.A. Yusuf (ed.), <i>African Yearbook of International Law</i> , Volume 16.
Adepoju, A. 2010	The Case of Nigeria. In A. Mohamoud (ed.), <i>Building Institutional Cooperation between the Diaspora and Homeland Governments in Africa: the cases of Ghana, Nigeria, Germany, USA and the UK. Netherlands: African Diaspora Policy Centre.</i>
Adepoju, A. 2010	Migration to, within and from Africa: 'That's where we belong'. In D. Knauf & B. Moreno (eds.), <i>Leaving Home: Migration Yesterday and Today. Bremen, Germany: Edition Temmen.</i> (German title 2009: 'Wanderungsraum Afrika: hier gehören wir hin'. In <i>Aufbruch in die Fremde: Migration gestern und heute.</i>)
Adepoju, A. 2010	Promoting managed migration through bilateral and multilateral agreements between European and African countries. In A. Adepoju (ed.), <i>International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers.</i>

Adepoju, A. (ed.) 2010	<i>International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World</i> . Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers.
Adepoju, A. & A. Atsenuwa. 2010	<i>Rights of African Migrants and Deportees: a Nigerian case study</i> . Dakar: Justice Without Borders Project.
Adepoju, A. & A. van der Wiel. 2010	<i>Seeking Greener Pastures Abroad: a migration profile of Nigeria</i> . Ibadan: Safari publishers.
Adepoju, A., F. van Noorloos & A. Zoomers. 2010	Europe's Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: a critical review. <i>International Migration</i> 48 (3) 42-75.
Adepoju, A. 2009	Migration Management in West Africa within the Context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration. In M. Tremolières (ed.), <i>Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives</i> . Paris: EOCD (English and French).
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Adepoju, A. 2007	<i>Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.</i> Uppsala: Nordic African Studies Centre.
Adepoju, A. 2007	Perspectives on International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In A. Adepoju, T. van Naerssen & A. Zoomers (eds.), <i>International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.</i> Leiden: Afrika-Studiecentrum Series.
Adepoju, A. A. Boulton & M. Levin. 2007	<i>Promoting Integration through Mobility: free movement and the ECOWAS protocol.</i> New Issues in Refugee Research, Paper No. 150. Geneva: UNHCR.
Adepoju, A. & A. van der Wiel,	Migration and Development: challenges and opportunities for the West African region. <i>Nigerian Journal of International Affairs</i> 33 (2) 9– 30.
Adepoju, A., T. van Naerssen & A. Zoomers (eds.). 2007	<i>International Migration and National Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.</i> Leiden: Afrika-Studiecentrum Series.
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Adepoju, A. 2006	<i>The Challenge of Labour Migration Flows between West Africa and the Maghreb</i> . ILO Migration Research Papers. Geneva: International Labour Organisation.
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Adepoju, A. 2005	<i>Perspectives on Migration within and from Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Background paper for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Conference 'Policy Coherence for Development: the African Experience'. Paris, November 3-4.
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Adepoju, A. 2003	<i>Dynamics of Ageing and Support of the Elderly in Nigeria</i> . HRDC Policy Paper No 2. Lagos: Concept Publications.
Adepoju, A. 2003	<i>Feminisation of Poverty: perspectives from women in Nigeria's urban centres</i> . HRDC Research Series No. 4. Lagos: Concept Publications.
Adepoju, A. 2003	Migration in West Africa. <i>Development</i> 46 (3) 37–41.
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What follows is a sample of Adepoju's papers that have been published only on the Internet, followed by some selected papers, either commissioned or presented at international conferences, that may not be currently available on-line:

- *An Overview of International Migration in sub-Saharan Africa at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century*. <http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images>
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- *Environmental Changes and Migration in the Sahel: an exploratory note*. <http://www.docstoc.com/docs/45680460/ENVIRONMENTAL-CHANGES-AND-MIGRATION>
- *Migration and Social Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa*. <http://www.unrisd.org/80256B2C005BCCF9/http>
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- *Principles and Best Practices for a Rights-Based Approach to Migration: the African experience*. http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/1066B09_343_engl.pdf
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- Adepoju, A. 2006. *Migration of West African Youths to Europe and North America: towards the formulation of an ECOWAS Common Position on Migration*. Keynote address delivered at the ECOWAS Dialogue on Migration and Development. Abuja, 18 October.
- Adepoju, A. 2006. *South-South Migration: the case of West Africa*. Commissioned paper for the Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies Whole of Government Workshop. Geneva, april 18-19.
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Aderanti Adepoju remains an authority in migration work, not only in Africa, but also globally. It is virtually impossible to read any piece on African migration without encountering citations of his publications. In whatever he does, he acquits himself well as an exceptional personality with an aura of charisma, yet too humble to project this. He is an accomplished academic whose work has been well received in academic, policy and other settings. He is a respected diplomat in the family of the United Nations and he has bequeathed to the continent of his birth an enviable legacy which Africa should treasure, conserve and build upon.

A migration doyen, Adepoju's work, and his rare dedication, qualifies him as equivalent to a Nobel Laureate on migration work, the most fitting prize that the doyen of African migration work deserves in the Economic Sciences.
Professor John O. Oucho, Executive Director, AMADPOC, and University of Nairobi, Kenya

Aderanti Adepoju has done much over the past decades...in numerous journal articles, book chapters and policy related papers, he has successfully raised a prominent African voice in debates that are dominated mostly by European agendas. His main point of departure has been that mobility must be seen as a profound and normal element of African social life, and that migration, in general, is not an undesirable phenomenon, but an inherent component of development processes... however, we have come to realise, by reading Adepoju's early work, that it has taken some thirty-five years for this message to arrive in the relevant policy arenas.

*Dr Joris Schapendonk and Professor Annelies Zoomers University of Utrecht
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Professor Aderanti Adepoju's prolific and crucial scholarship has played a key role in putting African migration on the world agenda, highlighting the importance of migration for West African societies and arguing that regional integration has a long history in Africa.

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Professor Aderanti Adepoju is one of Africa's leading migration experts

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Adepoju was a pioneer in the study of population movements. He has worked and written extensively on migration. His work has won the hearts of many more Africans and Africanists, especially younger ones whom he has mentored and who have found much softer landing on migration scholarship than was possible two decades ago or more.

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